

Learning the Right Lessons from Mozambique's Transition to Peace

Carrie Manning
and
Monica Malbrough

Abstract

After sixteen years of civil conflict, Mozambique experienced a successful transition to peace, despite numerous social, political, and economic conditions that were not conducive to peace or democracy. This essay explores the reasons for this successful outcome. It argues that, in Mozambique and elsewhere, scholars have tended to overlook the role of bilateral donors in underpinning UN-led interventions designed to broker the transition from war to peace via democratic statebuilding. In Mozambique, longstanding relationships between bilateral donors and belligerents and the ability of committed donors to provide flexible, coordinated efforts to implement the peace process were critical to the construction of a durable peace.

Key words: Mozambique, peace, conflict, democracy, peacebuilding, donors, United Nations, UNOMOZ, donor coordination.

After sixteen years of civil conflict, Mozambique embarked in 1992 on what would become a successful transition to peace. Since then, the security situation in the country has remained relatively stable. There has been no return to armed conflict. Postwar democratization, while not without problems, has been successful. With the exception of isolated acts of violence and protests and boycotts surrounding election periods, post-conflict Mozambique has been devoid largely of political instability. Furthermore, despite complaints of fraud by political opposition in each election, international election monitors have regarded each of Mozambique's general elections as free and fair. More importantly, political elites have generally treated the new democratic rules of

Carrie Manning is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University. <cmanning2@gsu.edu>

Monica Malbrough is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University. <mmalbrough1@gsu.edu>

the game as “the only game in town.” There have been no major opponents to democracy in the country, either among politicians or among the population at large.

Mozambique’s success is the result of a combination of factors. These include the intervention of the UN Observation Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) from 1992 to 1994, longstanding relationships between the government of Mozambique and the particular donors, who would later play a key role in the war-to-peace transition, the repercussions of regional and more distant international events, and the choices of the warring parties’ leaders. Also crucial was the existence of a viable state structure, which was capable of delivering on commitments made at the negotiating table. Donor support largely bolstered and facilitated this state capacity in important ways during the years leading up to the peace agreement.

The UN operation has received much credit for the success of the peace process in Mozambique. While the UN was crucial in overseeing the cease-fire and providing the overarching formal framework within which the peace process was carried out, the success of this process largely depended upon flexible and responsive interventions on the part of bilateral donors who stepped in to supplement the mandate and resources of the UNOMOZ. Less visible, but not less important, was the impact that many of these same donors had on bolstering the capacity and confidence of the Mozambican government in the years leading up to the peace agreement.

Background: The Civil War and Its Termination

After gaining independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) established a single-party regime in Mozambique. Frelimo initially enjoyed widespread support because of its struggle for independence against the Portuguese as well as its call for national unity, mirroring the post-colonial political experience of numerous other newly independent African states.¹ The Frelimo government adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform in 1977—the same year that the civil war against the rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), began—and proceeded to enact ambitious reforms and nationalization projects.

The civil war in Mozambique began two years after independence. Neighboring states initially encouraged and supported Mozambique’s insurgency.² At independence, Frelimo had established a relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Rhodesia, providing arms to it, bases in Mozambique, and other resources to aid its struggle for independence.

¹ Carrie Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).

² Ibid.

Rhodesian security forces, seeking to destabilize the Mozambican government and undermine its support for Rhodesia's national liberation forces, backed the guerrilla group that was to become Renamo.³ After Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe in 1980, Renamo was handed off to South Africa's Department of Military Intelligence, which continued to provide support throughout the 1980s. South Africa's interest in Renamo was a key part of the apartheid regime's program of systematic destabilization of neighboring black-ruled regimes. South African support helped Renamo to significantly expand its activities in Mozambique and to become a more public and structured threat to Frelimo.⁴ Although Renamo was encouraged and funded initially by outside forces, the rebel group was able to take advantage of widespread popular dissatisfaction within Mozambique over time to build a political platform that won considerable support in postwar elections.⁵

