

The Effect of Social Movements on Representative Deficit
A Study of Two Taiwanese Cases

Da-chi Liao and Yueh-ching Chen

Abstract

This essay explores the extent to which social movements can remedy representative deficits. Based on prior literature addressing the effect of social movements on liberal democracy, a theoretical impact spectrum is used that defines five criteria for measuring the degree of political change, with the aim of identifying three levels of historical milestones within a movement: superficial, substantial, and fundamental change.

This essay also empirically examines two hypotheses from prior literature. The first hypothesis is that social movements that concern matters mainly related to the public interest should be able to remedy a representative deficit at least at the superficial level. The second hypothesis is that social movements that directly seek widened participation and deeper deliberation should be more able to remedy representative deficits than movements that are more indirect.

The two cases examined are the Red Shirt Movement and the Sunflower Movement, which occurred in Taiwan in 2006 and 2014, respectively. This essay focuses on research inside the Legislative Yuan, the only representative institution in Taiwan, to measure and evaluate the degree of effect. In undertaking this aspect of data collection, we cooperated with information technologists and used computer assisted techniques.

The evaluation results chiefly confirm the two hypotheses. In the conclusion, the essay discusses the limitations of the research design that was used as well as those of its theoretical application.

Keywords: Representative deficit, Red Shirt Movement, social movement, Sunflower Movement, Taiwan.

Da-chi Liao is a Professor at the Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. <dcliao@faculty.nsysu.edu.tw>

Yueh-ching Chen is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University. <christinegenger@mail.nsysu.edu.tw>
Representative democracy, by its essence, is not equivalent to “direct” democracy.¹ The gap between “rule by elected representatives” and “rule by the people” always has forced groups that have little or no representation to find other channels to voice their concerns. One of these channels is to launch social movements.² Even though the meaning of a social movement may vary,³ the effects of social movements on liberal democracy are regarded as mainly positive by the current literature.⁴ However, there has not been much solid empirical research to explore the specific effects of social movements on the operation of representative democracies. This essay, therefore, studies the extent to which social movements can fix the problem of representative deficits that exists in current democracies.

In this essay, the meaning of “social movement” mainly follows their three essential characteristics identified by Charles Tilly:⁵ “(1) campaigns of collective claims on target authorities; (2) an array of claim-making performances including special purpose associations, public media statements, and demonstrations; and (3) public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.”⁶

¹ This means “a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved.” See David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 4. Held generally divides democracies into two models, “direct participatory democracy, and liberal or representative democracy.” Ibid., 4-6. The latter means “a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests and/or views of citizens within the framework of ‘rule of law.’ ” Ibid., 4. This essay primarily follows this classification scheme and its associated meanings, since the literature on social movements prevalently adopts these.

² Hirschman has classified these channels into two types: exit and voice. Social movements should fall into the category of “voice.” See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).


⁵ Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004.

⁶ Tilly and Wood, Social Movements, 1768-2012, 8.
To put it simply, social movements involve a series of collective actions that aim to promote some claims that largely have been neglected or even aggravated by relevant authorities.

As for the term “representative deficit,” it is borrowed from Jonathan Bright. Its original meaning conveys the sense that there is always a gap between the policy stances of a certain political party and those of the general public. In this essay, however, the term is used in a more direct way, to refer to the fact that elected representatives in a liberal democracy can never fully represent the interests or the stances toward policy of their constituents who elect them.

In its empirical study of the effect of social movements on the representative mechanism in a democracy, this essay makes deductions from relevant discussions and offers an impact spectrum for social movements. This three-tiered spectrum of change ranges from “superficial,” to “substantial,” to “fundamental.” In between these three milestones, there are innumerable minor changes. Their cumulative appearances at different stages can be given five respective labels: “immediate legislative behavioral responses to target claims”; “formation of behavioral patterns in general legislative processes”; “rule changes in democratic institutional mechanisms”; “amendment of the constitution to widen participation and deepen deliberation,” and “enactment of a new constitution.” Among these five labels for cumulative effects, “superficial” change starts with “immediate legislative behavioral responses to target claims.” “Substantial” change involves “rule changes,” and the ultimate “fundamental” change would result in the “enactment of a new constitution.” Further details and explanations of this spectrum are provided in the essay’s second section.

This essay considers two cases of social mobilization that occurred in Taiwan in 2006 and 2014, to examine their effects on Taiwan’s representative deficit. The 2006 case is called the Red Shirt Movement, which was a protest against then president of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Chen Shui Bian (反貪倒扁). Its main goals were to lessen corruption and impeach Bian, as he was alleged to have taken bribes. The 2014 case is the Sunflower Movement.

---

9 Sheng Shingyuan and Cheng Sufen, “Tai wan min zong de lan lu ren tong yu hong shan jun yun dong de can yu: Yi ge kuang jia jie meng de jie shi” [Taiwanese blue-green party identification and the participation in the Redshirts protest: An explanation of the frame alignment], in Gong min yu zheng zhi xing dong: Shi zhen gyou gui zhi jian de dai hua [Citizenship and political action: A dialogue between empirical inquiries and normative reflections], ed. Chang Fukien (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 2009), 131-182.
sought transparency in the legislative process and more participation, since its supporters protested that the The Straits Agreement on Trade in Services (CSATS) was signed without allowing people to adequately participate and deliberate in the process. Rather, they asserted that the agreement was made law in the black box of the Legislative Yuan.\(^\text{10}\) They also deeply distrusted then president Ma Ying-jeou, since he had signed twenty-three cross-strait agreements between 2008 and 2014.\(^\text{11}\) Both movements launched large-scale street protests in Taipei that involved about one-half to one million people.\(^\text{12}\) Both also organized a series of activities, as well as formed relevant associations to unite claim supporters before and after protest events.\(^\text{13}\) The two movements also displayed a strong ability to collaborate with the mass media.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, they fully meet the conditions for being called social movements in accordance with Tilly’s criteria.\(^\text{15}\)

One discernable difference between the two movements, however, is that the Red Shirt Movement targeted only President Chen and made anticorruption its main objective, while the Sunflower Movement not only blamed President Ma for the lack of deliberation over cross-strait agreements, but also occupied the Legislative Yuan for twenty-four days (March 18—April 10, 2014) and demanded more participation and deliberation in the legislative process. Since the latter movement’s claims, indeed, are related directly to the remediation of the representative deficit, but the former movement’s claims are not, we hypothesize that the Sunflower Movement should have a greater impact on remediation than the Red Shirt Movement. However, both should be able to attain a superficial level of change in accordance with the consensus of prior studies.

\(^\text{10}\) Yan Shannong, Luo Huiwen, Liang Qiuhong, and Jiang Binglun, *This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement”—A Comprehensive Record of the 318 Movement* (Taipei: Yun-chen, 2015), 8-25.


\(^\text{13}\) Chang Fukien, ed., *Gong min yu zheng zhi xing dong: Shi zheng yu gui fan zhi jian de dai hua* [Citizenship and political action: A dialogue between empirical inquiries and normative reflections] (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 2009), iii-vii, and Yan et al., *This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement.”*

\(^\text{14}\) See Sheng and Cheng, “Tai wan mín zhong de lan lu ren tong yu hong shan jun yun dong de can yu” [Taiwanese blue-green party identification and the participation in the Redshirts protest: An explanation of the frame alignment], and Yan et al., *This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement,”* 200-266.

\(^\text{15}\) See Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004.*
This essay primarily uses the Taiwan Legislative Yuan’s responses to the two movements as the affected object. It attempts to examine the Legislative Yuan (L. Y.) from an information-gathering perspective, since the improvement of a representative deficit always demands wider information gathering and/or deeper information exchange.\textsuperscript{16} These can be achieved either by inviting more informants to participate in the legislative process or by allocating more time for them to speak so that they may have more opportunities to share their views with legislators. Either approach may or may not involve rule changes.

We therefore observed how many and what types of informants were invited to the Legislative Yuan, and how often they were permitted to speak during the legislative process in comparison to governmental officials. These observations then were operationalized as primary indicators for observing the L. Y.’s responses to social movements—before, during, or after they occurred.

