

## Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan's National Security

Cheng-yi Lin and Wen-cheng Lin

### Abstract

Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy. But democracy has failed to reduce social divisions and partisan confrontation in Taiwan. In fact, some observers have begun to use the terms “suicide” or “self-destruction” to describe Taiwan’s political development. This article studies the problems in Taiwan’s democracy, and argues that the key problem is Taiwan’s division in terms of national identity. Hence, democracy has become a disintegrating factor for Taiwan’s society. The article further suggests that the island is playing an asymmetrical game against a rising China, and internal quarrels further weaken Taiwan. Taiwan’s national security faces serious challenges ahead, but the internal division is the factor which is fatal to Taiwan’s survival.

---

“Democracy” is a term with a variety of definitions. As Samuel P. Huntington points out, democracy can be defined “in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures for constituting government.”<sup>1</sup> By any definition or criterion, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy. For instance, Freedom House rates Taiwan as a free country and the most democratic country in Asia.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Department of State regarded Taiwan as a “multiparty democracy” in its *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004*.<sup>3</sup>

---

**Cheng-yi Lin** is a Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica. <cylin@sinica.edu.tw>

**Wen-cheng Lin** is a Professor at the Institute of Mainland China Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University. <wencheng@mail.nsysu.edu.tw>

<sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 6.

<sup>2</sup> Taiwan’s civil rights rating is 1 and political rights rating is 2 for 2005. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are the three most democratic countries in Asia. *Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/42641.htm>.

Democracy has won substantial support and sympathy for Taiwan in the international community. For example, American lawmakers passed House Concurrent Resolution 292 by an overwhelming 418-1 vote on March 28, 2000, praising Taiwan's democratic presidential elections on March 20 and criticizing China for threatening to use force against the island.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. government has also affirmed Taiwan's democratic achievement on many occasions.<sup>5</sup> But democracy, regarded as a means to promote stability and harmony in plural societies,<sup>6</sup> has failed to reduce serious social divisions and confrontation among political parties in Taiwan. Only a few years after the 2000 election, many observers have begun to use the terms "suicide" or "self-destruction" to describe Taiwan's political development.<sup>7</sup>

What went wrong with Taiwan's democracy? How will it affect Taiwan's national security? How should Taiwan balance its democracy and national security? This article tries to answer these questions.

## Democratic and Divided

Taiwan was under the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) from 1949 to 1988. Martial law had been in force for thirty-eight years until it was lifted on July 15, 1987. The Legislative Yuan was dominated by the KMT, and was only a rubber stamp. The founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the first real opposition party in Taiwan, on September 28, 1986, ushered the island into the era of a multiparty system. Lee Teng-hui, who assumed power upon the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and became the first Taiwanese president of Taiwan in January 1988, accelerated democratic reforms. The constitution, which was enacted in 1946, was amended several times in the process of democratization. Ten constitutional articles were either amended or added in 1991, providing the legal basis for the comprehensive elections of the three central representative bodies, namely the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the National Assembly. All the

---

<sup>4</sup> "Department of State Washington File: Lawmakers Praise Taiwan Elections in March 28 Vote," <http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/000329/epf303.htm> (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>5</sup> For instance, President Bush stated in his speech in Kyoto on November 11, 2005, that "modern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/print/20051116-6.html> (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>6</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Edward Friedman, "Paranoid, Polarization and Suicide: Interpreting Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election," SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) Taiwan Studies Working Papers, <http://www.soas.ac.uk/taiwanstudiesfiles/workingpapers/friedman.pdf>.

senior parliamentarians, who had been elected on the Chinese mainland in 1947 or 1948 and never reelected, retired in December 1991. All of the seats were opened for public competition in the National Assembly in 1991 and in the Legislative Yuan in 1992.

More importantly, a new article that stipulates that “the president and vice president shall be directly elected by the entire populace of the free area of the Republic of China,” was added to the constitution in July 1994. The presidential election of March 23, 1996, was the first time in the history of Chinese civilization that the highest position in a government had been directly elected by the people, and consequently was a milestone in Taiwan’s democratization. Embodying Taiwan’s popular sovereignty, the 2000 presidential election resulted in the first turnover of power in Taiwan’s history, and was equally remarkable. Chen Shui-bian, the presidential candidate of the DPP, won the tripartite race. The DPP, whose goal is the establishment of a *de jure* independent Taiwan state, became the ruling party.

The DPP’s victory and President Lee’s subsequent forced resignation from the KMT chairmanship to take responsibility for the party’s defeat in the presidential election, as well as his eventual departure from the KMT to form another political party, significantly changed the island’s politics. Although Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy, politically it is hardly an integrated country. On the contrary, Taiwan is divided in terms of national identity. Taiwan’s numerous problems come from this division.

There are four major ethnic groups in Taiwan: Minnanren,<sup>8</sup> Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aborigines. The first three groups are all Han Chinese. The Minnanren and Hakka, together, are generally called Taiwanese, although their ancestors immigrated to Taiwan from China prior to the Japanese takeover of the island following Japan’s defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The Taiwanese account for about 85 percent of Taiwan’s population of twenty-three million. However, the Minnanren outnumber the Hakka by a three-to-one ratio.<sup>9</sup> The Mainlanders came to Taiwan from China after the defeat of Japan in 1945, and together with their children, compose about 13 percent of the island’s total population. The non-Chinese Aborigines of Malay origin, who had inhabited the island before the first Chinese settlers arrived, account for about 2 percent of the population.

