Democratization and Citizenship Education
Changing Identity Politics and Shifting Paradigms of Teaching and Learning in Taiwan

Pei-te Lien

Abstract
Taiwan has evolved from a Sino-centric authoritarian state to an indigenized multicultural society, nearing consolidation of the fruits of democracy in response to sweeping social and political changes over the last three decades. How might these socio-political changes affect the teaching and learning of national identity and citizenship in Taiwan? A review of the literature suggests that the development of citizenship education in Taiwan follows changes in identity politics. The notions of citizenship and civic/citizenship education in Taiwan, as well as the pace and direction of Taiwan’s civic education reform, have evolved over time in correspondence with several milestone changes in society, politics, and education. To judge the extent to which students in democratized Taiwan believe in the basic values of democracy and democratic participation as well as other concepts taught in the reformed curriculum, the essay employs data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study to provide empirical assessment of student learning about democratic citizenship in Taiwan.

Keywords: Political socialization, citizenship education, democratization, identity politics, educational reform.

The island of Taiwan was occupied by a long line of foreign regimes beginning in the sixteenth century. The contemporary culture and institutions in Taiwan reflect the confluence of Spanish, Dutch, Han Chinese, Japanese, American, and indigenous elements. As part of the third wave of global democratization,

Pei-te Lien is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.<plien@polscl.ucsb.edu>

The author acknowledges the support of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship and of the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, by hosting her residency, and thanks the American Region of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Sociology Exchange for sponsoring the larger project.
Taiwan has experienced sweeping social and political changes. Over the past three decades or so, Taiwan has evolved from a Sino-centric authoritarian state to an indigenized multicultural society on its way to consolidating the fruits of democracy. How might these socio-political changes affect the teaching and learning of national identity and citizenship in Taiwan? And, among students who experienced curriculum reforms in democratized Taiwan, what is the evidence that student learning outcomes will lead to positive prospects for the development of democratic citizenship?

Kennedy notes that citizenship education cannot be studied in a vacuum and that attention must be paid to the influence of “cultural norms, political priorities, social expectations, national economic development aspirations, geopolitical contexts and historical antecedents.”1 To explore the evolution and transformation of Taiwan’s citizenship education during the last half century, the essay first discusses definitions of citizenship and citizenship education. Then, it explores how the notions of civic and citizenship education in Taiwan have evolved over time, in correspondence with several milestone changes and reforms in society, politics, and education. The essay pays special attention to the politics of identity and the teaching of national identity as reflected in curriculum guidelines and textbooks. Data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) are employed to provide empirical evidence of student learning of civic knowledge, values, and civic engagement in present-day Taiwan.

Democratic Citizenship and Citizenship Education: Possibilities of Convergence in Taiwan

In this essay, citizenship education refers to “the formation through the process of schooling of the knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of citizens.”2 Alternatively called political, ideological, moral, or civics education in East Asia, the various expressions of citizenship education in each society convey its strategic function as a tool for inculcating (future) citizens and for instilling desirable political identities and other qualities of citizenship considered

---


2 This definition is used in John J. Cogan, Paul Morris, and Murray Print, eds., Civic Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Case Studies across Six Societies (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002), 4. The editors refer to it as civic education, which is used interchangeably with citizenship education in this study. In their research on international civic and citizenship education, Schulz et al. note that the prevailing global trend is to use the term citizenship education to capture the dynamic process and growing field of study. See Wolfram Schulz, John Ainley, Julian Fraillon, David Kerr, and Bruno Losito, ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic Knowledge, Attitudes, and Engagement among Lower Secondary School Students in 38 Countries (Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 2010).
crucial to the stability of a political system.

What are considered desirable qualities of citizenship in a political system may be largely structured by the dominant political philosophy. An analysis of primary- and secondary-school texts related to citizenship education from 1990 through 2003 in Western democracies, especially the United States, reveals a continuing dominance of civic republicanism and political liberalism in citizenship discourses, as well as a marginalization of critical and cosmopolitan discourses.3 Whereas political liberalism places emphases on the values of individual rights, individual responsibility, liberty, and equality, citizenship under civic republicanism stresses the importance of identification with, and commitment to, the political community’s goals. Citizenship education under the former stresses the importance of political participation, while citizenship education under the latter may be equal to national identity education, with a main goal of cultivating patriotism or an affective attitude toward the republic and its citizens. Both versions of citizenship discourse have been criticized for privileging either the nation-state or individualism and for being deficient in feminist, indigenous, and transnational considerations of citizenship in multicultural societies.4 A challenge in the development of democratic citizenship education in post-reform Taiwan is to avoid these pitfalls associated with Western democracies.

In a constitutional democracy, a central tenant of citizenship education is the development of civic virtues, intellectual knowledge, and participatory skills that would enable (future) citizens to think and act on behalf of their individual rights and the common good. A widespread acceptance of these civic values and attitudes in society is considered evidence of having a political culture that may help sustain a modern pluralist liberal democracy.5 In East Asian societies, although there is debate about the specific contours of “Asian values,” Kennedy notes common emphases on the collective entity, an underlying appeal to authority, and the adoption of Confucian values.6 Concerns have been raised, however, about the compatibility of hierarchical traditional values and collective-oriented beliefs with pluralistic liberal democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and tolerance and respect for the worth

---

and dignity of all individuals in society. The relatively smooth and swift transition in Taiwan from an authoritarian state to a vibrant democracy seems to suggest the possibility of convergence in a Confucian society.