The methods employed for collecting the data concerning information gathering and exchanges presented in this essay included text mining and computer-assisted techniques. Furthermore, the relevant rules regarding either the claims of social movements or those involving participation and deliberation inside the L. Y. are documented. The detailed design for evaluating the degree of the L. Y.’s responses to the two social movements, method utilization, and data collection are provided in the third section of this essay.

This essay has five parts. This introduction is followed by a literature review and discussion of the theoretical spectrum. The next section addresses the research design and methods that have been employed. The fourth section examines the two mentioned cases, after which there is a discussion of the findings and a conclusion.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Spectrum**

**Literature Review**

As mentioned previously, although few prior studies have attempted to empirically examine the effect of social movements on the operation of democracy, many studies hold a positive (but not empirical) view. Among these relevant studies, Charles Tilly and Lesley J. Wood’s volume, *Social Movements 1768-2012*, is one of the more cautious regarding the positive effects of social movements on democracy. Other scholars, such as Donatella della Porta, are more confident, believing in the transformative effect of such movements on liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{17} Della Porta’s answer to whether

\textsuperscript{16} Although wider and deeper information gathering should not result in a perfect preference match between the people who are representative and those who are represented, these actions more or less reduce the gap between the two. Please see Liao Dachi, *The Influence of Culture on Information Gathering in Organizations: An Authoritarian Paradigm* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1990).

\textsuperscript{17} Della Porta, *Can Democracy Be Saved?*
democracy can be saved by social movements, which she lays out in her book title, *Can Democracy Be Saved?*, is certainly “yes.” The other works by Archon Fung, Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Tarrow, Steven Buechler, and Pierre Rosanvallon, demonstrate positive attitudes toward the relationship between social movements and current liberal democracies that fall in between those of Tilly and Della Porta. Following is a brief review of these relevant studies and the effects they identify or try to ascertain.

Tilly studies social movements from both historical and sociological perspectives. He primarily observes reciprocal connections between democracy and social movements based on his own collection of historical records of social movements, as well as on his long-term concerns about the dynamics between rulers and contenders in a regime. For him, only governments that are democratic can offer opportunities for social activists to launch various movements. The effect of social movements on democracy, therefore, comes from democratic governments that acknowledge the right of social activists to mobilize popular support, enlarge the range of participants, equalize various participants, and, to a certain extent, balance the unfair treatment of vulnerable groups in society. All these effects can be said to more or less contribute to reducing the representative deficit that inevitability exists in representative democracy. Tilly also notes, however, that some background conditions may promote both democratization and social movements. These may involve demographic, technological, or other social changes that increase social networks, equalize access to resources, insulate public politics from existing inequalities, or proliferate trust networks. If these conditions do not all evolve in a stabilizing direction, social movements can promote de-democratization.

Tilly also warns that the current trend of globalization, with its accompanying economic and technological changes, may increase polarization in society and give rise to racially based movements. Such polarization might boost nationalist parties that potentially could become less democratic.

In summary, Tilly is very cautious in dealing with the relationship between social movements and democratic progress. He argues that historical lessons do not demonstrate a linear relationship between the two. Other social and technical conditions which might not be controllable by a national democratic government could play some crucial roles in influencing the relationship. Such issues notwithstanding, Tilly still holds a positive view regarding the effect of social movements on representative deficits in current liberal democratic regimes, at least when their demands are not narrowly focused, but instead

---

18 Ibid.
21 Tilly and Wood, *Social Movements 1768-2012*, 143-144.
22 Ibid., 143-145.
publicly concerned.

Since the other conditions that Tilly considers cannot be controlled at a national level, this essay does not elaborate on these conditions or their influences. This essay’s main concern is the challenges from social movements that are faced by democratic institutions at the national level. Such challenges are raised by social movements with the claim that they are promoting better democracy. As for the effects of social movements on representative deficits, this essay categorizes them into participation and deliberation, because these are the two types Tilly implicitly suggests. The essay further elaborates on various forms of effect and their meanings, as discussed by Tilly, as well as his ideas regarding change that can bring about greater democracy. It is worth noting that short-term behavioral responses do not address Tilly’s expectation of democratic improvement. Rules that afford more participation and deeper exchange of views in public policy-making processes, which have been promulgated after social movements, might better fit with Tilly’s ideas. 23

In contrast to Tilly, Della Porta is far more optimistic concerning the effect of social movements on democratic development. In her recent book, she first criticizes liberal democracy because it may not be appropriate to the twenty-first century. 24 In her view, some historical alternative forms of democratic governing have been neglected by current democracies. For her, a more democratic form may be a “participatory deliberative democracy,” in which both the majority vote and the representative decision making often seen in liberal democracies are replaced by deliberative and participatory decision making. 25 Since her vision of this more full-fledged democracy derives mainly from a survey of almost 250 social movement organizations in Europe, generalization of this form of democratic process to a national government is doubtful. However, her formula for this type of transformation relies chiefly on the effect of social movements, since she believes that the willingness of public officials to learn and adopt new approaches to decision making results only from the shock of social movements.

In sum, Della Porta holds the most positive view toward the transformative effect of social movements on liberal democracy. In keeping with her assessment of plausible effects, this essay assumes that social movements not only may cause public officials to respond immediately and fix participatory

---

23 Ibid., 143-144.

24 Della Porta argues that the three conditions that made liberal democracy possible and desirable in the twentieth century no longer hold in the twenty-first century. These three conditions are: (1) reliance on political parties as collective actors; (2) the territorial nation-state as the area in which majoritarian decisions govern; and (3) the efficacy of political means and political equality to constrain economic and social inequality. Each of these conditions has given way to different realities: individual connective politics vs. the concentration of power in the hands of national executives; regional and global dynamics; and market forces against state regulation. See Della Porta, Can Democracy Be Saved? 1-30.

25 Ibid., table 1.1, 8.
or deliberative problems, but also may have the potential to motivate them to amend current constitutions that constrain the adoption of so-called participatory deliberative democracy in a liberal democratic nation.

Other scholars, such as Buechler, Tarrow and McAdam, Frances Fox Piven, and Fung, generally agree with Della Porta that elected representatives cannot fully represent the people in a democracy. The function of social movements, then, is to reduce the plausible deficit in public representation. Buechler and Tarrow and McAdam go further to suggest that elections plus social movements equals democracy. They advocate the institutionalization of social movements in democracy, and view that societies marked by movements are coming into being everywhere in the world. However, this school of thought seemingly takes only party rotation and public policy change into account regarding the effects of social movements. It provides no significant criticism of the rules that govern the operation of liberal democracy.

Piven and Fung notice that social movement organizations may lead to better democratic practices, including both wider participation and deeper deliberation among their own members. They nevertheless point out the problems that often occur internally in social movement organizations, stemming from such wider and deeper engagement. Yet, they hold out hope that social movement organizations will be able not only to affect their members but also to achieve governmental reforms, once they have successfully implemented their own internal participatory democracy. It could be said that the effect of a social movement on a representative deficit is anticipated by this view. Furthermore, the efforts required to fix the deficit problem cannot stay superficially at a behavioral level. Some rule changes regarding participation and deliberation may be required. However, it remains unclear how long it would take for a social movement to be able to force governmental reform that would adopt this participatory version of democracy.

The last work to be reviewed is Rosanvallon’s *Counter-Democracy*. He uses this term to capture people’s attempt “to impose control over the political processes carried out in their name.” Rosanvallon believes these “counter-democracy” activities are rooted in normative democratic theories, but also benefit the health of democracy. In other words, Rosanvallon argues that social movements are justified in preventing government from doing something in a political process that is carried out in the people’s name, thereby exercising legitimate power to compensate for the representative deficit produced by elections. He suggests that taking this “counter-democratic universe” into account offers a more comprehensive understanding of democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, he

---

26 For instance, Piven points out that, to have both more participatory and deliberative discussions of certain issues in a social movement organization, endless meetings must be held.

