

# The Structure of Taiwan's Political Cleavages toward the 2004 Presidential Election A Spatial Analysis

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## Abstract

The cleavage structure in a democracy is crucial to its stability. Since the 1990s, more people on Taiwan have embraced Taiwanese identity, and most elite groups have accepted the principle of "Taiwan priority." Despite these unmistakable trends, the issue of national identity has retained its seemingly dominant salience, to the extent of eclipsing all other potential cleavages. This essay employs spatial analysis to investigate the cleavage structure in Taiwan toward the 2004 presidential election. The findings reveal that, as of 2003, Taiwan's political space was dominantly defined by the Green vs. Blue dimension. The essay discusses the implications of these findings for Taiwan's democratic future.

**Key words:** Taiwan, democracy, democratic consolidation, democratic transition, election, national identity, pluralism, political cleavage, spatial analysis, TEDS.

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In an article published in *World Politics*, Lin, Chu, and Hinich presented a spatial analysis of the political cleavages in post-transition Taiwan.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan," *World Politics* 48, no. 4 (1996): 453-481.

analysis found that, by 1992, a cleavage on socioeconomic justice had emerged, cutting across the traditional cleavage on national identity. The existence of cross-cutting cleavages, the authors argued, provided competing elites with opportunities for electoral and legislative realignments and hence was conducive to the consolidation of democracy.

Since 1992, there is evidence that both voters and elites have shifted their positions on the national identity issue toward greater consensus. Periodic surveys conducted by the Election Study Center (ESC) of National Chengchi University show a significant trend in favor of Taiwanese identity.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, since the National Development Conference in 1996, politicians of all parties have embraced the principle of “Taiwan priority.”<sup>3</sup> What is puzzling, however, is that the issue seems to have retained its seemingly dominant salience in elections, in particular, in the 2004 presidential election.

What exactly was the cleavage structure in Taiwan toward the 2004 election? More than ten years after 1992, was it true that voters still perceived national identity as the dominant political cleavage? What was the distribution of their positions on the issue and how did they perceive the positions of politicians? Were there other significant cleavages that politicians manipulated electorally and legislatively? The Taiwan Election and Democratization Study’s 2003 survey (henceforth TEDS 2003) included items specifically designed for spatial analysis that allowed us to revisit the important questions raised in our 1996 article. In this essay, we will address these questions in the pre-2004 context and discuss their implications for the future of democracy in Taiwan.

## Theoretical Perspectives

As early as the 1960s, scholars provided various theories for understanding the transition to democracy. These include macro-level explanations based on socioeconomic variables, as represented by Lipset; micro-level explanations based on shared beliefs and attitudes among citizens, conspicuously Almond and Verba’s theory of “civic culture”; and the pluralist/elitist theories which emphasize the role of political leaders in shaping the process of conflict and reconciliation that are essential to democracy, for example, as articulated by Truman, Schattschneider, Dahl, and McClosky.<sup>4</sup> Rustow reviews these

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<sup>2</sup> Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2007),” <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm> (accessed November 1, 2008).

<sup>3</sup> John Higley, Tong-yi Huang, and Tse-min Lin, “Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan,” *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998):148-163.

<sup>4</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); David Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1975); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); and Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in

theories.<sup>5</sup> He contends that these theories, which draw their conclusions from mature democracies and focus on the question of *stability*, are “functional” and “correlational” in nature. The study of *transitions* to democracy, Rustow argues, should instead address the “genetic” question by providing “causal” explanations.

Rustow himself provides an elitist process model involving four phases. First, there is a background condition requiring national unity, in the sense that the vast majority of citizens are not irreversibly divided in their national identity. Second, a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle characterizes the preparatory phase. Third, in the decision phase, political leaders *deliberately* agree to “accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure.”<sup>6</sup> And, finally, through a habituation phase, the routinization of democracy is explained by the need for cognitive consonance, rational incentive, as well as political practicalities.

From Rustow’s model, we see that, if there is a single dominant cleavage, and if the cleavage is based on an *irreversibly* divided national identity, there is little chance that minority elites will rely on existing democratic institutions, specifically elections, to facilitate political and social change. Rustow’s background condition is “that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to,” and he speaks generally about national unity.<sup>7</sup> Such “unity” presumably has ethnic, racial, religious, and probably also linguistic components. Where more or less majoritarian electoral systems prevail, the dominance of a single, symbolic issue dimension tends to create political polarization between the majority and the minority. Thus, one may hypothesize that, if a national identity cleavage dominates the political struggle, or if all other issues reinforce that cleavage, then electoral incentives are unlikely to motivate elites to comply with democratic rules. Instead, some might seek subversive means or secessionist outlets.

This hypothesis is not necessarily true if the relative advantage of the contending elites in mobilizing a dominant cleavage can be reversed. For example, a minority socialist party might decide to participate in elections because its leaders expect an eventual victory when the number of workers increases with industrialization.<sup>8</sup> Even if class conflict is the single major

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American Politics,” in *Political Opinion and Behavior: Essays and Studies*, ed. Edward Dreyer and Walter Rosenbaum (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970).

<sup>5</sup> Dankwart R. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 337-363.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 355.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 350-351.

<sup>8</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

cleavage, electoral incentives still could work. Nor is the hypothesis necessarily true if the cleavage in question involves tangible and divisible benefits.