When Taiwan was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek and next by his son Chiang Ching-kuo from 1949 to 1988, political power was concentrated in the hands of the Mainlanders. Due to the February 28 Incident in 1947,<sup>10</sup> the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders in the 1950s were described by a scholar as water and

---

<sup>8</sup> Minnanren literally means those Taiwanese whose ancestors came from southern parts of Fujian Province.

<sup>9</sup> Government Information Office, Republic of China, *Taiwan Yearbook 2005*, 32.

oil that could not be mixed together.<sup>11</sup> The KMT resorted to white terror and coercion to suppress the Taiwanese democracy and independence movement and to control the society. In addition, the Taiwanese were politically socialized to support Taiwan's eventual unification with China.<sup>12</sup> Through politically-screened teachers and the deliberate design of the school curriculum, the ROC government promoted China as the motherland as well as a Chinese national identity among Taiwanese. Mandarin was stipulated as the sole official language, and other dialects were banned at schools, in the military, and at all levels of the government. TV and radio programming in dialects was kept to a minimum. To an extent, political socialization in Taiwan was successful during the first four decades of KMT rule. The majority of the people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese and supported Taiwan's unification with China in 1989.<sup>13</sup>

Lee Teng-hui's succession to the presidency following Chiang Ching-kuo and his efforts to promote democratization dramatically changed the equation of power among ethnic groups on the island. Although the Hakka and the Aborigines politically tend to side with the Mainlanders against the Minnanren majority, the Minnanren have the advantage in the elections since they outnumber the Mainlanders and the other two minority groups. Therefore, they are the ethnic group that has benefited the most from Taiwan's democratization.

To bridge the ethnic divides and forge a common (and new) national identity, former President Lee has assiduously advanced the concept of "New Taiwanese" and enhanced Taiwanese consciousness.<sup>14</sup> On July 9, 1999, President Lee redefined Taiwan-China relations as "a state-to-state relationship,

---

<sup>10</sup> On February 28, 1947, the Taiwanese revolted against the oppression and corruption of the Chinese Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek's attaché general, Chen-yi. Still on the mainland, Chiang dispatched troops to Taiwan on March 8, and began an island-wide slaughter of Taiwanese, killing more than ten thousand, including many of the elite. The massacre left a permanent scar on Taiwanese-Mainlander relations. After the massacre, the Taiwanese began to struggle for independence.

<sup>11</sup> Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 89-121.

<sup>12</sup> Political socialization can be broadly defined as "all political learning, formal or informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning, but also nominal, non-political learning." See Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," in *International Encyclopedia of Social Science* 15 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press Publishing, 1968), 551.

<sup>13</sup> Chia-lung Lin, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. Stephane Corcuff (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 222.

<sup>14</sup> The New Taiwanese refer to those "who are willing to fight for the property and survival of their country, regardless of when they or their forebears arrived on Taiwan and regardless of their provincial heritage or native language." See Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999), 9.

or at least a special state-to-state relationship,” during an interview with a German radio station.<sup>15</sup> The ruling DPP continues President Lee’s efforts to promote Taiwanese consciousness. As a result, national identity among people in Taiwan has been reversed. According to a survey conducted by the *United Daily* in 1989, 55 percent of the respondents supported unification and only 6 percent supported Taiwan’s independence. The survey also showed that 52 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Chinese, 16 percent as Taiwanese, and 26 percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese.<sup>16</sup> One decade later, those who identify themselves as Chinese have become a minority in Taiwan.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the support of Taiwan’s separation from the mainland has become the mainstream on the island.<sup>18</sup> It is important to note that identity is not innate, but rather acquired, and that national identity does not exactly correspond with ethnic identity. Many Minnanren and Hakkas are self-identified as Chinese and entertain the idea of unification with China, while some Mainlanders see themselves as Taiwanese, relishing Taiwan’s independence.

Despite the deepening of Taiwanese consciousness on the island, Taiwan remains a divided society. A portion of its population still supports Taiwan’s unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). And a significant number of Mainlanders, who dominated Taiwan’s politics for the first four decades in the post-World War II era, feel insecure after losing their political power. They have become the leading force pushing for more cross-Strait exchanges and closer relations with China.

## **China’s Rise and Taiwan’s National Security**

National security can either be broadly defined as safeguarding a country’s cherished values, such as sovereignty, economic prosperity, the political system, and the people’s security, from being destroyed by either internal or external forces, or narrowly defined as protecting a country from external threat.

---

<sup>15</sup> *Zhongguo Shibao* (China Times), July 10, 1999, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Lin, *The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism*, 222, and Dafydd Fell, *Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991-2004* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 92.

<sup>17</sup> A survey conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, in April 2000, showed that only 13.6 percent of the people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese, while 42.5 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese and 38.5 percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese. See [http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/890623/89062\\_3.gif](http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/890623/89062_3.gif).

<sup>18</sup> A survey conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, in November 2005, showed that 10.3 percent of the people in Taiwan supported Taiwan’s independence as soon as possible, 14 percent chose the status quo now/independence later, 18.4 percent preferred the status quo indefinitely, 37.7 percent chose the status quo now/decision later, 12 percent supported the status quo now/unification later, and 2.1 percent preferred unification as soon as possible. The three groups, which together accounted for 42.7 percent of the population, favored Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. See <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm>.