27 Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy*, xi.

28 Ibid., 57-75. Some other forms include the press, the social watchdog, and the vigilant citizen.
considers that “by focusing on counter-democratic institutions, we can envision ways of overcoming their limitations and avoid their perverse consequences.”

In sum, Rosanvallon offers a counter-democracy theory to address the problem of people not really ruling during nonelection periods in current representative democracies. He asserts that, by the essence of democracy, people have the sovereignty of prevention, and can stop government from ruling against the people in nonelection periods.

The recognition and understanding of the counter-democratic universe, according to Rosanvallon, can help fix representative democracies within a broader view and smarter democratic institutional design. Even though he does not directly state that social movements can be a remedy to a representative deficit, the essence of his viewpoint does not depart from this logically deductible effect. As to the extent of the influence of social movements, Rosanvallon’s counter-democracy theory suggests that they can lead to a substantial level of change that may allow for more public participation and deliberation.

**Theoretical Spectrum**

This essay offers an impact spectrum based on the published literature reviewed above. This impact spectrum of social movements on a representative deficit is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. The Theoretical Effects of Social Movements on Representative Democracy

Figure 1 has three constraints. The first is that it focuses only on the governing form of representative democracy (i.e., the prevailing formula for democracy in modern times). This essay agrees with Tilly’s observation that the effect of social movements (SM) on further democratization can be seen clearly only in established democracies. Second, the relationship between social movements and a democratizing regime, or even an established democracy, can be influenced by many contextual factors, such as technology or socioeconomic effects. Given the scope of this essay, we do not take these

---

29 Ibid., 317.
contextual factors into account; our research and analysis are limited to the institutional design of representative democracy at a national level.

The third constraint, which cannot be suitably displayed in figure 1, is the question of time frame and establishing a cause-and-effect relationship. One may question: Will all five labeled “change indicators” (A, B, C, D, E) occur immediately after a given social movement? The answer to this question can be both “yes” and “no.” We say “yes,” if the impact occurs soon after the catalyst. But it is also “no,” because the term “immediately” is subjective.

Under the two constraints stated above, figure 1 presents the plausible effects mentioned by prior studies in a continuum format. The general milestones for understanding the degree of change after a social movement are categorized as: superficial, substantial, and fundamental. Under these milestone categories, there are five labeled indicators: A, B, C, D, and E. Whenever “A” happens (immediate behavioral responses to target claims), it means that some “superficial” reaction to a social movement has been manifested. If “C” (rule change in democratic institutional mechanism) can be observed, then the impact of a social movement has reached the milestone of “substantial” change. Finally, if “E” (enactment of a new constitution) occurs, that is a “fundamental” change. The content and sources of the five indicators can be illustrated as follows:

A. Immediate Behavioral Responses to Target Claims
An immediate response is a normal reaction from a government that encounters severe strikes or protests that can be the leading edge of certain social movements. A range of possible actions may be taken to respond to the demands raised by a social movement, such as inviting more stakeholders who demand participation to join in relevant policy-making processes, promising more interaction in the future, and so on. Since this level of response may be too mundane to be specifically mentioned, prior studies do not pay much attention to this aspect of change. Only Buechler and Tarrow implicitly suggest that social movements may create policy change and party rotation. If the demand-related policy changes, government must have taken one of the above-mentioned actions. Moreover, if government pursues only one of these actions, the impact of the social movement should be evaluated as superficial. Despite being labeled as superficial, this type of effect nonetheless lessens the representative deficit.

B. Formation of Behavioral Patterns in General Legislative Processes
When the government’s immediate response evolves into some general patterns of decision making, the social movement is having more effect. For example, a type A response of expanding invitations to outside participants to attend a relevant bill review process might evolve into invitations to all bill-reviewing processes; this would become a legislative pattern. Both Tilly and Deiia Porta offer this type of expectation. They believe social movements can be good for
democracy if they have the goals to promote wider participation and deeper deliberation. However, if this pattern of behavioral change is not written into new rules, it is not yet concrete, as judged from a traditional institutional perspective.\textsuperscript{31}

C. Rule Change in Democratic Institutional Mechanism
The next step is formally written rules, laws, or regulations. This can occur within the legislature, the bureaucracy, or the judicial branch, or within the linking mechanism among the three. Della Porta and Tilly implicitly support this type of rule change in their works, as do Fung, Piven, and Rosanvallon.

D. Amendment of Constitutional Rules to Widen Participation and Deepen Deliberation
Amending constitutional rules is the safest way to guard the democratic fruits that are produced by social movements. This type of rule change may involve constitutional laws that govern electoral systems and governmental institutions. Modern democratic constitutions have rigidity that makes them usually difficult to amend,\textsuperscript{32} so a substantial democratic reform faces a high hurdle. It is hard to judge whether Tilly prefers this degree of change. Della Porta, Rosanvallon, and others more clearly and eagerly support this step. Della Porta seems to demand even more than this.

E. Enactment of a New Constitution
If a participatory deliberative democracy is to be fully implemented at a national level, a new constitution may need to be enacted to substitute for the old one that may mainly embody the spirit of representative democracy. Della Porta, the most optimistic concerning the realization of a full-fledged democracy at a national level, correspondingly supports this fundamental solution to remedying representative democracy. No realistic proposals currently exist regarding what this type of constitution would look like. As researchers of the effects of social movements on representative deficits, we nevertheless cannot and should not exclude any possible effects that are theoretically and logically deductible from prior studies.

Figure 1 also tries to show that there are many minor changes existing not only among these five labelled indicators, but also before A and after E. This fact conveys the sense that social movements remedying representative deficit may start from nonobservable places, experience many incremental revisions,


and continue even after a new constitution is enacted. It also suggests that this process may be circular, and not linear, as Tilly suggests. Due to the scope of this essay, figure 1 may present a particular linear portion embedded within the circuitous relationship between social movements and democratization under the premise of not yet taking other contextual factors into account.

In addition to providing the impact spectrum for evaluating the influence of social movements on a representative deficit, this essay draws two theoretical hypotheses from prior literature:

H1. The impact of a social movement that is concerned about an issue related to the public interest should reach at least the superficial level of point A on the impact spectrum.

H2: Social movements directly aimed at achieving wider participation and deeper deliberation will remedy a representative deficit more than other, more indirect movements.

H1 is based chiefly on Tilly’s historical observations. As Tilly indicates in his writings of 2004 and 2013, not all social movements aim to promote democracy. Quite a few of them seek to achieve group interests or private gains. He also reminds us that only publicly concerned social movements have the power to push for further democratization in a liberal regime. Since Tilly does not specify to what extent this type of movement can address the problems of representative deficit, this essay chooses, like Tarrow and Buechler, to interpret Tilly’s hypothesis conservatively, that is, to require only meeting the superficial influence level.

H2 is derived mainly from Fung and Della Porta. They encourage social movements to embrace the goal of improving democracy with the aim to reform current representative systems in which wider participation and deeper deliberation are constrained. Based on their suggestions, it is logical to hypothesize that social movements with a strong and clear democratic reform purpose should have a greater effect on representative deficit than those without, though to what degree is hard to hypothesize.

Research Design and Methods

Case Selection
This essay selects two cases that occurred in Taiwan, the Red Shirt Movement in 2006 and the Sun Flower Movement in 2014, to evaluate the impact of social movements on representative deficit. The rationale for choosing these

33 Tilly and Wood, Social Movements 1768-2012, 144.
two cases is based on three commonalities they share, and one difference that is central to our study. The commonalities are, first, they strongly match Tilly’s criteria of a “social movement,” since they targeted the highest authority in Taiwan, the president; launched a series of activities that drew the attention of the mass media; made claims concerning issues related to public interest; and generated a large-scale protest that involved at least one-half million people going into the streets to support their claims. Second, they sought public goods (such as anticorruption), and united multiple civic associations to participate in their activities. Prior studies of these two movements, therefore, are inclined to treat them as symbols of an awakening of Taiwan’s citizenship. As Tilly’s historical observation suggests, this type of movement focused on public concerns has a positive effect on representative democracy. Third, the two movements led to much discussion and research not only in the mass media but also in academic fields, especially those relate to Taiwan studies. However, none of those discussions focused on how these movements influenced the operation of Taiwan’s democracy.