Scholars have argued that the stability of democracy entails the perception of politics among elites as “bargaining” rather than “war,” and a view of political outcomes as positive-, rather than zero-sum.<sup>9</sup> In a conflict system dominated by a single, deeply divisive, and irreversible symbolic cleavage, such a perspective is certainly difficult to achieve. When there are two or more competing cleavages, however, the situation is different. The existence of cross-cutting issues and voters’ overlapping membership in different conflict systems provides the possibility for multiple and ever-shifting majorities in the electorate. This situation creates the likelihood of multiple winners on different issue dimensions.

Rustow criticizes the pluralist notions of “multiple membership,” “cross-cutting associations,” and even “displacement of conflicts” as functional and correlational. This is probably due to the fact that pluralist theories of democracy pertain mainly to the mature, long-consolidated, Western democracies, and, hence, lack the explanatory power that Rustow seeks in his genetic and causal approach. In our view, we do not think that these notions are necessarily functional and correlational in the context of democratic transition and/or consolidation. This is especially so because scholars have reinterpreted pluralist notions in terms of social choice theory.

Schattschneider contends that the essence of democracy lies in the exploitation of social conflicts by political leaders and organizations in involving the public in the decision-making process. More recently, social choice theorists have examined the possibility of cyclical majorities in conflict systems involving cross-cutting cleavages.<sup>10</sup> Thus, Schattschneider’s observation that “[e]very shift of the line of cleavage affects the nature of the conflict, produces a new set of winners and losers and a new kind of result”<sup>11</sup> is now seen as based on the Condorcet paradox of voting, in which alternative A beats B, which beats C, which beats A.<sup>12</sup> The more cross-cutting a cleavage structure is, the more likely that winners become losers and losers become

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<sup>9</sup> Giovanni Satori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publisher, 1987), 224-226, and Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, “Introduction: Elites and Democratic Consolidation,” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>10</sup> William H. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982), and Nicholas R. Miller, “Pluralism and Social Choice,” *American Political Science Review* 77, no. 3 (1983): 734-747.

<sup>11</sup> Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*, 61.

<sup>12</sup> Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquise de Condorcet, “Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making,” in *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, ed. Keith Michael Baker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976).

winners. Associating pluralism with social choice, Miller argues that pluralism causes moderate attitudes and behavior, distributes political satisfactions, and encourages electoral calculations and stratagems, all of which are conducive to the stability of democracy. In contrast, in a polarized society divided by a single dominant cleavage or mutually reinforcing cleavages, winning and losing are universal, and instability is very probable.<sup>13</sup>

It is in this theoretical perspective that we concluded in our 1996 article that Taiwan had met the three conditions that we considered conducive to the stability of democracy: (1) the existence of new, cross-cutting issues; (2) the differential advantages of competing elite groups in mobilizing support on different issues; and (3) the possibility of coalitional realignment in both electoral and legislative politics. In our view, the three conditions provide incentives for contending elites to accept the value of democratic institutions and avoid confrontational strategies. The incentives reside in the possibility that different political groups can win the support of the public in different conflict systems, and, hence, make political outcomes positive-sum in the long run.

### **Taiwan toward the 2004 Presidential Election**

Lin, Chu, and Hinich demonstrated through spatial analysis that cross-cutting cleavages had existed in the electorate prior to the 1992 legislative elections.<sup>14</sup> Based on a survey conducted in 1992 by the Institute of Ethnology of Academia Sinica, the spatial analysis confirms that national identity and socioeconomic justice were the defining dimensions of the latent ideological space in which elite competition took place. The recovered maps of politicians' positions indicate that, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the nonmainstream faction of the Kuomintang (KMT) were on the opposite sides of the national identity dimension, they shared the same side on the socioeconomic justice dimension in opposition to President Lee Teng-hui and his KMT mainstream faction.<sup>15</sup> In a separate paper, we discussed the implications of the emerging cleavage structure on Taiwan's legislative politics.<sup>16</sup>

Much has changed since 1996. In March 1996, amid China's missile firings and naval exercises, President Lee, the KMT incumbent, was reelected with 54 percent of the popular vote in Taiwan's first freely contested and

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<sup>13</sup> Miller, "Pluralism and Social Choice."

<sup>14</sup> Lin, Chu, and Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan."

<sup>15</sup> The KMT nonmainstream faction split away from the party in 1993 and formed the New Party (NP).

<sup>16</sup> Yun-han Chu and Tse-min Lin, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, Electoral Competition, and the Emerging Party System," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Hung-mao Tien (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).

direct presidential election. The election, in our view, marked the end of Taiwan's democratic transition. President Lee would soon convene a National Development Conference (NDC), in which participating elites reached crucial consensus on a wide range of issues in the style of an elite settlement.<sup>17</sup> Although important differences remained, elites in Taiwan were unified in their determination to settle the core disputes separating them by democratic means, specifically, elections and legislative maneuvering.

However, Lee's increasingly pro-independence stance on cross-Strait relations rekindled symbolic struggles on the national identity cleavage. In 1999, in an interview with a German broadcasting company, Deutsche Welle, he spoke of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China as having a "special state-to-state relationship." The statement not only angered China but also further alienated factions of the KMT that had sought a more moderate approach toward cross-Strait relations. Soong Chu-yu (James), who had resigned as Governor of Taiwan Province in protest against the NDC's agreement to abolish the Taiwan Provincial Government as an autonomous body, declared his independent candidacy for the 2000 presidential election. The split of the KMT resulted in the defeat of Lien Chan, the party's official nominee. In a tight three-way race, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian won unexpectedly with only 39 percent of the vote, compared with 37 percent for Soong and 24 percent for Lien.