The war in Mozambique officially ended in October 1992, when Renamo and the government of Mozambique signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome. The war ended because of a combination of factors that made continuing the fight increasingly less attractive for both sides. A severe drought that began in the early 1980s made it harder for Renamo to sustain itself by living off the local population. In 1984, the South African and Mozambican governments signed the Nkomati Accords, which aimed to put an end to South African support for Renamo. Although that agreement was largely unsuccessful, by the late 1980s, the looming end of the apartheid regime in South Africa threatened to cut off remaining external aid for the movement. In combination with the dramatic economic decline in Mozambique resulting from external shocks and disastrous economic policy decisions by the government, the drought also forced the Frelimo government to turn toward the West for economic support, culminating in a World Bank austerity program begun in 1987.

Since independence, Mozambique had received substantial support from the Soviet bloc countries for its socialist experiment. But as the 1980s drew to a close, so did the Cold War. Aid from the Soviet bloc was replaced by support from the West, conditioned on compliance with economic and political conditionality that favored democratic politics and market economies. When the Frelimo government drafted a new constitution in 1990, abolishing the one-party state and ushering in an era of democracy, it undermined Renamo's remaining justification for continuing the war—that it was fighting for democracy and economic freedom in Mozambique.

Yet, it would be a mistake to view the successful peace process in Mozambique as the inevitable result of these changes. Drought and regional

³ Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁵ See Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique*, and Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*.

changes, like the end of apartheid in South Africa, made the war harder to fight, but not impossible. At the end of the war, Renamo retained plentiful arms supplies and fighting personnel as well as a state-of-the-art radio communication system. It should also be noted that it had the continued support of individuals in South Africa who provided vehicles and personal financing to Renamo officials for years after the peace agreement was signed.⁶ As late as summer 1992, Renamo was launching attacks just beyond the Maputo city limits. Moreover, Renamo had sufficient popular support to do extremely well in the first three postwar elections. These facts undermine the claim that the war ended because of a lack of popular support for the movement, or because Renamo could no longer operate as a guerrilla force after the withdrawal of foreign support. The fighting ended because a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors changed the calculus of the leaders on both sides regarding the costs of continuing to fight versus ending the war through a negotiated settlement. This provided powerful motives to sue for peace.

However, an end to armed conflict is not synonymous with durable peace. In countless other cases, such as Angola in 1992 and 1997, or Liberia on multiple occasions over the course of the 1990s, belligerents have used cease-fires to rearm, regroup, and resume battle. In the case of Mozambique, it was the intervention of external actors, including the UN but also a network of well-prepared and motivated bilateral actors, that provided the context that made it possible for the belligerents to make and follow through on the commitments necessary to build a lasting peace.

An additional challenge was that the establishment of peace in Mozambique was premised upon the process of democratization. When the peace agreement was signed in 1992, Mozambique was an unlikely candidate for a successful transition to democracy. In addition to being situated near the bottom of the human development index, Mozambique also had a history of political intolerance, social strife, and regional socio-economic imbalance. Before the first elections in 1994, Mozambique had no previous experience with multiparty democracy. Furthermore, along with years of poor economic performance and the consequences of Frelimo's unsuccessful economic policies, Mozambique faced several humanitarian crises. During the 1980s, famine and drought plagued the country, exacerbating the dire economic conditions. Thus, virtually all of the economic, political, and social preconditions of democracy were absent when Mozambique began the process of post-conflict democratization.⁷ Under these challenging circumstances, democratization has proceeded and has provided a foundation for the consolidation of peace because it has served the interests of both of the former belligerents, and because key external actors

⁶ Manning, "Democratization in Mozambique: Beginning at the End?" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997), 223-263.

⁷ Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique*, 5.

understood, and thus were able to prioritize, the vital connection between peace and democratization in Mozambique.

