

External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones A Comparative-Analytical Framework

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Abstract

We investigate whether countries can emerge from civil wars as democracies and to what extent and by what means external actors can support such a transition. While the effects of peacebuilding on peace are well documented, there is hardly any investigation of the effects of peacebuilding on peace *and* democracy. This essay serves as an introduction to a research project hosted by Freie Universität Berlin on postwar democratization. It intends to give an overview of the relevant literature and to describe the research design. We rely on a qualitative comparative approach, using evidence from nine case studies on postwar democratic transitions in Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste. With the exception of the case study on Macedonia, all case studies are presented in this special issue of the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*.

Key words: Peacebuilding, post-conflict democratization, transition, intervention.

From War to Democracy

The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can—to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition?

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While many research efforts have been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence but also succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity.

Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical about the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and to rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia, and Macedonia in the post-Cold War period, to name only a few. What made these cases of postwar democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.

Conceptual Issues

There are a number of highly relevant conceptual issues involved in the study of postwar democratic transition. The most obvious one is about the study variable: scholars of postwar democratization are interested in studying the effects of a number of factors on an outcome, which involves both a measure of democracy and a measure of stability. Traditionally, two distinct bodies of literature have each researched one of these outcomes. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peacebuilding is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy is typically not of interest in this literature. This division of labor may explain why there is little literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes that are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or, to the contrary, is it an artifact of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that postwar countries are, in essence, a subclass of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases *sui generis*.

The researchers who contributed to this special issue of the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* assume that post-conflict countries are substantively different from transition countries for a number of reasons. In postwar countries, the incentives and the constraints for elites are influenced by the fact that security is a scarce good; political elites are exposed to very real physical risks; postwar societies tend to be highly divided; and finally, postwar countries typically lack fundamental administrative capacities, which sets them apart from authoritarian countries that have at least sufficient levels of coercive power. If postwar cases are substantially different from other cases of democratic transitions, then we must account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same or do not necessarily have the same

impact as in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy, respectively, do not necessarily add up, and, indeed, may cancel each other.

Another important conceptual issue relates to our measures and our thresholds for success. By what standards do we qualify a case as a success or as a failure? What and how much of it constitutes a success? Just how much “peace” and how much “democracy” are needed? Setting the bar for success or failure clearly involves a measure of arbitrariness. Standards may be set according to an investigator’s normative conviction that a certain level of democracy and stability is *per se* a desirable goal. Or, standards may be set according to a more functional logic. For example, a certain measure of democracy may be seen as indispensable for sustainable and stable future development. Or, standards may be set taking into account the desire and expectation of the population of the country. Each of these logics may lead researchers to define different thresholds for success, which, in turn, has an impact on data collection, case selection, sampling, and issues of measurement.

But defining “success” is not only about defining a threshold; it also involves selecting and defining the subconcepts of what constitutes a postwar democratization success. It is reasonable to propose that a successful transition from war will result in a polity which is peaceful, democratic, and administered by a state with viable bureaucratic capacities. “Success” thus involves “peace,” “democracy,” and “state-capacities.” Leaving problems of standards, data, and measurements aside, there is the issue of how these concepts are defined and how, if at all, they are causally related. On a highly aggregated, conceptual level, there is little theoretical ambiguity: without peace, there is no democracy and no capable state. Vice versa, democracy is widely seen as a political system which is conducive to international and internal peace, and the absence of war is a precondition for the establishment of a democratic regime. Likewise, state capacities matter for peace: various measures for state capacities such as GDP, newly achieved independence, and central-level political instability are negatively associated with the proneness toward war.¹

But to argue that all these good things go together is of little analytic or practical value for the study of post-conflict democratic transitions, because

¹ Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, World Bank Report (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003); Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, “Greed and Grievances in Civil War” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90; Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, ed. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103-125.

states emerging out of war usually lack peace, democracy, and state capacity. For these states, the question of how these three blessings of political life are related to each other, how they can be built up, and whether they are always mutually supporting, or at times conflicting objectives, is essential.

Interestingly, the different strands of the literature which are relevant for an investigation of post-conflict democratic transitions (the literature on peacebuilding, democratic transitions, democracy theory, power sharing and democratization, and war) very rarely address the relations among all three concepts, nor do they attempt to measure these concepts individually. For example, the peacebuilding literature is concerned with the factors and strategies that account for the absence of war. A peacebuilding success is typically measured by the absence of war, regardless of the level of democracy and the administrative capacities that the state displays. The power sharing literature is interested in the effect of power-sharing agreements on the absence of war, regardless of whether power sharing leads in the long run to more or less democracy. The literature on democratic transitions is interested in the paths that lead from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes, regardless of the war context. It is true that a growing strand of this literature investigates the relation between democratic transition and war, but the question of whether and how state capacities influence this transition is rarely ever researched.²

There may be different reasons why most researchers do not disaggregate the concept of “success” in all of its subcomponents, but focus instead on one or perhaps two components (most often peace or security and democratic quality of the regime).³ Many researchers may only be interested in one particular aspect of the outcome. Furthermore, the fact that consistent data over time on state capacity is not as readily available as data on war and democracy also explains why state capacities are often not explicitly addressed. But the main reason why researchers rarely disaggregate, in our view, stems from the fact that peace, democracy, and state capacity tend to be treated as subconcepts of each other, depending on the primary interest of the researcher. For example, state capacities are implicitly written into most definitions of democracy, that

² For an exception, see Jonathan Wheatley and Christoph Zuercher, “On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes: The State of Democracy in the Caucasus,” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 1 (2008): 1-31.