Taiwan’s role as a Chinese immigrant haven, lengthy periods of foreign occupation, the absence of monarchical rule, as well as the Nationalists’ determination to develop Taiwan as an anticommunist bastion for freedom and democracy may have laid the groundwork for a relatively smooth and swift democratic transformation. Yet, influences of traditional values and vestiges from a nonliberal past may not disappear instantly or completely with the abandonment of authoritarianism. As evidenced by various findings about public opinion over the past decade or so, nostalgia over tight social order and high economic growth associated with the authoritarian past seem to have taken a foothold in Taiwan and other third-wave democracies. In the authoritarian era, a core mission of Taiwan’s education was to serve the function of nation building under the ideology of Chinese nationalism. With the replacement of nationalistic education by democratic education, students of civic education are expected to hold a strong commitment to democratic values and principles of equality, even if they may also show signs of influence from both past and current politics. Empirical verification of this proposition will be discussed after a review of history and change in Taiwan’s citizenship education.

Development of Citizenship Education in Taiwan under Japan’s Colonial and the KMT’s Authoritarian Rule

In Taiwan, the development of citizenship education reflects, above all, the changes in ruling ideology, and follows closely the island’s shifting identity politics. The liberalization of education policy, in general, and civic education, in particular, is tied to the process of democratization in Taiwan. Reform of civic education is part of the educational reform movement that aims

---

7 For a review, see Don Chull Shin, *Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
10 Mau-kuei Chang, “Democratization and Civic Education Reform in Taiwan,” speech delivered at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Pacific Circle Consortium Conference, Taiwan Normal University, May 26, 2009, Taipei, Taiwan.
for autonomy of the teaching profession, deregulation and empowerment, protection of student rights, and parents’ right of choice.¹¹ The evolution of civic education as a subject in senior high schools also is closely connected to changes made earlier in the subjects of history and social studies in elementary and junior high schools in response to changing politics and rising Taiwanese consciousness.¹² Scholarship on civic or citizenship education in Taiwan has reported paradigm shifts in curricula and pedagogies in response to forces for liberalization, decolonization, localization/indigenization, and globalization.¹³ Examples include major overhauls in the goals of civic education, curriculum creation, the adoption and the production of textbooks, methods of teacher training, and student admission processes.

Although most scholarly attention to the politics of Taiwan is paid to the post-1949 era, since the retreat of the central government controlled by the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan’s checkered colonial history has affected the identity and consciousness of generations of the island’s natives. During Japanese rule (1895-1945), education in Taiwan served the campaign of Niponization when cultivating loyalty to the


Japanese Emperor and familiarizing the people of the island with the Japanese language, work ethic, and basic knowledge of math and the sciences—the primary goals of the common education available to all children.\textsuperscript{14} Perceived deprivation of identities indigenous to the homeland of Taiwan by the Japanese contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness among locals.\textsuperscript{15} However, Japan’s development of Taiwan as a model colony also explained massive modernization efforts. The Japanese were intent on constructing an economic infrastructure and industrial base, nurturing rule of law, establishing a modern governing system through the household registration system, and spreading knowledge about health and hygiene. This mixed view of the legacy of Japanese colonialism continues to complicate the decolonization process and contributes significantly to the rift in identity politics in contemporary Taiwan. Whether and how to introduce and interpret colonial influence in Taiwan became a key source of dispute in 1997 curriculum reform efforts regarding a new course, “Knowing Taiwan,” offered at the junior-high level.\textsuperscript{16}

After the retrocession of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC) at the end of World War II, KMT-based rulers from the Chinese mainland (the Mainlanders) were perceived as arrogant, corrupt, violent, and illegitimate by existing residents of Taiwan (the Taiwanese). Cultural gaps and mutual misunderstandings between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese led to interethnic tensions early on, symbolized by the tragic 2-28 Incident in 1947.\textsuperscript{17} A state of martial law was declared by the ruling KMT in the name of national emergency and mainland recovery soon afterward, and martial law was not lifted until 1987. Between 1945 and 1988, Taiwanese schools were crucial sites for the KMT-led government to maintain its legitimacy by forging a national identity and ideology featuring discourses upholding \textit{Fa-tung} (constitutional governance) and the ultimate recovery of the Chinese mainland.\textsuperscript{18} Citing the need for national survival and ideological consolidation, the state adopted a highly centralized administration system for education to enforce its goals. The educational system implemented the ideology of Chinese nationalism and Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy of the Three Principles of the People (nationalism,
democracy, and prosperity). Democracy was juxtaposed against a totalitarian China, and the teaching of democratic values focused on inculcating basic individual rights and freedoms, but not the rights of dissent and democratic decision making. Educational policy during this period aimed to mobilize the population behind the KMT’s mission of mainland recovery and national unification. Schools taught only Chinese literature, history, and geography to inculcate a Sino-centric national culture. In this process, the study of Taiwan received minimal time, and Mandarin was the only official language. The curriculum focused on the cultivation of “Chinese” morality, culture, national consciousness, and patriotism.