The Nature of External Intervention

External actors played a key role in the negotiation process as well as during Mozambique's transition to peace. The Italian government hosted the peace negotiations, and they were observed by the country's major donors, notably the United States, Great Britain, Portugal, and Germany.⁸ According to Suhrke and Buckmaster, Italy "played a key role in organizing the peace negotiations and was prepared to take the lead in financing its implementation."⁹ Before and during the peace negotiations, donors, especially the like-minded group of donors, as well as the U.S., worked closely with both parties to provide political guidance and assistance in preparation for the transition period.¹⁰ The General Peace Agreement (GPA) provided an explicit role for the UN as well as for bilateral donors in implementing and monitoring the peace agreements. Between 1992 and 1994, UNOMOZ and international donors played prominent roles in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. The GPA called for the dismantling of Renamo's armed forces and the integration of some of its troops into a new, unified, national army; the reform or disbandment of various government security forces and the restructuring of the police force; the reintegration of Renamo-held territory into a unified state administration; and the holding of the country's first multiparty elections. These tasks were initially meant to be completed within one year, with the peace process culminating in elections in October 1993. The deadline was later extended to October 1994. The 1994 general elections marked the end of the formal peace process and the departure of UNOMOZ.

The UNOMOZ Mandate

The peace agreement was to be overseen and supported by a 6,800-strong UN peacekeeping force and observation mission (UNOMOZ), in addition to substantial support and active participation by Mozambique's key donor countries. Total gross expenditure reported by UNOMOZ was U.S. \$492.6 million.¹¹ The plan for implementing the GPA called for the creation of a series

⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁹ Asri Suhrke and Julia Buckmaster, "Aid, Growth and Peace: A Comparative Analysis," Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, CMI Working Paper (2005), 16, <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2053=aid-growth-and-Peace-a-comparative-analysis> (accessed May 1, 2008).

¹⁰ The like-minded group of donors includes Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada. These countries were influential and long-standing supporters of the Mozambican government, beginning soon after independence.

¹¹ United Nations Operation in Mozambique, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumuz.htm (accessed April 1, 2008).

of peace commissions, staffed by representatives of Renamo, the government, and/or ruling party Frelimo, and, in most cases, representatives of various donor countries and UNOMOZ. These peace commissions corresponded to the tasks outlined in the peace agreement, and were meant both to remove remaining obstacles to the creation of the new regime (through the demobilization and disarming of rebel troops, the creation of a unified army, the restructuring of state security forces, and the reintegration of former soldiers into society) and to establish the foundation for the new political system (by holding elections, crafting electoral laws, and bringing former rebel territory under effective state authority).

The GPA called for the United Nations to assume a leading role in the monitoring, assistance, and implementation of the agreement. In comparison to other UN peacekeeping missions, the UNOMOZ mandate was quite robust and comprehensive. As mentioned above, following the failure of several previous UN peacekeeping missions, the characteristics and funding of the UNOMOZ mandate were reflective of the international community's strong desire for Mozambique to become a successful example of UN peacekeeping operations. In light of these circumstances, the UNOMOZ mandate provided for a more holistic approach to peacekeeping. The mandate consisted of political, military, electoral, and humanitarian components of intervention, with an emphasis on the interrelationships and complementarities among these four aspects. For example, the UNOMOZ mandate emphasized the integration and close cooperation of military transformation operations and humanitarian assistance in order to facilitate demobilization and reintegrate soldiers into civil society. The two primary objectives of the intervention's humanitarian mission, led by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), were to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger. These humanitarian missions would provide food and assistance to former soldiers, along with training, counseling, and employment opportunities.¹²

The military component of the UNOMOZ mandate emphasized the necessity of prompt demobilization and the establishment of a new national armed force as a prerequisite for successful elections. Along these lines, UNOMOZ was to enforce and monitor the cease-fire agreement, including the demobilization and disarmament of warring parties. UNOMOZ did have coercive power in providing security to the country, but violations of the cease-fire were relatively rare and did not compromise the peace process. In addition to this, the mandate required that UNOMOZ oversee the withdrawal of foreign military and provide security for crucial infrastructures and international activities.¹³

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., and Dennis Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1999).

