

Political Support from Election Losers in Asian Democracies

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Abstract

Democracy entails popular participation through elections, and elections necessarily produce losers as well as winners. Losers' attitudes affect the continued viability of democracy, particularly in countries that only transitioned from authoritarian rule in recent years. Using two waves of the Asian Barometer survey, this study examines the impact of winner/loser status on four dimensions of system support in Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Results show that although losers have less confidence in political authorities (incumbent government or president) and institutions (parliament) and sometimes express greater dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, they are no less committed to democratic norms (including rejection of autocratic regime types) than winners. The magnitude and impact of winner-loser gaps do not vary systematically as a function of the age of democracy or institutional structures; instead, their explanation likely lies in country-specific contexts such as political history.

Key words: Losers' consent, system support, new democracies, East Asia.

Elections constitute a defining element of democracy,¹ but their impact on mass attitudes toward democracy may vary substantially within individual countries. Elections inevitably produce losers as well as winners, and supporters of losing parties have fewer reasons to be satisfied with the results both instrumentally and affectively. While a large volume of studies has been devoted to the translation of voter preferences to policy implementation, voters whose interests are not represented in government—"losers" in the electoral process—have received much less scholarly attention. Yet, according to Nadeau and Blais, "The

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¹ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), and G. Bingham Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

viability of electoral democracy depends on its ability to secure the support of a substantial proportion of individuals who are displeased with the outcome of an election,² since lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a significant minority, or even a majority, of citizens is likely to threaten the survival of not only the government but also the democratic system itself.

Losers' support is particularly important in countries that have only recently transitioned from authoritarian rule, because democracy remains only one of several possible regime types.³ Whereas established democracies cultivate reservoirs of diffuse support among citizens, so that dissatisfaction with specific policy outputs does not delegitimize the regime itself, publics in new democracies have not undergone similar socialization. In the absence of reassuring experiences that losing does not imply long-term exclusion from the political system, "democratic regimes are likely to be more seriously threatened if citizens are not used to losing," and turn to violence or apathy instead of attempting to (re)gain power in future elections.⁴ Moreover, political contestation in the immediate aftermath of democratization likely entails fundamental questions such as establishing new institutional structures and confronting legacies of the previous regime, thus increasing the stakes of each election and creating greater schisms between winners and losers. In short, the impact of losers' attitudes on democratic sustainability is greatest where winner-loser differences are likely to be widest.

Among the limited literature addressing the topic of how winner/loser status affects political attitudes, most works focus on established democracies.⁵ Studies of attitudinal differences between winners and losers in new democracies have included cases from Eastern Europe⁶ and, more recently,

² Richard Nadeau and André Blais, "Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers' Consent," *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1993): 553.

³ Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives," *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1996): 29-58, and Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998).

⁴ Christopher J. Anderson, André Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Ola Listhaug, *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28-29.

⁵ Christopher J. Anderson and Andrew J. LoTempio, "Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America," *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002): 335-351; Susan A. Banducci and Jeffrey A. Karp, "How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System: Campaign, Media Effects and Electoral Outcomes in Comparative Perspective," *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (2003): 443-467; Benjamin Ginsberg and Robert Weissberg, "Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (1978): 31-55; and Nadeau and Blais, "Accepting the Election Outcome."

⁶ Christopher J. Anderson and Silvia M. Mendes, "Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential," *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (2005): 91-111; Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya Tverdova, "Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies," *International Political Science Review* 22 (2001): 321-338; and Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent*.

Africa.⁷ Absent from this list are countries from another region affected by the wave of democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, namely East Asia. Using the Asian Barometer survey, the present study seeks to fill this gap by exploring attitudes of winners and losers at the levels of democratic values, political regime, political institutions, and political incumbent actors⁸ in five East Asian countries that cover a diverse range of democratic experiences and achievements in economic development. While greater skepticism among losers toward specific objects of system support is expected, similar findings at more diffuse levels would show that democracy has yet to become entrenched as “the only game in town” in the minds of many citizens.

In contrast to works cited above that rely on data at a single point in time, I also attempt to detect trends over time by utilizing two waves of public opinion surveys. Analysis of these data demonstrates that, while losers are invariably less trustful of the incumbent government and in most cases parliament as well, electoral defeat of parties or candidates they support rarely diminishes their adherence to democratic norms. Utilizing Easton’s classification,⁹ losers withhold specific support from authorities currently in power, but continue to offer diffuse support toward principles underlying the political system. The fact that this pattern holds true even in countries that only recently transitioned from authoritarian rule is encouraging for prospects of sustaining democracy. Furthermore, instead of a straightforward winner/loser distinction, explanation for satisfaction with democratic principles and processes often lies in country-specific contexts such as political history.

The essay is organized as follows: Section two reviews the literature on winner-loser gaps with respect to individual attitudes toward various dimensions of political support, from the most specific to the most diffuse. Section three describes data sources and variables. Section four presents results and explains cross-national differences by detailing country-specific contextual factors. The last section summarizes the findings and discusses their implications.

Losers’ Consent

Elections are a necessary if not sufficient prerequisite of democracy and the most common means for citizens to participate in government decision-making. At the same time, one should remember that elections are meaningful

⁷ Wonbin Cho and Michael Bratton, “Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support in Lesotho,” *Electoral Studies* 25 (2006): 731-750, and Devra C. Moehler, “Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects: Election Losers and Winners in Africa,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 345-366.

⁸ Pippa Norris, “Introduction,” in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-30.

⁹ David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-457.

only to the extent that they offer voters alternatives from which to choose. Since “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties,”¹⁰ electoral choices are most often presented through political parties, as they are the only organizations capable of aggregating and articulating collective interests, on the one hand, and pursuing office- and policy-seeking goals, on the other. It follows that “democracy is a system in which parties lose elections,”¹¹ as agendas and preferences represented by winning parties are converted into policy outputs at the expense of those advocated by losing parties. While election results are often analyzed in terms of changes in vote and seat shares, for both office- and policy-seeking purposes, winners only refer to parties that participate in government after each election. It should also be noted that winners often do not receive the support of a majority of the electorate, especially under majoritarian electoral rules,¹² including presidential contests without run-off provisions.

While winners have incentives to preserve the political system that gives them a voice in government decision-making, the same system may engender “ambivalent attitudes towards authorities on the part of the losers.”¹³ This prompts Riker’s statement that, “The dynamics of politics is in the hands of the losers. It is they who decide when and how and whether to fight on.”¹⁴ To use Hirschman’s terms, losers have as much incentive to opt for exit or voice as to maintain loyalty.¹⁵ Withdrawal or protest calls the legitimacy of the regime into question. Democratic stability faces the least threat if losers do not extend their dissatisfaction with specific political actors in power to disenchantment with abstract principles underpinning the system, and choose to fight on through the ballot box in the belief that democracy offers the most appropriate means of attaining their goals. Evidence from surveys suggests that losers are not inclined to withdraw,¹⁶ but rather to engage in protest activities.¹⁷

There is some debate regarding certain attitudinal differences between winners and losers. For example, Clarke and Acock point to “persons who supported winning candidates manifesting increased levels of internal and

¹⁰ E.E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 1.

¹¹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10.

¹² Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

¹³ Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, *Beliefs in Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 60.

¹⁴ William Riker, “Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics,” in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), 62.

¹⁵ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

¹⁶ Moehler, “Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects,” 357.

