

Election Strategy and Ethnic Politics in Singapore

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Abstract

According to Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's electoral system is essentially representative and does not suffer from significant ethnic conflict. Opposition leaders, however, denounce legislative elections as unfair and claim that Singapore's ethnic minorities disagree politically with the Chinese-dominated People's Action Party (PAP). This essay aims to test both of these hypotheses empirically, using freely available electoral and public-opinion data. Logistic regression of the 1968-2006 parliamentary election results by constituency indicates that the PAP government did create Group Representation Constituencies in 1988 so as to eliminate districts that had voted disproportionately for the opposition in 1984. Analysis using Gary King's method of ecological inference suggests that ethnic polarization between Chinese and Malays was moderately high in the 1976 election, peaked in 1988, and was minimal in 2006. Indians, meanwhile, appear to have voted with the Chinese in all three elections. A parallel cross-sectional, logistic regression of the 2002 Singapore subset of the World Values Survey, however, has Indian respondents being slightly less likely to admit to dissatisfaction with the government and indicates that being Malay does not make one more willing to express such dissatisfaction. These empirical results thus cast doubt on the extent to which Singapore's elections have been truly free, fair, and devoid of ethnic tension. The findings also suggest that young, middle-class, highly educated Chinese have replaced working-class Malays as the greatest challenge to continued PAP dominance.

Key words: Singapore, ethnic politics, elections, voting procedures, directed election, ecological inference, Chinese, Malays, Indians, People's Action Party.

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Singapore has shown that a system of clean, no-money elections helps to preserve an honest government.... [We] set out to become a multiracial society of equal citizens, where opportunities are equal and a person's contribution is recognized and rewarded on merit regardless of race, language, culture, or religion. In spite of our meager natural resources, we succeeded, and our policies have benefited all our citizens, including our Malays.

—Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First*

Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk.

—Henry David Thoreau, *Journal*

Although the city-state of Singapore lacks a huge population and a large land area, its political system merits attention not simply from scholars of Southeast Asia. Political and economic leaders throughout Asia and other developing regions regard the island nation as an “economic miracle,” and such authoritarian regimes as Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China may look to the Singapore model as a guide for “opening up” their own economies and governments.¹ At least superficially, the country’s political patriarch, Lee Kuan Yew, suggests that his government is fundamentally “representative” and that it treats citizens of all ethnic backgrounds fairly.² If true, Lee’s assertions imply that the country’s elections are free and fair. One might also expect ethnic groups in Singapore not to vary markedly in their political behavior.

In principle, these hypotheses are empirically testable. Yet previous social-science research on Singapore’s elections has almost always been primarily qualitative, describing electoral laws and results or chronicling many of the events and personalities of the campaigns, but not relying on the advanced statistical methods commonly used in American or European studies of elections.³ Probably the closest that earlier scholars have come to University

¹ Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files*, 2nd, revised ed. (New York: New York Review Books, 2003), 217, and Diane K. Mauzy, “The Challenge to Democracy: Singapore’s and Malaysia’s Resilient Hybrid Regimes,” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (2006): 47-68.

² Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 166, 254, 494.

³ C. Paul Bradley, “Leftist Fissures in Singapore Politics,” *Western Political Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1965): 292-308; Thomas J. Bellows, *The People’s Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System*, Monograph Series No. 14 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1970), 39-41, 50-51, 65-69, 116-120; Jon S. T. Quah, “Singapore in 1984: Leadership Transition in an Election Year,” *Asian Survey* 25, no. 2 (1985): 220-231; James Michin, *No Man is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew*, 2nd ed. (North Sydney,

of Michigan-style explanations of electoral outcomes is Garry Rodan's 1993 book chapter on class and voting.⁴ Historically, subconstituency-level voting analysis has not been feasible in the city-state because the relevant, detailed election tables are never made public.⁵ And even if such subconstituency tables were available, traditional statistical methods would generally not allow us to make valid individual-level inferences (e.g., about the proportion of Singaporean Malays who voted for the opposition). The 2002 inclusion of Singapore in a slightly reduced version of the World Values Survey⁶ as well as Gary King's development in 1997 of a more methodologically defensible way to analyze aggregated data⁷ may nonetheless now permit researchers to test several hypotheses about the political behavior of individuals residing in Singapore.

Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 215-220; R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 64-76; Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 152-186; Garry Rodan, "Elections without Representation: The Singapore Experience under the PAP," in *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, ed. R. H. Taylor (New York and Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), 61-89; Garry Rodan, "Singapore in 1996: Extended Election Fever," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 2 (1997): 175-180; Chee Soon Juan et al., *Elections in Singapore: Are They Free and Fair? An Open Singapore Centre Report on the Conduct of Parliamentary Elections in Singapore* (Singapore: Open Singapore Centre, 2000); Hussin Mutalib, "Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (2000): 313-342; Yeo Lay Hwee, "Electoral Politics in Singapore," in *Electoral Politics in Southeast + East Asia*, ed. Aurel Croissant, Gabriel Bruns, and Marei John (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002), 203-232; Diane K. Mauzy, "Electoral Innovation and One-Party Dominance in Singapore," in *How Asia Votes*, ed. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and David Newman (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002), 234-254; Chris Lydgate, *Lee's Law: How Singapore Crushes Dissent* (Carlton North, Victoria, Australia: Scribe, 2003), 88-105; Jeremy Grace, *Delimitation Equity Project, Case Study: Singapore*, prepared by IFES/Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2004); Raj Vasil, *A Citizen's Guide to Government and Politics in Singapore* (Singapore: Talisman, 2004), 104-117; and Francis T. Seow, *Beyond Suspicion? The Singapore Judiciary*, Monograph 55 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2006), 34-70.

