“Neighborhood Effects” of Democratization in Europe

Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Abstract

External factors have received relatively little attention in the broad democratization literature. This essay examines specific “neighborhood” effects in the transitions to democracy in three phases in Europe concerning, first, Southern Europe, then Central and Eastern Europe, and, finally, the more recent “color” revolutions. It distinguishes between immediate neighborhood and “contagion” effects, both on the general population and elite levels, overall European Union attractiveness and specific EU support, and the more general international “climate.” Some neighborhood effects may be positive in supporting democratic transitions and consolidation, whereas others may be negative, as, for example, was the case with regard to Russia during the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. It can be shown that distinct patterns of such factors existed during the various phases of these European transitions. In conclusion, some general lessons are drawn from this analysis.

Key words: Democratic transition, consolidation, external factors, neighborhood effects.

The last “wave” of democratization, to use Huntington’s term, has arrived in Europe in three distinct phases. The first occurred with the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s. The
second, and most forceful one, happened in Central and Eastern Europe\(^2\) after 1989 and 1990, and the third, which only has been a trickle so far, has been the “Orange Revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan during the last few years. There has been an enormous amount of literature on these and similar developments elsewhere.\(^3\) Whereas a wide variety of factors has been considered as possible explanations and there certainly is no simple monocausal one,\(^4\) the emphasis for the largest part has been on domestic factors and internal developments. As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter put it (with regard to Southern Europe and Latin America), “Domestic factors play a dominant role in the transition ... there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regimes themselves.”\(^5\)

By contrast, the external and international dimensions have received relatively less attention.\(^6\) In this essay, I will therefore focus on some specific aspects of the international dimension which can be termed “neighborhood effects.” Thus, the essay emphasizes some historically and geographically contingent factors, rather than attempting a more universal explanation. Some further distinctions, however, are in order. First of all, “neighborhood” also is a

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\(^2\) There are no clear-cut geographical, cultural, or political definitions for the use of these terms. See, for instance, Judy Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” in *Developments in Central and East European Politics* 4, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 1-19. For practical purposes, we restrict the term here to those cases where an effective democratization occurred in the early 1990s, but exclude dubious cases such as Russia and the new states in former Yugoslavia.


relative term. It does not necessarily imply having common borders; instead it can mean sharing some historical and cultural proximity and being involved in some common processes and interactions. Second, there often can be unintended regional diffusion and “contagion” effects at the society level, as stimulated by trade, tourism, or international media, in contrast to explicit policies by major neighboring regimes or international actors, such as the European Union or, on an even wider scale, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and so on, which are directed toward political elites. Third, such effects can be positive in the sense of promoting and enhancing further democratization, but also they can attempt to prevent, contravene, or slow down such developments, as for example, Russia’s position on the recent “Orange Revolutions” has demonstrated. Finally, a distinction must be made between factors affecting the breakdown of previous authoritarian regimes and the initial phase of transition to democracy, and longer-term influences after some kind of democratic regime has been established, concerning its further prospects of stabilization, “consolidation,” and enhancing the overall quality\textsuperscript{7} of the new political order.

A more general methodological problem in this respect must also be mentioned. It is often very difficult, if not impossible, to clearly identify and distinguish internal independent developments in certain cases from patterns of interactions and learning from and imitating others. This is the familiar “Galton’s problem” in comparative analysis, referring to the well-known British statistician, Sir Francis Galton, who posed the question, “It would be extremely desirable for the sake of those who wish to study the evidence for Dr. Tylor’s conclusions that full information should be given as to the degree to which the customs of the tribes and races compared are independent. It might be that some of the tribes had derived from a common source, so that they were duplicate copies of the same original.”\textsuperscript{8} With this remark, Galton commented upon Sir Edward Tylor’s presentation at the Royal Anthropological Institute in London in 1889 on his findings concerning bivariate correlations between selected characteristics of a variety of ethnic groups in Africa that were investigated by him.\textsuperscript{9} Since then, the problem whether a phenomenon can be considered to have had its own independent origins or must be attributed to intercultural diffusion effects has become known as “Galton’s problem.”\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{7} These terms will be further discussed below.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
In the following, I will first discuss some of the possible neighborhood effects during the first phase of transitions in Southern Europe in the 1970s. A second section will then be concerned with the major upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, again focusing on their interactions and major regional influences. The third part then turns to the more recent developments of the “Orange Revolutions” and their specific neighborhood situation. Finally, the concluding section will attempt to compare these developments with regard to their respective neighborhood patterns and to draw some lessons from these experiences, which will also enable us to develop some further perspectives.