The main difference between the two movements was their claims, which precisely reflected the theoretical distinction for which we were looking. The Red Shirt Movement focused on “Anticorruption” and “Down with Bian.” These focuses were not directly related to the expansion of democratic participation and improvement of the deliberative process. In contrast, the Sunflower Movement clearly and directly demanded more participation and

---

34 See Chang, Gong min yu zheng zhi xing dong [Citizenship and political action], and Ho, “Occupy Congress in Taiwan.”


36 These studies focus mainly on the origins, the factors, or the claims of these two movements. In other words, they are concerned with why these movements occurred.
deliberation with the objective to pry open the “black box” of the legislative process. This movement occupied the Legislative Yuan for twenty-four days (March 18—April 10, 2014), and was considered to have revealed the functional failure of the highest representative organ in Taiwan. The question of whether the Sunflower Movement, which directly demanded transparency of the democratic process, was thereby able to achieve a better remedy to the representative deficit in the Legislative Yuan than the Red Shirt Movement, which made no such demands, will provide insight into H2. Since this essay considers Taiwanese social movements, the plausible remedy is primarily designated as research regarding Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. More specifically, this research involves three layers of the legislative process: behavior, pattern of behavior, and institutionalized rule. The first two layers can be observed within the L. Y., while the last one may include rules both within and outside the L. Y., as even outside rules may exert influence on information-gathering behaviors or patterns in the L. Y.

The rationales for selecting research concerning the Legislative Yuan are threefold. First, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan is a unichamber legislature, and the island’s only and therefore highest representative institution. The Legislative Yuan is the best choice, though not the only one, for examining the effect of Taiwanese social movements on the representative deficit. Second, as previously mentioned, prior studies suggest that the positive effects of social movements on democracy can promote participation and deliberation in the policy-making process. The idea is that a social movement may introduce more participants to and impose more deliberative demands on the representative institutions when public policies are legalized. Third, even though the above effects also can affect other governmental institutions (e.g., executive, judicial, and so on), more data are available for collection and analysis for the Legislative Yuan.

---

37 Yan et al., This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement,” 26.
38 Ibid., 404-409.
39 The main rule outside the Legislative Yuan that influences information gathering behaviors in the L. Y. is Article 67 of the R.O.C. Constitution: “The Legislative Yuan may set up various committees. Such committees may invite Government Officials and private persons concerned to be present at their meetings to answer questions.”
40 The R.O.C. Constitution has been amended seven times since it was promulgated in 1947. The seventh revision was in 2005. See Liao et al., “The Myth of a Rigid Constitution in Taiwan,” 357-395.
41 The objects that could be influenced by a social movement may involve the executive and judicial branches, the bureaucracy per se, political parties, and civil society.
42 Since the Legislative Yuan is the only representative institution at the national level, it faces the most focused supervision from Taiwanese civil society. Legislative documents have been more open than the documents of Taiwan’s four other branches of government (Executive, Judicial, Control, and Examination).
**Design of Impact Evaluation**

To evaluate the effect that social movements exercise on the Legislative Yuan’s information-gathering process, we focus on its bill review procedures. These procedures involve three readings of each bill: in yuan (plenary) meetings, in committee meetings, and, again, in yuan meetings. Legally, the Legislative Yuan has the authority to invite outside informants to attend its meetings, if it considers that these participants are necessary in the review of certain bills. In practice, the L. Y. invites outsiders to participate mainly in committee meetings or by attending public hearings. The ministers and higher-ranking governmental officials are required to sit in these meetings waiting for questions, in accordance with the R.O.C. Constitution. Thus, the number and backgrounds of participants who attended these bill review meetings and public hearings can be a primary indicator of whether the L. Y. responded immediately to the two social movements, especially in its review of bills that were related to the movements’ demands. Furthermore, the frequency with which outside informants spoke in comparison to the frequency of governmental officials can indicate the depth of the information exchange. The above indicators, however, are only the initial step in checking the L. Y.’s immediate responses to the two social movements. We introduced the following steps shown in figure 2 to conduct our evaluation.

Based on the flow chart in figure 2, the second step for our evaluation of the degree of effect relied on whether the Legislative Yuan invited more informants, especially outsiders, to attend meetings or hearings and offered them more chances to speak. We compared information gathering regarding claim-related bills before, during, and after the social movement event in that L. Y. session. If the answer in this step was “yes,” then we first compared this with the general bill review process for other non-claim-related bills in the same session, to observe: (1) whether there were more informants and exchanges (I&E) in the claim-related bills in that session, (2) if there were more I&E, in general, during that session (i.e., a spill-over into other bill-reviewing processes in the same session), and (3) whether increased I&E had an ongoing effect in the next legislative session. If the answer in this step was “yes,” then, as figure 2 shows, the next step was to examine the internal rules that

---

43 This is according to both Article 67 of the Constitution and Article 56 of the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power.

44 Ibid.

45 According to both the R.O.C. Constitution and the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan, there are two sessions in a year. The first session usually starts on February 1 and finishes at the end of June; the second begins in September and ends in January of the next year.

46 Since the seventh constitutional amendment (2005) prolongs the legislative term of office from three years to four years (and reduces the number of legislators from 225 to 113), the sixth term (2005–2008) in which the Red Shirt Movement occurred (2006), had six sessions (2*3). The eighth term of the L. Y. (2012–2016), in which the Sunflower Movement occurred (2014), had eight sessions (2*4).
Figure 2. Flow Chart of Impact Evaluation

A. Immediate response to claims
   More informants (I)
   More exchanges (E)

No   Yes

Stop   B. Behavioral patterns
More I & E
Expanding to other bill-reviewing processes in the same session in which the social movement event occurred.
Even expanding to the next session

No   Yes

Stop   C. Rule change
Internal rule of L.Y. (or other related rules)

No   Yes

Stop   D. Constitutional rule change
Amending process has been done

No   Yes

Stop   E. Enacting a new constitution
In the process of drafting

No   Yes

Stop

govern information gathering in the L. Y., which is a matter of constitutional amendment in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{47} An even further potential step could be the rewriting of Taiwan’s Constitution.

Such amendments or larger rewrite certainly could be analyzed for how closely they relate to the claims of the relevant social movements. However, the last amendment to Taiwan’s Constitution was in 2005—before either the

\textsuperscript{47} That is, Article 67 of the R.O.C. Constitution. See note 39.
2006 or 2014 movements, so this study must consider the steps at the bottom of figure 2.48 Relevant data collection and the impact evaluation procedures are listed below.

**Data Collection and Methods**

**Informant Data Collection**

The collection of numbers, backgrounds, and the speaking frequency of informants who were invited to attend legislative committee meetings or public hearings across different terms of the Legislative Yuan is a complex task.49 But, with assistance from information technologists,50 we employed text-mining techniques to gather the data. The computer-assisted tasks are as follows:51

1. Collect information regarding invited informants (including governmental officials) attending committee meetings or public hearings from the library of the Legislative Yuan. This involves ten different databases.52

2. Adopt automatic labeling techniques to first make judgments concerning the names of invited informants, and the frequency of their speaking at each committee (or hearing), as well as their replies to legislators in that committee (hearing) concerning one single issue on a one-to-one basis. These data are then built into the dataset.

3. Based on the constructed dataset, take the most recent finished term of the L. Y. (the eighth term, February 2012

---

48 The Sunflower Movement proposed a citizen committee on constitutional affairs, but this aspiration was not successfully set into the reform agenda. Please see Yan et al., *This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement.”* 364.