³ For a notable exception, see Michael Bratton and Eric C. C. Chang, “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?” *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 9 (2006): 1059-1083. They disaggregate the concept of statehood into various components. First, they show that democracies in sub-Sahara emerge only in the context of relatively effective states. Having established the commonplace assumption that democracy needs to be nurtured by political order, they then investigate how statehood and democracy depend on each other. When disaggregating statehood, they find that it is predominately the rule of law that is conducive to democracy. The scope of state infrastructure and the delivery of welfare services have little impact on democratization. Political goods seem to trump economic goods in the consolidation of democracy.

is, they are treated as an integral part of a democratic regime. All complex concepts of democracy, from Dahl's polyarchy⁴ to the "embedded democracy,"⁵ depend implicitly on highly developed, solid state institutions. It is hence no surprise that Charles Tilly writes that "no democracy can work if the state lacks the capacity to supervise democratic decision making and put its results into practice."⁶ Likewise, Larry Diamond states that "whatever the specific form of the post-conflict effort to build democracy, one thing must be stressed above all others: no order, no democracy."⁷

The Empirical Evidence

Let us now return to our core question: Can countries emerge from war as democracies? The empirical evidence with regard to successful democratic transitions, as reflected in the small but growing body of postwar democratization literature, is ambiguous, and much of this ambiguity is due to the fact that different studies use different thresholds and different samples. For example, Bermeo finds that 51 percent of all electoral democracies founded after 1945 were formed "in the immediate aftermath of war."⁸ This is a rosy picture, and it is due to a number of choices. First, in this study, the recurrence of war does not affect the classification as a success. Secondly, cases of recent civil wars (as in Georgia or Sierra Leone) are lumped together with cases of international war (as affected Germany and Japan). Thirdly, the study does not specify what is meant by "immediate aftermath" of war. Arguably, the time that elapses between the end of hostility and the establishment of a new political regime may have a significant impact on the outcome. And fourthly, Bermeo classifies countries as democracies that meet Freedom House standards of "electoral democracy." This category is assigned to countries that have met certain minimum standards concerning the last major national election but are not necessarily fully institutionalized liberal democracies. Thus, even a "partly free" country such as Liberia meets the standards of "electoral democracy."

Equally optimistic are Doyle and Sambanis,⁹ who find that multidimensional peacekeeping operations (missions with extensive civilian functions, economic reconstruction, institutional reforms, and election oversight) are significantly

⁴ Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁵ Wolfgang Merkel, "Embedded and Defective Democracies," *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.

⁶ Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15.

⁷ Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (2006): 96.

⁸ Nancy Bermeo, "What the Democratization Literature Says—Or Doesn't Say—about Postwar Democratization," *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003): 162.

⁹ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 779-801.

and positively associated with peacebuilding success. Note, however, that their measure of success is the absence of large-scale violence and a minimum of political openness, defined as a Polity IV Index score of -7 or higher on a -10 to 10 scale, where -10 denotes a fully autocratic regime and + 10, a fully democratic one. This is clearly a very modest threshold and does not tell us much about the effects of UN peace missions on democracy.

Other authors are far more pessimistic. A study of seventeen recent major UN-led peacebuilding missions finds that, while thirteen missions succeeded in ending the war, only five of them increased the level of democracy in absolute terms five years after the mission had started.¹⁰ This is also quite a modest threshold because a shift from Uzbekistan to Belarus would also be coded as a success. But even then, twelve out of seventeen countries failed to pass this threshold. Since this study focuses on complex UN missions only, there may be a selection bias: it could be that the UN engages only in the most difficult war zones or that UN missions actually reduce the chances for democratic development.

When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after World War II (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission), we find little reason to believe that countries typically emerge from war as democracies. Using the Polity IV index as a measurement of democracy, we find that most war-affected countries do not emerge from war as democracies. Two years after war had ended, only 10 percent of the countries had reached a Polity score of 7 or higher (similar to Kenya, Moldova, or Mali). About half of all war-affected countries (53 percent) show a Polity score of -5 or lower, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. Thirty-seven percent have a Polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan.¹¹

The picture looks equally gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52 percent have a Polity score of -5 or lower; 39.4 percent have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10.6 percent have a score of +7 or higher. In general, values and distributions two years and five years after war end are remarkably similar: when comparing the means of the two samples (Polity scores two years and five years after the conflict), we find a high correlation between the two samples of 0.958 (at a significance level of 0.10). These figures lead us to conclude that democracy does not unfold in the first five years after war.

Note that these figures provide information on the postwar level only. In order to evaluate the effect that war has had on a polity in terms of democratic standards, we need to take into account the prewar democracy scores and take


¹⁰ Christoph Zuercher, *Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building after 1989*, CDDRL Working Papers (Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute on International Studies, 2006): 20.

¹¹ All data are from Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis."

a look at the postwar gains or losses in democracy. When comparing Polity scores five years before with five years after a war, we find that the postwar Polity scores are on average about 3.1 points higher on the scale than the five-year average score before the war. However, these gains in democracy turn out to be temporary and partly driven by the floor effect of a few outlier cases with very low prewar democracy scores. When we compare ten-year Polity averages before the war and Polity scores ten years after the war, we find that the average Polity scores plunge back to their levels ten years before the war (see figure 1 below).

This indicates that following an upsurge of Polity scores five years after a war, the general democracy scores of conflict countries return to the long-term prewar level ten years after the war. Empirically, then, we are tempted to conclude that warring countries only rarely emerge from war as democracies. But can external support better the odds?

Figure 1. Democracy Levels of Conflict Cases before and after a War



Source: Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000), and Polity IV, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed July 9, 2009).