Southern Europe

Portugal

“The third wave of democratization in the modern world began, implausibly and unwittingly, at twenty-five minutes after midnight, Thursday, April 25, 1974, in Lisbon, Portugal, when a radio station played the song ‘Grandola Vila Morena.’ ”11 With these lines, Samuel Huntington began his account of the “Carnation Revolution,” which eventually led to the country’s democratization and membership in the European Union. The junta of junior- and middle-rank officers who took over power from Caetano’s (and previously Salazar’s) “corporatist-authoritarian” regime,12 originally wanted to establish some kind of socialist system, but was committed to convene a Constituent Assembly, devising a new constitution, and to hold free elections. This situation had been triggered by the increasing hardships and loss of lives created by the wars of independence in Portugal’s African colonies, in particular, Angola and Mozambique, which constitutionally were regarded as part of the mother country. This was a special, de facto external effect, which did not apply in the other cases to be considered below.

In the protracted transition phase which ensued, several other external forces were at work. One was the support by the Soviet Union for the new regime and its socialist orientation, including support for the still largely Stalinist and orthodox Communist Party, chaired by Alvaro Cunhal. This was strongly opposed by the United States, which apparently even considered some direct intervention under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a position which was mitigated, however, by the “softer” approach of a number of European states and the European Community. Thus, at this stage, the overall Cold War situation still prevailed.

11 Huntington, The Third Wave, 3.
The elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1975 and the subsequent parliamentary elections in 1976 produced clear majorities of the democratic forces, including center-left (“Socialist,” PS), center-right (“Social Democratic,” PSD), and conservative (“Democratic Social Center,” CDS) parties. Leftist forces in the military where held in check by Colonel Eanes, who represented more moderate elements, and who was elected as Portugal’s first president under the new regime in 1976. The parliamentary elections had been won by the Socialist Party (36.7 percent), chaired by Mario Soares, who became the first democratically elected prime minister. In the meantime, democratically oriented civil society groups had also received support from outside. Among others, the German Social Democratic Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation had been particularly instrumental in supporting the PS and its leader, Mario Soares.

A constitutional revision in 1982, which established the civil control of the military, then laid the groundwork for further democratic consolidation. This was greatly enhanced by the prospect of becoming a full member of the European Community, which was accomplished in 1985. From then onward, Portugal has been a fully democratic and increasingly prosperous country.

**Greece**

(Re)democratization in Greece occurred when the military regime, established by Colonel George Papadopoulos in 1967, was unable to respond to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. Previous promises of “enosis” (reunification with the Greek-speaking part of the population on the island) turned out to be hollow. This, indeed, again was a very special (indirect) neighborhood effect. The social basis of the junta had been very narrow anyhow, and it was relatively easy for conservative party leader Constantine Karamanlis to take over power as acting prime minister, with the support of some senior military officers. This was followed by parliamentary elections in December 1974, which confirmed Karamanlis’s position, and a referendum that abolished the monarchy implicated with the authoritarian regime.

The European Community, which had reacted with sanctions after the coup, now supported the transition and the new regime, and Greece was admitted as a full member to the Community in 1981. At the same time, the relatively strong Communist Party, which had fought a long civil war after World War II, had split into a still Moscow-leaning (KKE) and a more Euro-communist wing, along the lines of Berlinguer’s PCI in Italy. Thus, this foreign influence also had weakened considerably. With the electoral victory of the

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13 For a brief account of the period, see, for example, Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 116-129.