The defeat of the KMT, which had ruled Taiwan for fifty years, led to a shake-up of Taiwan's party system. Soong soon formed the People First Party (PFP), with himself as its chairman. Lee, under pressure from disillusioned KMT members who suspected that he did not support Lien wholeheartedly, resigned as the party's chairman. That cleared the way for Lien to lead the KMT in a direction that appealed to the party's conservatives on cross-Strait issues. Displeased with Lee's downfall, several members of the original mainstream faction left the KMT to form the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Lee became the "spiritual leader" of the party and was soon ousted from the KMT. The depleted KMT found itself struck by another defeat in the 2001 legislative elections, in which all the new parties participated. In those elections, the DPP secured 87 seats of the 225 seats available, with the KMT winning 68 seats, the PFP 46 seats, and the TSU 13 seats.

The DPP, meanwhile, did not fare well in its first taste of executive power. The initial optimism after President Chen's inauguration quickly turned sour after a couple of administrative missteps. Stock prices plummeted, and the economy went into a recession that would mar almost all of Chen's first term. Even with the help of the TSU, the DPP did not have a majority in the Legislative Yuan and often saw its bills blocked by the KMT-PFP coalition. Complicating the situation, Chen stated in an August 2002 speech, "Simply put, with Taiwan and China on each side of the Strait, each side is a country."

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<sup>17</sup> Higley, Huang, and Lin, "Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan."

Although that pleased former President Lee and members of the TSU, it once again incurred great concerns from China, the international community, as well as Chen's domestic opponents. Chen's administration was often charged with "ruling by ideology," and it countered as often that the opposition was nothing but obstructionist. As the 2004 election approached, the gridlock turned into a vicious mudslinging electoral dogfight between the DPP-TSU on one side and the KMT-PFP on the other.

In spring 2003, Lien and Soong announced that they would run for the presidential and vice-presidential offices on a single ticket against Chen. By this time, it was clear that the elites and the electorate, alike, were deeply divided into two camps, "Green" vs. "Blue," on a continuum that was both partisan and ideological. At the elite level, "Green" signified the DPP-TSU coalition, and "Blue" signified the KMT-PFP coalition, with the TSU and the PFP taking the extreme position on each side, respectively. At the electorate level, the continuum reflected not only support for the parties but also what they stood for ideologically, primarily on the issue of national identity. Specifically, "Green" signified Taiwanese identity, and "Blue" signified Chinese identity. In the heat of a political debate, it was not unusual for a person to be labeled as "dark Green," "light Green," "light Blue," or "dark Blue."

What was not so clear was whether other issues had been coalesced with the "Green vs. Blue" continuum to form a single dominant cleavage or mutually reinforcing cleavages. Specifically, what was the status of the socioeconomic justice cleavage to which we attributed so much importance toward the 2004 election? In the early 1990s, the DPP and the New Party (NP) elites formed an effective coalition against President Lee's money politics. As the DPP ruled the country with support from Lee and his TSU, did the electorate still have concerns about money politics? If it did, against whom did it direct those concerns? There were other issues as well. For example, because its opposition movement was essentially a democratic movement, the DPP in opposition had enjoyed the support of voters with strong beliefs in democracy. With the KMT entrenched in incumbency, however, democratic reform was entangled with national identity because both issues were invoked to fight the KMT's rule.<sup>18</sup> As the two parties had switched their roles, were the two issues still coalesced? Or did democracy become an issue cross-cutting that of national identity? Finally, did the voters view government performance as an issue independent of their positions on national identity? Or did they tend to view it with their ideological lenses?

These are the kinds of questions that we sought to answer with the spatial analysis to which we now turn. In examining Taiwan's cleavage structure, our ultimate goal was to assess the stability of democracy in the country's post-transition development.

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<sup>18</sup> Lin, Chu, and Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan."

## Model, Methods, and Measurement

Enelow and Hinich present an introduction to the theory and methodology of spatial analysis, with empirical applications to American presidential politics.<sup>19</sup> The methodology, originally developed by Cahoon and Hinich, estimates politicians' positions and voters' ideal points in a policy space by analyzing the voters' feelings toward the politicians as measured in an opinion survey.<sup>20</sup> Appendix 1 provides a brief introduction to the methodology.

Following Lin, Chu, and Hinich, this study applied the Cahoon-Hinich spatial analysis to the thermometer data available in TEDS 2003.<sup>21</sup> The question in this survey that solicited the scores was virtually the same as the one used in the 1992 General Survey on Social Changes on which Lin, Chu, and Hinich's publication of 1996 is based:

I'm going to ask you to evaluate several political figures from the perspective of social development on a scale from zero to ten. If you believe that the decisions the following political figure has made about our country's future have led our society to the worst possible outcome, please give him or her zero points. If you believe that the decisions he or she has made have led our society to the best possible outcome, please give him or her ten points. If the outcome was between these two extremes, please give an appropriate number of points.

The political figures included persons in their key positions at the time the survey was conducted in 2003: the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (president), Lu Hsiu-lien (vice president), Yu Shyi-kun (premier), Su Tseng-chang (magistrate of Taipei County), and Hsieh Chang-ting (mayor of Kaohsiung City); the KMT's Lien Chan (chairman of the KMT), Wang Jin-pyng (president of the Legislative Yuan), Ma Ying-jeou (mayor of Taipei), and Chiang Pin-kung (vice president of the Legislative Yuan); the PFP's Soong Chu-yu (chairman of the PFP); Lee Teng-hui (former president and the "spiritual leader" of the TSU);

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<sup>19</sup> James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

<sup>20</sup> Lawrence S. Cahoon, "Locating a Set of Points Using Range Information Only" (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975), and Lawrence S. Cahoon and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Method for Locating Targets Using Range Only," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory* 22, no. 2 (1976): 217-225.