⁴ Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and Its Political Significance," in *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, ed. Garry Rodan (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 52-71.

⁵ At certain points in the main text of this article, a given statement may not be fully supported by references in a footnote. Where documentation is thus lacking, I have omitted the reference(s) to protect the print, Internet, or other source in question.

⁶ Tan Ern Ser, "Technical Report—Singapore," World Values Survey 2000 Methodological Questionnaire, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>. The Singapore administrators decided to exclude a number of "core WVS questions" in part because "some questions are politically sensitive" (p. 4).

⁷ Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

Table 1. Constituencies Won by PAP or Opposition and Constituencies Uncontested, Parliamentary Elections, 1959-2006

Year	PAP	Opposition	Uncontested
2006 Gen. Election	21	2	7
2001 Gen. Election	21	2	10
1997 Gen. Election	22	2	9
1992 By-Election	1	0	0
1991 Gen. Election	32	4	11
1988 Gen. Election	54	1	5
1984 Gen. Election	77	2	30
1981 By-Election	0	1	0
1980 Gen. Election	75	0	37
1979 By-Election	5	0	0
1977 By-Election	2	0	0
1976 Gen. Election	69	0	16
1972 Gen. Election	65	0	8
1970 By-Election	5	0	3
1968 Gen. Election	58	0	51
1967 By-Election	5	0	4
1966 By-Election	7	0	6
1965 By-Election	1	0	0
1963 Gen. Election	38	13	0
1961 By-Election	0	2	0
1959 Gen. Election	43	8	0

Source: Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Managed Elections

Results of Parliamentary Elections in Singapore

As table 1 suggests, the PAP has enjoyed overwhelming support in the parliament for the entire existence of the Republic of Singapore. In the 2006 general election, for example, opposition parties won in only two constituencies, while the ruling PAP prevailed in twenty-one voting districts.⁸ In seven of these twenty-one constituencies, moreover, the PAP candidate or candidates were

⁸ Although terminology in Singapore may differ, this article uses “district” as a synonym for “constituency.”

the only ones on the ballot (a so-called “walkover”). In the earlier decades of independent Singapore, electoral results were even bleaker for opposition parties; from 1965 to 1980, not a single opposition candidate was elected to the legislature. The greatest number of opposition victories occurred in 1991, when opponents of the PAP managed to win in four constituencies. Even in that year, however, the PAP was hardly threatened since it still maintained control of thirty-two electoral districts. In 1980, the nadir of opposition electoral representation, the PAP achieved victory in all seventy-five of the country’s constituencies, most of which were not even contested by the opposition.

Contemplating this history of spectacular “electoral success” by the PAP, an outside observer might be tempted to question the fairness of such political contests. Foreigners with a merely superficial knowledge of Singapore might be forgiven for comparing the country’s elections to those of such one-party dictatorships as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe,⁹ Lukashenko’s Belarus,¹⁰ or even Castro’s Cuba¹¹ or Hu’s China,¹² instead of thinking of such one-party-dominant liberal democracies as Japan¹³ or Sweden.¹⁴ Yet no one claims that Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew is simply having his political opponents shot Benigno Aquino-style.¹⁵ How, then, can Singaporean elections continue decade after decade to produce such lopsided victories for the PAP?

⁹ Martin Meredith, *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003); Geoff Hill, *The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown* (Cape Town: Struik, 2005); and James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, *Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe* (Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books, 2007).

¹⁰ David Marples, *Belarus: A Denationalized Nation* (London: Routledge, 1999); Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth I. Tarlow, eds., *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

¹¹ Rhoda P. Rabkin, *Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment* (New York: Praeger, 1990), and Susan Eckstein, *Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003).

¹² James C. F. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), and Chun-ju Chen, “Political Rights,” in Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, *China Human Rights Report 2006* (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2006), 39-74.

¹³ Timothy Hoye, *Japanese Politics: Fixed and Floating Worlds* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999); Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, 4th ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); and Ethan Scheiner, *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State* (New York and Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁴ Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark, eds., *Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), and Olof Petersson, *Svensk politik*, 5th ed. (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2000).

¹⁵ Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen Hill, *Aquino Assassination: The True Story and Analysis of the Assassination of Philippine Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.* (Sonoma, CA: Hilltop, 1983), and Sandra Burton, *The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Warner Books, 1989).

Allegations of Unfair Electoral Practices by the PAP

Human-rights activists, foreign scholars, and Singaporean opposition leaders point to a number of practices which may disadvantage non-PAP candidates. First, though no opposition leader has ever been executed in independent Singapore, a few have suffered various misfortunes after the PAP came to view them as a threat. Three years after Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) leader Chia Thye Poh's electoral victory in the Jurong constituency in 1963, Singaporean police arrested him under the Internal Security Act (legislation designed to suppress communists and other anti-PAP activists) and kept him in jail until 1989.¹⁶ After attorney and Workers' Party candidate Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam defeated the PAP in the 1981 by-election in the Anson constituency, he was briefly imprisoned by the government for fraud, he was disbarred, and eventually he was sued into bankruptcy by PAP leaders.¹⁷ In the 1992 by-election in Marine Parade, Dr. Chee Soon Juan was part of a Singapore Democratic Party slate of candidates that garnered almost a quarter of the popular vote, despite challenging a PAP delegation led by the sitting prime minister, Goh Chok Tong.¹⁸ The next year, Dr. Chee was fired from his teaching post at the National University of Singapore.¹⁹ The government has since jailed him four times and seized his passport, and, in 2006, Lee and Goh sued him into bankruptcy for "defaming" them.²⁰

¹⁶ Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, 204; "Chia Thye Poh a Free Man," *Straits Times*, November 22, 1998, 2; and Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006). During the election year of 1963, the PAP government also "arrest[ed] and detain[ed] without trial" more than "130 opposition organizers and community leaders," including "all the main *Barisan* leaders" (Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, 154). For an account of another politically motivated imprisonment, see Martyn See, "Zahari's 17 Years," motion picture, 2006, <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2022589417781119779&q=zahari%27s+17+years&total=5&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=1> (accessed November 17, 2007).