¹⁷ Anderson et al., *Losers’ Consent*, 46.

external efficacy.”¹⁸ Moehler notes that winners are more inclined to deem elections fair, and that such belief is in turn associated with greater external efficacy.¹⁹ But Anderson and Tverdova find that winner/loser status has no effect on either aspect of citizens’ feeling of efficacy,²⁰ and Ginsberg and Weissberg also contend that “patterns of attitudinal change do not appear to be related to the defeat or victory of respondents’ candidate preferences.”²¹ Moreover, the winner-loser gap is mediated by institutional mechanisms, with wider differences in assessment of how democracy works observed in majoritarian than in consensual systems.²² Finally, one should note the possibility that election results can have a greater impact on losers than winners, since losses weigh more heavily than gains psychologically.²³

Dimensions of System Support

Specific Support: Incumbent Governments and Political Institutions

While recognizing that winners have both instrumental and psychological incentives to express greater political support, it is important to examine whether the magnitude of the winner-loser gap differs at each level of the political system. Starting at the most specific level, winners are less likely to subscribe to the view that the government has too much power,²⁴ and are more willing to expand government authority.²⁵ Similarly, winners profess greater confidence in the integrity of government actions, and believe that government can be trusted to do the right thing, operate in the interests of all citizens, and not waste tax money or engage in crooked activities.²⁶ This is hardly surprising, since the government shares and represents winners’ interests much more than those of losers. Indeed, since holding the reins of executive power distinguishes winners from losers, one expects the largest gap between supporters of winning and losing parties with regard to evaluation of

¹⁸ Harold D. Clarke and Alan C. Acock, “National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy,” *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (1989): 558.

¹⁹ Moehler, “Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects,” 360-362.

²⁰ Anderson and Tverdova, “Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government,” 331.

²¹ Ginsberg and Weissberg, “Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support,” 36.

²² Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 91 (1997): 66-81. For example, Cho and Bratton show that electoral reform replacing first-past-the-post with a more proportional system saw satisfaction increasing among losers while declining among winners. See Cho and Bratton, “Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support in Lesotho,” 740.

²³ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 5 (1992): 297-323.

²⁴ Anderson and Tverdova, “Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government,” 328.

²⁵ Moehler, “Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects,” 352.

²⁶ Anderson and LoTempio, “Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America,” 341-343, 351.

incumbent decision-making authorities.

It is at the level of institutions that declining political support in established democracies has been most notable during recent decades.²⁷ Is the same observation valid in new democracies, and if so, how much of this phenomenon is attributable to a growing winner-loser gap? One should distinguish between institutions whose composition and functions are inherently political, such as parliament, and those less affected by shifting political fortunes, such as the civil service and military. Differences between winners' and losers' assessments of the former follow the same logic as the gap in trust toward government, but similarly sizeable differences in assessing formally nonpolitical institutions would suggest that losers perceive them as less than neutral. Moehler find that winners are more trusting of institutions such as the electoral commission, courts of law, the army, and police,²⁸ and Anderson and Tverdova report greater confidence among winners in civil servants, though the difference is not large.²⁹ Also worth noting is that winners in presidential systems (i.e., supporters of the president) may not be more trusting of the legislature if it is controlled by the opposition.

Lower satisfaction on the part of losers with both government and political institutions likely stems from disappointment with election outcomes and consequent policies, and is equally evident in both older and newer democracies. In contrast, length of democratic experience may affect the presence and magnitude of winner-loser differences concerning attitudes toward the regime and its underlying principles. Nadeau and Blais argue that "the main source of losers' consent is...diffuse support or regime-based trust."³⁰ While loyalty to the political system should come more easily to winners, maintaining the same attitude despite undesirable election outcomes poses a greater challenge. Losers naturally have incentives to "continue to try to bring about new political situations."³¹ The long-term viability of democracy hinges on the level at which they seek change (i.e., whether they aspire to alternate parties in power or install a different type of regime).

Diffuse Support: Regime Performance and Principles

On both theoretical and empirical grounds, one should differentiate between two dimensions of diffuse system support, namely attitudes toward principles that characterize democracy, on the one hand, and evaluation of how democracy functions, on the other. The latter captures a pragmatic view of the system, while the former measures normative commitment. It is conceivable that advocates

²⁷ Norris, "Introduction."

²⁸ Moehler, "Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects," 352.

²⁹ Anderson and Tverdova, "Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government."

³⁰ Nadeau and Blais, "Accepting the Election Outcome," 556.

³¹ Riker, "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," 62.

of democracy would express frustration or disappointment at shortcomings in its implementation (Norris labels them “critical citizens”³²), and, perhaps less frequently, that citizens who assess outputs of democratic procedures positively may nevertheless not reject alternative forms of governance.

Most studies analyze appraisal of how democracy works, with a consensus that winners offer more positive evaluations than losers.³³ In contrast, the question of how citizens assess the notion of having a democratic system, or whether they prefer democracy to alternative regime types such as a military dictatorship, is less frequently investigated. Among the exceptions, Anderson and his co-authors report that winners are more inclined to reject both criticisms of and alternatives to democracy in older and newer democracies alike,³⁴ but Moehler’s study of African countries finds losers more willing to defend democracy against infringement from authorities, while winners sometimes show excessive compliance with the government.³⁵ The relative dearth of attention to winner-loser differences with respect to the most diffuse level of support presents a major analytical vacuum. Whereas disappointment with the results of democratic procedures can be alleviated at the next round of elections, discontent with principles underlying democratic governance may not be ameliorated except by change of regime type. This underscores the significance of losers’ consent in sustaining democracy.

Winner-Loser Gaps in New Democracies

Across both older and newer democracies, winners are on average more satisfied than losers in each dimension of the political system, yet age of democracy may reduce the gap between these two groups. Results reported by Fuchs and his co-authors show that differences between winners and losers are larger in southern European countries that democratized in the 1970s than in more established democracies in Western Europe.³⁶ Anderson et al. emphasize that this gap is wider in new democracies on attitudes toward the former regime,³⁷ evaluation of the political system, and endorsement of democratic principles, and posit that “losers have not yet learned to lose in countries where democratic governance is of such recent vintage.”³⁸

³² Norris, “Introduction.”

³³ Anderson and Tverdova, “Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government”; Banducci and Karp, “How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System”; and Cho and Bratton, “Electoral Institutions.”

³⁴ Anderson et al., *Losers’ Consent*.

³⁵ Moehler, “Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects.”

³⁶ Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi, and Palle Svensson, “Support for the Democratic System,” in *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

³⁷ In established democracies, the comparison is between the current system and the one ten years ago.

Citizens socialized under authoritarian rule and who lack experience with democracy are mostly unfamiliar with government alternation through elections; therefore, losers may doubt whether the system will allow them opportunities to (re-)gain power in the future. Another reason that victory and defeat weigh more heavily in such societies is the higher stakes involved: “elections in new democracies are frequently contests between widely divergent ideologies and struggles over the structure of the new democratic institutions” that determine the rules of the game to which future contests must conform.³⁹ In addition, the pitting of supporters of the previous autocratic regime against its detractors often constitutes a significant cleavage in new democracies.⁴⁰ For the former group, unaccustomed to the notion of political opposition, winning may reconcile them to the new system, while losing is likely to reinforce an already skeptical attitude.

In sum, the literature on winner-loser differences points to higher propensity for winners to express greater support at each level of the political system, encompassing not only confidence in specific incumbent executive and legislative institutions but also satisfaction with regime performance and belief in democratic principles. Studies covering new democracies suggest larger gaps between winners and losers than in established democracies, due to both higher political stakes and unfamiliarity with democratic procedures. Confirmation of this hypothesis would raise warning signals regarding the fragility of recently democratized regimes, while the opposite finding would imply that losers have come to accept democracy as “the only game in town.” The analysis below utilizes data from a number of new democracies in East Asia to investigate variations in the direction and magnitude of winner-loser gaps for each of the four dimensions of political support described above.

Data and Variables

Data for this study are taken from two waves of the Asian Barometer survey, conducted during 2001-2003 and 2005-2008, respectively. Five countries from the first wave are included: Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (the Philippines is excluded due to unavailability of information on voting intentions, while China and Hong Kong are also excluded since executive composition does not depend on election results).⁴¹ These cases cover societies at different stages of democratic development, from an established

³⁸ Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent*, 108.

³⁹ Anderson and Mendes, “Learning to Lose,” 97.

⁴⁰ Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).