(socialist) opposition party PASOK in 1981, led by veteran politician Andreas Papandreou, Greek democracy (with some remaining weaknesses) could be considered to have become consolidated.15

**Spain**

Among the cases considered here, Spain experienced the most protracted transition, which became the paradigm for a “transicion pactada,” as later followed by some of the Latin American countries.16 This involved an agreement between the “moderates” in the government camp, as personified by Prime Minister Suarez after Franco’s death in 1975, and the “moderates” on the opposition side, led by Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Felipe Gonzales, but also joined later by Communist Party leader Santiago Carillo. It was, to the largest extent, an internal settlement, even though PSOE also had received some clandestine support from the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. It also can be argued that, after the return to the monarchy, the moderating role of King Juan Carlos was somewhat influenced by the unsuccessful experience of his Greek counterpart. The attractiveness of the European Community and the rewards offered by its membership certainly also played a role, even though democracy in Spain can be considered to have become fully consolidated before she became an EC member in 1986.17

**Central and Eastern Europe**

**General Background**

In contrast to the democratic transitions in Southern Europe, where, by and large, domestic factors prevailed, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was, from the beginning, determined by the dominant position of the Soviet Union, which had occupied most of the territories after World War II. Leaders in Moscow created a system of communist-ruled “satellite” states, which were firmly integrated into the centrally planned economic system of the Comecon and the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact. Only Yugoslavia, which went its own way under Tito after 1948, and the remote and isolated Albania, which split with Moscow after 1961 (and sought Chinese support instead), were exceptions to this pattern. When internal social unrest because of economic and political grievances threatened to shed this external dominance, as in the


German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, these attempts were forcefully put down by the Red Army and the allied bloc members. This “Brezhnev doctrine” of limited sovereignty of East European states, as it was formulated after the events in Czechoslovakia, remained in force until Gorbachev rose to presidential power in 1985.

In the meantime, however, other factors had been at work that weakened the regimes in power. On the one hand, the highly centralized planned economies and the division of production within the Comecon turned out to be increasingly cumbersome and ineffective, leading to widespread dissatisfaction with the standard of living in large segments of the populations and many acute shortages of essential consumer goods. This was exacerbated by the oil crises of the 1970s, which had an impact on energy prices in Eastern Europe, partly compensated by an increasing state indebtedness toward Western countries and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. On the other hand, the international politics of the Cold War had gone through a period of détente, which in part was facilitated by Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” toward West Germany’s eastern neighbors and a number of important bilateral and multilateral treaties signed in its wake. Most important among these, in the longer run, was the Helsinki Accord of the newly founded Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. This included, at first at least on paper, a guarantee of basic human and political rights by all signatory states. These rights increasingly were claimed by dissident movements in a number of countries, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, Solidarnosz in Poland, and, later, dissident groups in East Germany that were focused on ecological, pacifist, and general human rights issues.  

For these reasons, the strictly administered economies and tight communist rule began to be “softened” somewhat in a number of countries. Hungary, in particular, allowed for a more market- and consumer-oriented form of “Goulash communism,” and some political liberalization. In Poland, which had remained the most “pluralist” of all Eastern Bloc countries because of the persistent strong role of the Catholic Church, an uncollectivized peasantry, and strong nationalist (and anti-Russian!) sentiments, the Solidarnosz movement of the increasingly dissatisfied shipyard workers in Danzig, coal miners, and so on, became the rallying force for the opposition. This could be contained only by the declaration of a state of emergency and the taking over of power by General Jaruzelski in 1981, in order to prevent direct Soviet intervention. Elsewhere, however, as in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania, fledgling opposition forces continued to encounter strong repressive measures.