<sup>21</sup> The survey was based on face-to-face interviews conducted August-September 2003. The sample we use in this study is a combination of an independent sample (N=1,164) and a tracking sample (N=510), for a total of N=1,674. The two samples used exactly the same questionnaire. Due to missing values, only N=1,189 respondents are included in the spatial analysis.

and Lee Yuan-tseh (president of Academia Sinica).<sup>22</sup>

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of each politician's thermometer scores. Not surprisingly, the popular mayor of Taipei, Ma Ying-jeou, garnered the highest mean score (6.78). Although former president Lee Teng-hui had the lowest (4.25) mean, he also had the largest standard deviation (3.02), reflecting the bipolarized view toward him among the people. Between the two presidential candidates, President Chen edged Lien Chan by a significant margin (5.37 vs. 5.01).

In implementing the Cahoon-Hinich method, it is necessary to choose one of the politicians, called the "pivot," to be a reference politician. In our experience, it is always desirable to choose a centrist politician as the pivot. Choosing an extreme politician as the pivot often reduces the predictive power of the spatial model. We decided to choose Wang Jin-pyng, president of the Legislative Yuan, as the pivot. Although a vice chairman of the KMT, Wang represented the indigenous faction of the party and was known for his even-handedness in presiding over the Legislative Yuan's meetings.

As the pivot, Wang's scores were subtracted from the other politicians' scores on a respondent-by-respondent basis. The remaining eleven sets of adjusted scores were then subjected to factor analysis. As in conventional factor analysis, the variance-covariance matrix of the scores analyzed could be used to determine the number of significant factors which amounted to the

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Thermometer Scores

Politician	Mean (SD)
Lee Teng-hui	4.25 (3.02)
Chen Shui-bian	5.37 (2.49)
Lee Yuan-tseh	5.25 (2.53)
Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette)	4.57 (2.34)
Yu Shyi-kun	5.18 (2.17)
Hsieh Chang-ting (Frank)	5.20 (2.24)
Su Tseng-chang	5.70 (2.22)
Wang Jin-pyng	5.39 (2.09)
Chiang Pin-kung	5.46 (2.08)
Ma Ying-jeou	6.78 (2.22)
Lien Chan	5.01 (2.28)
Soong Chu-yu (James)	5.18 (2.73)

Note: N=1189.

<sup>22</sup> Although not really a politician, Lee Yuan-tseh was widely seen as a staunch supporter of President Chen. His endorsement for Chen a few days before Election Day in 2000 was considered of critical importance for Chen's election.

dimensionality of the policy space in spatial analysis. Our choice of the pivot—Wang Jin-pyng—led to a two-dimensional space with 46.59 percent variance explained by the first dimension, and 27.16 percent variance explained by the second dimension. According to the rule of thumb that a 10 percent variance explained indicates a significant factor, we proceeded to estimate the spatial model with two dimensions.


In the section that follows, we report the estimates of the Cahoon-Hinich model and check the empirical validity of the revealed dimensions by augmenting spatial analysis with regression analysis. Specifically, we sought the interpretation of each dimension by regressing the components of the estimated voters' ideal points on a battery of attitudinal and demographic variables. This approach, which was first used in Lin, Chu, and Hinich's work, not only reveals the substantive correlates of the dimensions but also provides an assessment of the relative importance of each dimension. The substantive variables we used as the regressors included a "Green vs. Blue" partisan scale, Chinese identity, belief in democracy, concerns about money politics, dissatisfaction with the Chen administration, income, education, age, and sex. They were chosen because they covered a wide range of cleavages that existed or could exist in Taiwanese politics, namely, partisanship, national identity, democracy, socioeconomic justice, administrative performance, class, education, generation, and gender. All these variables were available in TEDS 2003. A detailed discussion of how they were measured and/or constructed is provided in appendix 2.

### **The Spatial Maps and Their Interpretations**

Figure 1 shows the positions of the politicians as estimated by the Cahoon-Hinich method in a two-dimensional space. The array of the politicians on the first (horizontal) dimension clearly reflects the divide between the Green and the Blue camps, with Green politicians on the left and Blue politicians on the right, separated by a significant gap. Not surprisingly, former President Lee and President Chen led the Green politicians on the far left, and Chairman Soong of the PFP and Chairman Lien of the KMT led the Blue politicians on the far right. Interestingly, President Lee of Academia Sinica took the third position on the left, but the other four DPP politicians—Lu, Yu, Hsieh, and Su—were rather indistinguishable in their horizontal coordinates. On the right hand side, Mayor Ma of Taipei took the third position, with Chiang at fourth and Wang at fifth. As expected, the position of Wang, our pivot, was the closest to the center on this dimension. The Cahoon-Hinich method dutifully identified the Green-Blue cleavage as the first dimension of Taiwan's political space.

The second (vertical) dimension of the space, however, is not so easy to interpret. Ranking at the top of this axis were leaders from both camps. Indeed, the top four turned out to be top leaders of the four major parties: Soong of the PFP, Lien of the KMT, Lee of the TSU, and Chen of the DPP. Next down the

Figure 1. Perceived Positions of Politicians




ladder were ranking politicians, again from both camps: Vice President Lu, President Wang of the Legislative Yuan, mayors Ma and Hsieh, and Premier Yu. President Lee of Academia Sinica, Vice President Chiang of the Legislative Yuan, and magistrate Su were at the bottom of the scale. Our best interpretation of this dimension is that it simply reflected the politicians' ranking within their respective camps. Still, there is a question as to why voters would include the second dimension in their voting considerations. We return to this question below with regression analysis.