The Dilemmas of Postwar Democratic Transition

There is something inherently conflictual in the working of a young democracy: elites who fear losing their grip on the state by the ballot box may be tempted to stay in power by undemocratic or even violent means. The opening of the political arena entails that new elites with new constituencies receive the opportunity to mobilize and organize. Political competition will increase, and unless there are safeguards in place—viable checks and balances, mechanisms to ensure the accountability of political leaders to the public, democratic norms, and an acceptance of the rules of the game—there is always the risk that political competition will turn into violent competition. New polities and polities emerging from war often lack these safeguards. Elections are also a quintessential ingredient of democracy, and they, too, pose risks: elections may ensure representation of societal groups, but they also can lead to the dominance of one group over minority groups, leaving them disgruntled or excluded. Postwar societies, which are typically highly divided and polarized, are especially vulnerable to the risks of elections. Especially in divided post-conflict societies, simple majoritarian elections might effectively and permanently exclude minority groups from power. Elections thus run the risk of turning into a winner-takes-all contest and a contest for the ownership of the state.¹²

Hence, with regard to newly emerging democracies, the common assumption that peace implies democracy and vice versa may not be valid. And while few would question that democracy, in the long run, is conducive to both domestic and international peace, some authors have recently pointed out that the double transition from war to peace and from war-time, nondemocratic regimes to postwar, democratic regimes may be conflicting and at times even contradictory.¹³ These authors argue that war-to-democracy transitions are inherently dilemmatic situations in which the two objectives—securing peace and building democracy—are at least in the short term often competing.

Scholars have identified a number of dilemmas. One that has been debated extensively is the tension between the need for elections and the need for stability. Premature elections likely will foster instability and violence, but

¹² Timothy D. Sisk and Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Perspectives Series* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 32-33.

¹³ Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998); Roland Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’ in Postwar Statebuilding,” in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009).

postponing elections for too long will hamper the legitimacy of the new regime.¹⁴ Furthermore, democracy requires the inclusion of many groups, but the inclusion of groups that were involved in the organization of violence (such as warlords) could possibly harm democracy. A third dilemmatic situation pertains to the need to balance efficacy and legitimacy.¹⁵ Post-conflict situations often require swift and decisive political actions (and international actors actually often push domestic elites toward such actions), whereas democratic legitimacy is best acquired by consultations with as many societal groups as possible. This relates, then, to the fourth dilemma between the benefits of robust interventions with external actors assuming authority and the benefits of local ownership.¹⁶ Post-conflict peacebuilding may require intrusive external interventions, whereas democratization is hardly feasible without full local ownership of the political process.

In the light of such arguments, it is quite clear that peace and democracy, at least in the short run, may be conflicting objectives. This insight feeds into a broader literature, which investigates the relation between democratization and war. Recent studies provide evidence that the process of democratization increases the risk of interstate wars and civil wars.¹⁷ This is because the opening of the domestic political space in the early stages of a democratic transition intensifies the competition between incumbent elites and challengers. The new democratic structures are too weak to regulate political competition, and hence there is a risk that an unhealthy interaction between opportunistic elites, mass political participation, and underdeveloped democratic institutions will trigger war. This risk is, according to Mansfield and Snyder, especially high when the transition to democracy is incomplete, that is, when the political opening that enables mass participation is not accompanied by the institutionalization of democratic norms and institutions that guarantee that leaders are fully accountable to voters.

In search of possible remedies, many authors investigate power-sharing agreements as a mechanism to both end civil war and make democracy work in

¹⁴ Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*; Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paris, "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding"; and Sisk and Reynolds, *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*.

¹⁵ Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, 19.

¹⁶ Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges," 98.

¹⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Democratization and the Danger of War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 5-38; id., "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 297-337; and Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

difficult surroundings.¹⁸ The solution proposed by the power-sharing approach is to contain the uncertainty of democratic elections and the security concerns of parties recently involved in violent conflict by granting each party a share of central power and a certain amount of group autonomy. This approach has, in fact, become part of the standard repertoire of international interventions, as recent experiments in ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, and Afghanistan illustrate.¹⁹

However, a close reading of the recent literature on power-sharing agreement reveals that most authors are predominantly concerned with the effects power-sharing agreements have on peace, not on democracy. For example, Walter argues that the most difficult step in peace processes is the implementation of a peace agreement because of commitment problems that arise when capacities for monitoring the other side's behavior are lacking.²⁰ To overcome this situation, security guarantees must be provided by external actors, and power-sharing mechanisms need to be implemented to assure each party that its opponent will not be able to monopolize power. According to such a perspective, the main function of power sharing is to end violence, not to promote democratization.

Some authors have argued that although power sharing might be helpful and often necessary in the initial phase after conflict, it becomes problematic in the consolidation phase for both peace and democracy because it provides ethnic leaders with both the incentives and the means to escalate conflict.²¹ It does so because it focuses specifically on those divides that initially fuelled conflict, and it provides leaders who want to exploit these divides with the means to do so by equipping them with political power and resources.²²

The empirical evidence of the outcome of power-sharing arrangements is mixed. Case studies report varying results depending on the cases analyzed. In many African conflicts, power sharing failed as the peace agreements lacked political support at the outset,²³ while in Lebanon some studies find that power-

¹⁸ Florian Bieber, "Power Sharing after Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-Sharing Institutions in Post-War Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo," in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, ed. Sid Noel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); Ulrich Schneckener, "Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 2 (2002): 203-228; and Sisk and Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict., *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*.