Analyses of curricula related to the teaching of citizenship and national identity during this period clearly show the centralization effects of the curriculum policy and the Sinicization bent. For example, in their analysis of the social studies curriculum related to the teaching of history and politics prior to the 1990s, Liu and Hung note that the entire educational focus was “on the inculcation of an uncritical, state-centered patriotism, and a specific set of values associated with the official version of ‘traditional Chinese culture’” that encouraged socio-political conformity and an unquestioning loyalty to the state. An analysis of the junior-high civics curriculum in 1983 shows a similar emphasis on values of social cohesion and self-cultivation. Yet, Young’s analysis of elementary- and high-school textbooks on political education between the 1950s and the 1980s shows both continuities and changes in instructional priorities and topical interests. Specifically, mentions of “loyalty and obedience” consistently ranked the highest. In contrast, topics on “anti-communism and mainland recovery” experienced the most drastic reduction, from 21 percent in the 1950s to 3 percent in the 1980s. Although topics related to liberal democratic citizenship were low in frequency, the percentage on rule of law/civil rights and responsibilities significantly increased from 8 percent in the 1970s to 21 percent by the mid-1980s. These findings suggest incremental changes in Taiwanese democratic civic education in response to changing political contexts and the gradual opening of political space created by consecutive waves of social movements.

22 Ibid., 573.
23 Liu, “Civics Education in Taiwan.”
24 Young, “The Development of Political Education Policy in Taiwan.”
Educational Reforms under Liberalization and Democratization

A series of diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s sparked public concern about the KMT’s claim to legitimacy and the future status of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The state was forced to gradually open up its political space as a result. In addition to responding to rising international pressures, the KMT’s transition to soft authoritarianism was closely related to the emergence of social movement activism and the birth of a cultural indigenization movement, which was followed, in turn, by the emergence of grass-roots protests for self-help and middle-class advocacy for consumer protection, environmental protection, and women’s and workers’ rights. Taking a historical-institutional approach, Hsiao and Ho show that consecutive waves of social movement activism had a consistently positive effect on Taiwan’s democratization between 1970 and 2010. The ruling party’s forced recognition, acceptance, and selective incorporation of movement activists and their ideas into administration helped to rebuild the KMT’s legitimacy in governing Taiwan. Chang also demonstrates a symbiotic (and path-dependent) relationship between the state’s loosening of its political grip and the emergence of social/political space for freedom of speech and association. This development of new civic space then attracted a heightened level and broadened base of participation in social movement politics which, in turn, facilitated the pace of electoral change and the state’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

The campus democracy movement between 1982 and 1986 sowed the seeds of Taiwan’s education liberalization movement. Between 1987 and 1992, radicalized college students built intercampus organizations to pursue social justice for workers, farmers, students, and instructors. The 1990 Wild Lily student movement was instrumental in hastening the democratization process by demanding an immediate abolition of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, teachers formed a human rights association to seek protection of their workers’ rights, and formed another one to demand freedom in teacher training, legalization of the teachers’ union, and a more liberal educational system. From 1990 to 1993, educational reform groups, many of which were founded by allies of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), banded together to support reform and moved the battleground to the Legislative Yuan, where

many topics under discussion were debated among the parties.  

By the end of 1993, the enactment of the Teacher Education Act liberalized the teacher training system and protected teachers’ rights to due process in hiring and firing, and a revision of the University Law permitted universities to devise their own curricula and called for support of private institutions. The momentum for educational reform peaked with the formation of the historic 410 Educational Reform Alliance Movement, which was backed by some 50,000 parents in early 1994. The movement called for broadened access to senior high school and college education, smaller schools and class sizes, modernization of education, and the formulation of a basic law for education. By 1995, as a major move in the curriculum decentralization effort, Taiwan adopted the “one outline and multiple versions” policy to encourage pluralism in education and to allow market competition for the compilation and production of textbooks. A dual system of state-authorized and privately produced textbooks replaced the single standardized textbook policy, but the practice of central control over the writing of core primary-school and high-school subjects related to college entrance exams continued. To broaden student participation, flexible entrance exams into high schools and higher education were introduced by 2001.

As part of the “Integrated Nine-Year General Curricula” implemented in 2001 for elementary and junior high schools, a new field of social studies was established to integrate knowledge of history, geography, and social studies taught previously under separate disciplines. This event marks a milestone for teaching and learning civic education in Taiwan. The curriculum emphasizes social science thinking and approaches to learning by incorporating elements from six disciplines and focusing more on teaching “the essence of democracy, such as participation in the democratic process, the right of dissent, checks and balances, and democratic decision-making.” It also stresses the values of individualism, social diversity, and minority rights, and the distinctiveness of Taiwan as part of the tripartite framework of national identity education. At the senior-high level, Chang comments that, in retrospect, the highlight of the civic education reform may be the “transitional curriculum guidelines” (C-G 95) adopted in 2006, whose primary goals were to “remove or reduce the amount of the moral, ideological, and ethno-nationalistic connotations in the earlier version of Civics and the Three Principles,” and to link civic

28 Doong, “Taiwan’s New Citizenship Curriculum.”  
and citizenship education at the senior-high level directly with the teaching of democratic values, critical thinking skills, and the ability to participate in democratic decision making.

The Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness and Paradigm Shifts in Curriculum

To a large extent, Taiwan’s curriculum reform reflects conflicts over identity politics.\(^{31}\) Conceiving the rise of Taiwanese identity or consciousness as “the product of a history of resistance,” Liu and Hung note that resistance to Japanese colonization would be only the first of the three stages in the lengthy process of identity formation.\(^{32}\) Resistance to the repressive practice of the KMT regime, staffed mostly by the Mainlanders, facilitated the formation of the second stage of Taiwanese consciousness. The resistance of the people in Taiwan to a potential reign over the island by Communist China (as threatened, for example, when the Chinese fired missiles across the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to stymie any “separatist” intention) constitutes the third stage of the formation of Taiwanese consciousness. Liu and Hung\(^{33}\) consider the emergence of the national identity issue in Taiwan’s education as part cause and part consequence of the democratization process, which shifted political power from the Mainlander-based Nationalists toward the native or local participants in Taiwan’s politics.

To negotiate a changed political climate under democratic openings and the rising consciousness of being Taiwanese, proponents of curriculum reform pursued the strategy of separating political identity from cultural identity by creating a tripartite identity system of local-national-international in citizenship education. Two major shifts of the curriculum focus—localization (nativization or indigenization) and globalization—exemplified the educational reform movement of the 1990s.\(^{34}\) To indigenize the curriculum, the subject Taiwan Studies, as part of the nine-year integrated general curriculum, replaced a seventh-grade junior high school course in civics and morality. This received harsh criticism from conservatives, who alleged a pro-Taiwan independence

---


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.; Law, “Globalization and Citizenship Education in Hong Kong and Taiwan”; and Liu, “A Society in Transition.”
stance and suspected eulogizing of the era of Japanese colonial rule. For grades 3 to 6, a new subject called “Native Place Teaching Activities” aimed to acquaint students with the local living environment in the homeland on Taiwan. Although both courses were meant to help raise Taiwanese consciousness, the textbooks were more ambivalent concerning the question of national identity and favored the term “the people of Taiwan” rather than “the Taiwanese people.”

Comparing the values that were promoted in junior high school civics curriculum standards between 1983 and 1994, Liu finds that the mention of nationality identity (and self-cultivation) significantly decreased, while mention of civil society increased. Chen Min-hua analyzes changes in the national identity narratives of civic education textbooks in Taiwan’s junior high schools between 1968 and 2005, and notes the Sino-centric orientation in national identity to be evident in the 1968, 1972, and 1983 editions of the textbooks. In the 1994 edition, however, a competition and contradiction between the Taiwan-centric and Sino-centric identities was evident. In the 2003 and 2005 editions, both identities co-existed with a third identity called bentuhua, or localized ROC identity. Studying the evolution of national identity in junior high-school civics textbooks in Taiwan between 1950 and 2007, Li Min-hui identifies a similar causal relationship between changes in national identity as reflected in the ruling party’s ideology and the contents of high-school civics textbooks over the periods of authoritarian rule, liberalization, democratization, and the second transition of the ruling party. Lin Wen-hsien makes the same observation in his content analysis of social studies textbooks used in elementary schools between 1975 and 2003.

Whereas Taiwanization appears to be the irreversible trend, it is important to keep in mind that the observed separation from a Sino-centric curriculum instituted during the authoritarian era may not mean the simultaneous disappearance or the abandonment of Chinese cultural traditions and values. Given the deep-rooted influence of “Chineseness” in society and institutions, it may be too much to expect a complete rejection of Sino-centric thinking. What has been open for discussion in curriculum reform appears to be the difference

36 Liu, “Civics Education in Taiwan.”
in the amount of coverage of Chinese history and culture versus the coverage of native/local Taiwanese history and culture, as well as the sequence in covering key aspects of history. Increased democracy has also complicated the process of curriculum reform by extending involvement beyond the prerogative of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the National Institute of Compilation and Translations (NICT) by enticing interest from legislators, bureaucrats, and lobbyist groups.40

In place of Chinese nationalism, there has been a greater emphasis on the multicultural origins of Taiwan, the role of women, and the indigenous or aboriginal peoples and cultures.41 Furthermore, there has been emphasis on the extent to which the inhabitants of Taiwan are connected to and affected by global networks.42 Although Taiwanese nationalism may seem to be the popular ethos in post-reform Taiwan,43 some argue that the content of its character is much less about ethnic nationalism or the pursuit of independence than about civic nationalism or the pursuit of preserving the democratic and sovereign status quo.44 Despite the continuing scuffle between the major parties over national identity, there seems to be a common desire to develop a participatory civic culture based on indigenization/localization among the Taiwanese public.45 Teaching national identity as key to forging a collective and positive identity with the state in democratized Taiwan may be more complicated than before because of the perceived China threat, the ambiguous status of Taiwan’s statehood, and the encouragement of critical thinking in student learning.


41 Mao, “Fashioning Curriculum Reform as Identity Politics.”

42 Law, “Globalization and Citizenship Education in Hong Kong and Taiwan.”

43 The difference between ethnic and civic nationalism is expounded by Anthony Smith, “Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation,” in *Asian Nationalism*, ed. Michael Leifer (London: Taylor & Francis, 2000), 1-20. Whereas ethnic nationalism refers to an identity with a community based on myths of common descent where members possess a strong sense of native history, civic nationalism refers to an identity with a community in which members share territorial birth and residence, as well as territorial citizenship, but also are “integrated by a unified legal system and a mass, public culture.” See Smith, “Theories of Nationalism,” 16.