50 Professor Huang Sanyih and Miss Chang Shanlin.

51 For details, please see our demos on google drive, https://goo.gl/We2Q36 (accessed July 20, 2017).

52 Ibid.
to January 2016)\textsuperscript{53} as a learning sample for the algorithm. In this process, the background of each invited informant is entered by hand into our databank, then cross-checked for errors. We then have the computer process these coding results. It then starts to automatically label the backgrounds of invited informants who appeared during terms of office other than the eighth term.\textsuperscript{54} With this informant data in hand, we can trace patterned behaviors over a longer time frame. Since we have the same type of data for the fourth and fifth terms of the L. Y., they can be used if our analysis requires it.

**Selection of Bills Closely Related to the Claims of the Movements**

As mentioned previously, the logical examination of the effect of social movements on the representative deficit starts with the review of bills that are related closely to movement claims. The selection of these related bills was done by the authors, who are knowledgeable about Taiwanese politics. The steps for this process were:

1. Use keywords, such as “Red Shirts” or “Down with Bian,” to search information about relevant bills that resides in news databanks and in the library of the Legislative Yuan. At this stage, eight bills were selected.

2. Use the names of these eight bills to check the records of the L. Y.’s “bill initiative system” to confirm how many of these eight were entered into the legislative process. We found that seven of the eight bills had been addressed by the L. Y.

3. Check the time periods for processing the seven bills to make certain they were reviewed in the sixth term of the L. Y. (2005–2008), in which the Red Shirt Movement occurred during the fourth session (September 2006–January 2007). Five bills were confirmed so by this process.

4. Make final judgements concerning the relevance of the

\textsuperscript{53} This is because the eighth term has more complete data files than the previous term.

\textsuperscript{54} The Legislative Yuan offers the digital archives of legislative activities starting in the fourth term, so our data start there. The fourth term was February 1999–January 2002; the fifth term, February 2002–January 2005; the sixth term, February 2005–January 2008; the seventh term, February 2008–January 2012; and the eighth term, February 2012–January 2016.
five bills to the Red Shirt Movement. They have been made by the authors and included in this essay.

The same steps also apply to the bill selection and analysis for the Sunflower Movement that occurred during the fifth session (February to June 2014) of the eighth L. Y. term (2012–2016). However, the keywords were used differently for searches. In sum, five bills were selected for evaluating the immediate effects of each of the two social movements on the representative deficit in the L. Y. With respect to the Red Shirt Movement, the five related bills were:

1. Assembly and Parade Act (APA)
2. Law against Accepting Bribes Act (LABA)
3. Political Donation Act (PDA)
4. Police Power Exercise Act (PPEA)
5. Sunshine Act (SA)

Among the five, the authors considered the Law against Accepting Bribes Act to be the closest to having an effect on the Legislative Yuan, since the main demand of the Red Shirt Movement was to address corruption. LABA may more clearly reflect the immediate response of the L. Y. to the Red Shirts’s demands than other legislation. As for the Sunflower Movement, the five bills were:

1. Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (CSASA)
2. Special Act for Free Economic Pilot Zones (SAFEPZ)
3. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Goods and Medical Device Industry (CSAGMDI)
4. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services (CSATS)
5. Oversight Act for Agreements between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (OAATM)\(^{55}\)

Again, the authors chose the most relevant act, the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (CSASA), because it reflected the most important claim that movement supporters raised, and appeared in the L. Y. agenda both before and after the protest event.\(^ {56}\)

---

\(^{55}\) There are several versions of bills concerning supervision of the processes for signing agreements between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. CSASA, the first listed among the five, appeared both before and after the movement’s occupation of the Legislative Yuan. OAATM, the last listed among the five, appeared mainly after the event. See Yan et al., *This Is Not the Sunflower Student Movement*, 380-381.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
Selection of Relevant Rules for Improving Democratic Mechanisms

Rule revision for more participation and deliberation in democratic mechanisms is considered a sign of substantial change. Which rules should be taken into account? This essay explores both the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan (OLLY) and the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power (LGLYP), since both govern how the legislature (in its entirety, in committees, and by individual legislator) uses its power and fulfills its duties as stipulated in the Constitution. Aside from the Constitution, these rules most directly reflect whether representative deficit has been repaired. If these internal legislative rules have been made more democratic, we should carefully examine whether this change is owed to the pressures of social movements. We documented every initiative for revision related to these two laws since 2006, and checked which types of revision initiatives had been introduced successfully and made law, as well as which had failed. The timing for proposing these initiatives also was recorded. With these records in hand, we were able to make judgements concerning whether certain initiatives that attempted to change the respective law involving dimensions of democratic progress truly had occurred and when. In addition to the two L. Y. internal rules, OLLY and LGLYP, we checked whether the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act had been enacted since 2014. This is because it was not only the main claim raised by the Sunflower Movement, but also it governs the democratic mechanisms between the L. Y. and the Executive branch.

This research had no need to collect data regarding constitutional rule changes or the enactment of a new constitution, since such events did not occur in Taiwan during the period of this study.

Two Cases for Examination:
The Red Shirt Movement and the Sunflower Movement

Two cases, the Red Shirt Movement and the Sunflower Movement, are the subjects of our examination concerning their effect on the representative deficit in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. We first hypothesized that both movements would reach at least the level of superficial impact (meaning that each caused some expansion of the number of invitations to informants concerning targeted issues, as well as the granting of more opportunities to the movements’ members to share their views in the Legislative Yuan). Second, we expected that the Sunflower Movement would exert a greater influence than the Red Shirt Movement in remedying the representative deficit, since it made a more

57 If an expected change happened close to when the two movements occurred, we should be able to attribute that change to the effect of the social movements. However, we first must confirm that this rule change is related to the social movements by checking the relevant legislative documents in hand before making this causal link.

58 As mentioned previously, the seventh and last constitutional amendment was made in 2005.
direct demand for democratic reform, especially in the legislative process. Using the data regarding the numbers and backgrounds of invited informants, as well as their speaking frequencies, we tried to verify these two hypotheses from an information-gathering perspective. We started with hypothesis 1.

H1. The impact of a social movement that is concerned about an issue related to the public interest should reach at least the superficial level of point A on the impact spectrum.

As mentioned in the third section, we first selected five bills related to the claims of the Red Shirt Movement, and pinpointed the most directly relevant one. The five bills were: The Assembly and Parade Act, the Law against Accepting Bribes Act, the Political Donation Act, the Police Power Exercise Act, and the Sunshine Act. Among them, the Law against Accepting Bribes Act (LABA) was the most relevant. The five bills were first checked. Since the largest protest of the Red Shirt Movement occurred in mid-September 2006, the time at which the fourth session of the sixth term of the L. Y. (6.4) was being conducted, we divide the sixth term into three periods: ex-ante (6.1-6.3), mid-action (6.4), and ex-post (6.5-6.6). This is because we assumed the immediate responses came after the protest. Furthermore, we categorized all informants into three groups: governmental officials, experts, and interest groups. Table 1 presents the computer-assisted results.

Table 1. Informants for Five Bills Related to the Red Shirts’s Claims in the Sixth Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Officials (G)</th>
<th>Experts (E)</th>
<th>Interest Groups (I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-ante</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(February 2005—June 2006)</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(September 2006—January 2007)</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-post</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(February 2007—January 2008)</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: Number of informants; F: speaking frequency; F/N: speaking frequency per informant.
Table 1 tells us that wider participation for reviewing the five bills did not happen in the ex-post period, but did in the ex-ante period. As table 1 indicates, ex-ante sessions were attended most by government officials (6.1-6.3: 733), while “interest groups” attended the most among outside participants (28 vs. 5 vs. 2). Furthermore, regarding speaking frequency, among the three categories, governmental officials were slightly higher than the others, with an average 1.02 ahead of the other two groups across the three periods (6.1-6.6). Although the other two categories, experts and interest groups, could speak once on average across the last two periods and this record is better than that in the first ex-ante period, they did not have more opportunities than governmental officials (1 vs. 1.02). This type of result for information gathering, which was based on the five bills, did not adhere to our expectations for hypothesis 1.