¹⁹ Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

²⁰ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

²¹ Roeder and Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Andreas Mehler, "Machtteilung - Wohlklingendes Rezept Mit Vielen Risiken," *GIGA Focus* 2007, no. 3 (2007): 1-8, and Ian S. Spears, "Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002): 123-136.

sharing arrangements are frequently overruled by regional turmoil.²⁴ Among large-N studies of power sharing, Walter as well as Hartzel and Hoddie find that power sharing, combined with external guarantees, indeed contributes to peace.²⁵ Falch finds that neither power sharing nor external guarantees have an impact on prolonging phases of peace after civil war, and that it is rather the characteristics of the war itself and of the context in which the agreement was signed that account for a longer or shorter duration of peace.²⁶ Riese (2008) investigated nine cases of power sharing. She found that power sharing was conducive for post-conflict peace *and* democracy in only very few cases, and only when the obstacles to successful peacebuilding were atypically low. Other cases of power sharing led to prolonged phases of peace but not to more democracy. In these cases, power sharing was largely imposed by powerful outside actors, which acted not so much as guarantors of an agreement but as a party to the conflict. In the majority of cases, power sharing either failed completely or was a mere interim step to an authoritarian consolidation of power. Riese concluded that power-sharing success might very well be a result rather than a cause of established co-operation between the parties to the conflict.²⁷

Local Capacities and Local Demand

Local Capacities for Democracy

What causes a polity emerging out of war not to become democratic? While there is without doubt a multitude of causal mechanisms, one broad distinction among them can be made: either polities do not democratize because they lack the *capacity* to do so, or polities do not democratize because there is little or no *demand* for democracy among elites and/or the population. In the past, scholars and practitioners by and large have preferred to assume that it is the lack of capacities (or, in other words, insurmountable structural difficulties) that

²⁴ Michael Kerr, *Imposing Power-Sharing* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005); Brenda M. Seavers, "The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000): 247-271; and Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure," in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars.*, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

²⁵ Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318-332, and Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.*

²⁶ Åshild Falch, "Durable Peace Following Civil War? Testing the Importance of International Security Guarantees and Institutional Settlement Arrangements" (master's thesis, University of Bergen, 2006), 26.

²⁷ Sarah Riese, "Power-Sharing after Conflict: A 'Qualitative Comparative Analysis' of the Conditions for Success" (Berlin: Free University Berlin, 2008). These cases were: Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Liberia, Lebanon, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Tajikistan.

hinder the emergence of democracy. We, therefore, start with a brief discussion of capacity-related arguments and then turn to demand-driven explanations.

Many scholars have focused on the role of economic development. There is a well-developed strand in the literature on democratization that argues that economic development affects democratization. This argument dates back at least to Seymour Lipset's "social requisites of democracy,"²⁸ and many scholars have contributed to this long-standing debate on the economic prerequisites for democracy. According to the original theory, economic development is seen as a causal factor, affecting the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes.²⁹ In an attempt to refine the argument, Przeworski et al. demonstrated that development does not actually cause democratization but makes it sustainable once it is in place.³⁰ Other scholars maintain that economic development has an effect on democratization only when the political regime has already embarked on a transition toward more democracy. Thus, fully authoritarian regimes may experience economic development without moving toward democracy. But regimes in the middle, so-called anocracies, better their chances for democratization when they experience economic growth.³¹

As mentioned, these theories were developed and tested on cases of democratic transitions, but the core of the arguments may still be valid for postwar democratization. In sum, there seems to be a broad consensus that low levels of economic development can hinder democratic transitions and can make a country prone to violence.

While the democratic transition literature generally suspects that low capacities for democratization are caused by a lack of economic development, the civil war literature and the peacebuilding literature claim that it is the war that accounts for the lack of capacities. It should be noted, once more, that these latter works are predominantly interested in peace, measured as the absence of war. Whether this peace is a liberal peace, in the sense that it is accompanied by democratic institutions, or an authoritarian peace, is rarely specified.

Broadly speaking, civil war can hamper a society's capacity in two ways. First of all, civil war has been depicted as development in reverse since war destroys human lives and infrastructure, diverts resources from production toward the military, and leads to capital flight.³² Violence leads to reduced and

²⁸ Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, no. 53 (1959): 69-105.

²⁹ Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35, no. 4-5 (1992): 450-499.

³⁰ Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

³¹ Axel Hadenius and Jan Teoell, "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing the Evidence," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39, no. 4 (2005): 87-106.

³² Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, World Bank Report.

often negative growth, and the adverse effects of low levels of development, as discussed above, kick in.

Secondly, civil war can also reduce a society's capacity for a stable and democratic peace, because war creates highly divided societies and elites who deeply mistrust each other. Under such circumstances, actors may lack the capacities to overcome the coordination problem and they may not be able to engage in a meaningful peace process or to accept the bounded uncertainty that comes with democratic rules. This coordination problem may be overcome by the activities of external actors who mediate among the parties, implement trust building measures, provide external guarantees, and foster power-sharing arrangements. The assumption that high levels of hostility reduce the chances for postwar peace may seem intuitively plausible. Note, however, that the peacebuilding literature does not explicitly address the democratic quality of such a peace. Doyle and Sambanis find that various proxies for divided societies, such as the number of factions and the number of victims (which they interpret to be a measure of hostility rather than a measure for destruction and, hence, capacity), are negatively associated with the chances of successful peacebuilding.³³

Local Demand for Democracy

Lack of capacity need not be the only explanation for democratic failures. A lack of democracy also could be caused by the simple fact that there is not sufficient demand for democracy in postwar countries. While there is considerable literature devoted to the many dilemmas and difficulties in bringing democracy to postwar countries, there is surprisingly little research on the preferences of local actors, who include both the local elites and the population. The literature is clearly more concerned with local *capacity* to implement democracy than with local *interest*, and it only rarely addresses in a systematic way the issue of local demand for democracy, thereby implicitly accepting the notion that the constraining factor is capacity (or structure) rather than political will (or motivation).