¹⁷ Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, 206-209, and Lydgate, *Lee's Law*.

¹⁸ Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006), and Singapore Cabinet, "Mr GOH Chok Tong," <http://www.cabinet.gov.sg/CabinetAppointments/Mr+GOH+Chok+Tong.htm> (accessed July 2, 2008).

¹⁹ "NUS: Chee Soon Juan Sacked because of Dishonesty," *Business Times* [Singapore], April 1, 1993, 2; Martin Lee, "Introduction," in Chee Soon Juan, *To Be Free: Stories from Asia's Struggle against Oppression* (Clayton, Australia: Monash University Asia Institute, 1998), i-vii; Martyn See, "Singapore Rebel," motion picture, 2005, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_DRoUOcupo (accessed November 17, 2007); and Simon Tisdall, "World Briefing: Singapore's 'Fear Factor' Fails to Silence Dissident," *Guardian*, April 14, 2006, 22.

²⁰ Farah Abdul Rahim, "SDP's Chee Soon Juan Declared Bankrupt, Cannot Stand for Elections till 2011," *Channel NewsAsia*, February 10, 2006, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/192561/1.html> (accessed September 12, 2007), and Michael Y.M. Kau et al., "Petition for Chee Soon Juan," open letter to President S.R. Nathan et al., April 4, 2006, <http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2006/1658/> (accessed August 17, 2007).

Critics of the electoral system likewise point to the censorship of international publications as well as domestic media that have been captured by the ruling party. The government thus prevents dissenting, opposition voices from speaking freely to voters.²¹ A second restriction on political communication is the severe limit on how long the electoral campaign may last: a mere nine days. Opposition candidates thus have little time to make their views heard. The time from the government’s announcement of a forthcoming election to the actual polling can be as short as two weeks, again seriously hindering non-PAP politicians from mobilizing politically.²² The PAP openly threatens to delay repairing public housing units—inhabited by 81 percent of the population²³—in

Table 2. Effect of Opposition Vote on Likelihood of Abolishing Constituency in Next General Election, 1968-2006

Year Abolished	Opposition Vote	Constant	χ^2	Nagelkerke R ²	N
2006	-.226	3.010	2.586	.313	13
2001	-.057	1.315	.716	.065	15
1997	-.002	.217	.002	.000	26
1991	-.029	.532	.649	.018	50
1988	.094*	-3.524*	7.604*	.192	49
1984	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	39
1980	.006	-3.518	.002	.000	60
1976	-.076	-.265	1.330	.051	57
1972	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	9
1968	-.044	-1.825	.338	.037	54

Source: Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Note: Equations estimated using dichotomous Logit. χ^2 s all have 1 degree of freedom. The notation “n/a” signifies that no constituencies contested in the previous cycle of general elections and by-elections were abolished in the election listed in the first column, making this statistic impossible to calculate. * $p < .05$

²¹ Christopher Lingle, *Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency* (Barcelona: Edicions Sirocco, 1996), 104-113; Chee Soon Juan et al., 10-14; ANFREL, “Statement, May 7, 2006, ANFREL Study Mission to Singapore during the 2006 General Elections: Initial Findings and Recommendations” (Bangkok: Asian Network for Free Elections, 2006); and Francis T. Seow, 90-93.

²² Chee Soon Juan et al., 6.

²³ Housing Development Board, *HDB Annual Report 2006/2007* (Singapore: Housing Development Board, 2007), 78, [http://www.hdb.gov.sg/attachment/AR0607/\\$file/HDB%20AR06_07_stats_charts.pdf](http://www.hdb.gov.sg/attachment/AR0607/$file/HDB%20AR06_07_stats_charts.pdf) (accessed November 28, 2007).

constituencies that vote disproportionately for the opposition.²⁴ And, although electoral officials supposedly do not trace voters' identities, the counterfoil of each voted ballot is marked with the voter's registration number, quite possibly intimidating citizens who are contemplating voting against the PAP.²⁵

Empirical Tests of Selected Allegations

Many opponents of the PAP have alleged that the government eventually abolishes electoral districts which vote disproportionately for the opposition. Such critics point, for example, to the deletion of the Anson constituency after the opposition-party legislator J. B. Jeyaretnam, who represented this district, was forced to give up his seat in 1986.²⁶ Other Singaporeans accuse the ruling party of exhibiting a “kiasu [驚輸] syndrome” (Hokkien for “afraid to lose”) by “putting danger areas or opposition strongholds,” such as the pre-2001 Cheng San district, “into safe constituencies where the PAP is strong.”²⁷

One way to test this hypothesis is to regress the odds of a given constituency being abolished in the next general election on the opposition vote for that same²⁸ constituency. As table 2 suggests, however, the available data do not support this hypothesis for every election. In fact, only in 1988, when the PAP established its current system of Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) and Single Member Constituencies (SMCs),²⁹ does the opposition vote predict the odds of a district being axed. This GRC/SMC system, however, does appear to have been designed partly to disadvantage the opposition by abolishing its strongest districts ($b = .094, p < .05$). Once in place, the scheme appears to have worked as planned, limiting opposition victories to at most a couple of

²⁴ Lee Kuan Yew, 133.