Figure 2 shows the estimated voters' ideal points, with marks indicating the positions of the two presidential candidates and the mean voter. Each ideal point is distinguished by voting intent: whether the voter intended to vote for Chen, Lien, or otherwise. A few observations are in order. First, the candidates were perceived as taking divergent positions, both far away from

the mean voter. Second, although Lien's position was only slightly closer to the mean voter than Chen's, he was much closer to the mean voter *on the first dimension*. Third, using an item in TEDS 2003 that solicits the respondents' voting intent, table 2 shows that most of the voters who intended to vote for Chen were indeed located closer to Chen, while most of those who intended to vote for Lien were indeed closer to Lien. The correlation between voting intent and spatial location, however, is marred by the fact that there were many undecided voters. We elaborate on this below as an assessment of the validity of the estimated model.

If spatial voting were completely deterministic, a voter would vote for Chen if and only if Chen's position were closer to the voter's ideal point than was Lien's; otherwise the voter would vote for Lien. According to this model,

Figure 2. Candidate Positions and Voter Ideal Points



all the respondents to the left of the oblique line shown on figure 2 should have voted for Chen, while those to the right should have voted for Lien.<sup>23</sup> With the information about the respondents' voting intent, we can compare the predicted vote with the self-reported would-be vote. Figure 2 shows clearly that, relative to the reference line, most of the would-be Chen voters were to the left, most of the would-be Lien voters were to the right, and those undecided or not voting were dispersed. A more exact account on the fit of our spatial model is given in table 2.

Through cross-tabulation, table 2 shows that of the 465 Chen supporters according to the model, only 32, or 6.88 percent, reported their intent to vote for Lien, and of the 724 spatial supporters for Lien, only 47, or 6.49 percent, reported that they would nonetheless vote for Chen. Because a substantial proportion (40.87 percent overall) of the respondents were undecided or otherwise would not vote for either candidate, the predictive power of the model can be assessed only after excluding those respondents. Among the 703 respondents who had made a choice between Chen and Lien, the spatial model correctly predicted the voting intent of 89 percent of them. Since spatial voting in any realistic sense must be probabilistic, a certain amount of prediction error should be expected. In fact, the vote among these reportedly decided voters, 38.55 percent for Chen vs. 61.45 percent for Lien, was virtually identical with the predicted vote based on all the 1,189 respondents: 39.11 percent for

Table 2. Comparison of Predicted Vote Choice and Reported Voting Intent

Predicted vote choice based on spatial model of voting	Reported Voting Intent			Total
	Chen	Undecided or Not Voting	Lien	
Chen	224 (48.17)	209 (44.95)	32 (6.88)	465 (100%) [39.11]
Lien	47 (6.49)	277 (38.26)	400 (55.25)	724 (100%) [60.89]
Total	271 (22.79)	486 (40.87)	432 (36.33)	1189 (100%) [100%]

Note: Row percentages are in parentheses; column percentages are in brackets.

<sup>23</sup> The line is perpendicular to the line segment connecting the positions of the two candidates at its midpoint. Although we are using quadratic Euclidean distance, relative position is the same in quadratic Euclidean distance as in simple Euclidean distance.

Chen vs. 60.89 percent for Lien. On this account, the predictive validity of the estimated model seems to be excellent.<sup>24</sup>

Next, we turn to regression analysis on both coordinates of the estimated ideal points to check the validity of our interpretation of the dimensions. We expected the “Green vs. Blue” continuum to load highly on the first dimension. An increase in “Blueness” should lead to an increase in the first-dimension coordinate. Since the cleavage was mainly manifested in issues concerning cross-Strait relations and government performance, we also expect national identity and evaluation of government performance to have significant loadings on the first dimension. An increase in Chinese identification or an increase in dissatisfaction with the Chen administration’s performance should also lead to an increase in the first-dimension coordinate. Two other attitudinal variables are also included in our regressions. Belief in democracy and concerns about money politics were shown to work against the KMT when it was the incumbent party and in favor of the DPP and NP. In particular, Lin, Chu, and Hinich argued that concerns about money politics were chiefly responsible for the emergence of a second dimension in Taiwan’s political space under Lee Teng-hui’s administration.<sup>25</sup> Since the DPP had now become the incumbent party and had formed an alliance with the TSU for which Lee was a “spiritual leader,” we suspected that the effects of both belief in democracy and concerns about money politics perhaps had changed. Including them in the regression analysis allowed us to see whether or how their effects had changed and, more importantly, whether either of them still loaded on the second dimension that our spatial analysis identified. In addition to the five attitudinal variables, we also included the usual demographic variables—income, education, age, and sex—as control variables. We did not include (sub)ethnicity because national identity is more relevant and already had been included.

Table 3 and table 4 show the OLS estimates of the regressions for the first and second dimensions, respectively. As expected, Blueness, Chinese identity, and dissatisfaction with the Chen administration all had significant positive effects on the first dimension. Belief in democracy had lost its effect on this traditional cleavage, and, surprisingly, concerns about money politics now worked in favor of the Blue camp. Apparently, incumbency had taken its toll on the DPP, which was now held responsible by voters who had stronger beliefs in democratic values and who were more concerned about the collusion of politicians/government officials and business conglomerates.