The top priority of Taiwan's national security is to remain an independent sovereign state. The main threat to Taiwan's national security is China. China aims at terminating Taiwan's sovereignty in the long run either by peaceful approach or by nonpeaceful means. In the short term, Beijing will continue to isolate Taiwan in the international community, increase military pressure on the island, and promote economic integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. How to manage cross-Strait relations has always occupied the top position in Taiwan's national security strategy.

National identity conflict and partisan confrontation are common phenomena in many democracies, old and new. In Taiwan, these centrifugal, divisive forces are even more intractable, fueling acute disputes over national security. The PRC leadership has designated the following three conditions as grounds for the use of force against Taiwan: (1) if Taiwan declares independence; (2) if foreign powers intervene in Taiwanese affairs; and (3) if Taiwan continues to refuse to negotiate for unification for a long period of time.<sup>19</sup> China has gradually lost its patience, because its peaceful approach has failed to persuade Taiwan to accept its "One Country, Two Systems" principle for unification. On May 17, 2004, China's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council was authorized to issue a statement that warned Taiwan's leaders not to "keep following their separatist agenda." Otherwise, "the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost."<sup>20</sup> On March 14, 2005, China's National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law, legally authorizing the PRC's State Council and Central Military Commission to use nonpeaceful means to cope with secessionism in Taiwan should peaceful means be exhausted.<sup>21</sup>

Although Beijing has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan, it knows too well that to resort to war would not serve China's national interests. The perspective in Beijing is that the best approach remains unification by peaceful means. Thus, Beijing has made great efforts to create a positive international environment for peaceful unification. Its strategy is a mixture of diplomacy and deterrence. The key is to dissuade other countries from intervening in the Taiwan Strait.

On the one hand, Beijing uses economic incentives to encourage other countries to observe its one-China policy and to support China's sovereignty over Taiwan. In addition, it paints Taiwan as a troublemaker and urges

---

<sup>19</sup> The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," White Paper, February 21, 2000, [http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bps/bps\\_yzyz.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bps/bps_yzyz.htm) (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>20</sup> Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, "Statement on Current Cross-Strait Relations," [http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg\).asp?zywg\\_m\\_id=102](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg).asp?zywg_m_id=102) (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/flfg/flf.htm> (accessed December 15, 2005).

other countries to join China in opposing Taiwan's independence. For instance, in his speeches at the parliaments of Australia and Brazil in 2003 and 2004, respectively, Hu Jintao urged these two countries to join the PRC in accomplishing the goal of China's reunification. In September 2005, Hu once again urged President Bush to "join the Chinese side in safeguarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and opposing so-called Taiwan independence."<sup>22</sup> China's offer of a consumer market and its growing military capability has caused countries in Southeast Asia to be more hesitant to side with the United States in rivalries with the PRC. A U.S. Department of State official publicly admits, "China also seeks to leverage its economic influence with countries of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond to generate support for the PRC's stand on Taiwan."<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, China is not reluctant to punish those countries that dare to challenge its position. A recent example is Singapore. Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a "private and unofficial" visit to Taiwan in mid-July 2004. Less than one month later, Lee was sworn in as Singapore's prime minister. China immediately cancelled official exchanges with Singapore and withheld Lee's invitation to visit China until Lee reiterated Singapore's support for the one-China policy and opposition to any move by Taiwan toward formal independence.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, China has accelerated its military buildup in order to deter the United States and Japan from intervening in a cross-Strait conflict. Its defense budget has increased annually by a double-digit percentage since 1989. The official figure for China's defense budget in 2005 is around \$30 billion. However, the real defense budget could range anywhere from \$35.4 billion dollars (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate) to \$60-90 billion (estimates by the United States and Japan).<sup>25</sup> During the fourth Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore in June 2005, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that China's defense budget is the highest in Asia and the third highest in the world. He questioned why Beijing was increasing its military investment, purchasing expensive weaponry, and continuing to strengthen its capacity for flexible deployment, even though it faced no external threat. He also asked why Beijing continued to increase the number of missiles targeting Taiwan.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> "President Bush Meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao," September 13, 2005, [http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050913-8.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050913-8.html).

<sup>23</sup> "United States Seeks China as a Global Partner, State's Hill Says," June 7, 2005, [http:// usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Jun/08-742966.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Jun/08-742966.html).

<sup>24</sup> Jason Leow, "China Rejects DPM Lee's Reasons for Taiwan Visit," *Strait Times*, July 23, 2004, and Frank Ching, "China Favored in Cross-Strait Tug-of-War," *Japan Times*, September 4, 2004.

<sup>25</sup> "Truth about Military Spending," *Beijing Review*, July 7, 2005, 10.

<sup>26</sup> Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 4, 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2005/sp20050604-secdef1561.html>.

By strengthening its military, Beijing is eager to convince Washington and Tokyo that it is prepared to deter, delay, and defeat foreign intervention in cross-Straits conflict. The Pentagon's report on the military power of the PRC in 2005 pointed out that the PRC's military modernization and strategic capabilities "could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries in the region."<sup>27</sup> Chinese PLA generals such as Xiong Guangkai and Zhu Chenghu have not been hesitant to indicate the possibility of using nuclear weapons to deter U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.<sup>28</sup>

The United States has also become more willing to compromise with Beijing, especially after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Washington has cooperated with the PRC in the past four years and has chosen to sacrifice Taiwan's democracy in order to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Although Washington pressured the KMT to end martial law and to hasten democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, it did not support the right to self-determination for Taiwan. In order to win cooperation from Beijing to combat terrorism and solve the North Korea nuclear dilemma, President Bush warned Taiwan not to unilaterally change the status quo and stated his opposition to Taiwan's conducting a referendum on the same day of Taiwan's 2004 presidential election.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the U.S. government has reiterated that it observes the one-China policy and does not support Taiwan's independence.