⁴¹ Sample sizes are as follows—Japan 2003: 1,418, 2005: 1,096; Mongolia 2002: 1,144, 2006: 1,211; South Korea 2003: 1,500, 2005: 1,500; Taiwan 2001: 1,415, 2006: 1,587; Thailand 2001: 1,546, 2006: 1,546.

democracy (Japan) to countries that transitioned from authoritarian rule in the 1980s (South Korea and Taiwan) and 1990s (Mongolia and Thailand), and even an example of reversion to dictatorship (military coup in Thailand, 2006). In terms of political culture, Shin and Wells classify Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as consolidated democracies, in which majorities of the population prefer democracy both normatively and procedurally, while reservations about the new democratic system persist in Mongolia and Thailand (along with the Philippines).⁴² Since second wave data for Japan and South Korea have not yet been released at the time of writing, data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2005-2008) are used for these two countries instead.

To ensure comparability, only questions similarly phrased in both surveys are analyzed. Some differences in question format should be noted. First, whereas respondents were asked for which party they voted in the Asian Barometer survey, the WVS item solicited vote intention. Anderson et al. maintain that both measures are equally valid.⁴³ Voters who cast a ballot for a party that entered government, but intend to switch to an opposition party at the next election, probably feel less represented, or have received fewer benefits, than those who voted for the opposition but now support the government. In this sense, the latter have reason to identify themselves as winners under the incumbent government, and the former as losers. Second, in presidential systems, some voters may split their ballots in elections for the chief executive and parliament.⁴⁴ In the Mongolia 2006, South Korea 2003, and Taiwan 2001 and 2006 data, winners refer to voters who backed the incumbent president, while coding in all other cases is based on party choice. In both Mongolia and South Korea, presidential candidates are clearly identified with parties,⁴⁵ so results for these two countries should be comparable across time. Winning and losing parties and candidates are listed in appendix A.⁴⁶

As described in the previous section, winner-loser differences are tested

⁴² Doh-Chull Shin and Jason Wells, "Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?" *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2005): 88-101.

⁴³ Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent*, 35.

⁴⁴ Unfortunately neither survey asked separate questions on presidential and legislative voting behavior. Had this been done, voters supporting the incumbent chief executive should have been categorized as winners, following Anderson and LoTempio's ("Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America") finding that results of presidential contests influence political trust, while those of congressional elections have little effect.

⁴⁵ In the case of South Korea, it may be more accurate to say that parties are identified with presidential candidates, since several prominent political leaders have engineered the founding, splinter, and merger of multiple parties, while retaining the same base of followers. Recent cases include Roh Moo-hyun's Uri Party and Lee Hoi-chang's Liberty Forward Party. In Mongolia, only parties represented in parliament are eligible to nominate presidential candidates.

⁴⁶ Respondents who reported voting (or intending to vote) for "other" parties are classified as losers, since they did not identify with the incumbent government or president. "Don't know" responses are excluded from the analysis.

at four levels of political support. Attitudes regarding political authorities are measured by respondents' degree of trust in government.⁴⁷ Confidence in parliament serves as proxy for views toward regime institutions. The frequently used question on satisfaction with how democracy works in one's country captures assessment of regime performance. For adherence to democratic principles, a composite variable is utilized, combining responses on the suitability of democracy (in the World Values Survey, agreement with having a democratic system) and appraisal of three undemocratic regime types: dictatorship under a strong man, the military, and a single party that bans all opposition (the last option is not probed in the World Values Survey).⁴⁸ These autocratic alternatives are especially pertinent in the context of new democracies in East Asia, because most citizens have personally experienced one of these authoritarian categories. All dependent variables are coded from 1 to 4, with higher scores indicating greater support.

In addition to winner/loser status (1=winner; 0=loser), political interest may influence regime support. A number of studies highlight the effect of participation in election campaigns on political attitudes.⁴⁹ While the data used here are not election surveys and contain few items directly probing respondents' campaign activities, these findings suggest that general attention to and involvement in politics is related to support.⁵⁰ An independent variable measuring political interest is therefore included in the analysis. Socio-demographic control variables include age, gender, education, income,⁵¹ and type of community.⁵²

Results

⁴⁷ An alternative measure in the Asian Barometer survey solicits satisfaction with the incumbent government by name, but this item is not available in the World Values Survey, so for the purpose of comparability the confidence in government question is used here.

⁴⁸ Another alternative regime type included in the survey questionnaire is rule by experts, but as demonstrated by Rose et al. (*Democracy and Its Alternatives*), acceptance of technocracy loads on a different factor from other nondemocratic options.

⁴⁹ See Steven E. Finkel, "The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel," *Journal of Politics* 49 (1987): 441-464, and Nadeau and Blais, "Accepting the Election Outcome." However, Clarke and Acock ("National Elections and Political Attitudes") draw the opposite conclusion, stating that attitudes are affected by election results alone, rather than engagement during the campaign or turnout.

⁵⁰ See also M. Stephen Weatherford, "Mapping the Ties that Bind: Legitimacy, Representation, and Alienation," *Western Political Quarterly* 44 (1991): 251-276.

⁵¹ Five categories in the Asian Barometer surveys, and ten categories in the World Values Survey. Greater values indicate higher income strata.

⁵² In the Asian Barometer surveys, this is a dichotomous variable, 1=urban and 2=rural. Community size is divided into six categories in the South Korea 2005 dataset, and five categories for Japan 2005. Higher values indicate smaller population sizes.

Exploration of the impact of winner/loser status on various dimensions of system support should begin with an exposition of how attitudes between backers of governing and opposition parties differ. Table 1 displays absolute levels of support from winners and losers for each dimension of the political system, from the most specific to the most diffuse, and differences between these two groups. Table 2 presents results of t-tests determining whether the magnitude of winner-loser differences in each instance is statistically significant.

In nearly every case, one observes the largest gap with respect to trust in government (the exceptions are Mongolia 2002 and, by a small margin, South Korea 2003), and t-tests confirm that the difference is always highly significant. This comes as no surprise, since electoral victory and defeat are most sharply demarcated at the level of executive control: losers are by definition excluded from the exercise of decision-making authority.⁵³ Winners also express greater confidence in parliament than losers in four of the five countries. Once again, t-tests offer evidence that (with the single exception of South Korea 2005) losers are significantly less trusting than winners, even though the absolute difference is generally smaller compared with trust in government. While losers are shut out of government, their parties still retain seats in the legislature, providing to them an institutional mechanism through which their concerns can be voiced (if not usually heeded).⁵⁴ The exception of Mongolia 2002 supports this explanation, since the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) not only controlled the presidency, but also won 95 percent of the seats in the 2000 parliamentary election, leaving the sole opposition party with barely a foothold in the Great Khural.

The only country where losers actually hold parliament in higher regard than winners is Taiwan. This is readily explicable by the fact that, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential elections in both 2000 and 2004, it only commanded a minority in parliament. An informal coalition among opposition parties, led by the Kuomintang (KMT/Nationalists), often used its majority in the Legislative Yuan to block executive proposals. DPP supporters (coded as winners) thus disapproved of the opposition-controlled legislature. A similar situation developed in South Korea, when President

⁵³ It warrants noting that, while one expects winners and losers to differ significantly in their attitude toward the incumbent government, this is not a tautological statement. To take an example found in the second wave of the Asian Barometer to ensure questionnaire compatibility, losers in Indonesia 2006 (defined as respondents who did not vote for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party) are not significantly less trustful of the government than winners (t-statistic=1.166; $p=.244$). Indonesia's exclusion from this study is due to its short history as a full democracy, which renders diachronic comparison impossible.

⁵⁴ Winners are also more trustful of the civil service than losers in every case; but with a single exception (South Korea 2005), the gap is smaller than differences over confidence in government and parliament.