Findings from the 2009 ICCS Survey of Students

To what extent do students in democratized Taiwan believe in the basic values of democracy, diversity, equality for all, and democratic participation—or the concepts taught in the revised nine-year general curriculum? How much pride and respect do students have for their native homeland and how much trust do they place in political and social institutions? Finally, how do key components of democratic citizenship relate to each other? To answer these questions, the remainder of the essay presents some data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), organized by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).46 A total of 5,167 eighth-graders,47 or fourteen-year-olds, from 150 schools as well as 2,367 teachers and their school principals in Taiwan participated in this third, and to date, most comprehensive data gathering effort on civic and citizenship education.48 A total of thirty-eight countries or places were studied in the 2009 survey round.

The targeted cohort of student participants in the survey were fourteen-year-olds who experienced schooling only under democratization and the reformed curriculum aimed at cultivating democratic citizenship and the tripartite system of identity. Much of Taiwan’s attention to the 2009 ICCS findings has been on the achievement of civic knowledge—gauged by eighty items broken down into four content domains (40 percent on civic society and systems, 30 percent on civic principles, 20 percent on civic participation, and 10 percent on civic identities) and between two cognition domains (25 percent on knowledge and 75 percent on reasoning). The press celebrated the high ranking of Taiwan in terms of the students’ level of civic knowledge,49 which follows that of students from Finland, Denmark, and South Korea. Taiwanese students attained a mean civic knowledge score of 559, which is well above the ICCS or international mean of 500 and is slightly higher than Hong Kong’s mean score of 554, but lower than the South Korean mean of 565. Similar to most countries in the ICCS sample, female students had significantly higher scores than male students in Taiwan.

46 Both the ICCS 2009 International Report by Schulz et al. (Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 2010) and the raw survey data released by the IEA in 2011 were consulted for this report.
47 These typically are students in the second year of junior high or middle schools in the United States and some other countries. In the English system, they are students in year nine of education.
48 It would be ideal to have the trend data, but Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) did not participate in the previous two rounds of the project in 1971 and in 1999. Prof. Liu Meihui at National Taiwan Normal University was the project coordinator for the Taiwan portion of the 2009 data gathering initiative.
49 For an example, see the December 2011 special issue on Civic Education in Taiwan’s Commonwealth magazine.
To assess students’ learning outcomes in other dimensions of democratic citizenship, the essay examines students’ value beliefs and attitudes, as well as their civic engagement as reflected in the main portion of the international survey. The following discussion is broken down into seven topical areas covered in the main student survey. It is followed by an exploration of interitem correlations of these survey responses.

**Commitment to Basic Democratic Values**

Students were asked to indicate their levels of agreement (“strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree”) with eight statements about basic democratic values used in table 1a. Reflecting their strong commitment to basic democratic values, students in Taiwan nearly unanimously agreed (both strongly and moderately) with the statements about guaranteed rights to freedom of expression, free elections, and social and political rights for all. Over nine in ten participants also agreed with the statements that protests should never be violent and that government jobs should not go to family members of political leaders. Their degrees of agreement with the statements on the rights to protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q20. There are different views about what a society should be like. We are interested in your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyone should always have the right to express his or her opinions freely.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people should have their social and political rights respected.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political protest should never be violent.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders should not be allowed to give government jobs to their family members.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should always be free to criticize the government publicly.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No company or government should be allowed to own all newspapers in a country.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS), main student survey data from Taiwan.
unfair laws, to openly criticize government, and to oppose press monopoly are lower, but still at 83 percent, 73 percent, and 65 percent, respectively.

Focusing only on the percentages of respondents who “strongly agree,” we note that support among students in Taiwan is strongest for ensuring basic rights to freedom of expression and having social and political rights for all, for which about three in four respondents expressed strong support. About two in three students expressed strong support for free election of leaders, nonviolent protests, and antinepotism efforts in government employment. However, when it comes to exercising critical citizenship, no more than one-third would strongly support the right to protest unfair laws or to openly criticize the government. Also, only about one in four would strongly support a ban on press monopoly.

**Supporting Limits to Civil Liberties**

Table 1b shows degrees of support for governmental limitations on civil liberties in the name of national security. When national security is said to be threatened, as high as eight in ten students in Taiwan would support governmental control of the media; three in four would support monitoring private correspondence conducted electronically; and three in five would support holding suspected individuals in jail without trial. Nevertheless, even in the name of national security, only about one in three would strongly agree with the idea of allowing government to take control of the media. Fewer would strongly agree with the idea of allowing governmental surveillance of electronic communications. Only two in ten would strongly agree with the idea of jailing suspects without trial. Living under the shadow of China, students in Taiwan may be vulnerable to the perceived need to limit their civil liberties and rights in the name of national security concerns. However, their support for governmental control of the media in the name of national security may also reflect their lack of trust in the media as a civic institution (shown in table 4 below).
**Perceived Importance of Conventional and Social-Movement-Related Citizenship**

The ICCS includes survey items intended to distinguish between active (i.e., conventional and social-movement-related citizenship behavior) and passive (i.e., national identity, patriotism, and loyalty) elements of citizenship. Table 2a shows that, among the seven items gauging conventional citizenship behavior, students unanimously rated obeying law as (very or quite) important. To follow political news was rated by close to nine in ten students as important. Eight in ten believed it was important to learn a country’s history. Voting in every national election and respecting government representatives ranked fourth and fifth in perceived importance among students. Only a third thought it was very important to vote, while fewer than one-fourth thought it was very important to show proper respect for government representatives. Engaging in political discussions was thought very important by only 13 percent. However, joining a political party received the lowest rating of perceived importance, a finding that corresponds to the low trust in political parties reported in table 4.