The ultimate political objective of the intervention was to oversee a transition to multiparty politics: the UNOMOZ mandate included several actions to prepare and provide political guidance for Mozambique's first democratic elections. It provided for the creation and development of political parties as well as electoral technical assistance, such as voter registration and finance. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was to oversee and direct the political objectives. A National Elections Commission, with technical support from the UN, would organize the electoral process, while UNOMOZ's Electoral Division would monitor it. It would also oversee the negotiation and development of the Electoral Law and work to ensure the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.

Financial support for the peace operation in Mozambique was extensive and set precedents in the pattern of international aid for war termination. In fact, there were several sources of funding and resources in the implementation of Mozambique's transition to peace, both within and alongside UNOMOZ. Italy played a key role in organizing and financing the intervention, along with the major donor countries, which included the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Portugal. Mozambique's international visibility, longstanding relationship with key donors, and significance as a "test-case" for intervention resulted in a large, stable infusion of aid from the donor countries.

The active commitment of the donor countries and the United Nations gave UNOMOZ a high capacity to monitor and implement the peace agreement. As a result, through the combined efforts of UNOMOZ and the major bilateral donors, resources were readily available when needed. It is important to note that international intrusiveness in Mozambique was unique in many ways, setting precedents in international financial support. Financial incentives for demobilization and reintegration and the establishment of a trust fund to aid in Renamo's transition to a formal political party are two examples of new forms of financial support in war termination.¹⁴

Though UNOMOZ's mandate and resources were robust in comparison to other less successful cases, it is also clear that the success of the mission depended in large part on those who led it, especially SRSG Aldo Ajello. It was also dependent on those who supported the goals of the mission by supplementing its resources and its authority, most importantly the major bilateral donors. Ajello actually understates the case in saying, "I was occasionally accused of exceeding [my] powers [as SRSG], but in reality I was working to ensure that the United Nations played the active role needed to keep the peace process on track."¹⁵ In fact, Ajello worked together with the major bilateral donors to

¹⁴ Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique*, 30.

¹⁵ Aldo Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement," in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999), 623.

reinforce and improve upon the original plan for external support to the peace process.

In general, most scholars tend to overstate the degree to which UNOMOZ is responsible for peace in Mozambique. Doyle and Sambanis argue, for instance, that UNOMOZ was crucial in ensuring that both of the formerly warring parties fulfilled their commitments. They maintain that “UNOMOZ appears to have stepped in to play an active, quasi-sovereign implementing role through a variety of commissions for disarmament, elections, and humanitarian activities,” and that “UNOMOZ actually helped to organize a political party as well as to employ demobilized soldiers in building roads: a true capacity infrastructure-building effort.”¹⁶ In fact, UNOMOZ was just one among many external actors with seats on the peace commissions. Major bilateral donors also had positions on all of the commissions created to oversee the peace process. Though the SRSG personally oversaw the disbursement of Renamo’s trust fund, the fund itself was conceived and financed by bilateral donors. Finally, as is discussed later, UNOMOZ’s demobilization program proved inadequate and was saved by the quick and creative intervention of key bilateral donors.¹⁷

Moreover, despite Mozambique’s successful outcome, UNOMOZ suffered from many of the same problems with which less successful missions have struggled elsewhere. Jett points out that “UNOMOZ accomplished the key elements of its mission. It was not an unqualified success, however, as will be seen by a closer look at how it operated and how well it went about fulfilling its many and varied responsibilities.”¹⁸ One particularly problematic area of UNOMOZ as it was initially designed was the demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, which were to be overseen by the UNOHAC. However, the UNOHAC’s excessive bureaucratic obstacles, heavy infrastructures, and slow, inflexible approaches to humanitarian assistance frustrated donors. Donors questioned the UNOHAC’s long-term approach to humanitarian aid, for which there was no mandate. Thus, as Jett points out, donors and NGOs took the lead themselves in redesigning and implementing reintegration and demobilization programs, rather than the UNOHAC.¹⁹ The successful outcome of DDR (demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration), an integral component of the peace process, cannot be attributed to UNOMOZ alone.