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<sup>24</sup> Note that these results, based on TEDS 2003, are significantly different from the March 20, 2004 election outcomes in which Chen won by a margin of 0.22 percent of valid votes. The 2004 election, of course, was marred by an incident on March 19 in which Chen was shot and slightly wounded and the post-election protests by Lien’s camp, which charged Chen of electoral conspiracy and fraud.

<sup>25</sup> Lin, Chu, and Hinich, “Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan.”

What is most interesting, however, is that none of the attitudinal variables load significantly on the second dimension, rendering impossible its substantive interpretation. The only variables that have significant effects on the second dimension are education and age, both of which are not significant in the first-dimension regression. Neither income nor sex has a significant effect on either dimension.

If the second dimension reflects leadership rankings, then the regression results reveal that both the young and the less-educated were closer to top party leaders on the dimension than older and more-educated people. This does not necessarily imply that the young and the less-educated were more ideologically extreme. On the contrary, it is well known that Taiwanese and Chinese identifiers tend to be older while “both” identifiers tend to be younger.<sup>26</sup> Our findings simply indicate that, compared with older and more-educated people, the young and the less-educated were more supportive of their top party leaders on issues orthogonal to the first dimension. Whatever

Table 3. Regression of First Dimension on Attitudinal and Demographic Variables  
Dependent variable: First dimension of the voters' ideal points

Independent Variable	OLS Estimate (SE)
Intercept	-3.222 (0.273)***
Blueness on the “Green/Blue” scale	0.347 (0.034)***
Chinese identity	0.123 (0.025)***
Belief in democracy	-0.032 (0.076)
Concerns about money politics	0.161 (0.054)**
Dissatisfaction with Chen administration	0.516 (0.051)***
Income	0.001 (0.011)
Education	0.006 (0.015)
Age	-0.000 (0.002)
Female	0.084 (0.059)
N	770
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.453
SEE	0.791

\*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; two-tailed tests.

<sup>26</sup> See I-Chou Liu, “Trends in People’s Taiwanese/Chinese Identity,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Taiwanese Political Science Association, December 13-14, 2003, Taipei, Taiwan. For the effect of education on national identity as more complicated, see Mau-kuei Chang and Hsin-yi Wu, “Education and Its Effects on Tong-Du Inclinations,” *Taiwanese Political Science Review*, no. 2 (1997): 107-187.

Table 4. Regression of Second Dimension on Attitudinal and Demographic Variables  
 Dependent variable: Second dimension of the voters' ideal points

Independent Variable	OLS Estimate (SE)
Intercept	0.428 (0.218)
Blueness on the "Green/Blue" scale	0.040 (0.027)
Chinese identity	0.014 (0.020)
Belief in democracy	0.078 (0.061)
Concerns about money politics	-0.068 (0.043)
Dissatisfaction with Chen administration	-0.007 (0.040)
Income	-0.012 (0.009)
Education	-0.044 (0.012)***
Age	-0.004 (0.002)*
Female	0.036 (0.047)
N	770
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.024
SEE	0.630

\*\*\* p<0.001; \* p<0.05; two-tailed tests.

those issues were, the second dimension apparently did not represent a major cleavage. Note that while the first-dimension regression has an adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of 45.3 percent, the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of the second-dimension regression is a meager 2.4 percent. Clearly, the first dimension represented a dominant cleavage. If the second dimension represented anything, it was the residual of the first dimension. When the Cahoon-Hinich program was asked to come up with a second dimension, it obliged simply by ranking the politicians in terms of their leadership.

To illustrate the dominance of the first dimension once more, table 5 shows the regression of voting intent on the same attitudinal and demographic variables. The results in terms of statistical significance are very similar to those of the first-dimension regression.

Thus, as of 2003, Taiwan's political space was dominantly defined by the "Green vs. Blue" dimension, with an obscure second dimension that reflected leadership rankings within each camp. No longer was socioeconomic justice a cross-cutting issue. Instead, concerns about money politics, the main content of the socioeconomic justice dimension found in our earlier research, joined national identity and dissatisfaction with the administration's performance in forming reinforcing cleavages together with "Green vs. Blue." Belief in democracy ceased to be a reinforcing issue with national identity, but it did not become a cross-cutting issue. Amid the passions of partisan political struggle, it simply dropped out of Taiwan's political map.

Table 5. Regression of Vote Intent on Attitudinal and Demographic Variables  
 Dependent variable: Vote intent (-1: Chen; 0: Undecided/ Nonvoter; 1: Lien)

Independent Variable	OLS Estimate (SE)
Intercept	-2.281 (0.193)***
Blueness on the “Green/Blue” scale	0.326 (0.024)***
Chinese identity	0.081 (0.018)***
Belief in democracy	0.037 (0.054)
Concerns about money politics	0.120 (0.038)**
Dissatisfaction with Chen administration	0.358 (0.036)***
Income	0.007 (0.008)
Education	-0.018 (0.011)
Age	-0.003 (0.002)
Female	0.056 (0.042)
N	770
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.507
SEE	0.559

\*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; two-tailed tests.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Our results have answered questions about Taiwan’s cleavage structure toward the 2004 presidential election, but they also have raised some new questions. How and why did the structural change come about? Why did President Chen and his DPP take a position—or let the voters perceive that he took a position—on national identity away from the mean voter’s position? Last but not least, what are the implications of the structural change on the prospects of Taiwan’s democracy?