A powerful China has also succeeded in convincing other countries to accept a bandwagon strategy and to believe that compromise or cooperation with Beijing at the expense of Taiwan is a must. China has become more assertive and confident in dealing with other major powers. Jiang Zemin used the term "strategic partnership" to depict China's relations with Russia and the United States only in the late 1990s. Hu Jintao has expanded the term by applying it to countries in Europe (France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), South Asia (India and Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela), Canada, and Central Asian countries (e.g., Kazakhstan). The PRC has also used this term to describe its relationship

---

<sup>27</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005*, July 2005, 4, [www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, "Looking beyond the Nuclear Bluster: Recent Progress and Remaining Problems in PRC Security Policy," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 15 (Summer 2005): 1.

<sup>29</sup> In his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on December 9, 2003, President Bush said in response to a question about President Chen's planned defensive referendum: "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose." See "Blunt Bush Message for Taiwan," <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/09/bush.china.taiwan/index.html>. See also Bonnie Glaser, "Wen Jiabao's Visit Caps an Outstanding Year," *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 5, no. 4 (January 2004): 37-48.

with regional blocs, such as the EU and ASEAN. China and ASEAN, through a strategic partnership based on peace and prosperity, have set up a 10+1 cooperation mechanism and launched a China-ASEAN free trade area.

China is now the largest export market in Asia and the third largest in the world, and has become one of the major suppliers of overseas tourists to many ASEAN countries. The ASEAN countries deliberately neglect the role of Taiwan in any matters that might displease Beijing. In November 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN defused a territorial dispute from escalating into a military confrontation. In March 2005 in Manila, state-owned oil corporations from China, Vietnam, and the Philippines signed the tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea.<sup>30</sup> Even though Taiwan is a claimant party to the Spratly Islands, Taipei was not invited to participate in either the declaration on the conduct of the involved parties or the joint marine seismic undertaking project. Taiwan increasingly is becoming more isolated in the international community.

### **Internal Squabble over External Threat**

Taiwan is playing an asymmetrical game against China. China is about sixty times larger than Taiwan in terms of population, more than 260 times larger in terms of territory, and seven times larger militarily. China's national power has increased dramatically in the past two and a half decades, thanks to its successful economic reforms. As previously noted, its defense budget has increased annually by a double-digit percentage since 1989. Many experts believe that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has shifted in favor of China.<sup>31</sup>

Both Taiwan's ruling and opposition elites know that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has been tilting in favor of China. They also know that national security policy should be bipartisan. Taiwan has no chance to defend itself against China if it is divided. But partisan confrontation, mixed with ideological disputes and ethnic conflict, has driven Taiwan in another direction. While the process of Taiwan's democratization was smooth and peaceful, her democracy has so far failed to establish "effective governance."<sup>32</sup> The weakness of Taiwan's democracy is most noticeable in the area of national security. Six factors contribute to this weakness.

---

<sup>30</sup> "Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam Signed Agreement on South China Sea Cooperation," March 14, 2005, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjlb/zwjg/zwbdl/t187333.htm>.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," *Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 119-133.

<sup>32</sup> Shelly Rigger, "Taiwan's Best-Case Democratization," *Orbis* 48, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 285.

First, mutual trust between the DPP political appointees and the civil servants is low, and this friction reduces the efficiency of the government in making decisions, implementing policies, and managing crises. Most of the civil servants, who were recruited and politically socialized by the KMT, are KMT supporters. Some of them either adopt an uncooperative attitude, or even worse, engage in destructive action, including leaking national security secrets to the mass media and opposition legislators. For instance, sensitive information that a delegation, headed by Taiwan's vice defense minister, would go to Washington, D.C., and Hawaii to conduct joint war games with the Pentagon and the U.S. Pacific Command was leaked to the media just a few days before Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to the United States in December 2003.<sup>33</sup> As a result, the Taiwanese delegation's trip was postponed and some of the programs were eventually cancelled. In addition, the names of foreign scholars and think tanks that participated in projects secretly funded by Taiwan's National Security Bureau in the 1990s were released to the media in March 2002.<sup>34</sup> The purpose was to tarnish former President Lee's image and to create trouble for the DPP government at the expense of Taiwan's national security.

Second, confrontation between the ruling DPP and opposition parties is high, especially since President Chen's reelection in 2004. Indeed, it is very difficult for Taiwan to reach bipartisan agreement on national security policies. In fact, national security policy has become the victim of partisan confrontation. The special arms purchase budget is a good example. The Bush administration approved the sale of an arms package to Taiwan, including eight diesel-powered submarines, six batteries of PAC-3 missiles, and twelve P-3C Orion antisubmarine aircraft in April 2001. Whether these weapons meet the need of Taiwan's defense or whether the special budget is appropriate is a legitimate issue for rational debate in the Legislative Yuan. But there has been no opportunity for democratic dialogue. Rather the issue has become one of political tactics. The opposition, which endorses a portion of the military procurement to show its support of the island's defense, but also pushes for commercial and cultural exchanges with China as a way to ameliorate any national security threat, has refused to support all essential military hardware

---

<sup>33</sup> *Zhongguo Shibao* (China Times), December 4, 2003.