But is this assumption warranted? Let us consider why the local elites would not want democracy. To start with, introducing democratic rule endangers the militarily strongest party's grip on power because it may lose in elections what was won in battle. Hence, when a party that emerged as the winner on the battlefield risks losing its supremacy at the ballot box, it is likely to oppose democratic procedures. It is for this reason that many political theorists from Hobbes to Huntington have been deeply skeptical of a democratic regime arising from the chaos of civil war.

Liberal peace brings along norms and rules of good governance that restrict the ability to arbitrarily reign, extort, and expropriate. Elites who grew

³³ Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis."

strong and rich during civil wars will hence oppose any reforms that endanger their ways of extortion, which may include such activities as racketeering, smuggling, illegal private taxing, drug cultivation, and corruption. Similarly, they will oppose any reforms that endanger their way of ruling, which is typically based on closely knit patron-client networks and the credible threat to use force.³⁴ It should be noted that this way of accumulating wealth and power is not a prerogative of the winning elite, but it is also practiced by secondary elites, who may rule their fiefdoms in the provinces or regions as autonomous rulers. There is a rich and growing empirical literature on these entrepreneurs of violence who “do well out of war,” and who are—with their imported SUVs, fancy clothes, and latest mobile phones—a ubiquitous feature of postwar zones from Southern Africa to Eastern Asia.³⁵

Democratic procedures and good governance threaten the very foundation on which the authority and often the survival of most regimes in post-conflict states are built: patron-client networks. Clientelistic networks are an endemic feature of weak states; arguably they are the most basic form of governance practiced in places where infrastructural power is weak.³⁶ Clientelistic ties form the basis of support in many nondemocratic systems, where an ambitious elite cultivates ties with a subset of society in order to make an implicit bargain—political support in exchange for state jobs or targeted public goods.³⁷ At the commanding heights of the political system, a principal may distribute resources to favor his constituency (often as large as a tribe or ethnic group) and use state resources to establish dominance.³⁸ Leaders may broaden their support by co-opting powerful actors into their network. A transition to good governance standards endangers these mechanisms, and it is hence no surprise

³⁴ William Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars,” in *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), and Williams Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

³⁵ Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 6 (2000): 839-853, and Antonio Giustozzi, *Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Destin, LSE, Working Paper Series No. 33 (London: Crisis States Programme, 2003).

³⁶ Alisher Ilkhamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan,” *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 1 (2007): 65-84.

³⁷ Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and Nicolas van de Walle, “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa,” in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³⁸ Michael Bratton and Nicholas van der Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars.”

that elites in states that are ruled predominately by patronage networks oppose reforms that would make patronage more difficult and that would strip them of the possibility to co-opt potential contenders.

For all of these reasons, the transition to a liberal and democratic state places considerable costs on elites in post-conflict zones who rationally prefer the status quo. The implications of this for the study of postwar democratization is that researchers should study interests and constraints of local actors, assuming that democratization more often than not creates high costs which local elites have to bear. Seen from this perspective, in the eyes of local elites, democratization is often a problem rather than a solution to a problem, contrary to assumptions of the peacebuilding literature. This may explain the poor track record of postwar democratization even better than structural problems and the lack of capacity.

External Support for Post-Conflict Democratization

Let us now turn to a discussion of external factors that may have an impact on the prospects for democracy in a post-conflict country by increasing the capacity or by increasing the demand of elites or a population for democracy. We define external factors very broadly—working our way from structural constraints and opportunities to the intentional policies of peacebuilders, aid donors, and democracy promoters.

Neighborhood Factors

A first set of factors can be subsumed under the heading of “neighborhood factors.” We once again have to treat the civil war literature and the democratic transition literature separately, bearing in mind that the first is interested in the transnational dimensions of violence whereas the latter is concerned with the transnational dimension of democratization. Two mechanisms which both explain why violence may spill over from one country to another have acquired a particularly prominent place in the civil war literature. The first is commonly referred to as the demonstration effect: a successful rebellion in one country may inspire a rebellion in a neighboring country. The other one is known as “contagion.” Violence in one country may trigger refugee flows which destabilize a neighboring country, or rebel groups may use a neighboring country as their operational base.³⁹

³⁹ James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 45-75; and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

If there are negative spill-over effects that spread violence, we may also observe positive spill-over effects. Some scholars maintain that there are international linkages that reduce the risk of violence. For example, Pevehouse and Russett show that membership in one particular type of international governmental organization, which they call “densely democratic” because they consist mainly of democratic states, will actually reduce the risk of violence.⁴⁰ The democratization literature also has identified a number of transnational mechanisms, which may account for the spatial spread of democratization. Gleditsch and Ward—using a global sample from 1951 to 1998—show that there is a strong association between a country’s institutions and the extent of democracy in the surrounding region. They show that there is a strong tendency for transitions to impart a “regional convergence,” and that regimes are generally similar within regions.⁴¹ They explain this by arguing that there may be a positive demonstration effect of democratic transition on neighboring countries. Reluctant autocratic leaders may be more willing to initiate democratic transitions if the experiences of others states suggest that the cost of reforms may not be as bad as they had feared and that former autocratic leaders have been able to hold to power under democratic rules.

Lewitsky and Way have put forward the concept of “linkage.”⁴² Linkage refers to the density of economic, political, institutional, social, and infrastructural (communication, transportation, media) ties between the country and external actors. They assume that extensive linkage to democratic and economically liberal actors facilitates democratic change in the country; similarly, weak linkage creates a more permissive environment for autocracy, which may in fact hamper democratization.