Table 1. Levels of Support on Four Dimensions of Political System

	Confidence in government			Confidence in parliament			Satisfaction with how democracy works			Belief in democratic principles		
	Winner	Loser	Difference	Winner	Loser	Difference	Winner	Loser	Difference	Winner	Loser	Difference
Japan 2003	2.31	2.00	0.31	2.05	1.79	0.26	2.54	2.43	0.11	3.38	3.39	-0.01
Japan 2005	2.46	1.96	0.51	2.32	1.90	0.42	N/A	N/A		3.29	3.53	-0.24
Mongolia 2002	2.78	2.46	0.32	2.86	2.47	0.39	2.78	2.80	-0.02	3.08	3.25	-0.17
Mongolia 2006	2.72	2.37	0.35	2.68	2.49	0.19	2.72	2.74	-0.02	2.90	3.14	-0.24
S. Korea 2003	2.12	1.99	0.13	1.89	1.79	0.10	2.69	2.54	0.15	3.15	3.14	0.02
S. Korea 2005	2.50	2.38	0.13	2.12	2.05	0.07	N/A	N/A		2.99	3.00	0.00
Taiwan 2001	2.64	2.23	0.41	1.88	1.99	-0.11	2.60	2.38	0.22	3.06	3.04	0.02
Taiwan 2006	2.57	2.09	0.48	1.82	2.05	-0.23	2.72	2.45	0.27	3.02	3.04	-0.02
Thailand 2001	2.96	2.58	0.38	2.76	2.60	0.16	3.30	3.19	0.11	3.16	3.18	-0.01
Thailand 2006	2.97	2.29	0.68	2.87	2.44	0.43	3.25	2.86	0.39	3.12	3.19	-0.06

Note: All variables on a four-point scale; higher values denote greater support.

Table 2. T-tests for Winner-Loser Differences

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Confidence in government					
t-statistic	6.781	6.095	3.096	9.316	8.506
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000
Confidence in parliament					
t-statistic	5.882	7.433	2.350	2.271	3.264
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.023	0.001
Satisfaction with how democracy works					
t-statistic	2.233	0.294	4.836	4.823	2.650
<i>p</i>	0.025	0.769	0.000	0.000	0.008
Belief in democratic principles					
t-statistic	0.171	4.684	0.617	0.591	0.414
<i>p</i>	0.864	0.000	0.537	0.554	0.679
	Japan 2005	Mongolia 2006	S. Korea 2005	Taiwan 2006	Thailand 2006
Confidence in government					
t-statistic	9.728	6.119	2.786	11.081	13.610
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000
Confidence in parliament					
t-statistic	8.280	3.700	1.460	4.920	9.574
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.145	0.000	0.000
Satisfaction with how democracy works					
t-statistic		0.394		6.279	8.186
<i>p</i>		0.693		0.000	0.000
Belief in democratic principles					
t-statistic	6.684	6.350	0.097	0.701	1.629
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.923	0.484	0.104

Roh Moo-Hyun broke with a majority of legislators from the Millennium Democratic Party that had nominated him for the 2002 election, and effectively lost an already tenuous hold over the National Assembly. Roh formed his own Uri Party, which garnered a majority in the 2004 parliamentary election. The 2003 survey was conducted prior to these events; had the interviews taken place during the first few months of 2004, a reverse winner-loser gap similar to the one seen in Taiwan likely would have been observed.

Turning to more diffuse levels of system support, winner-loser differences in evaluating regime performance (satisfaction with how democracy works in one's country) mostly exceed those for appraising democratic norms (belief in the suitability of democracy and rejection of autocratic options). Indeed, the gap over democratic principles is usually smaller than for the other three dimensions. This implies not only that citizens can distinguish between these two dimensions, but also—and more importantly for long-term democratic stability—that discontent with procedural operations of democracy does not escalate into repudiation of its underlying values. Leaving aside Japan and South Korea for which the question of democratic satisfaction is unavailable for 2005, table 2 shows that losers are significantly less contented about the functioning of democracy in Taiwan and Thailand, but not in Mongolia. Ironically, the reverse is found for belief in democratic principles: Losers in Taiwan and Thailand, as well as in Japan 2003 and South Korea in 2003 and 2005, are as committed to democratic norms as winners, whereas significant differences exist between the two groups in Mongolia and also in Japan 2005.⁵⁵ Moreover, table 1 reveals that, in all three instances, it is the losers who profess deeper faith in democracy than the winners.

Mongolia stands out as a major exception to general patterns described above. Not only are winners less satisfied with how democracy works in the country their party governed, but also they find the very idea of democracy less palatable than opposition supporters. A plausible explanation lies in the history of the governing MPRP. While its leadership attempted to steer the party in a social democratic direction, along similar lines as many communist successor parties in Central and Eastern Europe, reorientation of political culture among MPRP supporters inevitably will take time.

The length of the MPRP's continuous rule both during and after communism (which exceeds any other authoritarian regime among the countries under examination) means that almost none of its supporters can remember a time when the party was last out of power.⁵⁶ Furthermore, whereas successive

⁵⁵ It is also ironic that less than half a year after the 2006 Thai survey, some among the losers who expressed staunch adherence to democratic norms, despite strong misgivings about its functioning, supported a military coup overthrowing the Thai Rak Thai government that had just won reelection, albeit under controversial circumstances.

military regimes in South Korea allowed opposition parties to compete in presidential and legislative elections, and local elections in Taiwan were open to opponents of the Kuomintang during its one-party rule, such contests never took place in communist Mongolia. If “supporters of old communist parties are the least positive in their expressions of support when they are among the losers,”⁵⁷ the Mongolian case suggests that such skepticism toward democracy remains even when they are the winners. In contrast, supporters of the other former autocratic party in our sample, the Kuomintang in Taiwan which banned opposition parties for nearly forty years, show greater adaptability. While unhappy about democratic processes that saw their party lose not only a monopoly of power but also the presidency, KMT backers displayed no proclivity for restoring dictatorship.

The sizeable reverse winner-loser gap in democratic principles in Japan 2005 is unexpected in view of Japan’s status as the sole East Asian nation with a long, continuous history of democracy, and appears even more puzzling in comparison with results in 2003, because government and opposition in both years were comprised of the same parties. While the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been in office for all but ten months since its founding in 1955, it had never made any attempt to impede free elections. Various opposition parties won elections at both local and national (upper House of Councillors) contests, and alternation of power became a more realistic prospect in recent years.⁵⁸ A closer look at changes between 2003 and 2005 reveals that, while losers became slightly more likely to endorse democratic principles, winners became less prone to do so. The rationale behind this finding warrants further investigation.

One possible explanation accounting for the magnitude of winner-loser differences is party system polarization, with the expectation of greater loser discontent relative to winners in highly polarized countries.⁵⁹ Although experts are best qualified to judge spatial distance among parties, it is citizens’ perception thereof that affects vote choice. The absence of questions on parties’ spatial locations in either the Asian Barometer or World Values Surveys prevents

⁵⁶ The incumbent MPRP President Nambaryn Enkhbayar lost the 2009 presidential election to Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, the candidate supported by an alliance of three opposition parties. Consequently, the party is out of power for the first time in more than seven decades.

⁵⁷ Anderson et al., *Losers’ Consent*, 107.

⁵⁸ While single non-transferable vote (SNTV) used until 1993 encouraged fragmentation among opposition parties, the new mixed-member majoritarian system promotes two-party competition. A credible challenge to the LDP gradually emerged in the form of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which won the House of Representatives elections in August 2009, and entered a coalition government as the dominant partner.

⁵⁹ This would be less valid in presidential systems where only weak links exist between support for parties and presidential candidates. This is less the case in the three presidential systems covered here (Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan) than in other new democracies in Asia such as Indonesia.

testing of this hypothesis, but data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), asking respondents to place parties along an overarching left-right (or progressive-conservative) spectrum, permit calculation of a polarization index. Adopting the method introduced by Dalton (2008), indices for Japan (2004), South Korea (2004), and Taiwan (2001)⁶⁰ are 24.3, 34.1, and 10.0, respectively. Comparing these numbers with table 1 suggests a *negative* correlation between party system polarization and the magnitude of winner-loser gaps. Losers are least differentiated from winners in South Korea, where parties are perceived as farther apart from the center. However, the very small number of cases renders any conclusion tenuous.