<sup>34</sup> *Zhongguo Shibao* (China Times), March 20, 2002.

<sup>35</sup> There are 225 legislators. In the 2001 legislative elections, the pan-blue camp won 115 seats (KMT 68 seats, People First Party, or PFP, 46 seats, and New Party, or NP, 1 seat) and the pan-green camp, the DPP and its ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), won 100 seats (DPP 87 seats and TSU 13 seats). In the 2004 legislative elections, the pan-blue camp won 114 seats (KMT 79 seats, PFP 34 seats, and NP 1 seat) and the pan-green camp won 101 seats (DPP 89 seats and TSU 12 seats). Therefore, the pan-blue camp dominates the Legislative Yuan. In fact, the pan-blue camp enjoys an even more comfortable majority because it always has the support from ten independent legislators.

items in a package by means of a special budget proposed by the president's party. The Legislative Yuan, which is controlled by the pan-blue camp, a coalition of the KMT and its allies, the People First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP),<sup>35</sup> rejected placing the special budget on the agenda a total of forty-three times by December 27, 2005.<sup>36</sup>

Third, quite similar to other democratic countries, democracy has expanded Taiwan's spending on social welfare at the expense of the national defense budget. During the presidential or legislative elections, candidates compete to make "policy checks" or promises (i.e., pledges for health care reforms or pension increases for farmers, workers, and the elderly) in order to solicit voters for their support. Welfare spending accounted for 17.7 percent of governmental expenditures in 2004, compared to 8.9 percent in 1994. In contrast, defense spending accounted for 23.7 percent of the governmental expenditures in 1994 but was reduced to 15.4 percent in 2004.<sup>39</sup> The ratio of Taiwan's defense budget to GNP decreased from 3.69 percent in 1995 to 2.5 percent in 2004.<sup>40</sup>

Fourth, it is taking much time and effort to depoliticize the military in Taiwan. In the past, the KMT permeated the military which was indoctrinated to fight for Taiwan's final unification with China. Therefore, since President Lee began to emphasize "Taiwan first," "Taiwanese consciousness," and the concept that "the relations between Taiwan and China are a state-to-state or at least special state-to-state relationship," and especially since the DPP became the ruling party in May 2000, the professional soldiers have been puzzled by two questions: For what should they fight and for whom should they fight? The morale of Taiwan's armed forces is a concern to both Taiwan's government and that of the United States.<sup>41</sup> According to a Pentagon report, the morale of Taiwan's military, "especially among the enlisted ranks, is generally assessed as poor."<sup>42</sup>

Fifth, as in any democracy, the government in Taiwan is susceptible to the ever present pressure from interest groups. Highly dependent on the market and investment opportunities in China, Taiwanese businesses or *taishan* active in the Chinese economy repeatedly have pushed for closer economic links

---

<sup>36</sup> *Liberty Times*, December 28, 2005, 7.

<sup>39</sup> Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, "Central Government General Budget Proposal, Fiscal Year 2005," <http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Attachment/52416594671.xls>, and Hou-sheng Chan and Hui-fen Lin, "Taiwan's Past, Present, and Future Social Welfare," *NPF Background*, August 12, 2003, <http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/SS-B-092-018.htm> (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>40</sup> Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2005* (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2005), chap. 7.

<sup>41</sup> John Pomfret, "Also on Taipei's Radar: Reform," *Washington Post*, April 25, 2001.

<sup>42</sup> United States Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait\\_02261999.doc](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait_02261999.doc), p. 22.

across the Strait, an advocacy that may unintentionally undermine national security. China became Taiwan's top trading partner in 2003, while Japan and the United States dropped to second and third place, respectively. Two-way cross-Strait trade totaled \$61.8 billion in 2004.<sup>43</sup> Exports to China accounted for 25.83 percent of Taiwan's total exports. Taiwan's investment in China is even more impressive. According to the official PRC data, Taiwan's total investment had risen to about \$87 billion by November 2005.<sup>44</sup> The real figure is even higher. In addition, on average, more than ten thousand Taiwanese travel to China every day. More than one million people from Taiwan live or work in China.

President Lee promoted a "go south policy" in early 1994, encouraging Taiwanese companies to invest in Southeast Asia instead of China. In addition, he adopted the "go slow, be patient" policy in 1996 to control Taiwan's investment in China in order to reduce Taiwan's dependence on the China market.<sup>45</sup> However, the policy failed and was replaced with the "actively opening, effective management" policy of President Chen. The business community, one of the most powerful interest groups in Taiwan, has pushed the government to further loosen the control over economic exchanges with China and to establish three direct links (trade, postal service, and transportation) between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Some of the business leaders even have gone to the public to criticize the DPP government's China policy and express their support for unification.

Sixth, Taiwan's hyperactive mass media has compounded, if not created, schismatic political and social discourse on national security issues. Established in the predemocratic era, most of the newspapers, radio stations, and television stations are inclined to promote Chinese identity and even the idea of unification. Some new media outlets are sympathetic to the cause of Taiwan's independence. Few sit on neutral ground, a landscape that is in vivid contrast with the majority of Taiwan residents who prefer to stay away from the debate about unification versus *de jure* independence.