Finally, “integration” refers to a country’s official entry into a regional (or exceptionally global) political, economic, or security community membership, which may entail a host of democracy promotion mechanisms (from requirements for adopting specific institutions and rules to monitoring and official sanctioning for violation of democratic principles). The best-known and arguably by far most successful case of democratization via integration is the EU accession of many former socialist states. The prospective EU membership, which was seen by elites and the public as highly beneficial because of the economic opportunities and the security guarantees it offers, unleashed a transformative power that ended in the swift democratization of central Eastern Europe and parts of the Balkans.⁴³

⁴⁰ Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett, “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace,” *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 980.

⁴¹ Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 960.

⁴² Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change,” *Comparative Politics* 38, no. 4 (2006): 379.

The Impact of Peacebuilding Missions

One of the few robust results of recent scholarship is that peacebuilding missions indeed help to keep peace. In a groundbreaking study, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis demonstrated that well-resourced and well-manned UN peacebuilding missions significantly increase the odds that a country remains at peace.⁴⁴ They argue that the success of peace depends on local capacities and the degree of hostility. Peacebuilding missions can substitute for missing local capacities and hence contribute to peace. Based on data from 124 civil wars since 1945, Doyle and Sambanis assess the statistical probability that, once a civil war has ended, the country remains at peace. Among other explanatory variables (such as type of war, duration of war, prewar level of development, or number of battle-related deaths), the authors also test for the effect of the specific type of UN peace operations. They find that, while traditional peacekeeping is not significant in enhancing the prospect for a peacebuilding success, multidimensional peacekeeping operations (missions with extensive civilian functions, economic reconstruction, institutional reforms, and election oversight) were significant and positively associated with peacebuilding success. Other studies on the impact of peacebuilding missions come to similar conclusions.⁴⁵

But while robust peacebuilding seems to be successful at ending war, does it also bring along a significant change toward a viable, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous state? There are only a few studies in the field of peacebuilding that investigate this question. Most studies focus primarily on the “core business” of peacebuilding missions, which is securing the absence of war. In the above mentioned study, Doyle and Sambanis measure a peacebuilding success as absence of large-scale violence and a minimum standard of political openness, measured as a Polity IV value of at least -7, which is approximately the degree of political openness of Uzbekistan or China.

⁴³ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric, Themes in European Governance* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, *International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Change*, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, Routledge Advances in European Politics 30 (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁴⁴ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “Theoretical Perspectives,” in *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, ed. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), and id., “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.”

⁴⁵ Virginia Page Fortna, “Peacekeeping and Democratization,” in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Zuercher, *Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building after 1989*.

Yet, the little available empirical evidence seems to indicate that even robust peacebuilding missions rarely achieve the kind of societal change that would transform a post-conflict state into a Denmark of sorts. In a comparative study of seventeen recent UN peace-building missions, Zuercher finds that only roughly half of all postwar countries have increased in absolute terms the level of rule of law five years after mission start, and less than half have increased the effectiveness of government during the first five years of the mission.⁴⁶ Only one out of three postwar intervention countries achieved a significant increase in the level of democracy during the first five years of the mission (measured as an increase of 3 or more on the 20-point Polity scale). Only one out of three reached a level that is equivalent to the average within the region. Finally, only one out of three countries reached a level of development five years after the start of the mission that was similar to the average within the region, but all had a very high aid dependency.

In the first quantitative study that exclusively deals with the question of whether peacebuilding also fosters democracy, Fortna finds no significant impact of peacebuilding on democratization.⁴⁷ She suspects that the positive and the negative impacts of peacebuilding tend to cancel each other. This is, she argues, because the two objectives of peacebuilding—stability and freedom—are inherently conflictual. A similar argument is made by Paris and Sisk who also refer to the dilemmas of peacebuilding.⁴⁸

These sobering results indicate that there are clear limitations to what external actors can achieve. Apparently, different from securing the absence of war, the implementation of democracy cannot be easily outsourced by the conflict state to third parties. Given both the resources and the ambitions of peacebuilders, this track record is certainly disappointing. Why is it that peacebuilding missions very rarely achieve their ambitious goals?

Doyle and Sambanis argue that, among other factors, the success of a peacebuilding mission depends on the capacities and resources available for peacebuilding.⁴⁹ If local capacities are low, then external actors have to step in and substitute the missing resources. Hence, peacebuilding failures are to be explained by too few resources. Other authors point to the massive coordination problems among the peacebuilders, which leads to misallocation of scarce resources.⁵⁰ In this view, it is not the general lack of resources, but rather the

⁴⁶ Zuercher, *Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building after 1989*.

⁴⁷ Page Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization."

⁴⁸ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Security and Governance* (Milton Park Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

⁴⁹ Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis."

⁵⁰ Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The Ngo Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 5, and Paris, "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding."

ineffective allocation which explains the limited success of peacebuilding missions with regard to democratic transitions.