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18 See also Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 113.
Gorbachev and his advisors had realized some of the causes of the economic decline and the enormous costs of maintaining military supremacy in the East and an “equilibrium of terror” in the Cold War vis-à-vis the West. Therefore, they propagated both economic and (some) political reforms (perestroika and glasnost) and finally abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine. In Hungary, this allowed for the formation of the first non-communist political organization since 1956, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, in 1987. Within the Communist Party, long-time party leader, Janos Kadar, was removed in 1988, and other hardliners were sidelined. In the spring and summer of 1989, massive street demonstrations by the opposition led to the formation of a “Roundtable” and effective agreements initiating a transition toward an open multiparty system. Similarly, in Poland, after renewed strikes and broad social unrest, Roundtable negotiations in early 1989 led to a compromise legalizing Solidarnosz and to elections in June, which were clearly won by the opposition. In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarnosz activist, became the first non-communist head of government.

Immediate “Neighborhood” Effects

Whereas these developments still were dependent on the “grand” situation of international politics and internal changes made possible by the Gorbachev reforms, the real turning point came with the subsequent events in the GDR, the opening of the Berlin Wall on the eve of November 9, 1989. This was followed by a series of immediate “demonstration” and “neighborhood” effects, with all Eastern regimes falling like dominoes within a few weeks (the dates of these events are provided in table 1 in chronological order, indicating some immediate neighborhood reactions).

The ongoing changes in Hungary had led to an opening of its border with Austria. This became an important escape route for East Germans who had been permitted to travel to Hungary, but not outside the Eastern Bloc. Demonstrations, initiated by weekly Monday prayers in Leipzig, and general social unrest increased in the GDR. Many more now demanded to be able to travel abroad and to enjoy basic civil liberties. Thousands fled to the West German embassies in Budapest and Prague, and, after some intense negotiations with the GDR leadership, were finally permitted to travel to the West. Gorbachev personally had indicated his disapproval of the stubborn “gerontocratic” leadership under Erich Honecker, who had to step down. But the general turmoil could no longer be contained, and during the night of November 9, the closely guarded checkpoints at the Berlin Wall were finally opened.

All this was broadly reported by the international media and in the other East European countries. Immediately afterward, massive demonstrations and demands for sweeping reforms followed in the other communist states. Some ruling parties, as in Bulgaria, attempted to contain these forces by some internal changes, and long-time party leader Todor Zhivkov was replaced by
the more “moderate” Retur Mladenov. This could not, however, appease the opposition, which had been organized in a new Union of Democratic Forces and demanded more comprehensive changes. Roundtable talks in January 1990 then led to the complete dismantling of the regime and the first pluralist elections on October 19, 1990.

Similarly, in Prague a week after the fall of the Berlin Wall, big and increasingly intensified demonstrations started. These, too, could not be contained any longer, and within two weeks, the Communist Party leadership under hardliner Gustav Husak resigned. The Czech opposition organized itself as the Civic Forum, involving former Charter 77 activists such as Vaclav Havel. In the Slovak part of the country, a parallel organization, Public against Violence, was formed. In the end, Vaclav Havel was elected president on December 29, 1989.

The tough and “sultanistic” regime of the Ceausescus in Romania also

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19 For brief accounts of this period see, for example, ibid., chap. 15, 235-254, and Mark Pittaway “From Communist to Post-Communist Politics,” in Developments in Central and East European Politics 4, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 20-36.
came to a most dramatic end in December. Widespread strikes and revolts, first emanating from the city of Timisoara in the west of the country with a strong Hungarian diaspora, led to an internal party coup and put former Vice President Ion Iliescu into office. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were publicly executed on Christmas Day, 1989. The following elections on May 20, 1990, confirmed this “captured revolution.” Only in 1996, when for the first time opposition forces won the elections, did an effective change of power occur.