Internal conflict in Taiwan provides a golden opportunity to officials in Beijing to cost-effectively glue Taiwan to China by influencing Taiwan's politics without enacting its military threat. Economically, Beijing promotes cross-Strait integration. It encourages Taiwan's businessmen to invest in China through tax reduction measures, opening the PRC's domestic market, or even providing rent-free land. Politically, China uses a united-front strategy to win

---

<sup>43</sup> Mainland Affairs Council, "Table 5: Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China," <http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/em/155/5.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly*, no. 155 (September 2005): 30.

<sup>45</sup> The "go slow, be patient" policy prohibited high-tech industries and single-project investments over \$50 million to invest in China and also banned Taiwan's companies from investing in China's infrastructure projects.

the hearts of some Taiwanese by inviting scholars, college students, legislators, opinion leaders, retired generals, and politicians to visit China.

To some extent, Beijing's strategy has been successful. The KMT and the PFP elite are increasingly coming to believe that China can be both Taiwan's economic partner and a manageable political neighbor. They argue that Taiwan need not allocate a huge defense budget because Taiwan cannot win a war against China, and if cross-Strait relations are well maintained, Taiwan will not be attacked by the PRC. Increasing cross-Strait economic integration has alerted an American scholar to warn that peaceful unification between Taiwan and China might be possible in the future.<sup>46</sup>

### **The Case of the Anti-Secession Law**

The enactment of the anti-secession law on March 14, 2005, is a perfect case study of Hu's policy toward Taiwan and how the island's internal division weakens its leverage in coping with the threat from China. The law stipulates that force is authorized against Taiwan if the island is legally separated from China. China drafted the proposed law to establish a legal basis to stop independence and promote unification, while restraining both Taiwan and other countries. Beijing will reward those who support unification and punish those who oppose it under this law, so as to accomplish its goal of "opposing independence and promoting unification." Even before China's National People's Congress passed the law, various surveys conducted in Taiwan had revealed the anger of the Taiwanese people at Beijing's move. For example, a survey conducted by the Institute of National Policy Research March 9-12, 2005, indicated that 61 percent of the respondents "absolutely do not approve" and 32.4 percent "do not approve" the enacting of the anti-secession law by the PRC.<sup>49</sup> Other surveys showed very similar results.<sup>50</sup> The ROC Government criticized China's anti-secession law for denying democratic values, slighting the people in Taiwan, unilaterally changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, increasing cross-Strait tension, distorting the nature of cross-Strait problems, and threatening security in East Asia.<sup>51</sup> Hundreds of thousands of people rallied in Taiwan on March 26, 2005, to protest against China's anti-secession law.

---

<sup>46</sup> Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care," *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15-28.

<sup>49</sup> Cited in <http://taiwanthinktank.org/activityfinal.php?id=548>; <http://www.mac.gov.tw>.

<sup>50</sup> For example, a survey conducted by the Elections Studies Center, National Chengchi University, February 25-27, 2005, showed that 57.6 percent of the respondents absolutely do not approve and 24.7 percent do not approve the PRC's enacting the anti-secession law as a legal excuse to take Taiwan by force in the future. Only 3 percent support Beijing's move. See <http://taiwanthinktank.org/activityfinal.php?id=548>; <http://www.mac.gov.tw>.

<sup>51</sup> See <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=16210&ctNode=848>.

The United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have all spoken in support of Taiwan and in opposition to China's intention to solve the Taiwan issue by nonpeaceful means.<sup>52</sup> This law was one of the reasons that the EU did not lift the arms embargo on China.

This is a case where elites on Taiwan should have been united and a bipartisan position should have been adopted to condemn Beijing's provocative action. Unfortunately, partisan conflict trumped whatever centripetal forces that the anti-secession law had unleashed. Although the pan-blue camp does not support Beijing's use of force against Taiwan, neither the KMT nor the PFP opposes an anti-secession law which tries to prevent Taiwan from splitting from China. Therefore, the pan-blue camp chose to be silent in March 2005, although Taiwan's public opinion strongly disapproved Beijing's action. In fact, both the KMT and PFP blamed the DPP government for forcing Beijing to adopt such a law. Leaders from the pan-blue camp, who oppose independence and want to improve relations with China, stayed away from the March 26 demonstration.

Taiwan's confrontation between parties again gave Beijing an opportunity to reduce the negative feeling among the Taiwanese people concerning the anti-secession law. Hu wasted no time to send invitations to Taiwan's opposition leaders and they responded very favorably. On March 29, 2005, the KMT's vice chairman, Chiang Pin-kun, led a delegation to China in order to prepare for a meeting between Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan on April 29. Following the Lien-Hu meeting, Hu met PFP Chairman James Soong on May 12 and New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming on July 12, 2005. They reached separate communiqués with Hu, pledging to jointly curb the trend toward Taiwan's independence. These Taiwan opposition parties urged better and safer cross-Strait relations and pledged their commitment to one China to President Hu Jintao. In addition to the KMT's support of the "1992 consensus,"<sup>53</sup> the PFP espoused the so-called "two sides, one China" formula and the New Party proposed a "one China, two systems" plan. Yok went even further to call for cross-Strait joint actions to achieve reunification in the twenty-first century.<sup>54</sup> The meetings of China's top leaders and Taiwan's

---

<sup>52</sup> See the memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=16210&ctNode=848>.