Barnett and Zuercher have put forward an alternative explanation. While they agree that resources and military muscle are essential ingredients for peacebuilding and are hence critical for the outcome of peacebuilding operations, they argue that peacebuilders may often prefer stability over potentially disruptive liberal reforms.⁵¹ Being faced with the realities on the ground and the low demand for a liberal peace by the state elites, peacebuilders prefer cooperation with status-quo-oriented elites over the vagaries of possible regime change. In short, they think that peacebuilders, for very pragmatic reasons, may compromise on their noble objectives. If this holds true, then the outcome of a peacebuilding mission is determined not only by resources and military forces on the ground, but also by a tacit agreement between peacebuilders and state elites on the kind of state that they want to build. Barnett and Zuercher call this tacit agreement the “peacebuilders contract.”⁵² They see two reasons why peacebuilders may want to compromise. First, peacebuilders highly value security and stability, because they can operate only in a secure and stable environment. Furthermore, the public at home may withdraw its support for the mission if confronted with casualties. Peacebuilders may therefore refrain from pushing state elites toward implementing reforms that may pose a threat to stability. Leaders in post-conflict states have capitalized on numerous occasions on the peacebuilders’ preference for stability. Second, peacebuilders are highly dependent on domestic actors because their cooperation is essential for a smooth and stable implementation of the many peacebuilding projects. Without the consent and the support of local elites, peacebuilding programs cannot be implemented, and security for international personnel cannot be guaranteed. Because of this, peacebuilders are likely to compromise in order to move ahead with their programs and projects.

If this is true, the outcome of peacebuilding is not only a function of factors such as the degree of hostility among parties, local capacities in the conflict region, resources of peacebuilders, or military muscle. Rather, peacebuilding outcomes also reflect the equilibrium outcome of a bargaining game between state elites and peacebuilders, and this equilibrium may not be conducive for democracy.

A somewhat similar argument is raised by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs. They find that third-party military interventions only rarely lead to an increase in levels of democracy in target countries.⁵³ They explain this by the fact that

⁵¹ Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External State-Building Reinforces Weak Statehood; Working Paper for the 2nd Conference of RPPS,” (Boulder, CO: Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building [RPPS], 2006).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 627-649.

the leaders of the intervening states are dependent on their home constituencies, which will rarely see the implementation of democracy abroad as a policy priority. Hence, leaders have few incentives to support democratization abroad, especially given the fact that this is a costly endeavor and that some strategic objectives of the intervention might be achieved even with an autocratic regime in place. Note that Bueno de Mesquita and Downs see the main constraint for democratization as the lack of supply of democracy promotion by external parties; they do not discuss the impact of local demand for democracy.

Democracy Aid

Finally, what about the role of foreign aid for promoting postwar democracy? Theoretically, aid can contribute to democratization in several ways: through technical assistance focusing on electoral process, strengthening legislatures and judiciaries, promotion of civil society and a free press, and so on; through conditionality; and through contributing to education and per capita income (both of which are seen as conducive to democracy). There is, to the best of our knowledge, no literature that examines the impact of aid on peace *and* democracy in postwar countries. Again, different strands of the literature are interested in either the impact of aid on peace or on democracy. We will report the scarce empirical evidence separately. The strands, however, converge on one finding: the evidence is scant in both cases and rather ambiguous.

Does aid help secure peace? Some authors maintain that aid can help peace by spurring growth. Higher growth rates and higher levels of economic development make states less prone to civil war.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, many scholars claim that the impact of development aid on growth is limited.⁵⁵ Other scholars argue that aid effectiveness depends on good policies within recipient countries.⁵⁶ In addition, aid may help peace indirectly by increasing the quality of political institutions, either by building capacity in cases where elites lack the means to build viable institutions, or by providing incentives for a policy change in cases where predatory elites deliberately weaken institutions for their private gains. Chauvet and Collier show that aid has a positive impact on

⁵⁴ Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*; *World Bank Report*, and Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity and Civil War."

⁵⁵ For an excellent overview, see John Hudson, "Introduction: Aid and Development," *The Economic Journal* 114, no. 496 (2004): F185-F190; Peter Boone, "Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid," *European Economic Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 289-329; Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and William Russell Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

⁵⁶ Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction," *European Economic Review* 46, no. 8 (2002): 1475-1500, and Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies," *European Economic Review* 48, no. 5 (2004): 1125-1145.

the quality of political institutions in weak states.⁵⁷

With regard to the effects of aid on democracy, the evidence is also ambiguous. Promoting democracy has become a core priority for most bilateral and multilateral donors; the United States alone spent U.S. \$1 billion in 2006.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, there is very little conclusive evidence with regard to the effects of this aid. The closest thing to a consensus may be that, in Thomas Carothers' words, "democracy aid is not the driver of democratization but a useful partner in the process."⁵⁹

Such an assessment is indeed supported by many single case studies. For example, in a micro-level study on Ukraine's Orange Revolution, McFaul carefully traces the process by which the *ancien régime* was weakened and flags the instances when imported Western inputs were consequential in tipping the balance in favor of the democratic challengers.⁶⁰ He convincingly shows how external assistance played a role in impeding the full-scale consolidation of autocracy and how Western resources helped strengthen institutions such as the parliament, which checked presidential power. Most importantly, Western imports were crucial in exposing electoral fraud. The technology for uncovering fraud—exit polls, parallel vote tabulation, and poll monitors—were imported from the United States, and funding for these activities came largely from Western sources. External actors also contributed to the development of an independent media in Ukraine which helped to mobilize opposition. This study highlights both the levers and the limitations of foreign assistance. Clearly, foreign aid did not create the regime crisis which opened up the possibility of a regime change, and it was predominantly domestic actors who drove the drama of democratic change. Also, democracy promoters needed a strong local partner for change. On the other hand, investment in election monitoring, free media, civil society, and state institutions added, in a critical moment, the extra fuel that kept the Orange Revolution going.

How, if at all, are the effects of foreign aid reflected in cross-sectional, quantitative studies? Once again, the evidence is scarce and inconclusive. A study by the World Bank, based on a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid

⁵⁷ Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier, "What Constrains Turnarounds in Fragile States?" in *Staatszerfall Und Governance*, ed. Marianne Beisheim and Gunnar Folke Schuppert (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2007).