**Longer-term Changes**

Other parts of the larger Eastern and Southeastern European region did not remain untouched either. In contrast to countries where previous statehood had been relatively secure or where a peaceful separation of the major regions was achieved, as in Czechoslovakia in 1993, attempts to achieve self-determination and democratization led to a more violent break-up of the multi-ethnic and multireligious states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

In 1990, each of the six republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia held multiparty elections. In Catholic Slovenia and Croatia, governments were formed which favored independence, whereas in Serbia and Montenegro, communist leader Slobodan Milosevic maintained his grip. When Slovenia and Croatia officially declared independence in June 1991, a short secession war ensued, but the center was no longer able to enforce its control. In September 1991, the Republic of Macedonia followed suit, this time without resistance from Belgrade. In other parts, however, in particular, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, protracted and very bloody civil wars erupted, challenging the domination by Serbia. This led to external military intervention by the United Nations and NATO and to a very tense situation and complicated attempts of settling these conflicts up to the present day.

This special situation cannot be considered here in any more detail. It has led, however, to a strong involvement of the European Union in this region and, as in the other East European cases, to full membership of Slovenia in the EU in 2004 and possibly also Croatia in the near future. In 1992, isolated Albania also experienced a regime change following the first democratic elections. Milosevic’s authoritarian rule finally also came to an end in 2000, after his regime had been severely weakened by the lost wars and public discontent, leading to the “bulldozer revolution” that could no longer be contained by nationalist slogans alone.

The other multi-ethnic state breaking up during this period was the Soviet Union. Here, the three Baltic republics had a special position. They had

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20 For the use of this term, see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 51.

21 More detailed accounts can be found in *ibid.*, chap. 18.
become independent states after World War I and had experienced a period of democratic rule until the early 1930s. After interims of internal authoritarian rule, they were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 and became integral parts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They were also the most westward parts, with continuing links across the Baltic Sea and enjoying a relatively prosperous situation as compared to most other parts of the Soviet Union. In all three republics, strong ethnic-cultural sentiments prevailed toward Russian domination, but also toward strong internal Russian minorities (in Estonia and Latvia, more than 30 percent), most of whom had immigrated after 1940. “Nationalist” and democratic reform elements thus largely coincided.

In Estonia, such convergence led to the formation of an Estonian Popular Front as early as 1987. Democratic opposition forces and moderate (ethnic Estonian) members of the Communist Party found a common ground and won the elections in 1990, still under the roof of the Soviet Union, which under Gorbachev no longer was opposed to such reform strategies. In Latvia, a similar development took place, even though the hard-line communist forces still maintained a greater influence. A coup attempt of pro-Russian elements in August 1991 failed, however. In Lithuania (with a Russian minority of less than 10 percent), nationalist forces, including post-communist organizations and personalities, prevailed from the very beginning. They chose to confront the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev openly, which led to a brief armed conflict. In March 1990, Lithuania declared its independence. When, after the tumultuous events in Moscow in August 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union was formally dissolved into its fifteen constituent republics (the Community of Independent States, or CIS), Estonia and Latvia also achieved full independence. All three Baltic states then rapidly sought support from their Scandinavian neighbors and the European Union, becoming full EU and NATO members in 2004.

The Eastern and Southeastern Periphery

In this way, practically all the relevant dominoes in Eastern and Southeastern Europe had fallen, with the exception of the still unresolved complicated situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, both remaining more or less under EU and UN tutelage. The geographically more distant CIS states proved, however, to be much more resistant to substantive democratic changes. But even remaining under mostly authoritarian rule, at least formal elections were held in most of them, presenting an opportunity for opposition forces to express their discontent. Even though on many occasions these elections were largely fraudulent, increased international attention and monitoring made cheating more difficult and led to massive protests by newly organized opposition groups.
Georgia

In Georgia, where former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze had become president, the post-communist regime was faced both with attempts of regional secession in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a growing internal opposition demanding more democratic rights and free and fair elections. Having lost all major internal and external support, Shevardnaze quickly resigned, facing the “Rose Revolution” in 2003. His successor, Mikheil Saakashvili, easily won the following elections, turning to support by the EU and the United States with the hope for eventual EU and NATO membership.