<sup>53</sup> The so-called "1992 consensus" refers to an agreement in a meeting between the Straits Exchange Foundation and its counterpart the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in November 1992 in Hong Kong. Both sides agreed that there is one China and that each side maintains its own interpretation of the definition of one China. Ironically, it was Beijing that refused to sign an agreement because it believed that two different interpretations of one China would create two Chinas. Therefore, there is no written agreement. President Chen argues that there is no "1992 consensus," only a "1992 spirit." This means that, although Taipei and Beijing disagree with each other, the disagreement does not stop them from negotiating with each other.

opposition leaders dramatically changed cross-Strait politics. Opinion polls conducted right after those visits indicated that the Taiwanese perception of China's hostility decreased immediately,<sup>55</sup> and the criticism of Beijing's anti-secession law also was more subdued.

During the visits of Taiwan's opposition leaders, Beijing offered Taiwan a pair of giant pandas, agreed to cut import tariffs on Taiwan-grown fruit, and reduced tuition for Taiwan students in China. After the visits, Beijing began to deliver its promises. In July 2005, Beijing announced that it would scrap import tariffs on fifteen types of Taiwanese fruit. In late August 2005, it further announced that Taiwanese students studying at China's universities would pay the same tuition fees as their mainland peers beginning in the fall term. In early September, Beijing offered a \$30 billion loan to Taiwanese businessmen investing in China, and approved over-flight rights for Taiwanese air carriers.<sup>56</sup>

What bothers the DPP government most is that opposition leaders rejected discussions with the ruling party. Instead, they chose to talk with Hu Jintao with very poor timing, helping Beijing to reduce the pressure from both the international community and Taiwan against the anti-secession law. Even worse, they created an opportunity for Hu to use a united-front strategy to soften the hearts of the Taiwanese people and to pressure the DPP government. All of the three opposition parties established regular forums with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for dialogues and communications. Those forums provide Beijing with platforms to affect Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-Strait relations.

## Taiwan's Challenges Ahead

Taiwan continues to face two difficult tasks. One is to strengthen Taiwan's sovereignty by winning international recognition; the other is to improve cross-Strait relations. President Lee tried to pursue "a closer pragmatic relationship"

---

<sup>54</sup> "New Party Leader Calls for Joint Efforts to Promote National Unity," [http://english.people.com.cn/200507/12/eng20050712\\_195641.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200507/12/eng20050712_195641.html); "Hu: CPC Ready to Work with New Party to Promote Reunification," [http://english.people.com.cn/200507/12/eng20050712\\_195678.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200507/12/eng20050712_195678.html); and Jim Yardley and Chris Buckley, "New Maxim from Beijing, '2 Sides of Strait,' Is Met with a Yawn from Taiwan's President," *New York Times*, May 13, 2005.

<sup>55</sup> A survey conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, on May 5, 2005, showed that 45.4 percent of the Taiwanese people believed that Beijing was hostile toward the ROC government compared with 79.4 percent in December 2004, and 37.3 percent believed that Beijing was hostile toward Taiwan's people compared with 54.8 percent in December 2004. See [http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9411/9411e\\_7.gif](http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9411/9411e_7.gif) (accessed December 15, 2005).

<sup>56</sup> "Taiwan Students on Mainland Given Level Fees," [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/25/content\\_3400369.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/25/content_3400369.htm), and *People's Daily*, September 8, 2006, 2.

with China and hoped that better relations with China would help Taiwan's relations with the rest of the world.<sup>57</sup> He paid lip service to unification and established direct contact with Jiang Zemin from 1991 to 1995 through secret envoys. Their envoys met at least twenty-seven times, including three times in 1994-1995 between the directors of the two presidents' offices.<sup>58</sup> However, this strategy failed when Beijing unilaterally suspended cross-Strait talks indefinitely in June 1995 in retaliation for President Lee's June trip to the United States. In addition, the PLA conducted a series of military exercises in 1995-1996 in order to intimidate Taiwan from moving further toward *de jure* independence. Beijing's stiff position on its one China principle leaves no room for Taiwan to expand its international recognition. In fact, Taiwan has lost additional diplomatic ground in the past decade as China has risen to become an economic giant and a superpower candidate.

Even if Taiwan is able to improve its relations with China, there are new problems to worry Taipei. Taiwan's psychological defense is very weak. Beijing has reiterated that it places its hope on Taiwan's people for unification. If tension in the Taiwan Strait decreases because of Beijing's good-will strategy, Taipei will have difficulty reminding its people of the potential threat from China and persuading them to support an increase of the defense budget. Moreover, the pressure from the business community and the opposition leaders to establish the three direct links with China will increase immediately.

Another major challenge ahead for Taiwan is how to survive as an independent sovereign state when it has been gradually forced into China's economic orbit. Taiwan's economic dependence on the China market has long passed an alarming point. As mentioned above, President Lee's "go slow, be patient" policy failed. President Chen's "active opening, effective management" was criticized by many observers as no management but only an opening. Two-way trade has doubled and Taiwan's investment in China has increased rapidly since President Chen came to power in May 2000. The escalation in cross-Strait economic ties and other exchanges not only has increased Beijing's leverage vis-à-vis Taipei, but also has created a euphoria among the people in Taiwan. In addition, the DPP doubts whether those who have vested interests in China would defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island.

If the national identity crisis, as President Chen points out, is the greatest challenge to Taiwan's security,<sup>59</sup> the problem is how to promote national identity among Taiwan's people. As mentioned above, the support for Taiwan's independence has become the mainstream position among people in Taiwan during the past two decades. In the face of a rising China which has the

---

<sup>57</sup> Harvey Sicherman, "An Interview with President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China," *Orbis* 39, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 585.