⁵⁸ Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study; Final Report*, USAID, 2006, cited September 5, 2007, http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/downloads/USAID_Democracy_Assistance_and_its_Impact_on_Democratization_v34.pdf.

⁵⁹ Thomas Carothers, "A Quarter Century Promoting Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 181, no. 1 (2007): 116.

⁶⁰ Michael McFaul, "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution," *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2007): 45-83.

on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations during 1975-1996, finds no association between aid and levels of democracy.⁶¹

By contrast, another study, sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), assesses the effects of U.S. funds earmarked specifically for democracy promotion (election, state institutions, and civil society) on levels of democracy around the world and finds a significant and positive effect on democracy, while all other types of aid are found to be statically insignificant.⁶²

The Research Strategy

This brief literature review has highlighted a number of substantive and methodological issues which an empirical investigation of postwar democratization should address.

To start with, while the effects of peacebuilding on peace are well documented, there is hardly any investigation about the effects of peacebuilding on peace and democracy. There is still a division of labor between the transition literature, which is concerned with democracy, and the peacebuilding literature, which is concerned with peace. One of the challenges of research on postwar democratization is thus to combine these two research strands.

Second, and related to this, we think it is rewarding to disaggregate the concept of what constitutes a postwar democratization “success.” Obviously, success constitutes a measure of democracy and a measure of peace. But we can and should further disaggregate these concepts, for two reasons: first, this will facilitate an analytically rich description of the outcome which goes beyond the success/failure dichotomy. Second, assuming that different sets of factors affect the various subcomponents and allowing for the possibility of interaction effects, we need to disaggregate in order to identify causal mechanisms. Analytical narratives of postwar democratizations thus can and should describe the outcome with regard to different subcomponents. An analytically rich description of an outcome would therefore provide information on participation, competition, rule of law, and legitimacy, and also on whether the polity suffers from organized violence other than outright civil war.

Third, researchers should remain open to the possibility that some of these outcomes actually conflict with each other, which implies that peacebuilders and democracy promoters face trade-offs when attempting to establish a peaceful and democratic society. Also, we cannot exclude the possibility

⁶¹ Stephen Knack, *Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy*, Iris Center Working Paper 238 (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2000).

⁶² Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study; Final Report USAID, 2006* (2007).

that factors that cause democracy and factors that cause peace cancel each other. The research design should therefore allow for the identification of such mutually suppressing effects.

Fourth, we think that the focus on constraints caused by a lack of capacity (which has been the traditional angle of much of the literature) should be complemented by a focus on the local demand for democracy and the external supply for democracy. This is not to deny that structural factors may seriously hamper a society's capacity for democracy, but we should not take for granted the willingness of local elites to implement democracy; nor should we take for granted the assumption that democracy is always a priority for external actors. We think that an analysis of the interests and priorities of local and external actors and their interaction will contribute considerably to explaining peacebuilding outcomes.

Given these challenges, we opted for a case-study-oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms;⁶³ case studies also allow researchers to treat cases as a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causations and may lead to the identification of typological subclasses.⁶⁴ Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons. Finally, small-N research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data that they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We are interested in investigating the impact of peacebuilding missions on democratic outcomes in postwar countries. As reported, war-affected countries rarely emerge as stable *and* democratic. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war or they can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic, polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in the sample. Furthermore, we also wanted to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the comprehensiveness and intrusiveness of the peacebuilding mission. We understand intrusiveness as a combination of quantitative and qualitative aspects of a mission: in terms of manpower on the ground and resources spent and in terms of the range of competencies (with regard to executive, legislative, judicial, and security-related functions) that the external actors took on in executing their mandate.

There are fifty-two cases of civil war which came to an end after 1989,⁶⁵ of

⁶³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Basic Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

⁶⁴ Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

⁶⁵ Data from Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis."

which only twenty received a major peacebuilding mission.⁶⁶ An international team of country experts prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2007 and December 2008. The sample covers the cases of Rwanda, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste, which includes almost half of all major peacebuilding missions after 1989. We deliberately chose cases from the post-Cold War period only, because the main interest is the contribution of external actors to postwar democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peacebuilding missions became fashionable and feasible only after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Table 1. Outcome and Level of External Support

	Stable and democratic (Polity IV score 6 or higher)	Stable and undemocratic	Unstable and undemocratic
High external support	Timor-Leste	Bosnia Kosovo	Afghanistan
Low external support	Namibia Macedonia Mozambique	Tajikistan	Rwanda

Source: Scores from Polity IV, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed July 9, 2009).

In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security,” “democracy,” and “state capacities” into subconcepts: with regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? Regarding security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of organized violence (e.g., criminal violence). With regard to state capacity, we refer to the capacity of the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement

⁶⁶ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, 15.

them. In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and redeploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors—such as long-term economic development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy—and about war related factors—such as duration and type of war, numbers of factions, level of war-related destruction, and quality of a peace agreement—which may have had an impact on the countries' capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy, such as linkages and integration. It then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention, focusing on both military and nonmilitary aspects. We are interested in the state-reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures and in the question of how intrusive these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure, and/or persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences, and constraints. These questions let us reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining process which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of external intervention, but we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows into the conflict country and to assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. It inquires about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid. Experts provided annual figures for: (1) elections and the political processes; (2) rule of law, accountability, anticorruption, human rights and minority rights; (3) institutional infrastructure, parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administration capacity; (4) civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; and (5) civil-military relations, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and security-sector reform. Please note that these are our five generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Finally, we asked our experts to identify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

For this special issue of the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, the case study

authors have produced a version of their chapters that is significantly shorter than the original version. The full versions are accessible at the project's Web site.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ <http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/konflikt/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html>.