If anything, the change of the cleavage structure reflects the die-hard nature of national identity as a political issue in Taiwan. The cross-cutting cleavages of the 1990s emerged mainly because of the KMT’s intraparty power struggle, with President Lee enlisting native politicians, many of whom had strong ties with business conglomerates, to help him fight the party’s conservatives. As money politics became a viable political issue, the DPP leaders were faced with a dilemma: either to cooperate with Lee on the national identity dimension or to ally with the NP on the socioeconomic justice dimension. The DPP leaders at that time, including consecutive chairmen Huang Hsin-jie, Hsu Hsin-liang, and Shih Ming-teh, deliberately chose to be conciliatory on the national identity issue. After the 1995 legislative election, the DPP openly denounced its own image as the party for Taiwan independence, and Chairman Shih proposed

the idea of a “Great Reconciliation.” In response to Shih’s overture, the NP supported his bid for the presidency of the Legislative Yuan. For a moment, the prospect looked very promising for a coalitional “sunshine” cabinet that would focus on socioeconomic issues and fight the KMT-style “black-gold” politics. However, the coalition’s effort failed, defeated by a single vote (81 to 82) in a second balloting. The chance for the cross-cutting cleavages to leave a lasting imprint on the fledging democracy had come and gone.

After Lee Teng-hui became Taiwan’s first popularly elected president in 1996, the relationship among the three parties began to change. At the NDC, conciliation took place between the KMT and the DPP at the expense of the NP. The NP agreed on vital cross-Strait issues, but its members objected to the shrinking of the Taiwan Provincial Government and eventually walked out in protest against a KMT-DPP deal on other constitutional reform items.<sup>27</sup> In the 1998 legislative election, the KMT won a major victory, securing 123 of the 225 seats, and the DDP garnered 70 seats. The NP, meanwhile, started to evaporate. When President Lee gave his infamous “special state-to-state relationship” interview in 1999, many of his fellow party members felt betrayed. His overture to the DPP was so obvious that they doubted his loyalty to the party he led. Soong had left, and Lien was not sure he had Lee’s wholehearted endorsement as his successor for the presidency. The aftermath of the 2000 election left no doubt on anyone’s mind: national identity had once again taken over. The parties—TSU, DPP, KMT, and PFP—in the new party system were now aligned on a one-dimensional map: Green versus Blue. President Chen’s “each side is a country” theory was but a confirmation of his alliance with Lee on the dimension.

So the question is: Why did the DPP change its coalitional strategy? Leadership personality aside, it is arguable that, as of 1995-1996, the DPP was better off not to dwell on the national identity issue. Four ESC surveys during this period show an average of only 24.8 percent Taiwanese identifiers, compared with 20.1 percent Chinese identifiers and 48.1 percent “both” identifiers. Since the cleavage was not irreversible, the DPP could hold onto it and wait until the balance was reversed to its advantage. With the KMT entrenched in incumbency, however, such a strategy would be too passive. The availability of a new, cross-cutting cleavage provided a golden opportunity for a more effective strategy to win power, and it almost succeeded. By the late 1990s, however, the national identity cleavage had changed substantially. Four ESC surveys conducted in 1999-2000 showed an average of 38.4 percent Taiwanese identifiers, 43.6 percent “both” identifiers, and only 11.8 percent Chinese identifiers. The NP had largely disappeared from the scene, and the KMT was crumbling. The DPP was in a position to co-opt Lee’s followers at

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<sup>27</sup> Higley, Huang, and Lin, “Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan.”

both the elite and the grass-roots levels.

Could the DPP have done this by taking a position closer to the mean voter position on the national identity dimension? Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen derive general conditions under which probabilistic spatial voting in a multidimensional space results in a convergent equilibrium at which all candidates take the minimum-sum point—the mean voter position with quadratic Euclidean distance.<sup>28</sup> In reality, however, it is not unusual for parties or candidates to take divergent positions in equilibrium. Schofield and his collaborators have published a series of papers taking on this puzzle.<sup>29</sup> They argue that although spatial voting entails centripetal forces, an endogenous valence dimension can produce centrifugal forces that, in balance, will result in a divergent equilibrium. Specifically, they argue that candidates need financial resources to promote their personal qualities. To solicit campaign contributions, candidates must adopt more extreme positions in order to please party activists, who are usually the major donors. Activists' contributions, however, have diminishing return, and hence an equilibrium will be reached at which candidates take divergent positions away from the zero-sum point. This is a plausible theory for the DPP's strategic behavior in recent years. Compared with the KMT, which owns substantial party assets, the DPP relies much more on campaign contributions. Many of the DPP's donors are overseas activists for Taiwan independence, and it is understandable that the DPP has needed to please them. This explanation, however, must be empirically tested in separate research.

With a one-dimensional cleavage structure in which other issues reinforce national identity, democracy in Taiwan is likely to remain fragile. Those on the minority side of the cleavage are going to perceive the situation as increasingly irreversible. If political leaders do not deliberately agree to the existence of diversity in unity, according to Rustow's model, the routinization—consolidation—of democracy in Taiwan may still have years to go.

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<sup>28</sup> Tse-min Lin, James M. Enelow, and Han Dorussen, "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," *Public Choice* 98, nos. 1-2 (1999): 59-82.

<sup>29</sup> Norman Schofield, "Valence Competition in the Spatial Stochastic Model," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 4 (2003): 371-383; Norman Schofield, Gary Miller, and Andrew Martin, "Critical Elections and Political Realignment in the USA: 1860-2000," *Political Studies* 51, no. 2 (2003): 217-240; and Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (2003): 245-260.