In the meantime, however, the international “climate,” which had been so favorable toward democratization in the 1990s as “the only (legitimate) game in town,”22 had changed significantly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, by the Islamist terrorist organization Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon had brought another violent antidemocratic force to the fore, which, at least in countries with sizeable Muslim populations, could muster some support. They distracted world attention and redirected U.S. foreign policy toward fighting this new enemy (even in places such as Iraq, where previously Al-Qaeda did not have any significant support). The succession from ailing President Boris Yeltzin to Vladimir Putin in 1998, and the stabilizing economic and political situation in the Russian Federation, favored by strongly rising oil and gas prices for this major export-country, also had led to a reassertion of Russia’s international role, paying particular attention to its “close neighborhood,” where some of the adjacent states were heavily dependent on energy imports from Russia.

Ukraine

When in Ukraine, again after fraudulent elections, massive protests erupted in December 2004 in the “Orange Revolution,” the situation had become more complicated. The leader of the opposition, Viktor Yushenko, managed to secure a victory in a rerun of the second round of the presidential elections over his chief opponent, Viktor Yanukovich, who had his power base in the eastern parts of the country and who was strongly supported by Moscow. Russia also raised oil prices and threatened to cut supplies entirely. The internal situation still remains tense and complicated, and even though the 2007 parliamentary elections were termed “free and fair” by outside observers, Ukraine’s democracy is far from being consolidated. The country remains torn between aspirations to become an EU and possibly NATO member, as expressed by the new leadership, and strong pressures to keep a nonaligned (or pro-Russian) position by its eastern neighbor.

**Kyrgyzstan**

The third former Soviet republic where a “color” or “flower” revolution occurred was Kyrgyzstan. It had declared independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991, and Askar Akayev won the first open presidential elections. His rule became more and more authoritarian, however, and subsequent elections were largely flawed and opposition groups suppressed. When again in February 2005 parliamentary elections were judged to have fallen “short of OSCE commitments and other international standards,”23 thousands of demonstrators took to the streets calling for Akayev’s resignation. He had to flee abroad, and in the following presidential elections, opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev crowned this “Tulip Revolution” by his victory. Since then, again more authoritarian tendencies can be noted. A new constitution, approved by referendum in 2007, reinforced executive powers. In terms of foreign relations, the government tried to keep a balance between ties with the West, allowing the use of a strategic airport for U.S. and NATO forces engaged in the war in neighboring Afghanistan, and an emerging “authoritarian bloc,” represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Altogether, democracy, here too, remains far from being consolidated.

With regard to some linkages among these developments, there certainly was some “diffusion” both at the general population and the elite levels.24 It has convincingly been argued, however, that domestic factors—such as control over mineral resources including oil and gas and effective party organizations—and the overall international situation were more decisive.25 This seems to have been borne out by most recent events in Georgia, where “old” Cold War politics highlighting efforts by both the U.S. and Russia to assert their control over this region have come to the fore again.

**Conclusions**

This essay deals with the international dimension of democratization processes during the last three major phases in Europe (and a little bit beyond). These, however, have to be seen in a differentiated manner. Immediate “neighborhood” effects of closely adjacent, very similar countries have to be distinguished from the general (and growing!) role of the European Union and the overall regional and global aspects of international politics. What have such effects been in all

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the cases considered here? What was the interaction of domestic and external factors? Has there been an interaction from one phase to another? What are the lessons to be drawn from these experiences and what are the perspectives for further democratization in the European periphery?

These are important questions both for empirical democratic theory and practical politics in the years and decades to come. At this place, they can, of course, only be answered in a very preliminary manner, and because of the special focus of this essay, questions concerning the relative weight of internal and external factors of democratization cannot be answered here. “Galton’s problem” (see above) thus cannot be resolved here for these cases. Nevertheless, as our cursory overview has shown, some tentative conclusions can be drawn.