This would suggest that the impact of the Red Shirt Movement did not reach even a superficial level of change with respect to the representative deficit. But there are two mitigating factors. One is that the five bills, though related to the claims of the Red Shirt Movement, are not strongly focused on the main slogan of the movement’s protest campaign, which was a “Million voices against corruption, President Chen must go.” As we suggested previously, the most relevant bill, the Law against Accepting Bribes Act (LABA) would be singled out for further examination.

Second, our theoretical hypothesis deserves further detailed explication and application, since social movements, by definition, do not start with public protest, but involve a series of activities. Therefore, the effect of such activities should be seen not only in events that occur immediately following a large protest that is launched by a certain movement, but also immediately after the social activists commence their activities. In the case of the Red Shirt Movement, the Taiwanese media uncovered a corruption scandal regarding Chen’s family that occurred in 2005.  

Shih Ming-te, the main leader of the Red Shirt Movement, launched a series of “Anticorruption” and “Down with Bian” activities starting in 2006. If we take the above time frame into account, it should not be too surprising to see that the so-called ex-ante period (February 2005–June 2006) had more informants than the other two periods. However, to check whether both the revised time frame and directly related bill were valid assumptions, we created table 2, which focuses on only the Law against Accepting Bribes Act (LABA), and extends information-gathering behaviors for this law to the previous fourth and fifth terms of the Legislative Yuan. This means we examined effects on the law not just for the time at which major protests occurred, but also for the entire sixth term. This is because impacts

---

60 He once was the chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to which then President Chen (2000–2008) also belonged. Please see Wiki, https://goo.gl/k5QtqJ (accessed July 20, 2017).
61 To reiterate, the seventh and last constitutional amendment was made in 2005.
might have been manifested before the large protest, since various related activities already had been conducted during earlier L. Y. sessions. Thus, the comparison between the sixth and previous terms for the same target law should tell us more about the so-called immediate response to the main claim raised by movement activists. In table 2, we again kept the original division of three periods from table 1, for reference.

Table 2. Information Gathering for LABA across the L. Y. 4th, 5th, and 6th Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Officials (G)</th>
<th>Experts (E)</th>
<th>Interest Groups (I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-ante (February 2005—June 2006)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1-6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-action (September 2006—January 2007)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-post (February 2007—January 2008)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5-6.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th term total</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th term total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th term total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: Number of informants; F: speaking frequency; F/N: speaking frequency per informant.

The results shown in table 2 provide more confidence in hypothesis 1. If we take the sixth term in its entirety and review the most relevant bill, information gathering indeed displays wider participation and deeper deliberation than in previous terms (fourth and fifth). Not only did governmental officials attend meetings and hearings more often than in previous terms (271, 100, 5), but outside experts and interest groups did so as well (8, 0, 0 and 17, 3, 0, respectively). Although governmental officials still spoke slightly more frequently than experts and interest groups during the sixth term (1.03, 1, 1, respectively), outsiders had more opportunities to exchange their views than they did during previous terms (there were, in fact, no exchanges with experts in those earlier terms).

To summarize, the impact of the Red Shirt Movement in remedying the representative deficit in regard to the directly targeted bill barely reached the level of superficial change. In other words, this impact may still have some invisible distance to point A in our theoretical spectrum, since a deeper
deliberation in our definition requires governmental officials to speak less than at least one of the other two groups. Furthermore, according to our theoretical spectrum and logic of analysis, if a given social movement already reaches a milestone A change, it may plausibly move to level B or even higher on the impact spectrum. Since the Red Shirt Movement barely reaches level A’s impact, we expect that it will not have a greater effect on the representative deficit, either at the level of patterned behaviors (Label B) or rule change (Label C).

Turning to internal rule changes in the Legislative Yuan, an examination of the records of the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power and Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan reveal that there were seven initiatives proposed to amend both laws between September 2006 and the end of 2007. Only one amendment was passed, on December 17, 2007. This new amendment dealt mainly with the internal organization formula of the L. Y., in accordance with the seventh constitutional amendment that was undertaken in 2005 to reduce the number of legislators from 225 to 113.62 In other words, this internal rule change had nothing to do with a more democratic design that would encourage wider participation and deeper deliberation.

In sum, the Red Shirt Movement might reach a level A change on the spectrum. This indicates a superficial effect on the representative deficit. By the logic employed in the spectrum and the practices this essay investigated above, the L. Y. did not demonstrate changes in its internal rules or the pattern of behavior in the ways that it gathered information.

The second case is the Sunflower Movement. We followed our previous steps of examination. The Sunflower Movement occurred in the fifth session of the Legislative Yuan’s eighth term. We also divide the eight sessions into the three periods: ex-ante (8.1-8.4), mid-action (8.5), and ex-post (8.6-8.8). We present information gathering for the relevant bills across the three periods in table 3, and the results for the most targeted bill in table 4.

Table 3 has similarities to the table for the Red Shirt Movement. The information collection for the five bills related to the Sunflower Movement does not show a clear picture of wider participation from outside (E & I) groups when ex-post sessions (8.6-8.8: 374) are compared to the previous two sessions (8.1-8.5: 1084 & 505). It shows that governmental officials, though more dutiful than the others, attended these bill review meetings most often in the mid-action sessions (8.5: 3506 vs. 3395 & 3348). By our criteria for wider participation, they nevertheless are not counted. However, they spoke less frequently on average than experts, though they are shown to have spoken a little more frequently than interest groups in table 3. This suggest that some deeper deliberation from outside occurred in the review of the five bills.

62 To repeat, Article 67 of the R.O.C. Constitution provides that, “The Legislative Yuan may set up various committees. Such committees may invite Government Officials and private persons concerned to be present at their meetings to answer questions.”
Following the previous experience of examining the case for the Red Shirt Movement, we next focused only on the Cross-Strait Agreements Supervisory Act (CSASA). We treated all information gathering in the eighth term as the object of impact since long-term anti-Chinese sentiment was expressed only during the large protest launched by the Sunflower Movement on March 31, 2014, and during the occupation of the Legislative Yuan from March 18 to April 10.\textsuperscript{63} The time frame for measuring the immediate effect of the Sunflower Movement should not be limited to such large protests. In fact, small- or medium-sized social protests opposing closer ties with China had been occurring since 2012, in disapproval of President Ma’s signing of various agreements with the mainland.\textsuperscript{64} At the same time, public consensus had been forming that sought greater supervision by ordinary people or by the L. Y. in the signing of such agreements.\textsuperscript{65}

Social movements indeed involve a series of activities, media statements, and the public presentation of common claims. Thus, it is logical that we treated the eighth term of the Legislative Yuan as the object immediately affected by the Sunflower Movement, and compared its information gathering regarding the directly targeted bill to the seventh term, as shown in table 4.

---

\textsuperscript{63} Yan et al., \textit{This Is Not the “Sunflower Student Movement,”} 8-26.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 9-10.

\textsuperscript{65} See note 62.
### Table 4. Information Gathering for the Targeted Bill (CSASA) across the Seventh and Eighth L. Y. Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Officials (G)</th>
<th>Experts (E)</th>
<th>Interest Groups (I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-ante</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(February 2012—January 2014)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(February 2014—June 2014)</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-post</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(September 2014—January 2016)</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8th term total</strong></td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7th term total</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: Number of informants; F: speaking frequency; F/N: speaking frequency per informant.

Table 4 also shows that the appearance of governmental officials increased most during the ex-post period among the three periods (7, 421, 751, in ascending order). However, the other two groups, experts and interest groups, demonstrated more balanced attendance across the three periods. Furthermore, the average speaking frequency reveals that experts spoke most often across the three periods, and that even interest groups spoke more frequently than governmental officials in the ex-ante period. This further confirms that deeper deliberation occurred during the CSASA bill review process, even though wider participation was demonstrated mainly by governmental officials. The Executive Yuan was very reluctant to enact the Cross-Strait Agreements Supervisory Act, given its nature. It is not a surprise to see that only seven governmental officials attended the ex-ante sessions and 421 attended the mid-action session, but that 751 were present in the ex-post period. In other words, governmental officials were awakened by the Sunflower Movement and paid more attention to its main demands concerning the enactment of CSASA. If we take this background into account, a sense of wider participation and deeper deliberation can be discerned from the trends appearing in table 4. Moreover, if we view the entire eighth term as the object affected by the

---

66 This is because CSASA will ask for more leeway for legislators to participate in the process of signing agreements. See Liao and Chen, “Parliamentary Oversight in ‘Atypical Foreign Affairs’ under Semipresidentialism,” 83-125.
Sunflower Movement, and further compare its information gathering with that of the seventh term on the targeted bill (CSASA), a clear picture of both wider participation across the three groups (G, E, and I) and deeper deliberation by outside groups (E and I) is demonstrated in table 4. This is especially the case for the average speaking frequency of interest groups. No speaking frequency was recorded for the seventh term, because there were no participants. However, it was 0.79 with 71 invited, and even close to that of governmental officials (0.88) for the eighth term.