UN troops under UNOMOZ did provide a credible guarantee that international interveners could use force to prevent a return to war in Mozambique. However, this was true not only, and perhaps not even primarily,

¹⁶ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 325.

¹⁷ Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique*, 28-31.

¹⁸ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 76.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

because of the size and effectiveness of its military component. In fact, the ability of the UN mission to use force was not tested. Instead, its presence served as a reminder that force could be used if necessary to guarantee the peace. What actually *did* guarantee the peace, however, was the responsiveness of external actors acting in concert. This included the UNOMOZ political leadership and the country's major bilateral donors.

The Role of Bilateral Donors

The successful completion of the UN mandate depended on collaborative intervention by the country's major donors, most of whom—at the time of the peace agreement—already had worked in Mozambique for more than a decade. Although UNOMOZ had a more robust mandate and was better resourced than some earlier missions, neither its mandate nor the way that mandate was implemented extended to meet the full range of challenges of the transition process. As a result, bilateral donors stepped in at many points during the implementation process, often on a flexible ad hoc basis, to offer support where UNOMOZ could not. These parallel structures were particularly vital in implementing DDR and providing electoral support for Mozambique's first democratic elections, discussed below in more detail.

The pattern of bilateral cooperation and flexibility to implement the peace process that emerged in the postwar period owed much to the early experience of donor aid in Mozambique. Of particular importance was the shared experience by major donors of a failed effort to engage in centralized coordination of aid provision during the humanitarian crises. During the humanitarian emergency of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had failed to provide the kind of leadership in terms of aid coordination and policy formation that many donors expected, despite its leading role in the emergency appeals process. As a result, a system gradually emerged in which donors and International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) developed both individual and coordinated plans of action outside those of the UNDP. In some cases, donors with similar approaches or policy aims formed working groups to loosely coordinate their efforts. This pattern of donor disappointment in the UNDP's leadership capacity and consequent bilateral donor autonomy with loose cooperation continued into the postwar period.

Just as they had during the emergency appeals process, after the war, donors became frustrated with UN obstacles in the implementation of the UNOMOZ mandate. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), which was to oversee and direct the political objectives of the mandate, faced problems within UNOMOZ, many of which were created by rivalries and differing agendas within the various elements of the peace operation. As a result, bilateral donors and the UNDP took on necessary tasks not covered by UNOMOZ. As Ball and Barnes point out, bilateral donors created several forums, both formal and informal, in order to coordinate

assistance for peace implementation.²⁰ These were most important in the areas of DDR and elections, as detailed below. Overall, the ways in which bilateral donors stepped in to implement the GPA during situations where they found UNOMOZ actions inadequate played a key role in the successful outcome of Mozambique's transition to peace.

Donor coordination and cooperation permitted greater flexibility with respect to funding of the peace process. Advanced authorizations, which allowed donors to provide funds up front, without first going through a bureaucratic budget amendment process, were a primary feature of aid administration during the peace process.²¹ As a result, through the combined efforts of UNOMOZ and the major bilateral donors, resources were readily available when needed.

Patterns of External Aid

Mozambique is a highly aid-dependent country. Perhaps ironically, this dependency produced positive effects in the Mozambican case. First, aid dependency from independence onward resulted in long-standing relationships between the government of Mozambique and its major donors. Immediately after independence, when the Frelimo government's transformative socio-economic program was in full swing, the so-called "like-minded donors" became heavily invested and directly involved in the running of the state apparatus. The like-minded donors included primarily the Nordic countries, Canada, and the Netherlands. Foreign "cooperantes" (cooperators) from these countries sat in government ministries. Foreign governments and expatriate volunteers were invested, ideologically or personally or both, in Mozambique's success during this period. Donor support for state capacity remained strong, even as Mozambique transitioned from a socialist party-state to a market-oriented formal democracy. These donors provided steadfast support for state capacity throughout the post-colonial period.