## Appendix 1. The Cahoon-Hinich Methodology

Formally, let  $T_{jm}$  denote the  $m^{\text{th}}$  respondent's thermometer score for candidate  $j$ ; spatial analysis posits that

$$T_{jm} = -[\|\pi_j - z_m\|^2 + aV_j]^{\frac{1}{r}} + e_{jm} \quad (1)$$

where  $\pi_j$  denotes the coordinates of the  $j^{\text{th}}$  politician on a  $k$ -dimensional policy space;  $z_m$  denotes the ideal point of the  $m^{\text{th}}$  respondent in the space;  $\|\pi_j - z_m\|$  denotes the Euclidean distance between  $\pi_j$  and  $z_m$ ;  $V_j$  denotes the  $j^{\text{th}}$  politician's characteristic value (scaled inversely) whose weight,  $a$ , is to be estimated;  $r$  is a predetermined parameter reflecting the sensitivity of  $T_{jm}$  to policy differences and valence; and  $e_{jm}$  is an error term depending only on nonsystematic factors. The Cahoon-Hinich method applies factor analysis on observed values of  $T_{jm}$  to derive estimates for  $\pi_j$ ,  $z_m$ , and  $a$ . The method is implemented in a Fortran program.

TEDS 2003 did not ask respondents to evaluate the politicians' personal qualities, but it did ask them to assess the likeability of five political parties (KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, and TSU). By associating politicians with their parties, it is thus possible to attach some form of valence to the politicians. We tried this approach but found the estimate of  $a$  to be statistically insignificant. The results presented here are based on model (1), without the valence term, i.e.,  $a=0$ .

Following Lin, Chu, and Hinich, we set  $r=1$  in model (1). This essentially assumes that the thermometer scores are linear in quadratic Euclidean distance. The use of quadratic Euclidean distance is common in spatial analysis. Using the simple Euclidean distance ( $r=2$ ) does not change our substantive conclusion.

## Appendix 2. Measurement Scales

**“Green vs. Blue” Scale:** A 5-point scale measuring the degree to which a respondent identifies with the Pan-Green or the Pan-Blue camp. Question H4: “Some people think that they belong to the Pan-Green camp, and some people think that they belong to the Pan-Blue camp. Do you think of yourself as leaning toward the Pan-Green camp or the Pan-Blue camp?” Valid answers are coded 1 = leaning strongly toward the Pan-Green camp; 2 = leaning toward the Pan-Green camp; 3 = neutral; 4 = leaning toward the Pan-Blue camp; and 5 = leaning strongly toward the Pan-Blue camp.

**Chinese Identity:** A 5-point scale measuring the degree to which a respondent identifies with Taiwan or China. Question K1: “In Taiwan, some people think that they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you think that you are Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese?” Valid answers are coded 1 = Taiwanese; 2 = both; and 3 = Chinese. If the answer is “both,” the respondent is further asked Question K1a: “Do you think that you are ‘Taiwanese and also Chinese’ or ‘Chinese and also Taiwanese’?” Valid answers are coded 1 = Taiwanese and also Chinese; 2 = Chinese and also Taiwanese; and 3 = no difference between the two. Combining the answers to the two questions, the Chinese identity scale is coded 1 = Taiwanese; 2 = both/Taiwanese and also Chinese; 3 = both/no difference between the two; 4 = both / Chinese and also Taiwanese; and 5 = Chinese.

**Belief in Democracy:** A composite scale summarizing the scores on five items composed of statements about democratic procedures and institutions. The items are: F8g: “Whether or not an idea should be allowed to flow through society should be decided by the government”; F8j: “In any society, if groups proliferate everywhere, it will influence stability and tranquility in that place”; F8k: “If a country has a lot of political parties, it will influence political stability”; F8m: “When judges rule on important cases which influence law and order, they should accept the opinions of executive organs”; and F8n: “If the government is often checked by the legislature, it can’t possibly accomplish great things.” Answers to each item are coded 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = disagree; and 4 = strongly disagree. The composite scale is the average score on the five items.

**Concerns about “Money Politics”:** A composite scale summarizing the scores on two items concerning “Money and Politics.” The items are: C9: “Our politicians and political parties never publicly disclose how much money they receive from rich people and business conglomerates,” with answers coded 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; and 4 = strongly agree; and C14: “How widespread do you think collusion between high government

officials and business conglomerates is?” with answers coded 1 = very rare; 2 = occasional; 3 = not too rare; and 4 = widespread. The composite scale is the average score on the two items.

**Dissatisfaction with the Chen Administration’s Performance:** Question F4: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the overall performance of the government led by Chen Shui-bian?” Valid answers are coded 1 = very satisfied; 2 = satisfied; 3 = dissatisfied; and 4 = very dissatisfied.

**Income:** Q17: Monthly household income in New Taiwanese dollars. 1 = under 24,000; 2 = 24,000-34,000; 3 = 34,000-44,000; 4 = 44,000-53,000; 5 = 53,000-61,000; 6 = 61,000-72,000; 7 = 72,000-84,000; 8 = 84,000-100,000; 9 = 100,000-130,000; and 10 = over 130,000.

**Education:** Q6: 1 = illiterate; 2 = literate but no formal education; 3 = some primary school; 4 = primary school graduate; 5 = some junior high school; 6 = junior high school graduate; 7 = some senior high or vocational school; 8 = senior high or vocational school graduate; 9 = technical college graduate; 10 = some university; 11 = university graduate; and 12 = graduate school.

**Age:** Q2 – year of birth (Q1)

**Female:** Q20, coded 0 = male and 1 = female.