Returning to absolute levels of support in table 1, one discerns that in every single case except Thailand 2001, losers evaluate the incumbent government more negatively than positively (i.e., below the neutral point of 2.5), and the same holds true for appraisal of parliament (except in Thailand in 2001 and 2006). While this is hardly remarkable, what is more noteworthy is that even winners profess relatively low confidence in parliament in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (keep in mind that the DPP in Taiwan won the presidential office but its candidates did not win control of the Legislative Yuan). With respect to regime performance, losers in Thailand have been more satisfied with how democracy works than winners in all other countries. In contrast, losers in Japan and Taiwan are particularly discontented. More reassuringly, democratic principles are widely approved in every country, never falling below 3.0 even among losers (ironically, the lowest average score is recorded among winners in Mongolia 2006, and the highest score is that of losers in Japan 2005).

Losers in Mongolia and Thailand express not only the greatest confidence on the two more specific measures of system support, but also high satisfaction with how democracy works. Rather than attesting to better representation and more beneficial system outputs in these late democratizing (and comparatively less wealthy) countries, however, one can argue that citizens in countries characterized by more extended experience with democracy as well as higher standards of living have greater expectations of their political system, and become more critical when their demands are unmet. The case of Japan, with the highest average scores on attachment to democratic principles despite relatively low levels of specific support, suggests that more than half a century of democracy has succeeded in cultivating a reservoir of diffuse support, which may in turn foster the growth of “critical citizens” who reproach political authorities and institutions for failing to live up to democratic principles.

⁶⁰ Russell J. Dalton, “The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (2008): 899-920. Thailand (2001) is also included in the CSES data, but questions on left-right party locations were not asked.

Multivariate Analysis

While the discussion so far is based on descriptive data, the impact of differences between winners and losers on political support can be confirmed only through multivariate analysis. Tables 3, 5, and 7 show results of ordered logistic regressions for three dimensions of the political system: confidence in the government and parliament, and satisfaction with how democracy works. Since logit coefficients do not lend themselves to straightforward interpretation, tables 4, 6, and 8 supplement the tables by illustrating the probabilities of winners and losers offering favorable and unfavorable responses to each dependent variable. Since support for democratic principles is an additive index constructed from four variables with four response categories each, the total number of possible sum scores reaches 13, which justifies treatment as an interval measure and the use of ordinary least squares regression. Results are presented in table 9.

In line with large winner-loser gaps on confidence in government described above, table 3 shows that losers are always significantly less trustful of incumbent executives than winners.⁶¹ In nearly every case, winner/loser status exerts a greater influence on attitudes toward government than all other variables. No other variable is consistently found to be significant, though politically engaged respondents tend to trust the government more in South Korea and Thailand than in Japan, Mongolia, and Taiwan. The frequency of negative coefficients for education is telling, suggesting that highly educated strata are more critical of parties in office, though this variable attains significance only in Taiwan 2006 and Thailand 2001.

Table 4 shows the probability of winners and losers professing confidence in the incumbent government, with all other variables held at their mean values (see appendix B). For ease of interpretation, we may combine columns for “none at all” and “not very much” into a “not confident” category, and the probabilities for “quite a lot” and “a great deal” into a “confident” category. Observing the last two columns of table 4 (which by definition add up to one), one notes that differences are relatively modest in South Korea, but exceed 10 percent in all other countries, with losers particularly less trusting than winners in Japan 2005 (30 percent difference in probability), Thailand 2006 (41 percent), and Taiwan in both years (28 percent in 2001, 32 percent in 2006).

Results for confidence in parliament, shown in table 5, bear many resemblances to trust in government. Winner/loser status emerges as a key factor in shaping attitudes toward this key political institution in all countries except South Korea, where political interest is found once again to exert greater influence. Politically engaged respondents are also significantly more

⁶¹ Replacing the dependent variable with an item on satisfaction with the incumbent cabinet/president in the Asian Barometer surveys does not alter these results. In fact, the effect of winner/loser status becomes stronger, accounting for the greater variance.

Table 3. Confidence in Government

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Age	.009 (.007)	.004 (.023)	-.006 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.004 (.004)
Gender	.286 (.169)	.042 (.122)	.247 (.131)	-.277* (.138)	-.007 (.116)
Education	-.012 (.045)	.014 (.035)	-.103* (.046)	-.056 (.038)	-.056 (.032)
Income	.008 (.072)	.021 (.041)	-.025 (.069)	.087 (.060)	-.064 (.059)
Rural/urban	.028 (.208)	.009 (.129)	.346 (.190)	.159 (.178)	.328* (.164)
Pol. interest	-.005 (.114)	.062 (.075)	.411*** (.082)	.059 (.089)	.245** (.077)
Winner/loser	.874*** (.170)	.708*** (.124)	.330** (.126)	1.131*** (.141)	1.012*** (.129)
Nagelkerke R square	0.065	0.038	0.054	0.108	0.090
-2 Log Likelihood	1175.1	2201.1	2056.6	1644.3	2264.5
N	602	965	972	856	1159
	Japan 2005	Mongolia 2006	S. Korea 2005	Taiwan 2006	Thailand 2006
Age	.022*** (.006)	.008 (.005)	.011* (.005)	-.001 (.005)	.007 (.005)
Gender	.284 (.154)	-.007 (.124)	.472*** (.115)	.039 (.136)	.125 (.136)
Education	.099* (.049)	-.048 (.028)	.028 (.038)	-.119** (.040)	-.017 (.039)
Income	-.019 (.028)	-.030 (.046)	.097** (.034)	.095 (.057)	-.076 (.069)
Rural/urban	.054 (.057)	.336** (.127)	.019 (.034)	.525** (.187)	-.716*** (.197)
Pol. interest	.032 (.115)	.097 (.095)	.295*** (.076)	.175* (.082)	.302** (.095)
Winner/loser	1.371*** (.161)	.704*** (.131)	.372** (.132)	1.400*** (.142)	1.931*** (.162)
Nagelkerke R square	0.163	0.062	0.051	0.162	0.211
-2 Log Likelihood	1353.3	2294.2	2360.3	1703.1	1770.2
N	654	977	1179	878	905

Dependent variable: 1=don't trust at all; 4=trust a lot
 Unstandardized coefficients shown; standard error in parenthesis
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 4. Probability of Confidence in Government

	a) No confidence at all	b) Not very confidence	c) Quite a lot of confidence	d) A great deal of confidence	Not confident (a+b)	Confident (c+d)
<i>Japan 2003</i>						
Loser	0.197	0.628	0.160	0.015	0.825	0.175
Winner	0.093	0.570	0.302	0.036	0.663	0.337
<i>Mongolia 2002</i>						
Loser	0.143	0.351	0.407	0.098	0.495	0.505
Winner	0.076	0.249	0.494	0.180	0.325	0.675
<i>S. Korea 2003</i>						
Loser	0.280	0.505	0.194	0.021	0.785	0.215
Winner	0.218	0.506	0.247	0.029	0.724	0.276
<i>Taiwan 2001</i>						
Loser	0.117	0.538	0.328	0.016	0.655	0.345
Winner	0.041	0.339	0.571	0.048	0.380	0.620
<i>Thailand 2001</i>						
Loser	0.034	0.427	0.459	0.080	0.461	0.539
Winner	0.013	0.225	0.570	0.193	0.237	0.763
<i>Japan 2005</i>						
Loser	0.260	0.539	0.192	0.009	0.799	0.201
Winner	0.082	0.420	0.464	0.034	0.502	0.498
<i>Mongolia 2006</i>						
Loser	0.165	0.365	0.397	0.074	0.530	0.470
Winner	0.089	0.269	0.504	0.138	0.358	0.642
<i>S. Korea 2005</i>						
Loser	0.085	0.476	0.412	0.026	0.562	0.438
Winner	0.060	0.409	0.494	0.037	0.469	0.531
<i>Taiwan 2006</i>						
Loser	0.138	0.621	0.225	0.016	0.759	0.241
Winner	0.038	0.399	0.500	0.063	0.437	0.563
<i>Thailand 2006</i>						
Loser	0.161	0.416	0.393	0.030	0.577	0.423
Winner	0.027	0.138	0.657	0.178	0.165	0.835

Note: All variables other than winner/loser status held at mean values.

likely to place trust in the parliament in Thailand. The negative and substantive coefficients for winner/loser status in Taiwan reflect divided government, with opposition parties retaining a parliamentary majority and frequently at loggerheads with the president. Table 6 displays the probabilities of losers and winners expressing trust in parliament. Following the same method as that used for interpreting table 4, in a few cases, one can observe that winners are much more likely to evaluate parliament positively than losers (22 percent in Japan 2005, 28 percent in Thailand 2006), but for the most part, the magnitude of these differences in probability are smaller compared with table 4.