The level and intensity of involvement by long-time donors was sustained through the government's shift in ideological orientation in the 1990s, when Mozambique embraced multiparty politics and a market economy. Some of the same donors, plus some new ones (notably the United States), again made intensive and direct investments in building the capacity of the state. These efforts created the confidence and capacity necessary within the government to carry out the dual economic and political transitions that accompanied or were part of the peace process.

²⁰ Nicole Ball and Sam Barnes. "Mozambique," in *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*, ed. Shepard Foreman and Stewart Patrick (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 174.

²¹ United Nations Development Programme Reports, "Electoral Assistance to Mozambique: Final Report," April 1995.

Beginning in 1989, the Swiss and other donors began to finance a process of state planning for postwar reconstruction and demobilization, providing technical assistance as well as funding. By the end of the war in 1992, these donors had a clear idea of both the resource constraints (human and financial) of the state and what it would take to allow the government to finance a peace process and a transition to democracy. They also had the trust and confidence of the Mozambican government. For example, during the transition from war to peace, involvement by the like-minded group of Scandinavians was aimed at stabilizing the peace agreement by providing aid for social and economic reforms designed to alleviate the effects of structural adjustment. Sührke and Buckmaster point out that, unlike other cases of postwar peacebuilding, in Mozambique, “there was a core of donor-government consensus on the need for budgetary outlays to institute social reforms and use economic policy... to soften the effects of the structural adjustment demands.”²² The Economy Working Group, for example, consisted of a group of donors including the Nordic countries, the United States, the World Bank, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, among others, which worked closely with the government to provide technical advice and material support that would enable the state to finance and carry out the three-pronged transition.

The thorough understanding of the state’s limitations and the ability of the donors to work closely with a state whose confidence they enjoyed were key factors that contributed to the success of Mozambique’s dual transition from war to peace and from a party-state to a multiparty system. It allowed these donors to anticipate problems in UNOMOZ’s plan and to craft the appropriate response, in a flexible manner, in order to ensure the implementation of the GPA. For example, to this group, it was obvious that the UN effort and the usual donor conference procedures would fall short of both the resources and the oversight needed to bring Mozambique’s peace process to a successful close with elections. In particular, the United States, the EU, Great Britain, Spain, and Denmark were instrumental in bringing this to the attention of the wider donor community. If not for their efforts, the pattern of aid would have been quite different; UNOMOZ likely would have pursued its mandate of oversight rather narrowly, and the great bulk of donor funds would have gone to humanitarian relief, to the exclusion of many of the less obvious, but crucial, aspects of the peace process. Following intervention by these five countries, the 1993 Donor Conference for Mozambique was broadened in scope to include discussion of funding options for election-related and DDR projects. Thus, the overall pattern of aid contained both large-scale infusions (by UNOMOZ or the annual donor conference mechanisms) and a patchwork quilt of ad hoc interventions by various donors.²³

²² Sührke and Buckmaster, “Aid, Growth and Peace: A Comparative Analysis,” 16-17.

²³ Ball and Barnes, “Mozambique,” 174.