Table 2a. Percentage Distribution of Perceived Importance of Conventional Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q21. How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Quite important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obeying laws</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV, or on the Internet</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about a country’s history</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting in every national election</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing respect for government representatives</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in political discussions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining a political party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS), main student survey data from Taiwan.

By comparison, significantly higher percentages of students in Taiwan considered it very or quite important to exercise social-movement-related citizenship (table 2b). To wit, about nine in ten Taiwanese students considered it important or very important to participate in activities to promote human rights, to protect the environment, and to benefit the local community. However, only two-thirds considered it (very or quite) important to participate in peaceful protests against unjust laws. This latter finding seems to reflect the students’ relatively weaker degree of support for the right to protest unfair laws, as reported in table 1a.
Support for Equal Rights for Women, Ethnic/Racial Groups, and Immigrants

Students were asked to express their degree of agreement with six statements about the roles of women and men in society. Nearly all registered (strong or moderate) agreement with the statements that men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government, be offered the same rights in every way, and receive equal pay when they are doing the same jobs. Not surprisingly, there was near unanimous opposition to such ideas as blocking women from politics, preferring men over women when there are not enough jobs available, or treating men as better qualified to be political leaders than women. These statistics help explain why students in Taiwan expressed the highest support for gender equality of all participating countries.

Students also were asked to indicate their levels of support for five statements regarding equal rights for ethnic and racial groups. As in the case of the near consensus support for gender equality, practically all respondents indicated support for giving equal rights to all ethnic/racial groups to access good education, good jobs, and be accorded the same rights and responsibilities. In addition, there was near unanimous support for demanding the teaching of respect for all ethnic/racial groups. However, support for encouraging ethnic/racial minorities to run for electoral office is weaker, but still at a respectable rate of 83 percent.

Students’ attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for immigrants were assessed using a battery of five questions. Again, there was near unanimous support for giving immigrant children the same opportunities for education and the same rights as everyone else in the country. Over nine in ten students (94 percent) supported giving immigrants the opportunity to continue speaking their own language. About nine in ten students supported giving immigrants the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle (91 percent) and to vote in elections once living in a country for several years (92 percent).

Table 2b. Percentage Distribution of Perceived Importance of Good Citizenship Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q21. How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Quite important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking part in activities promoting human rights</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking part in activities to protect the environment</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in activities to benefit people in &lt;name of local community&gt;</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for Equal Rights for Women, Ethnic/Racial Groups, and Immigrants

Students were asked to express their degree of agreement with six statements about the roles of women and men in society. Nearly all registered (strong or moderate) agreement with the statements that men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government, be offered the same rights in every way, and receive equal pay when they are doing the same jobs. Not surprisingly, there was near unanimous opposition to such ideas as blocking women from politics, preferring men over women when there are not enough jobs available, or treating men as better qualified to be political leaders than women. These statistics help explain why students in Taiwan expressed the highest support for gender equality of all participating countries.

Students also were asked to indicate their levels of support for five statements regarding equal rights for ethnic and racial groups. As in the case of the near consensus support for gender equality, practically all respondents indicated support for giving equal rights to all ethnic/racial groups to access good education, good jobs, and be accorded the same rights and responsibilities. In addition, there was near unanimous support for demanding the teaching of respect for all ethnic/racial groups. However, support for encouraging ethnic/racial minorities to run for electoral office is weaker, but still at a respectable rate of 83 percent.

Students’ attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for immigrants were assessed using a battery of five questions. Again, there was near unanimous support for giving immigrant children the same opportunities for education and the same rights as everyone else in the country. Over nine in ten students (94 percent) supported giving immigrants the opportunity to continue speaking their own language. About nine in ten students supported giving immigrants the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle (91 percent) and to vote in elections once living in a country for several years (92 percent).
Affective Attitudes toward Own Country

The ICCS student questionnaire includes a set of seven statements on national identity. In table 3, around eight in ten students agreed (strongly or moderately) with the statements that the national flag is considered personally important and that people in Taiwan should be proud of what they have achieved. Three-quarters agreed that they are proud to live in Taiwan and, generally speaking, that Taiwan is a better place in which to live than most other places. Seven in ten agreed with the statements, “Taiwan shows a lot of respect for the environment,” and, “I have a great respect for Taiwan.” However, less than half (45 percent) of Taiwanese students agreed that “Taiwan’s political system works well.”