This does not necessarily mean that winners express greater confidence in the incumbent government than in parliament, nor that losers deem the former less credible than the latter. Cross-nationally, absolute levels of trust in both institutions do not vary systematically with winner/loser status. Instead, the emphasis is on the wider gap between winners and losers with respect to attitudes toward the executive than toward the legislature. It is also important to note that constitutional structure (presidential or parliamentary regime) does not appear to correlate with the magnitude of winner-loser differences.

Unavailability of data for Japan and South Korea across time cautions against drawing conclusions concerning these two countries from table 7, which shows results for satisfaction with democratic processes. In contrast, one is on firmer ground when observing that the distinction between winners and losers affects appraisals of regime performance in both Taiwan and Thailand. It is noteworthy that in both countries, the relative impact of winner/loser status had a greater impact in 2006, compared with 2001, at each of the three levels of system support discussed so far. The extension of losers' grievances from displeasure with the incumbent government to dissatisfaction with the regime testifies to rising political tensions. Chen Shui-bian was reelected president of Taiwan in 2004 by a razor-thin margin, and only after an assassination attempt that the opposition accused his supporters of concocting. The Thai Rak Thai party secured an overwhelming parliamentary majority in 2006, but all opposition parties boycotted the polls, eventually leading Thailand's Constitutional Court to nullify the election, indirectly paving the way to a coup later that year.

Table 8 displays differential probabilities of satisfaction with democratic processes. Focusing on the last two columns once again, the magnitude of winner-loser gaps varies from almost nil (in fact slightly negative) in Mongolia to 19 percent in Taiwan 2006, but overall differences are almost always smaller than those observed for confidence in government (with South Korea 2003 as the singular exception). It is notable that, for both winners and losers—but more importantly in the latter cases—the probability of evaluating the functioning of democracy positively exceeds that of institutional trust. Losers (and often winners also) in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have strong reservations regarding the trustworthiness of governing institutions, but their doubts about these specific aspects of the political system do not extend to the more diffuse

Table 5. Confidence in Parliament

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Age	.020** (.007)	.039 (.024)	.006 (.006)	-.002 (.006)	-.0006 (.004)
Gender	.220 (.167)	-.053 (.122)	.190 (.132)	.143 (.135)	-.007 (.115)
Education	.026 (.044)	0.049 (.035)	-.059 (.046)	-.086* (.037)	-.024 (.032)
Income	-.011 (.070)	-.019 (.041)	-.026 (.070)	-.056 (.059)	-.092 (.058)
Rural/urban	-.095 (.208)	.039 (.129)	.054 (.192)	.260 (.176)	.082 (.161)
Pol. interest	.102 (.112)	-.140 (.075)	.321*** (.082)	-.182* (.088)	.206** (.076)
Winner/loser	.786*** (.167)	.854*** (.125)	.294* (.127)	-.422** (.135)	.389** (.126)
Nagelkerke R square	0.067	0.067	0.034	0.045	0.027
-2 Log Likelihood	1146.6	2182.7	1944.8	1747.9	2402.6
N	632	964	972	856	1118
	Japan 2005	Mongolia 2006	S. Korea 2005	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2006
Age	.018** (.006)	2.765e-5 (.005)	.006 (.005)	-0.0005 (.005)	.008 (.005)
Gender	.277 (.158)	-.225 (.124)	.593*** (.116)	.144 (.132)	.021 (.138)
Education	.023 (.050)	-.051 (.028)	.017 (.038)	-.126*** (.038)	.016 (.039)
Income	-.023 (.029)	-.077 (.046)	.069* (.034)	-.047 (.055)	-.073 (.070)
Rural/urban	.004 (.059)	.387** (.128)	.057 (.034)	.333 (.182)	-.403* (.200)
Pol. interest	-.028 (.117)	.134 (.095)	.391*** (.075)	.084 (.080)	.249** (.097)
Winner/loser	1.177*** (.164)	.410** (.130)	.197 (.131)	-.820*** (.134)	1.254*** (.157)
Nagelkerke R square	0.125	0.047	0.056	0.070	0.105
-2 Log Likelihood	1293.0	2257.5	2416.1	1767.7	1649.3
N	642	984	1183	890	901

Dependent variable: 1=don't trust at all; 4=trust a lot
 Unstandardized coefficients shown; standard error in parenthesis
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 6. Probability of Confidence in Parliament

	a) No confidence at all	b) Not very confidence	c) Quite a lot of confidence	d) A great deal of confidence	Not confident (a+b)	Confident (c+d)
<i>Japan 2003</i>						
Loser	0.332	0.578	0.088	0.003	0.909	0.091
Winner	0.184	0.636	0.174	0.006	0.820	0.180
<i>Mongolia 2002</i>						
Loser	0.145	0.344	0.409	0.102	0.489	0.511
Winner	0.067	0.222	0.500	0.211	0.290	0.710
<i>S. Korea 2003</i>						
Loser	0.379	0.492	0.113	0.017	0.871	0.129
Winner	0.312	0.522	0.144	0.022	0.834	0.166
<i>Taiwan 2001</i>						
Loser	0.224	0.546	0.214	0.017	0.770	0.230
Winner	0.305	0.531	0.153	0.011	0.836	0.164
<i>Thailand 2001</i>						
Loser	0.062	0.386	0.446	0.106	0.448	0.552
Winner	0.043	0.312	0.497	0.148	0.355	0.645
<i>Japan 2005</i>						
Loser	0.269	0.579	0.145	0.008	0.847	0.153
Winner	0.102	0.530	0.343	0.025	0.631	0.369
<i>Mongolia 2006</i>						
Loser	0.113	0.363	0.437	0.087	0.476	0.524
Winner	0.078	0.298	0.498	0.126	0.376	0.624
<i>S. Korea 2005</i>						
Loser	0.196	0.561	0.229	0.013	0.757	0.243
Winner	0.167	0.553	0.264	0.016	0.719	0.281
<i>Taiwan 2006</i>						
Loser	0.184	0.559	0.243	0.014	0.743	0.257
Winner	0.339	0.529	0.126	0.006	0.868	0.132
<i>Thailand 2006</i>						
Loser	0.063	0.434	0.467	0.036	0.497	0.503
Winner	0.019	0.201	0.665	0.115	0.220	0.780

Note: All variables other than winner/loser status held at mean values.