<sup>58</sup> Tzou Jiing-wen, *An Account of Lee Teng-hui in Power* (Taipei: INK, 2001), 201-203.

<sup>59</sup> "Identity Crisis Biggest Enemy, Says President," Central News Agency, December 24, 2005.

resources to reward those Taiwanese who are willing to support Beijing and to punish those who are not, maintaining this momentum will be difficult. A good example is the once pro-Taiwan independence businessman Hsu Wen-lung, founder of Chi-mei Optoelectronics Corporation, the largest ABS producer in the world. On the same day as a DPP-mobilized demonstration protesting the anti-secession law, he was forced to publish his retirement statement in which he praised the law for making him assured of future peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.<sup>60</sup> Hsu's statement was a shock to many observers. It will not be a surprise to witness more shocks in the future. In order to avoid economic overdependence on China, President Chen announced a new economic strategy of "active management, effective opening" to control Taiwan's investment in China.<sup>61</sup> However, if the people in Taiwan cannot be united behind their government, the policy is doomed to fail.

## Conclusion

Before 1988, people in Taiwan were politically socialized to identify themselves as Chinese and to support the island's final unification with China. In his twelve-year rule of the island, President Lee adopted a gradual approach to change the policy. At the beginning, he acknowledged Beijing's rule on the Chinese mainland and promoted a "one country, two governments" or "one country, two districts" model. In 1999, he audaciously redefined the relationship between Taiwan and China as two sovereign states which have a special state-to-state relationship because they "share the same culture, historical origins, and ethnic bonds" and "the people on the two sides engage in myriad social, economic, and other exchanges, a level of integration not found in any other divided nation."<sup>62</sup> He had succeeded in reversing the trend induced by the KMT socialization process. The new trend is to support Taiwan's independence. President Chen continued in Lee's trajectory and emphasized that "there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait," furthering President Lee's efforts to promote Taiwanese consciousness. But two decades is too little time to undo what was done by four decades of authoritarian rule. As President Chen pointed out in his 2004 National Day speech, "discrepancy in national identity" is one of the issues which "continue to cause disruptions at [the] heart of Taiwan."<sup>63</sup>

In a dialectical manner, democratization shattered Chinese nationalism imposed on the island in the first four postwar decades and promoted Taiwanese nationalism and national identity in the 1990s, but democratization is becoming

---

<sup>60</sup> Joy Su, "Non-Peaceful Means in Play: MAC," *Taipei Times*, March 29, 2005, 3.

<sup>61</sup> "President Chen's New Year Message," January 1, 2006, <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4>.

<sup>62</sup> Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan," 12.

<sup>63</sup> "President Chen's National Day Message," October 10, 2004, <http://www.president.gov.tw/en>.

a force that may lead to the disintegration of Taiwanese society. Taiwan is a young democracy which only recently experienced the first power turnover after six decades of KMT rule. Like other young democracies, the ruling party and the opposition parties in Taiwan are still in the process of learning how to compromise. However, the advent of such compromise is frustrated by the underlying problem that Taiwan has not established a consensus on national identity. This is Taiwan's most serious problem and it might endanger the survival of this young democracy. Two forces coexist and compete for the people's national identity on the island. Both forces feel that their particular definition of identity cannot be compromised. Neither has embraced the notion of multiple identities depending upon the situation. Rather, Taiwanese and Chinese are often viewed as mutually exclusive categories, undermining a joint identification of Chinese and Taiwanese as a transitional state.

The trend in identity now favors independence and the Taiwanese forces, but democracy provides the forces for unification with much room to maneuver. Promoting unification is regarded as freedom of speech. The confrontation of divergent identities in Taiwan's democracy means that social rupture, ethnic tension, and party confrontation become worse after every election. As a result, today the people in Taiwan are fed up with the inconsistency of the government's policy, with fist fighting and idling in the Legislative Yuan, as well as with inter- and intraparty power struggles. Unfortunately, this disappointment with Taiwan's democratic practices could also increase the support for unification among the people of Taiwan.

The rise of China is not a formidable certainty, but the division of Taiwan might render the island defenseless in the face of Beijing's two-thrust policy—a combination of soft- and hard-handed approaches. The greatest danger for the DPP government is to find itself simultaneously engaged on three fronts, battling both Taiwan's opposition parties and the PRC and dealing with a lukewarm response from the United States. The consequence matters significantly for the island and for the region; either Taiwan will drift toward a rising China or maintain an enduring separation.

In order to survive the threat from a rising China, Taiwan must continue to consolidate its democracy. Civic education should be promoted to teach people, especially the youngest generation, about the true values of democracy, the rights and obligations of a good citizen, and the beauty of Taiwan. This would encourage rational debate on public policy, help to elect the best qualified candidates to represent the people, and increase the consciousness of Taiwanese in order to harden their will to defend their homeland.

The ruling party should also make every effort to effect a bipartisan national security policy. Although mutual trust between ruling and opposition parties is low, there is common ground on national security issues. For example, all of the party leaders on the island oppose CCP rule of Taiwan, support the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait, agree with the importance of continued good relations with the United States, and believe in expanding

Taiwan's international ties.<sup>64</sup> Those agreements can serve as the foundation for a bipartisan national security policy. If Taiwan's people are able to unite regardless of identity, Beijing will be forced to think twice before using its building military power against Taiwan.

---

<sup>64</sup> Shelly Rigger, "Party Politics and Taiwan's External Relations," *Orbis* 49, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 414-417.