Compared to the international averages reported in Schulz et al.,\textsuperscript{50} students in Taiwan scored significantly lower in their affective attitudes toward the island state, especially regarding its political system. In their responses to the Asian regional portion of the ICCS survey,\textsuperscript{51} as high as seven in ten students in Taiwan believed that the government intervened in the decision-making process of others, and only one in three believed that there was no corruption in the political system. One would think that the trials and charges of corruption, involving the embezzlement, bribery, and money laundering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q28. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Taiwan?</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The flag of Taiwan is important to me.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Taiwan, we should be proud of what we have achieved.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to live in Taiwan.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, Taiwan is a better country to live in than most other countries.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan shows a lot of respect for the environment.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have great respect for Taiwan.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political system in Taiwan works well.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS), main student survey data from Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{50} Schulz et al., \textit{ICCS 2009 International Report}.

of US$15 million in funds by former President Chen Sui-bian immediately before and during the time of the 2009 survey, probably influenced student responses toward the questions. However, one cannot rule out the possible significance of other elements in the political environment, such as Taiwan’s ambiguous international standing, the lingering tension between liberalism and (ethnic) nationalism, and the dilemma between being Chinese and Taiwanese in identity politics.

**Trust in Institutions**
The relatively weak sense of national identity among students in Taiwan may also have something to do with their fragile sense of institutional trust. Table 4 shows that, when asked to indicate their degree of trust in a number of social and political institutions, about seven in ten students indicated that they could trust (completely or a lot) Taiwan’s courts of justice. This is followed, in descending order, by students’ trust in the police, armed forces, national parliament, local government, the media, and political parties. Only one in four students in Taiwan indicated that he or she would trust (completely or a lot) political parties and only 3 percent said they could trust them completely. In fact, when studying the response patterns of those students who indicated that they could completely trust the institutions listed in the table, the highest percentage was only 17 percent (for courts of justice), while most institutions received only single-digit scores.

Similar to the case of patriotic attitudes, Taiwanese students’ levels of trust in the national and local governments, political parties, the mass media, and the armed forces were all well below the international averages. Scholars have observed that low levels of trust in political institutions are typical in societies that recently have undergone political transitions. This seems to partly explain the dismal levels of student trust in the national government, media, and major political parties in Taiwan, even though the idiosyncratic political history and socio-political context of the island state could be key, too.

**Degrees and Types of Civic Engagement**
Last but not least, from a comparative perspective, we examine student responses to a battery of questions on civic engagement, which is defined by the ICCS as students’ attitudes, behaviors, and behavioral intentions related to general civic participation as well as manifest political participation. They fall into the dimensions of students’ self-beliefs, engagement in communication about political and social issues, participation in civic activities outside school,

---

participation in civic activities in school, and prospective political participation as adults. A quick look into the summary numbers reported in Schulz et al. suggests a below-average level of engagement by students in Taiwan in almost all categories, with the few bright spots found in their levels of participation in certain elements of school democracy and their expected future participation in the electoral arena.53

Specifically, in contrast to their high ranking in civic knowledge, students in Taiwan scored below the international averages in terms of their interest in political and social issues, level of internal political efficacy, which refers to the beliefs that individuals have about their capacity to become politically involved, and levels of engagement in communication about political and social issues.54 Students’ civic engagement or activities outside school were measured by their reported membership or involvement in organizations or community groups. The scores of Taiwanese students also were low on their reported participation in youth organizations affiliated with a political party, union, or cultural organizations based on ethnicity. They were below the international mean as well in their levels of participation in environmental and human rights organizations, voluntary groups doing something to help the community, organizations collecting money for a social cause, and youth campaigns for an issue.

53 Schulz et al., ICCS 2009 International Report.
54 The seven items in the survey that are used to construct this index include discussing a newspaper article about a conflict between countries; following a television debate about a controversial issue; writing a letter to a newspaper to express one’s view on a current issue; arguing one’s point of view about a controversial political or social issue; campaigning in a school election; speaking in front of a class about a social or political issue; and organizing a group of students to achieve change at school.
Taiwanese students’ self-reported levels of participation in a variety of activities in the past (either within the last twelve months or before) at school were mixed. They were below the international averages in their frequency of voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities other than regular lessons, voting for class representative or school parliament, and becoming a candidate for class representative or school parliament. Their score in reported participation actively in a debate was substantially lower than the international average. However, they were above the international mean in the frequency of taking part in decision making on running the school. And, they were substantially above the international mean in the frequency of taking part in discussions during a student assembly.

Finally, when students were asked about their expected participation as adults in legal protests, Taiwanese students again scored below the international mean. The score was lower regarding illegal protests. However, their reported expected participation in elections as adults was above the international average.