²⁵ Chee Soon Juan et al., *Elections in Singapore: Are They Free and Fair? An Open Singapore Centre Report on the Conduct of Parliamentary Elections in Singapore*, 6-7, 15-16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 17, and Grace, *Case Study: Singapore*, 2.

²⁷ Laurel Teo, “Why Cheng San Is No More,” *Straits Times*, October 18, 2001, H3.

²⁸ “Same” was defined as having the same name in the following election. The boundaries may have changed in the interim, however.

²⁹ A Group Representation Constituency, or GRC, typically includes a large land area and population and sends several representatives to the legislature. At least one of the legislators in each GRC must belong to an ethnic minority. A Single Member Constituency, or SMC, in contrast, usually covers a small area and population and only sends one member of parliament. Elected officials from SMCs may come from any ethnic background. In the 2006 election, seventy-five MPs hailed from GRCs, but only nine from SMCs. (Elections Department Singapore, “Map of Electoral Divisions,” http://www.elections.gov.sg/maps_electoral.htm [accessed November 26, 2007]; Elections Department Singapore, “Types of Electoral Divisions,” http://www.elections.gov.sg/types_electoral.htm [accessed September 6, 2007]). The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China operates a roughly analogous system of “functional constituencies” for its elections to the Legislative Council (People's Republic of China, *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* [Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1991], 88-89, and James C. F. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics*, 202-203), perhaps also as a way to thwart democratic control.




Figure 1. Marine Parade GRC, 2006




Figure 2. Holland-Bukit Timah GRC, 2006

the single-seat SMCs. So long as the opposition takes no GRCs, the PAP need not worry about a handful of non-PAP members of parliament outvoting the seventy-five GRC-affiliated PAP loyalists in the legislature.

Another possibility is that PAP officials simply redraw the boundaries of the electoral constituencies so as to maximize the number of seats won by their party's candidates. Indeed, even cursory inspection of the shapes of the various 2006 constituencies makes one suspect gerrymandering. One would of course expect the land area of a typical SMC to dwarf that of the average GRC, but the boundaries of even most GRCs hardly constitute squares or rectangles.³⁰ Two of the most bizarrely shaped constituencies are Marine Parade GRC (figure 1)

³⁰ See Elections Department Singapore, "Map of Electoral Divisions."

and Holland-Bukit Timah GRC (figure 2). The outline of the former district, whose only nearly straight border is Singapore’s southern coastline, vaguely resembles the profile of Mickey Mouse’s sidekick, Goofy. And the boundaries of the latter constituency might stir up in the minds of particularly imaginative individuals an image of Casper the Friendly Ghost bending over to tie his shoelaces. The “ghost’s eye” in this view represents the Bukit Panjang SMC, which the Holland-Bukit Timah GRC completely surrounds.

This hypothesis about gerrymandering is also testable using quantitative methods. Table 3 summarizes the regression results for a model of the odds of a constituency’s boundaries being modified (including modified to include no area, or being abolished) during the years 1976-1984. I chose these election years to include all useable data from before the establishment of the GRC/ SMC system in 1988 but after the almost wholly uncontested³¹ 1968 election.³² The opposition vote in the previous regular parliamentary election, a dummy for whether a given district borders one of the top two strongest opposition constituencies (which are presumably most likely to have their boundaries

Table 3. Determinants of Boundary Changes, 1976-1984 Parliamentary Elections

	1976	1980	1984	1976-1984
Opposition Vote	-.135*	.246*	.014	.046
Border Opp. Const.	-2.587	9.075*	.600	1.801
Opp. Vote X Border	.072	-.283*	-.015	-.055
Constant	5.956*	-7.907*	-.558	-1.065
Nagelkerke R ²	.194	.368	.005	.036
χ^2	6.839	16.631*	.146	4.069
Degrees of Freedom	3	3	3	3
N	57	55	38	435

Sources: Republic of Singapore, White Paper on the Report of the Electoral Boundaries Delineation Committee, 1976 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1976); Republic of Singapore, White Paper on the Report of the Electoral Boundaries Delineation Committee, 1980 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1980); Republic of Singapore, White Paper on the Report of the Electoral Boundaries Delineation Committee, 1984 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984); and Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Note: Equations estimated using dichotomous Logit. * $p < .05$

³¹ In 1968, the Barisan Sosialis, the major opposition party at the time, boycotted the election. See “Who Is Afraid of Voting against PAP? Among the Issues the Participants Raised Was the Perennial Question on Whether There Is a Climate of Fear in Singapore,” *Straits Times*, April 13, 2006, LexisNexis database.

³² Election years in table 3 refer to the year in which the boundaries were modified. For “1976,” then, data on the level of opposition voting come from the previous parliamentary election, or 1972.

altered), and an interaction term between these first two independent variables constitute the substantive regressors.