After the donor conferences, major donors working in Mozambique formed a number of coordinating forums in an effort to foresee and provide for needs not fully covered by UNOMOZ. Some aspects, such as civic education, voter registration, and the like, were foreseen ahead of time. Others, such as the need to provide funding, food, and transport for party poll watchers, prodding Renamo and the government with carrots and sticks to implement the commitments made in Rome on demobilization, providing transportation for demobilized soldiers to return home, and providing resources for the demilitarization of Renamo were dealt with by one or more donors, with varying degrees of coordination, on an ad hoc basis as situations arose.²⁴

Support for Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR)

The demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration effort was a joint endeavor by UNOMOZ and a committed group of bilateral donors. UNOMOZ was responsible for setting up and supervising the assembly areas for government and Renamo troops and for disarming soldiers on both sides. The efforts of the UNDP and bilateral donors were divided among support for demobilization itself (support for vulnerable groups and preliminary information about social reintegration); reinsertion (including civilian clothing, seeds and tools, and cash payments for financial support of demobilized soldiers for eighteen months); and reintegration, including skills training and enterprise development. Together, donors (excluding UNOMOZ) contributed around U.S. \$84 million, with the government contributing around \$10 million.

Support for the DDR process was in a sense representative of the flexible approach that donors and UNOMOZ took to finance and help implement the peace process as a whole. After the financial and logistical limits of UNOMOZ capacity had been reached, donors got together and filled in the gaps. Though the process of getting to a coordinated approach was sometimes difficult, once achieved, donors successfully spoke with one voice and among them managed the technical and financial support necessary to make the process work. For example, after extensive discussions with Mozambican government officials, donors decided to augment the resources available for demobilization by an additional U.S. \$35.5 million, in order to extend cash payments to demobilized soldiers for an additional twelve months beyond the six months that the government was prepared to pay. Similarly, although the Reintegration Support Scheme, which provided financial and material benefits for demobilized soldiers, was managed by UNDP, it was conceived and funded by bilateral donors working separately from the UN.

²⁴ Sam Barnes, "Reintegration Programs for Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," United Nations Development Programme/Reintegration Support Services Report, Maputo, March 1997, mimeo; Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 96; and Manning, "Democratization in Mozambique: Beginning at the End?" 202-204.

Electoral Assistance

UNOMOZ was responsible for monitoring all aspects of the electoral process and for providing material and technical support to the main political parties, the Mozambican government, and the National Elections Commission. The key donor coordinating mechanism for elections was the Democracy Assistance Group (GAD) (later renamed the Electoral Process Support Group). This was a group of bilateral and multilateral major donors, which was formed in 1992 to “provide the desired financial support for important discrete activities and programs considered necessary for the social and economic development of the country.”²⁵ This group of donors had pointed out at the Rome Donor Conference (1992-1993) that there was no funding provided for political parties. Italy took the lead on discussing this issue with political parties to work out a plan to provide such aid. From this, the two trust funds (one for Renamo’s transformation, one to support all parties’ campaigns) were born.

Members of the group were primarily interested in technical and logistical support for elections, electoral and civic education, and democratization programs broadly defined. The group was comprised of fifteen or so donors who met bimonthly and then weekly as elections approached to coordinate technical and financial assistance for the elections. Among these donors, the European Commission delegation in Mozambique played a leading role. In addition to paying close attention to the complex details of establishing the electoral process, Mozambique’s major donors understood that they needed to concern themselves with securing the peace, if democracy was to have a chance. This understanding was reinforced by Angola’s failed peace process just a few months before Mozambique’s donor conference. Thus support for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration was viewed and pitched to home governments as part and parcel of supporting the electoral process in Mozambique.

Political Party Development

Mozambique was one of the first cases in which donors provided aid expressly for the development of viable political parties. Donors’ hesitation about this prospect was palpable, but they understood that the existence of viable opposition parties was key to the success of the peace process. As a cable from the Head of Mission in Maputo to the EPS Africa Working Group put it, “The most pressing issue concerning the elections is the proper involvement

²⁵ GAD’s principals were the United States, UNDP, EU, World Bank, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. These countries already had some experience with donor coordination as members of the “Emergency Program” donor group, which had been providing emergency relief to Mozambique for several years. See Michael Turner, “A Comunidade Internacional e o Process Eleitoral em Moçambique,” in *Moçambique: Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, 643-671, ed. Brazão Mazula (Maputo: Inter-Africa Group, 1995), 651.

of Renamo—and the other emerging political parties—in the process.”²⁶ With the support of the country’s major donors, the UN created two trust funds for this purpose: one to support all registered political parties (seventeen parties received U.S. \$150,000 each) and one to support the transformation of Renamo into a political party. The UN Trust Fund mechanism was created to alleviate the misgivings and restrictions of many donor countries with respect to funding political parties directly. However, the initiative was spearheaded and funded by bilateral donors.