Exploring Interitem Correlations
Civic knowledge, civic attitudes and beliefs, and civic participation are key domains of democratic citizenship. Will higher levels of civic knowledge correspond with higher scores in democratic attitudes and participation among fourteen-year-olds in Taiwan? Preliminary correlation analysis using the score scale constructed by the ICCS from a battery of items related to each of the selected questions reported above suggests a tentative yes. The demonstrated high civic knowledge of junior-high students in Taiwan is found to be positively associated with their strong support for equality for women, immigrants, and all ethnic groups, their support for democratic values, their perceived importance of exercising both conventional and movement citizenship, and their great levels of interest and participation in school-based activities and prospective electoral participation in adulthood. However, the students’ level of civic knowledge is not related to their level of institutional trust. Moreover, the students’ level of civic knowledge is negatively related to their attitudes toward their home country, which are found to be associated with the sense of trust in civic institutions. Thus, Taiwanese students’ low overall level of institutional trust may explain their relatively low level of national pride and vice versa. Further, the students’ level of trust in civic institutions is found to be positively associated with their attributing greater value to exercising conventional and social-movement-related citizenship and with their high level of support for equality for all three types of minority groups—women, immigrants, and people of ethnic diversity. Whereas there is no relationship between trust in civic institutions and holding democratic values, holding higher democratic values may contribute to raising the sense of pride in and regard for one’s native homeland. Yet, the strength of the relationship is not as strong as the relationship between supporting democratic values and supporting equality for
minorities and exercising citizenship, conventional or not. Last but not least, a preliminary analysis of findings on students’ civic engagement suggests that greater self-efficacy, interest in politics, and greater interest in future/adult political participation—both electoral and nonelectoral—may all help increase the levels of institutional trust and affective attitudes for one’s own country/native homeland. Conversely, the weaker showing in national identity and political trust among junior-high students in Taiwan may contribute to their relatively low level of civic participation. In a nutshell, many of the relationships are interdependent, and earlier sections of the essay also attribute what happened in real politics as an important source of influence on the teaching and learning of civic attitudes and beliefs in Taiwan.

Summary and Conclusion

This research provides a longitudinal review of the shifting patterns of civic and citizenship education in Taiwan. As part of the third wave of global democratization, Taiwan has experienced sweeping social and political changes over the last three decades or so—moving from a Sino-centric authoritarian state to an indigenized, multicultural, democratic state on its way to consolidating the fruits of democracy. Because civic values and citizenship cannot be studied in a vacuum, the essay has examined changes in Taiwan’s history and the socio-political context of education surrounding several milestones, such as the Japanese colonization, the KMT’s authoritarian rule, as well as political liberalization and democratization. How have these socio-political changes affected the teaching and learning of civic and citizenship education over time? The development of citizenship education in Taiwan corresponds with changing identity politics, and the pace and direction of Taiwan’s educational reform, including reform of civic education, is tied to the process of democratization and developments in movement politics.

During Japanese rule, education in Taiwan served the campaign of Niponization. In the authoritarian era under the Kuomintang, a core mission of education was nation building under the ideology of Chinese nationalism. When nationalistic education was replaced by democratic education in a politically liberalized and democratized homeland, the teaching of national identity was complicated by the tripartite needs and desires for de-Sinification, localization/indigenization, and globalization, as well as by the challenge of decolonization from multiple sources of identity and influence of the past. Although Taiwanese nationalism seems to be the popular ethos in post-reform Taiwan, the issue of teaching national identity as key to forging a collective identity in democratic Taiwan may also be more challenging than in previous times. An appraisal of changes made in Taiwan’s civic and citizenship education toward the cultivation and fulfillment of democratic citizenship must take the changed political climate and ambivalent sense of national identity into account.

To what extent do students in democratized Taiwan know and believe
in the basic values of democracy, democratic participation, diversity, and equality for all—or the concepts promoted in the revised nine-year general curriculum in effect since 2001? Taking advantage of a snapshot of student responses to a large-scale international survey on civic and citizenship education conducted in 2009, the essay provides an empirical assessment of learning outcomes toward the development of critical democratic citizenship among eighth-graders in Taiwan. A review of aggregate-level findings reveals a mixed answer to the opening question. Students in Taiwan compared very favorably to their counterparts in thirty-seven countries in terms of their level of civic knowledge. They also did very well in expressing support for equal rights for women, ethnic/racial groups, and immigrants. In addition, their scores for recognizing the importance of exercising good citizenship in both conventional and movement-related citizenship were statistically higher than the international average. However, Taiwan’s students were vulnerable in their commitment to defending civil liberties in the name of national security and were not as keen in openly criticizing government, protesting unjust laws, and participating in a variety of civic and political activities. In addition, they were relatively weak in their affective attitudes toward Taiwan as a native homeland and in their level of trust in their country’s social and political institutions.

Preliminary correlation analysis of the 2009 ICCS student survey data suggests that higher scores in civic knowledge may contribute to higher levels of support for democratic attitudes, the perceived importance of exercising good citizenship, and attitudes toward civic engagement among fourteen-year-old students in Taiwan. On the other hand, higher levels of civic knowledge are also associated with lower levels of identification with one’s own country and may not help mend the trust gaps regarding social and political institutions. An implication from the student survey findings is that weakness in these attitude domains may suppress the development of political interest, self-efficacy, and civic participation among future citizens and jeopardize progress made in the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan. However, the findings may also reflect a common phenomenon in new democracies in which strong democratic orientations are associated with critical attitudes toward government. The seemingly paradoxical findings also echo adult surveys in which factors that explain support for a democratic system (regime legitimacy) are found to be different from those that explain support for a particular administration (government legitimacy).55 Future research will need to provide multivariate tests to tease out the independent roles of civic knowledge, values, and skills to

explain the observed low political trust and national identity among Taiwan’s students. Comparison data on the evolution of citizenship education in Hong Kong and South Korea within the same timeframe should be gathered in the next research stage to help understand the role of the state and society in structuring the teaching and learning of citizenship education in East Asia.