As the last column of coefficients demonstrates, none of the regressors has any statistically significant effect across all three elections. Nor does any independent variable reach significance for the 1984 contest. In 1980, however, it appears that the Electoral Boundaries Delineation Committee gerrymandered the districts to reduce the odds of the opposition winning any seats ($b = .246, p < .05$). In this same year, bordering one of the top two opposition constituencies (Kampong Chai Chee and Telok Blangah) substantially increased a district's odds of having its own boundaries modified ($b = 9.075, p < .05$), but reduced the net effect of the opposition vote to almost zero ($b = -.283, p < .05$ for interaction effect). Bizarrely enough, the committee seems to have modified the boundaries in 1976 to *protect* high-opposition constituencies ($b = -.135, p < .05$), but neither the variable for bordering a top-two opposition district nor

Table 4. Determinants of Boundary Changes, 1991-2006 Parliamentary Elections

	1991	1997	2001	2006	1991-2006
Opposition Vote	-.069	-.107	-.271	-.092	-.044*
Border Opp. Const.	-2.452				-2.557
Opp. Vote X Border	.088				.099
Constant	2.430	6.272*	12.195*	.970	1.838*
Nagelkerke R ²	.099	.270	.698	.157	.115
χ^2	3.832	4.399*	8.733*	1.420	9.184*
Degrees of Freedom	3	1	1	1	3
N	50	26	15	13	104

Sources: Republic of Singapore, *Report on the Delineation of Electoral Boundaries and the Creation of Group Representation Constituencies*, Cmd. 7 of 1988 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1988); Bertha Henson and Zuraidah Ibrahim, "21 Single-Member Wards, 15 GRCs for Next Election," *Straits Times*, October 10, 1991, <http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/dream/politics/ref/grc3.html> (accessed August 9, 2007); Republic of Singapore, *Report of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee, 1991*, Cmd. 12 of 1991 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1991); Republic of Singapore, *Report of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee, 1996*, Cmd. 17 of 1996 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1996); Chua Lee Hoong, "New Ground for Opposition, Old Choices for Voters," *Straits Times*, October 18, 2001, H4; Jeremy Grace, *Case Study: Singapore*, Delimitation Equity Project, IFES/Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2004), 11; "What the Report Said: The Electoral Boundaries Committee Made Public Its Much-Anticipated Report on Changes to Constituencies on Friday," *Straits Times*, March 5, 2006, Lexis/Nexis; Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Note: Equations estimated using dichotomous Logit. Models for 1997, 2001, and 2006 data include only one substantive regressor to reduce computational problems with small-N maximum-likelihood. * $p < .05$

the corresponding interaction term achieved statistical significance.

In a parallel, post-GRC regression, table 4 estimates the effect of the opposition vote and, for 1991 and 1991-2006, a variable for bordering a top-two opposition district plus a related interaction term on the odds of a constituency having its boundaries modified. As for the 1976 boundaries changes, the relevant committee appears to have specially protected some opposition constituencies from 1991 through 2006 (b for opposition vote = -.044, $p < .05$). Indeed, the more-or-less progovernment *Straits Times* seems to admit as much, arguing that moderate opposition candidate Chiam See Tong’s Potong Pasir constituency remained untouched in 2001—despite having the fewest number of voters—because the “ruling party... accept[ed...] the incumbent.”³³ Also in table 4, no substantive regressor in any of the individual election years reached statistical significance, and neither the variable for bordering an opposition district nor the interaction term had any influence in the 1991-2006 model. The PAP thus seems to have achieved its primary objective of establishing a stable, opposition-adverse electoral system with the creation of the GRCs in 1988, and may feel confident enough with its overwhelming majority in parliament to allow or even foster a handful of safe opposition seats for show.

Yet another possible source of the PAP’s electoral advantage may lie in the party’s ability to prevent or dissuade potential opposition candidates from running for office at all.³⁴ In such walkover districts, the PAP wins by default. If one regresses the odds of a walkover during the 1991-2006 general

Table 5. Determinants of Walkovers, 1991-2006 Parliamentary Elections

	Estimate
Opposition Vote	-.086
Group Representation Constituency	3.611*
Constant	-1.032
Nagelkerke R ²	.470
χ^2	25.723*
Degrees of Freedom	2
N	75

Source: Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Note: * $p < .05$

³³ Chua Lee Hoong, “New Ground for Opposition, Old Choices for Voters,” *Straits Times*, October 18, 2001, H4.

³⁴ In a city-state in which the PAP is close to all-powerful, it is not hard to imagine that potential opposition candidates would hesitate to “ruin themselves” by running against the ruling party. And even if the candidate him- or herself would be willing to run, his or her more sober family

elections on the opposition vote and whether the constituency is a GRC, the first regressor fails to achieve statistical significance (see table 5). The dummy variable for a district being a Group Representation Constituency, however, is large and significant ($b = 3.611$, $p < .05$). Probably as PAP leaders anticipated, then, the opposition appears especially disadvantaged by having to field multiple candidates from at least two different ethnic groups under the current regulations for running in GRCs.³⁵

Ethnic Politics

Ethnic Setting of Singapore

Although Lee Kuan Yew claims that Singapore's economic opportunities are equally available to citizens of all ethnic groups, the society is effectively stratified into three principal layers. At the top is the 75 percent of the population who are ethnically Chinese (typically ethnic Fujianese, Cantonese, or Hakka). Their average monthly income in 2006 was Sg\$6,520, and 10.8 percent of Chinese citizens were university graduates in 2000. A close second in prosperity is the 9 percent of the resident nationals who are Indian (generally Tamils). Their income (Sg\$5,940/month in 2006) and educational attainment almost reach those of the Chinese majority (8.1 percent university graduates in 2000). Finally, Malays fall at the bottom of the society, making up 14 percent of the population and being relegated to almost half the average monthly income (Sg\$3,850 in 2006) and a fifth of the educational attainment (1.8 percent university graduates in 2000) of Chinese.³⁶ Such inter-ethnic inequality produces "the acute sense of relative deprivation generally felt by the Malay community with their persisting place in the socio-economic

members may well dissuade him or her against such a "rash" action. Another disincentive for the opposition is that those candidates who receive less than one-eighth of the total vote in a given constituency lose their hefty "election deposit," set at Sg\$13,500 for 2006. See "Electoral Boundaries Report to be Made Public Soon: DPM Wong," *Channel NewsAsia*, March 1, 2006, <http://www.chanelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/195692/1.html> (accessed December 4, 2007), and Workers' Party of Singapore, "Election Deposits in Singapore," http://www.wp.org.sg/news/hammer_online/09_election_deposits.htm (accessed December 4, 2007).