In sum, the effect of the Sunflower Movement on the review process for the targeted bill should reach at least point “A,” or the superficial level on the spectrum. However, given that the nature of the targeted bill (CSASA) is that it places more constraints on the Executive branch of government, thereby having caused its resistance over a long period of time, we then may understand why the wider participation in the ex-post period was demonstrated mainly by governmental officials. Our hypothesis 1, nevertheless, does not take the detailed content of a bill into account. The case of the Sunflower Movement also confirms the necessity of a longer time frame for considering the immediate response from the legislature, as validated by the case of the Red Shirt Movement.

Since the Sunflower Movement’s impact on the representative deficit more concretely reaches the A point, whether it also created patterned information gathering behaviors in the L. Y., in general, not only in the immediate session (8.5) but also in the next sessions (8.6-8.8), is subject to further examination. This means that we move on to verify H2.

H2: Social movements directly aimed at achieving wider participation and deeper deliberation will remedy a representative deficit more than other, more indirect movements.

The information gathering behaviors of all bills for the eight sessions of the eighth term are presented in table 5. There are two matters that should be noted before interpreting table 5. First, in the column, “Note,” in table 5, we mark the data for two sessions as “Excluded” (for the second and eighth sessions). The exclusion of the second session of the L. Y. is because the data for this session were retrieved less successfully than for the others.67 As for eighth session, it was the last session of the term and exceptionally shorter than the other terms, therefore, it was excluded.68 The second matter to note is that, for the fourth

67 Regarding session 8.1, there were 306 files; 8.3, 311; 8.4, 457; 8.5, 345; 8.6, 465; 8.7, 469; and 8.8, 286. For session 8.2, there were only 176 files. The L. Y. offers no explanation for this.

68 The eighth session ended on December 18, 2015, since legislators needed to return to their constituencies for their reelection, scheduled on January 16, 2016. A session usually ends at the end of January each year.
Table 5. Information Gathering for All Bills in the Eight Sessions of the Eighth L. Y. Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>F/N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>F/N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>F/N</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2012—June 2012</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4276</td>
<td>5078</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>4801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2013—Aug. 2013</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4643</td>
<td>5330</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>5172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2013—Jan. 2014</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4363</td>
<td>4742</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>5370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2014—Aug. 2014</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4579</td>
<td>4887</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>5347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2014—Jan. 2015</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4410</td>
<td>3525</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>4946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2015—June 2015</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5186</td>
<td>4864</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>6128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2015—Dec. 2015</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>2498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2012—Dec. 2015</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31016</td>
<td>31960</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>2866</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>36026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: number of informants; F: speaking frequency; F/N: speaking frequency per informant.
L. Y. session (September 2013—January 2014), we indicate both “before” the Sunflower Movement (“Sunflower”) and “during” it. This is because a Hung Chung-chiu event occurred in August 2013, which is considered to have paved the way for the Sunflower Movement. After excluding both the second and the eighth sessions, we could perform the first-step comparison between “during” and “after” Sunflower (8.5, 8.6, and 8.7), and “before” and “before & during” Sunflower (8.1, 8.3, and 8.4). Then we moved to the second step, which placed the fourth session into the category of “during” and “after” Sunflower (8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7).

Regarding the dimension of wider participation, table 5 indicates that the invited governmental officials on average were 4,427 before the Sunflower Movement, and 4,725 during and after it. Experts were 178 (before), then 228 (afterward). Interest groups were 509 (before) vs. 521 (afterward). It is quite obvious that wider participation among all three categories of informants occurred during all bill reviewing processes in the L. Y. both during and after the Sunflower Movement. Further, if we take into account the “during & after” period for the fourth session (September 2013—January 2014), the enlarged participation is even more pronounced. Its total participation was 5,370, higher than either of the two “before” sessions (8.1: 4,801; 8.3: 5,172).

As to the dimension of deeper deliberation, no direct evidence can be found that permits a pure comparison of average speaking frequency between the “before” and the “during & after” periods. The average frequency of governmental officials speaking in the “before” period was 1.14, then 0.93 in the “during & after” periods; experts, 1.11 (before), 0.97 (after); interest groups, 0.91 (before), 0.74 (after). However, the speaking frequency of experts in the “during & after” periods (0.97) is higher than for governmental officials (0.93), but the latter’s was higher than the former’s in the “before” period (1.14 vs 1.1). Since experts are outside participants, their having more chances than inside officials to speak in legislative processes is a sign of deeper deliberation by the theoretical logic of this essay. Again, if we take the fourth session into account in which the average speaking frequency for experts reached 1.21, the highest among all, the evidence increases for a deeper information exchange with outsiders. However, a dilemma may be discerned from the Legislative

69 Hung Chung-chiu was a specialist in the Republic of China army who died in July 2013 of organ failure while under detention, two days before he was due to be discharged. The so-called “white shirts” rally was launched in August to protest the way that the military punished Hung and afterward dealt with his death.

70 Hung Zhenling, Wo shi gongmin ye shi meiti [I am a citizen and a media] (Taipei: Wanglu yu shu, 2015), 59.

71 These estimations are based on: (4276+4643+4363)/3=4427.33, and (4579+4410+5186)/3=4725.

72 These are estimated as follows: (119+212+204)/3=178.33, and (178+145+360)/3=227.67.

73 Their estimations are: (406+317+803)/3=508.67, and (590+391+582)/3=521.

74 These estimations are the same as the above. For instance, governmental officials: (1.19+1.15+1.09)/3=1.14.
Yuan’s experience shown in table 5. That is, wider participation seemingly cannot be associated ipso facto with deeper deliberation, although who speaks more frequently can be changed.

In sum, according to our standard for patterned behavior, as stated before, the impact of the Sunflower Movement on the representative deficit should also reach the B point on the spectrum. The next evaluation of the Sunflower Movement’s impact was whether it could cause rule changes that would lead to more participation and deeper deliberation. Three laws were examined: The Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan (OLLY), the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power (LGLYP), and the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (CSASA).

The Sunflower Movement strongly attacked the “black box” masking the process of legalizing the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services, and demanded transparency and more supervision of legislative processes (especially related to cross-strait agreements). The legislators of the L. Y. responded to these demands by proposing a large number of initiatives to amend both the OLLY and the LGLYP. Before the end of the eighth term (January 2016) and after the occupation of the L. Y. (April 10, 2014), there were eleven relevant initiatives—but all remained stuck in the first-reading stage. The ninth term of the L. Y. started in February 2016, and so far, there have been eighty-nine relevant initiatives proposed by legislators. The second reading has been completed for fifteen of the eighty-nine, but they are now stalled because the L. Y. has established other priorities. However, two amendments have been passed that are directly related to the demand for transparency made by the Sunflower Movement. One regards videotaping the Yuans, caucuses, and committee meetings, simultaneously broadcasting them on the Internet, and allowing people to attend committee meetings. The other requires that the vote for the election of the L. Y. speaker and vice speaker be recorded by each legislator’s name. Since these two amendments have been enacted, the internal rule revisions oriented toward greater public participation and transparency should have reached the level of “substantial” change at point C on the spectrum.