The Renamo trust fund was a particularly challenging proposition for members of the like-minded group, who had forged strong bonds with Frelimo over the years. Nevertheless, thirteen countries, plus the European Commission, contributed to that fund. Italy made by far the largest contribution, over \$11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of over \$1.96 million to Renamo’s trust fund (twice the contribution of the United States), with the Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States. The contributions of these donors, who had strong and long-standing ties with the Mozambican government that were based on shared ideology from independence on, make clear how important these donors believed it was to secure Renamo’s full participation in the political process and the lengths to which they were willing to go to underwrite success.

Conclusion

A combination of factors was responsible for Mozambique’s successful transition to peace and multiparty politics. These include a robust UN mandate with dedicated leadership, a relatively high level of state capacity, and the particular international context of Mozambique’s status as the “test case” of successful peacekeeping and democratization operations. However, the most important factor behind Mozambique’s success was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of major donors, who were committed to making peace work and had long-standing relationships with the former belligerents. The relationships these donors had established with the government and, in some cases, with Renamo, fostered mutual trust and lowered uncertainty, giving donors a deep contextual understanding of the priorities and conditions that were necessary to successfully establish peace in Mozambique. As a result, bilateral donors were equipped, and willing, to fill in the gaps of the UNOMOZ mandate in order to ensure the successful implementation of the peace agreement. As credible guarantors of the peace agreement, these donors helped to overcome the considerable obstacles to peace that Mozambique confronted during the transition to it.

²⁶ Electoral Process Support Africa Working Group, 1993 mimeo.

Because of the longstanding relationships between bilateral donors and the belligerents, donors were able to anticipate potential problems. There were also many instances in which donors worked on an ad hoc basis to address and rectify unanticipated problems that developed during the implementation process, using as a precedent their successful experience with ad hoc cooperative efforts during the wartime humanitarian emergency. As a result, these donors implemented several successful interventions that were designed to supplement the shortcomings of the UN peace mission. Among their most important interventions was the creation and financing of the Renamo trust fund and the supplementation of financial resources and logistical support in order to manage the DDR and electoral processes. When the parties engaged in excessive foot-dragging on key measures of electoral law during the Multiparty Conference, donors withdrew funding for the conference facilities. When Renamo pulled out of the elections on the eve of voting, donors promised to investigate Renamo's concerns. When donors feared demobilized soldiers would become a source of instability in the countryside after their severance pay ran out, they designed and funded a program to extend soldiers' benefits.

Overall, the Mozambican case reinforces many of the findings from the literature on the role of third-party guarantors in securing negotiated peace settlements. Specifically, it provides insight into the complex interactions that underpin effective leverage for outside actors during the peace implementation process. The structure and multifaceted nature of the mission gave UNOMOZ itself little effective leverage in some of its areas. While the UN had *de facto* authority to oversee demobilization and elections, bilateral donors had the resources, knowledge, and practical capacity to make them work. Bilateral donors supplemented UN funding for elections, party transformation, and DDR, and played a direct role in monitoring these aspects of the agreement. None of this would have been possible for the UN peace mission alone, whose multifaceted mandate made it incapable of taking calculated risks in favor of one dimension, for fear that this might compromise its ability to carry out other dimensions. The direct involvement of bilateral actors allowed the international community as a whole to fine-tune its role as a credible guarantor of the peace agreement.