³⁵ Chee Soon Juan et al., *Elections in Singapore: Are They Free and Fair? An Open Singapore Centre Report on the Conduct of Parliamentary Elections in Singapore*, 16-17.

³⁶ Singapore Department of Statistics, "Changing Educational Profile of Singapore Population," paper presented at Conference on Chinese Population and Socioeconomic Studies: Utilizing the 2000/2001 Round Census Data, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, June 19-21, 2002, <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/papers/people/cp-education.pdf> (accessed September 12, 2007); Singapore Department of Statistics, "Key Household Income Trends, 2006," Occasional Paper on Income Statistics (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2007), 3, <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/papers/people/op-s12.pdf> (accessed September 12, 2007); and Singapore Department of Statistics, *Singapore Resident Population 1990-2006* (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2007), <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/respop1990-2006.pdf> (accessed September 13, 2007).

margins of society.”³⁷ Given that Malays might feel that PAP dominance does not work toward their economic advantage and that many supported the early Barisan Sosialis opposition party,³⁸ we may expect the Malay minority to vote for opposition candidates more frequently than do Chinese- and Indian-Singaporeans.

Empirical Tests of Political Differences by Ethnicity

A first attempt to test if Singaporeans of different ethnic groups vary in their satisfaction with the ruling PAP leadership uses the Singapore subset of the 2002 World Values Survey.³⁹ The original dependent variable is divided into four categories: respondents who claim to be “very satisfied” with “the way the people now in the government [i.e., the PAP elite] are handling the

Table 6. Determinants of Individuals’ Dissatisfaction with Government in 2002

	Estimate
Malay	-.164
Indian	-.325*
Education	.103*
Income	.021
Female	-.025
Age Category	-.069
Constant 1 (Y = 1)	-1.078*
Constant 2 (Y = 2)	2.516*
Nagelkerke R ²	.028
χ ²	30.069*
Degrees of Freedom	6
N	1,342

Source: Singapore subset of 2002 World Values Survey.
 Note: Equation estimated using ordinal Logit. Dependent variable = 1 if respondent “very satisfied” with actions of “the people now in the government,” Y = 2 if “fairly satisfied,” and Y = 3 if “fairly dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.” All regressors are dummy variables except for Education (range = 1 to 8), Income (1 to 10), and Age Category (1 to 6). **p* < .05

³⁷ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay Community* (Salangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1998), 24.
³⁸ Zubaidah Rahim, “SDP’s Chee Soon Juan Declared Bankrupt, Cannot Stand for Election till 2011,” 73-75.
³⁹ European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, “European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004,” v. 20060423, 2006. Data available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>. Neither the producers nor the distributors of these data are responsible for my analysis or interpretations.

country's affairs," interviewees merely "fairly satisfied," those who are "fairly dissatisfied," and those who are "very dissatisfied." Overall, 22.5 percent of the valid respondents chose "very satisfied" and 68.7 percent "fairly satisfied," but only 6.8 percent answered "fairly dissatisfied" and 2.1 percent "very dissatisfied." The relatively few respondents in these latter two categories were then conflated into a single grouping for the multivariate analysis. Regressing this three-value dependent variable on ethnicity plus a set of demographic controls (education, income, gender, and age) does not produce a statistically significant difference between the political views of ethnic Chinese (the omitted category⁴⁰) versus ethnic Malays. Ethnic Indians, however, seem even more satisfied with the PAP government ($b = -.325, p < .05$) than are the Chinese majority. Among the control variables, greater education appears to boost dissatisfaction with the ruling party ($b = .103, p < .05$). Income,⁴¹ gender, and age do not achieve statistical significance, however.⁴²

A second strategy for estimating the degree of ethnicity-based political opposition in Singapore is to examine actual voting results. As noted above, detailed voting tables remain a "state secret," but two methods may nevertheless give us a preliminary picture of the ethnic vote. First, we may compare the average level of opposition voting in those 2006 GRCs that require at least one candidate to be Malay (Aljunied, Bishan-Toa Payoh, East Coast, Hong Kah, Jalan Besar, Jurong, Marine Parade, Pasir Ris-Punggol, and Tampines) with the corresponding level of non-PAP voting in GRCs that oblige at least one of the contestants to be Indian or another non-Malay minority (Ang Mo Kio, Holland-Bukit Timah, Sembawang, Tanjong Pagar, and West Coast).⁴³ One would assume that the first set of constituencies contains a larger proportion of Malays than the second, and, conversely, that the second set of districts includes a larger percentage of Indians than the first. Overall, this analysis reveals that, in 2006, the Malay GRCs voted for the opposition at 35 percent, while the Indian/other GRCs gave 28 percent of their ballots to non-PAP candidates. Substantively, these results could suggest that Malays may well be

⁴⁰ The few respondents not belonging to one of the three major ethnic groups in Singapore were omitted from the regression analysis.

⁴¹ For a similar result for class, see Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and Its Political Significance."

⁴² Because citizens may fear retribution from openly expressing dissatisfaction with Lee and his allies (*Straits Times*, "Who Is Afraid of Voting against PAP?"), I also ran a parallel, dichotomous-Logit regression comparing respondents who claimed to be "very satisfied" with those who said they were "fairly satisfied," "fairly dissatisfied," or "very dissatisfied." Presumably, Singaporeans who actually oppose the PAP may feel safer responding "fairly satisfied" instead of answering "fairly dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied." The results for the effect of being an ethnic Malay or Indian remained substantively the same, however. Age nonetheless achieved statistical significance ($b = -.092, p < .05$).