First of all, during the first phase concerning the Southern European countries of Portugal, Greece, and Spain in the 1970s, in the transition period, domestic factors certainly were overriding. There was, however, some civil society outside support, a generally favorable climate for democratization, and only weak countervailing forces in this part of the world. For the (much longer) period of consolidation, the “pull” of the EC/EU and direct encouragement and support from West European countries for domestic democratic forces contributed considerably to the final success (see also, the rough listing of factors in table A1 in the appendix).

Secondly, the next phase, involving the Central and East European countries after 1989-1990, shows quite a different pattern. Here, under the general umbrella of domination by the Soviet Union and significant internal political changes there, immediate “contagion” and “demonstration” (even in the literal sense of the word!) effects were shown. These chain reactions led to a true “domino” situation, reaching even beyond the European continent into Africa and elsewhere. In the consolidating period, EU support also became very explicit and direct. Support programs such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring the Economy) immediately helped in this process, and the prospect of possible EU membership spurred these efforts in many ways. The “Copenhagen criteria,” formulated by the EU in 1993, set demanding thresholds in political, economic, and administrative terms in this respect (stability of democratic institutions and effective protection of human rights and the rule of law, a functioning market economy able to withstand competitive pressures, and the acceptance of the acquis communautaire of EU rules and regulations). Coming “back to Europe” was attractive for the largest part of the populations, in terms of shedding Soviet dominance and communist rule and gaining liberal democratic rights and prospects for economic well-being and security in the EU and NATO. Not everything went smoothly, of course, but those countries which have become EU members by now can be considered to have become (more or less) democratically consolidated. For some of the former Yugoslav republics, this process is still continuing.

Thirdly, the more feeble “Color Revolutions” again deviate from this
pattern. Here, geopolitical and, possibly, social-cultural factors seem to prevail. The (relative) remoteness from the European center, the reassertion of Russia’s influence over “CIS”-countries, and a generally much less favorable international climate returning to great power politics in a multipolar world have made these transitions more turbulent and shaky. They also have been too recent to be considered “consolidated” in any way. Nevertheless, some longer-term factors concerning better international communications, international civil society support, critical election observations, and similar influences can be observed. EU membership, however, if at all, remains a very remote prospect.

As far as interactions among these three phases are concerned, in contrast to Huntington’s arguments, no direct linkages between the first and the second phase could be found. The second and the third phases, of course, are more closely interlinked both in terms of comparable domestic conditions and the (changing) roles of the major neighboring powers, the EU and Russia.

A more formal analysis with the help of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) supports these findings. All transitions after the first phase, with the exception of the Eastern “forerunners” of Poland and Hungary, show strong “contagion” and immediate neighborhood effects. Further democratic consolidation then was facilitated by strong EU support, lack of external opposing forces, and a favorable international climate. This was the case for all present EU members (including Croatia, as probably the next in line). Conversely, the new states in former Yugoslavia and the CIS countries, which have not become members of the EU, cannot be considered to have been consolidated. They are facing a more difficult international climate and, for some of them, direct opposition from Moscow concerning further orientation toward the West.

Among the lessons to be drawn from these experiences are much lower expectations concerning further democratization in Europe’s periphery. There certainly still is some attractiveness and, in the “electoral democracies,” obvious electoral fraud and general dissatisfaction with the economic situation as well as with widespread political corruption and ineffectiveness may lead to further protests and “color” movements. A majority of CIS and Central Asian countries may, however, “stabilize” under more authoritarian conditions and an international environment in which nondemocratic powers such as Russia and China have again asserted themselves. Only renewed major shocks there or incremental democratic changes leading to a change in the foreign policies of the “big neighbors” could lead to more favorable conditions for further democratization in this region. This, however, is, of course, purely speculative and much beyond the scope of this essay.

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### Appendix

#### Table A1. Overview of External Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Consolidation</th>
<th>Contagion from immediate neighbors (general population)</th>
<th>Support for democratic forces (“elites”)</th>
<th>EC/EU attractiveness</th>
<th>Direct EU support</th>
<th>Opposing external forces</th>
<th>International “climate”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>ambivalent</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>favorable</td>
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