Table 7. Satisfaction with How Democracy Works

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Age	.011 (.006)	-.006 (.025)	.004 (.007)	-.005 (.006)	-.008 (.004)
Gender	-.043 (.158)	-.091 (.128)	.109 (.142)	-.338* (.135)	-.415*** (.118)
Education	.018 (.043)	.055 (.037)	-.083 (.050)	-.099** (.037)	-.083* (.033)
Income	-0.106 (.068)	.045 (.043)	-.042 (.074)	.032 (.059)	-.111 (.060)
Rural/urban	-.270 (.193)	-.067 (.136)	.280 (.214)	.409* (.174)	.307 (.166)
Pol. interest	.109 (.106)	.188* (.079)	-.089 (.088)	-.143 (.088)	.406*** (.079)
Winner/loser	.161 (.155)	-.065 (.129)	.637*** (.137)	.538*** (.135)	.316* (.129)
Nagelkerke R square	0.022	0.016	0.048	0.062	0.08
-2 Log Likelihood	1305.1	1913.4	1445.9	1723.1	2029.6
N	638	966	969	886	1182

	Mongolia 2006	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2006
Age	.004 (.005)	-.009 (.005)	.007 (.005)
Gender	.075 (.127)	-.227 (.132)	.035 (.130)
Education	-.015 (.029)	-.036 (.038)	-.073 (.038)
Income	-.027 (.047)	.059 (.056)	-.024 (.066)
Rural/urban	.288* (.131)	.191 (.181)	-.105 (.191)
Pol. interest	-.025 (.097)	.140 (.080)	.380*** (.091)
Winner/loser	-.104 (.133)	.804*** (.133)	1.000*** (.152)
Nagelkerke R square	0.01	0.059	0.106
-2 Log Likelihood	2034.3	1809.2	1763.7
N	989	928	946

Dependent variable: 1=not at all satisfied; 4=very satisfied (question not asked in World Values Survey [Japan 2005, South Korea 2005])

Unstandardized coefficients shown; standard error in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 8. Probability of Satisfaction with How Democracy Works

	a) Not at all satisfied	b) Fairly dissatisfied	c) Fairly satisfied	d) Very satisfied	Not satisfied (a+b)	Satisfied (c+d)
<i>Japan 2003</i>						
Loser	0.087	0.451	0.426	0.036	0.537	0.463
Winner	0.075	0.423	0.460	0.042	0.497	0.503
<i>Mongolia 2002</i>						
Loser	0.047	0.233	0.588	0.131	0.281	0.719
Winner	0.050	0.244	0.582	0.124	0.294	0.706
<i>S. Korea 2003</i>						
Loser	0.022	0.460	0.510	0.008	0.482	0.518
Winner	0.012	0.318	0.656	0.015	0.330	0.670
<i>Taiwan 2001</i>						
Loser	0.064	0.480	0.422	0.034	0.544	0.456
Winner	0.039	0.372	0.532	0.057	0.411	0.589
<i>Thailand 2001</i>						
Loser	0.010	0.092	0.604	0.294	0.102	0.898
Winner	0.007	0.069	0.560	0.363	0.076	0.924
<i>Mongolia 2006</i>						
Loser	0.030	0.305	0.550	0.115	0.335	0.665
Winner	0.033	0.326	0.536	0.105	0.359	0.641
<i>Taiwan 2006</i>						
Loser	0.084	0.418	0.468	0.031	0.502	0.498
Winner	0.039	0.271	0.623	0.066	0.311	0.689
<i>Thailand 2006</i>						
Loser	0.028	0.211	0.598	0.163	0.239	0.761
Winner	0.010	0.093	0.550	0.347	0.104	0.896

Note: All variables other than winner/loser status held at mean values.

dimension of democratic performance.

In contrast to other levels of system support, table 9 reveals no evidence of losers' discontent with respect to democratic principles. Indeed, in the few cases where winner/loser status significantly affects attitudes toward democracy and alternative regime types, one finds losers more committed to democratic norms than winners. This augurs well for the prospects of sustained democratic viability, since it implies that losers who are dissatisfied with election results will seek remedy within the framework of democratic rules of the game rather than resort to attempts at changing the regime type. Explanation for a persisting reverse winner-loser gap in Mongolia, as pointed out earlier, may be rooted in the authoritarian origins of the ruling MPRP. If so, supporters of this party provide a rare example of expressing satisfaction with how the democracy works, while retaining relative skepticism about its underpinning norms.

While the insignificance of coefficients for winner/loser status in South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand does not necessarily indicate extensive support for the idea of democracy (both groups could be equally disillusioned), it at least suggests that any changes losers try to pursue would be through democratic means. However, the 2006 military coup in Thailand challenges this conclusion. The case of Japan 2005 is probably the most unexpected finding. That losers profess such loyalty to democratic principles despite their parties' having been almost permanently excluded from power cannot be elucidated by socialization of diffuse support alone (since this would not have distinguished them from winners), and presents both a testimony to the strength of democratic norms (since their average level of democratic support exceeds winners and losers in all other countries) and a challenging research question.⁶²

Education often plays a significant role in encouraging democratic beliefs, in contrast to its effect on other dimensions of system support. This is true even in Japan, where one expects democratic consciousness to have taken root in all segments of the population after decades of socialization and experience. Among other socio-demographic variables, higher income is also independently correlated with greater support in most cases, making the reversal of coefficient signs in Thailand between 2001 and 2006 all the more perplexing. Similar to its impact on other levels of support, greater political interest is generally associated with more prodemocratic attitudes (Korea 2003 is the singular exception).

Finally, an overview of results in tables 3-6 does not reveal any clear pattern between age of democracy and the impact of winner/loser status on political support. The expectation that losers would be less satisfied in newer

⁶² One possible explanation is that losers are more vigilant against abuses of democratic principles (Moehler, "Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects"), though this argument is probably more applicable in younger democracies.

Table 9. Belief in Democratic Principles

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Age	.002 (.001)	-.002 (.007)	-.001 (.001)	.003* (.001)	-.00038 (.001)
Gender	.003 (.034)	.001 (.036)	-.060* (.030)	-.032 (.030)	-.004 (.033)
Education	.023* (.010)	.007 (.011)	.004 (.011)	.041*** (.008)	.00049 (.009)
Income	.003 (.015)	.025* (.012)	.033* (.016)	.037** (.013)	.034* (.016)
Rural/urban	.033 (.043)	.150*** (.038)	-.011 (.045)	.029 (.036)	-.006 (.042)
Pol. interest	.073*** (.022)	.054* (.022)	-.041* (.018)	.074*** (.019)	.080*** (.021)
Winner/loser	.005 (.034)	-.142*** (.036)	.013 (.029)	.056 (.030)	-.003 (.036)
Adjusted R squared	0.027	0.042	0.010	0.104	0.013
N	677	936	971	827	1182
	Japan 2005	Mongolia 2006	S. Korea 2005	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2006
Age	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Gender	.084* (.037)	-.109** (.036)	.067* (.027)	-.049 (.029)	-.014 (.038)
Education	.036** (.012)	.023** (.008)	.022* (.009)	.037*** (.008)	.023* (.011)
Income	.006 (.007)	.035** (.013)	.019* (.008)	.046*** (.012)	-.036 (.020)
Rural/urban	-.034* (.014)	-.058 (.037)	.006 (.008)	.017 (.037)	.085 (.054)
Pol. interest	.053* (.026)	.050 (.026)	.024 (.018)	.059*** (.018)	.004 (.026)
Winner/loser	-.230*** (.036)	-.213*** (.037)	-.005 (.031)	.029 (.029)	-.078 (.043)
Adjusted R squared	0.111	0.084	0.015	0.113	0.005
N	633	932	1185	915	912

Dependent variable: additive index of rule by strong man, banning opposition parties, military rule, and suitability of democratic system; 1=strong authoritarian preference, 4=strong democratic preference (rescaled)

Unstandardized coefficients shown; standard error in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

democracies due to unfamiliarity with open electoral processes and fear of consequences of losing is not validated. Nor does the hypothesis that losers' discontent would spill over from specific to diffuse dimensions of the political system in the absence of a reservoir of diffuse support find confirmation. Instead, one must reach the more accurate conclusion, albeit one from which it is not easy to generalize, that political contexts in individual countries frequently determine the direction and extent of winner-loser gaps.⁶³

Discussion and Conclusion

Attitudes of electoral losers have a crucial bearing on democratic stability, since the viability of the system can hinge on their choice of means to rectify their parties' exclusion from decision-making power. While they are by definition less pleased with election results than winners, and are less inclined to evaluate the government formed by their opponents positively, dissatisfaction at specific levels of regime authorities and institutions does not consistently extend to more diffuse dimensions concerning democratic principles and processes. The degree to which this spillover effect occurs, and how it varies across East Asian countries with divergent democratic histories, are the key questions this study seeks to address.