On the other hand, the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act was the target claim of the Sunflower Movement. There were at least seven versions proposed by different legislators or political parties following the Sunflower Movement. All versions of CSASA offered ways for legislators to participate in the process of signing cross-strait agreements. CSASA indeed has the

---

75 The proposed legislation includes initiatives such as for pension reform and the foresight project.
76 Chen Mingtong, Liangan xieyi chuli ji jiandu jizhi lifa xuezhe zhuanjia zuotan huiyi jilu [Management and supervision mechanism on cross-strait agreements: Minutes of roundtable discussions among legislative scholars and experts] (Taipei: Center for China Studies, National Taiwan University, 2015).
capacity to improve the democratic mechanism between the Executive branch of government and the Legislative Yuan. However, it has not been on the L.Y.’s agenda since 2016. Since the L.Y.’s internal rules have been substantially changed but CSASA has not been enacted, how do we estimate the effect of the Sunflower Movement on the representative deficit? Can its impact still be counted as solidly reaching point C? We decided to make a certain discount from its previous C credit. This means that its impact is certainly more than B, but not yet fully touching on C. It may fall somewhere between B and C, but nearer to C.

Considering the two movement cases together, our first hypothesis, which assumes that social movements can achieve at least the A-point change at the superficial level of the impact spectrum, should not be null. However, there are two new points we have learned from examination of the two cases. First, the time frame for measuring immediate impact should be extended, since it usually takes a longer period of time for social movements to establish their agenda, campaign, and raise public awareness. Second, a movement’s claim that, by nature, contradicts the interests of bureaucracy will lead to wider participation among bureaucrats in legislative processes following the movement. In other words, governmental officials are likely to be awakened to the demands of the movement and more apt than before to actively respond to them.

Hypothesis 2 assumes that if a movement’s claims directly relate to repairing the representative deficit, that movement will have more effect on the operation of democracy than other movements. The Sunflower Movement, which sought wider and deeper participation in legislative processes, indeed had greater impact on reducing Taiwan’s representative deficit than the Red Shirt Movement. This has been confirmed by the analysis offered in this essay. The Sunflower Movement nearly reaches the C point, which is designated as a substantial milestone on the impact spectrum. The Red Shirt Movement, in contrast, approaches only the A point, which is labeled “superficial” level.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This essay explores to what extent social movements can remedy a representative deficit. Based on prior literature regarding the impact of social movements on liberal democracy, it first offers a theoretical impact spectrum in which three milestones are marked as “superficial,” “substantial,” and “fundamental” change, respectively, and five criteria are established for measuring the degree of change:

A. Immediate behavioral responses to target claims;
B. Formation of behavioral patterns in general legislative process;
C. Rule change in democratic institutional mechanism;
D. Constitutional change encouraging wider participation
Among the five, “A” signifies that some superficial changes are occurring; “C” indicates that some substantial changes are in place; and “E” represents a fundamental ongoing change.

This essay further draws two hypotheses from prior literature to be empirically examined. The first hypothesis is that social movements that mainly concern issues related to the public interest should be able to remedy representative deficit at least at a superficial level. The second is that social movements that directly seek wider participation and deeper deliberation should be able to remedy representative deficit more than movements with indirect approaches.

The two cases examined by this essay are the Red Shirt Movement and Sunflower Movement, which occurred in 2006 and 2014, respectively. This essay focused on information gathering inside the Legislative Yuan, the only and therefore highest representative institution in Taiwan, as the object for measurement and evaluation of the degree of a movement’s effect.

The evaluation results chiefly confirm the two hypotheses. First, both the Red Shirt Movement and Sunflower Movement, which claimed for public interest, anticorruption, and transparency, as well as openness, remedied the representative deficit and reached at least the A level of superficial change from the perspective of information-gathering behaviors inside the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, the Sunflower Movement, which directly sought more democracy, indeed, had more impact than the Red Shirt Movement on the representative deficit, since its effect on the Legislative Yuan’s information gathering reached nearly the C level of substantial change, while the Red Shirt Movement did not.

However, some revisions in our research design, which occurred in the process of our analysis, must be discussed. The first revision concerns the time frame used to measure the immediate effects of the movements. We originally established the checking point as the time when the large protests were launched by the two social movements, and tried to compare their impacts before, during, and after the two large protests. After looking at the data, we revised that choice to include the fourth to the eighth terms of the Legislative Yuan, during which two large protests occurred. The entire sixth and eighth terms then were treated as the affected objects. By making this revision, we felt more confident in operationalizing Tilly’s definition of social movement, since he does not confine it to only large protests.

The second revision we made was to focus only on the bill that was most relevant to the movement’s claims, rather than include related bills that were not directly relevant. We found that this revision made it easier to delineate where the movements’ effects appeared.

Third, we added one more aspect to our analysis, in addition to considering
whether the claim was directly related to more democracy, which we considered in H2. This new aspect involved whether the issue was, by nature, contrary to the immediate interests of the bureaucrats. The main objective of the Sunflower Movement was the enactment of CSASA, a law which would place more burdens on the bureaucracy. Therefore, its enactment has been postponed from time to time. The bureaucrats did not actively participate in the legislative process until the movement pushed them to do so. We then included the dramatically increasing rate of appearances by governmental officials during the review of this law in the ex-post period as part of the phenomena of wider participation. We had a theoretical foundation for doing this. In her book *Can Democracy Be Saved?* Della Porta’s formula for saving democracy by social movements relies principally on the willingness of public officials to change, regardless of whether the change is caused by the shock of social movements. Further, informants who were experts or members of an interest group were still valued more in our conception of wider participation and deeper deliberation than government officials. In sum, we consider the three revisions explained above as a contribution to future studies of the effect of social movements on representative deficits.

However, we hold one concern related to our data and analysis. Even though we have confirmed that the Sunflower Movement had more effect than the Red Shirt Movement in redressing Taiwan’s representative deficit, one phenomenon must be highlighted. Although during the eighth L. Y. term following the Sunflower Movement more participants were invited to attend meetings and hearings (table 5), they did not have more opportunities to speak, nor did they speak more frequently than before the movement. This may reveal another constraint on the implementation of participatory democracy. That is, wider participation and deeper deliberation are not necessarily achieved at the same time.

Finally, the constraints of the theoretical spectrum presented in the essay and generalization of the essay’s findings must be addressed. The theoretical formulation of the effect of social movements on representative democracy, as mentioned in the essay, has three constraints. First, the impact spectrum focuses mainly on representative democracy, the prevailing form of modern democracies, since the effect of social movements that results in further democratization can be seen clearly only in established democracies. This means that the theoretical impact spectrum cannot be expanded to cover democratizing regimes. Second, the contextual factors that cannot be fully controlled by a national government, such as globalization trends that introduce technological and socioeconomic changes, are not taken into account. In other words, the linear-like impact spectrum, as shown in figure 1, is formulated under a condition that holds these contextual factors constant. Third, the spectrum does not specify a time frame to measure the cause-and-effect relationship between a given social movement and its effect on a representative democracy, since the so-called effect sometimes cannot be estimated within a limited time
period. However, for the sake of empirically verifying the theoretical impact spectrum, this essay has compared legislative responses that occurred closely before and closely after the two social movement events.

Given the three constraints stated above, the findings of the essay should be read carefully. Although they verify the two hypotheses, they should not be generalized to democratizing regimes, and not even to established democracies if these regimes are penetrated deeply by globalization trends. As Tilly points out, the current globalization trend, with its accompanying economic and technological changes, may increase polarization in society and give rise to racially based movements. Such polarization might boost nationalist parties that could potentially lead to de-democratization. The essay notices this plausible negative effect of social movements on even established representative democracies.

However, the essay has only limited scope and time to achieve three main goals: to bridge the research gap between theories about social movements and political studies; to construct an impact spectrum that subsumes the theoretical expectations of social movement researchers; and to verify the impact spectrum through the study of two Taiwanese empirical cases. Despite its limitations, the essay takes a preliminary step in studying the effects of social movements on representative democracy that has not been seriously explored by political scientists in the past. As an initial step, the essay leaves large room for the contributions of future related research.

---

77 Tilly, Contentious Performances.