⁴³ Elections Department Singapore, "Types of Electoral Divisions."

Table 7. Opposition Voting by Ethnicity, 1976, 1988, and 2006 Parliamentary Elections

	1976	1988	2006
Chinese, % Opp. (standard error)	23.7* (1.3)	28.6* (1.9)	34.8* (3.6)
Malay, % Opp. (standard error)	43.2* (5.4)	70.4* (5.8)	22.7* (8.6)
Indian, % Opp. (standard error)	11.0 (9.8)	10.5 (11.1)	38.5 (25.1)
N	53	54	13

Source: Khoo Chian Kim, *Census of Population 1980, Singapore*, Release No. 5: Geographic Distribution (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1980), 210-219; Lau Kak En, *Singapore Census of Population 1990, Statistical Release 5: Transport and Geographic Distribution* (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1990), 98-100; Leow Bee Geok, *Census 2000, Statistical Release 4: Geographic Distribution and Travel* (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000), 44-50; Periplus WallMaps, “Singapore Wall Map” (Hong Kong: Periplus Editions, 2005); and Elections Department Singapore, <http://www.elections.gov.sg> (accessed June 5, 2006).

Note: Equations estimated using Gary King’s method of ecological inference (Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], and Ezi software, <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/eziwin.exe>). For further technical details, see footnotes 44 to 46. * $p < .05$

slightly more supportive of the opposition than are Indians.

Next, as table 7 documents, one may make use of the recently developed King method of ecological inference to estimate the ethnic vote in the parliamentary elections of 1976, 1988, and 2006.⁴⁴ Although the relatively small number of Indians in each constituency prevents much precision in calculating this ethnic group’s degree of opposition voting, estimates for the comparatively large populations of Chinese and Malays are robust. The results

⁴⁴ Census and electoral districts were usually identical for the 1976 and 1988 data. For 2006, however, I needed to interpolate census data on ethnicity. The percentage of Chinese, Malays, and Indians in each 2006 electoral constituency was thus assumed to be the same as the overall percentage of these groups in the population of some combination of the 2000 census’s Development Guide Plans and/or DGP subzones. To estimate the proportion of a given ethnic group in the 2006 Aljunied Group Representation Constituency, I used the census data for Bedok DGP subzones Bedok Reservoir and Kaki Bukit, Hougang DGP subzones Rosyth, Trafalgar, and Others, Serangoon DGP subzones Serangoon Garden and Serangoon Central; for Ang Mo Kio GRC, Sengkang DGP subzones Others, Yishun DGP subzones Others, Ang Mo Kio DGP subzones Cheng San, Chong Boon, Sindo, Townsville, Others, Serangoon DGP subzones Seletar Hills and Serangoon North; for Bukit Panjang Single Member Constituency, Bukit Panjang DGP subzones Fajar and Bangkit; for Chua Chu Kang SMC, all of Choa Chu Kang DGP zone except for subzone Yew Tee; for East Coast GRC, all of Changi DGP, Tampines

reveal that in 1976, about 24 percent of the Chinese voted for the opposition, while Malays supported non-PAP candidates at almost twice (43 percent) the Chinese rate. The general election of 1988⁴⁵ appears to represent the high point of Chinese versus Malay ethnic conflict, with Chinese giving about 29 percent of their votes to the opposition compared to the Malays' anti-PAP vote of 70 percent. In the 2006 election,⁴⁶ ethnicity-based voting appears to have declined.⁴⁷ The difference in opposition voting between the two major ethnic groups has fallen to only 12 percent, but interestingly enough, it is now the *Chinese*—not the Malay minority—who are more opposed to the PAP (35 percent opposition voting by the Chinese versus 23 percent by the Malays). And without additional data, our best guess at the voting behavior of Indians is that it is relatively close to that of the Chinese majority.

Conclusion

The above empirical results thus cast doubt on the extent to which Singapore's elections are truly free and fair and on the degree to which the city-state's

DPG subzones Others, and Bedok DPG subzone Bedok South; for Hougang SMC, Hougang DGP subzones Hougang Central and Lorong Ah Soo; for Jalan Besar GRC, Kallang DPG subzones Bendemeer, Boon Keng, Geylang Bahru, Lavender, Downtown Core DPG, Rochor DPG, River Valley DPG; for Joo Chiat SMC, Bedok DGP subzone Frankel; for MacPherson SMC, Geylang DGP subzone MacPherson; for Nee Soon Central SMC, Yishun DGP subzones Yishun West and Yishun South; for Nee Soon East SMC, Yishun DGP subzones Northland and Yishun East; for Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC, all of Pasir Ris DGP and Sengkang DGP subzone Sungei Serangoon West; for Potong Pasir SMC, Toa Payoh DGP subzones Kallang and Potong Pasir; for Sembawang GRC, Woodlands DGP, Sembawang DGP; for Tampines GRC, Tampines DGP subzones Tampines East and Tampines West; for Yio Chu Kang SMC, Ang Mo Kio DGP subzones Shangri-La, Kebun Bahru, and Yio Chu Kang. I arrived at these equivalent combinations of areas by consulting such geographical sources as Google Earth for Singapore, a commercial Singapore street map, and various governmental publications on population, urban development, and electoral boundaries (see note at bottom of table 7 for further details).

⁴⁵ To achieve maximum-likelihood convergence of the model for the 1988 election, I needed to exclude data from opposition leader Chiam See Tong's Potong Pasir SMC, which appears to have been specially protected by the government-appointed boundaries committee.