When examining attitudinal differences between winners and losers toward regime authorities (confidence in government), institutions (confidence in parliament), performance (satisfaction with how democracy works), and principles (endorsement of democratic norms and rejection of authoritarian alternatives), overall the gap narrows as one moves from specific to diffuse levels of political support. T-tests demonstrate that, while losers are considerably less trustful of government and parliament than winners in most countries and express slightly greater skepticism regarding the functioning of the system, with a few telling exceptions, they are not substantially less committed to democracy as a set of principles than supporters of parties in power. In short, dissatisfaction with policies (or perks) does not frequently lead to rejection of the polity.

Multivariate analysis confirms that, while loser status significantly reduces confidence in government and parliament in most countries and leads to a more negative appraisal of democratic performance in some countries, it has little impact on allegiance to democratic norms. In fact, where significant differences

⁶³ The World Values Survey recorded respondents' self-placements on a left-right spectrum. When this independent variable is added to regression equations for each level of system support, it has no impact on any dependent variable in South Korea 2005. In Japan 2005, left-right orientation is significant at the $p < 0.01$ level for confidence in government and parliament (left-leaning respondents being less trustful), but not attitudes toward democratic principles and procedures. Whether ideology exerts influence on system support independent of party affiliation in new democracies warrants further study.

are found, losers profess greater commitment to upholding the democratic system than winners. This finding, supplemented by the fact that positive assessments of both democratic principles and processes exceed negative ones in every country examined, should assuage concerns about the viability of democracy in countries only recently freed from authoritarian rule. The most politically engaged segments of the population express greater support in every dimension of the system. Education, while having an ambivalent effect at more specific levels, is positively correlated with approbation of democratic principles.

While a discernible relationship exists between the magnitude of winner-loser gaps and the level at which the political system is assessed, no clear pattern emerges between age of democracy and winner/loser status in East Asia. This stands in contrast to findings by Anderson et al.⁶⁴ The hypothesis that one may expect larger differences in newer democracies where diffuse support is absent finds little empirical confirmation. The only evidence of diffuse support is seen in high levels of devotion to democratic principles in Japan, despite lackluster evaluations of political authorities, institutions, and performance. Indeed, one observes the highest confidence in these latter dimensions of the regime in Mongolia and Thailand, which democratized later than the three Pacific Rim countries. It is thus possible to suggest a curvilinear relationship between democratic experience and political support: Support may be high in countries just emerging from authoritarian rule simply by virtue of the new regime's not being dictatorial, but a combination of citizens' rising expectations and fading memories of the old regime increasingly challenges young democracies to meet popular aspirations through delivery of concrete outputs, until sufficient time has passed to allow for socialization processes that create a reservoir of good will toward the system itself. The number of cases covered in this study is too few to test this proposition, however.

Contrary to results reported by Anderson and Guillory,⁶⁵ in East Asia neither absolute levels of support nor the magnitude of winner-loser differences seems to vary systematically with constitutional structure. Losers in presidential systems, which are majoritarian by definition, are not substantially less satisfied with each dimension of the political support than winners when compared with their counterparts in parliamentary systems. The only exception is with regard to confidence in parliament, with wider gaps between winners and losers in Japan and Thailand than in Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan. This is hardly unexpected, since winner/loser status in the former two countries is defined by control of the legislature, whereas parties winning the presidency do not necessarily coincide with those holding a parliamentary majority in the latter cases. While one may plausibly argue that electoral rules providing for full

⁶⁴ Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent*.

⁶⁵ Anderson and Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy."

proportional representation, in contrast to mixed-member majoritarian systems such as those used in Japan and Thailand, would yield starker winner-loser contrasts in comparison with presidential regimes, it should be noted that parliamentary regimes with proportional outcomes are relatively rare in new democracies outside of Central and Eastern Europe.

A major limitation of this study lies in similar government compositions across the two points in time (with the partial exception of South Korea), leaving some room for speculation about whether and how attitudes of winners and losers in each country would change if their status were reversed. Based on patterns for each dimension of system support observed above, one can confidently surmise that winners would express greater trust in government and parliament (assuming unified government) than losers, regardless which party or president were to hold power. While predictions for satisfaction with democratic procedures are more ambiguous, the small winner-loser gaps in commitment to democratic norms and the frequent insignificance of winner/loser status on the most diffuse level of support suggest that, when winning parties in the cases examined here lose the following election—as occurred in South Korea in 2007, Taiwan and Thailand in 2008, and Mongolia and Japan in 2009—their supporters' disappointment with such outcome will not translate into disenchantment with democracy itself. Future surveys should be analyzed to test the validity of this proposition.

Finally, notable exceptions to findings in the previous section raise topics for further research. The reverse winner-loser gap in Taiwan for trust in parliament illustrates the potential impact of separation of powers between executive and legislative branches in presidential systems, and raises the question whether divided government mitigates or magnifies differences between supporters of parties controlling the presidency and the parliamentary majority.⁶⁶ This is particularly relevant in semi-presidential regimes in which no branch is clearly dominant over another. Another reverse gap, over democratic principles in Mongolia, highlights the issue of whether and how former authoritarian ruling parties adapt to democratic competition and the possibility of losing, entailing not only changes in party personnel, organization, and ideologies, but also a reorientation of political culture on the part of their supporters. A related inquiry concerns whether certain types of parties—examples include, but are not restricted to, ruling parties under past autocratic regimes such as communist successors—are more likely to delay or hinder the development of a prodemocratic political culture. If authoritarian sentiments persist even when supporters of these parties achieve power by winning elections, there is cause for concern for democratic stability when they lose.

⁶⁶ See Philip Paolino, "Democratization, Divided Government and the 2001 Taiwanese Legislative Yuan Elections," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 40 (2005): 125-147, for details on how assessment of divided government is associated with various dimensions of attitudes toward democracy.

Appendix A. List of Winning and Losing Parties/Candidates

	Winners	Losers
Japan 2003	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) New Komeito New Conservative Party (NCP)	Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Social Democratic Party (SDP) Japan Communist Party (JCP) Liberal Party (LP)
Japan 2005	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) New Komeito	Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Social Democratic Party (SDP) Japan Communist Party (JCP)
Mongolia 2002	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)	Democratic Party (DP) Motherland Party Civic Will Party
Mongolia 2006	Nambaryn Enkhbayar	Mendsaikhany Enkhsaikhan Bazarsad Jargalsaikhan Badarch Erdenebat
South Korea 2003	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Hoi-chang Kwon Young-ghil Jang Se-Dong
South Korea 2005	Uri	Grand National Party (GNP) Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) Democratic Labor Party (DLP) United Liberal Democratic Party (ULD)
Taiwan 2001	Chen Shui-bian	James Soong Lien Chan Hsu Hsin-liang Lee Ao
Taiwan 2006	Chen Shui-bian	Lien Chan
Thailand 2001	Thai Rak Thai Chart Thai New Aspiration Seritham	Democratic Party Thai Motherland Rassadorn Prachakorn Thai Chart Pattana
Thailand 2006	Thai Rak Thai	

Note: vote or vote intention for “other” parties classified as losers.

Appendix B. Mean Values of Independent Variables

	Japan 2003	Mongolia 2002	S. Korea 2003	Taiwan 2001	Thailand 2001
Age	50.97	5.52*	41.74	43.50	45.14
Gender	1.55	1.53	1.50	1.51	1.53
Education	6.63	6.38	6.84	5.90	3.49
Income	2.92	3.33	2.28	2.23	2.56
Rural/urban	1.20	1.41	1.12	1.22	1.75
Political interest	2.78	2.80	2.35	2.13	2.88

	Japan 2005	Mongolia 2006	S. Korea 2005	Taiwan 2006	Thailand 2006
Age	48.15	39.56	41.38	45.27	43.01
Gender	1.56	1.57	1.50	1.50	1.52
Education	6.88	6.25	7.36	6.29	4.60
Income	4.69	3.00	4.88	2.40	2.28
Rural/urban	2.45	1.46	4.01	1.19	1.81
Political interest	2.73	2.62	2.28	2.10	2.86

Note: age - actual age (except Mongolia 2002); gender - 1=male, 2=female; education - higher values denote higher educational attainment; income - see note 51; rural/urban - see note 52; political interest - 1=least interested, 4=most interested.

* Age category rather than actual age.