⁴⁶ To reach convergence for the model of the 2006 election, I was required to separate data from the opposition-held constituencies of Potong Pasir and Hougang, both of which seem to have received special protection from the boundaries committee (see Chua Lee Hoong, "New Ground for Opposition, Old Choices for Voters," *Straits Times*, October 18, 2001, H4: The "survival [of Hougang and Potong Pasir] as single seats can be read only as the ruling party's nod, not only to the usefulness of opposition voices in Parliament, but also to its acceptance of the incumbent MPs"), and from the Aljunied GRC, perhaps because it completely surrounds the anomalous Hougang SMC.

⁴⁷ Another possibility is that the PAP systematically tries to exclude Malay citizens from the electorate through such tactics as intimidation or deregistering at the next election those electors who have failed to vote. My attempts to test this hypothesis using the King method did not prove successful, however, primarily because statistics on the number of citizens (as opposed to non-citizen residents) living in each constituency do not appear to be publicly available.

various ethnic groups agree politically. Although PAP officials do not use every possible opportunity to gerrymander or abolish electoral districts to the ruling party's advantage, the boundaries committees do adjust the electoral rules enough to ensure that opposition parties have no chance of mounting a significant challenge to the PAP in parliament. In particular, the GRC system instituted in 1988 gives the PAP great control over the eventual results of the general election.

While Malays appear to have been the ethnic group most likely to oppose the Chinese-dominated PAP in the first couple of decades of independent Singapore,⁴⁸ later desegregation of the city⁴⁹ may have blunted Malays' ethno-political solidarity. In their place has arisen the next generation of opposition leaders, such as Chee Soon Juan, who are highly educated, middle-class, and ethnically Chinese. As modernization theory predicts,⁵⁰ the creation of a large middle class seems to be threatening the PAP's ability to monopolize political power. No longer willing to be treated like "children" by the older generation of PAP leaders,⁵¹ today's Chinese young people have been showing such signs of mild rebellion as listening to anti-government music⁵² or sitting down on the floors of MRT trains. Even political patriarch Lee Kuan Yew seems to have harbored momentary doubts about the future of his political system after a group

⁴⁸ In a mirror image of ethnic politics in early Singapore, the large ethnic Chinese minority in neighboring Malaysia also seems much more likely to support the Democratic Action Party, one of the most popular opposition parties there, than is the ethnic Malay majority (Heng Pek Koon, "Malaysia," in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, ed. Lynn Pan [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999], 172-182, and Amy L. Freedman, "The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas Acculturation: The Case of Malaysia," *Modern Asian Studies* 35, no. 2 [2001]: 411-440).

⁴⁹ Leo van Grunsven, "Integration versus Segregation: Ethnic Minorities and Urban Politics in Singapore," *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie* 83, no. 3 (1992):196-215; Chih Hoong Sin, "The Politics of Ethnic Integration in Singapore: Malay 'Regrouping' as an Ideological Construct," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27, no. 3 (September 2003): 527-544; and Grace, *Case Study: Singapore*, 4. According to the Minister for National Development quoted by van Grunsven, desegregation was desirable because "living in separate enclaves, [ethnic] community leaders will develop narrow views of society's interests. The enclaves will become the seedbeds for communal agitation. We will witness the unraveling of [the multiethnic society] we have knit so carefully since independence."

⁵⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 50-53.

⁵¹ See Internet discussion, "Singaporean is Unwanted Friend?" http://matrix.bangkokpost.co.th/forums/thread.php?Thread_ID=1579 (accessed September 12, 2007).

⁵² Phua Siew Chye and Lily Kong, "Ideology, Social Commentary and Resistance in Popular Music: A Case Study of Singapore," *Journal of Popular Culture* 30, no. 1(1996): 215-231. Lyrics by the Singaporean counter-cultural band, Raw Fish, for example, openly mock the government's ban on chewing-gum: "I don't know if you are a god, or if you are a king/Or if you are government./Show me a sign that says if I chew bubble gum/I will fall straight into fire, fire in hell."

of young Singaporean journalists harshly questioned him on live television.⁵³ Given Lee's advanced age (he turns eighty-five in September 2008⁵⁴) and the democratic aspirations of at least some of the young, highly educated Chinese citizens of the island nation, his particular version of soft authoritarianism may well face choppy waters in the next few decades.

As Jeremy Grace has pointed out,⁵⁵ the government's engineering of the electoral apparatus is not necessary to ensure a substantial PAP majority in the legislature for the immediate future. Older, "pre-1965" (Singapore became an independent republic in 1965) Chinese voters might still regard the PAP as the party of choice. Yet as these "veteran" citizens pass from the scene, their children and grandchildren may prefer to transform Singapore's party and electoral systems into ones that more closely resemble those in democratic but one-party-dominant Japan and Sweden or even those in the more competitive, "balanced" democracies of South Korea, Taiwan, or Germany.⁵⁶

⁵³ Seth Mydans, "Change Unlikely as Singapore Votes, but the Young Chafe," *New York Times*, May 6, 2006, p. A7; see also Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000*, 132.

⁵⁴ Seth Mydans and Wayne Arnold, "Modern Singapore's Creator Is Alert to Perils," *New York Times*, September 2, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com> (accessed September 4, 2007).

⁵⁵ Jeremy Grace, *Case Study: Singapore*, 6.

⁵⁶ For similar predictions, see John L. S. Girling, *The Bureaucratic Polity in Modernizing Societies: Similarities, Differences, and Prospects in the ASEAN Region* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981), 52, and Hussin Mutalib, "Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore."

