Book Review Essay on Three Volumes:

John Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 255 pages; and

**Democracy in the Age of Negativity, Abundance, and Hybridity**

*Jonathan Sullivan*

Twenty years ago, at the outset of the Internet revolution, much academic literature on the state of media and politics in advanced Western democracies was preoccupied with various forms of negativity. This was especially true of studies on the United States, which frequently framed the state of media and politics in crisis terms, with central elements of the democratic process apparently on the brink of failure. Typical narratives described how the mass media had followed the dictates of commercialism in dumbing down their political coverage and fixating over strategy and human interest storylines. The media’s obsession with the “horse race” features of political competition had become so entrenched that they were unable or unwilling to distinguish between routine governance and upcoming, often far off, elections.1 Politicians were equally culpable, their campaigns having become excessively long and divisive, with candidates trying to out-spend each other in a race to sling the most mud.2 The underlying logics of media coverage and the imperative of political point-scoring under the tyranny of public opinion were such that politicians were said to be “permanently” in campaign mode. No wonder large numbers of citizens lost interest in politics and allowed themselves to become enmeshed in entertainment. Preparing to choose a representative was too

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troublesome—and large segments of the American electorate failed to turn out
to vote.\(^3\) The disjuncture between democratic ideals and realities described by
a generation of political scientists and communication scholars had become, by
the 1990s, a “disquieting gulf.”\(^4\) Since then, the media ecologies in advanced
democracies (and many nondemocracies) have undergone revolutionary
changes. Near universal mobile device ownership and access to the Internet
has had a radical effect on modes of political communication. But have these
changes in the information and communications environment exacerbated or
reduced the “disquieting gulf”?

**Negativity**

A cursory glance at contemporary academic work suggests that, in the
digital era, media coverage of politics is superficial, obsessed with image,
laissez-faire and worse with “the facts,” exaggerated, misleading, and guilty
of “churnalism” and pseudo-news that adds nothing of substance to the
information environment.\(^5\) A glut of media content means that our daily
lives are constantly disrupted by the flow of mediated events to the point
where “the adversarial and ‘gotcha’ styles of commercial journalism” make
the world seem more threatening and duplicitous than it really is, reducing
public trust and darkening the public mood.\(^6\) Reflecting on contemporary
media practices, Keane describes how journalism “loves titillation, draws
upon unattributed sources, fills news holes, spins sensations and concentrates
too much on personalities.”\(^7\) Keane doesn’t, but many critiques of prevailing
media conditions, in academic and popular narratives, invoke nostalgia for a
more innocent time, usually the early era of mass broadcasting. They despair
at trends in the news media that began in the 1970s and 1980s when high
demand for content from the new twenty-four-hour news channels and the
dominance of “strategic” and “conflict” frames post-Watergate drove media
practices.\(^8\) Forgetting earlier iterations of media negativity and sensationalism

\(^3\) Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960); Edward Carmines and James Stimson, *Issue
Keeter, *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters* (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1996); and Ruy A. Teixeira, *The Disappearing American Voter* (Washington,

\(^4\) Michael Franz, Paul Freedman, Ken Goldstein, and Travis Ridout, *Campaign Advertising and

2012), and Nick Davies, *Flat Earth News: An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood,

\(^6\) Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence*, 41.

\(^7\) Ibid., 103.

(the terms muckraking and yellow journalism were invented to describe the New York publications of Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst at the turn of the twentieth century), structural accounts of the evolution of the media environment in the United States typically run as follows. Technological advances lowered production costs as levels of disposable income increased, leading to the near universal affordability of TV sets by the late 1960s. Increasing demand led to an exponential increase in cable/satellite penetration and concomitant expansion of commercial channels. Fragmentation of the national TV market exposed broadcasters to intense market competition, with literally hundreds of channels, including nascent twenty-four-hour news channels, competing for ratings and advertising revenue. As a result of these commercial pressures, TV moved away from issue-oriented “hard news” and analysis in favor of “infotainment” and “soft news” formats with greater mass appeal. By compelling broadcasters to present trivialized, personalized, and decontextualized coverage marked by the dominance of action over process and visualization over abstraction, Curran writes that the market undermined intelligent and rational debate. Similarly, Patterson argued that market competition created a situation in which “the chief goal of the media is not to foster a free marketplace of ideas, but to attract and hold a large audience for advertisers.” Rather than constituting a civic forum encouraging pluralistic debate, public learning, and participation in politics (as many have suggested the media should), scholars found the opposite. By the early 1990s, Patterson already was arguing that the progressively blurred distinction between news and entertainment had significantly diminished citizens’ ability to distinguish “reality” from “performance.” By the end of the decade, Gunther and Mugham concluded that the news media’s emphasis on the “horserace” (who’s ahead? who’s behind?) forced voters to “make choices on the basis of criteria that are unrelated to the real business of government.”

Alongside this structural account, a corollary cultural explanation for media evolution focused on the repercussions of the Vietnam War and protests as well as fallout from the Watergate scandal. These events marked the apotheosis of the media as “watchdog” and precipitated a fundamental form of

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13 Patterson, *Out of Order*.

“adversarial journalism” and the “anti-politics” orientation of the press.\textsuperscript{15} Post-Watergate news coverage is noted for the increasing dominance of conflictive and strategic frames in which politics, in general, not just electoral politics, is interpreted as a game in which politicians vie for power. In this strategic schema,\textsuperscript{16} winning and losing is the central concern, depicted with the language of war, metaphors from sports, and preoccupation with opinion polls. Politics becomes a story with its own performers, critics, and an audience who will decide on the respective merits of the candidates’ narratives with their votes. The images, styles, and perceptions of the candidates often render their stands or records on “the issues” irrelevant.

Social scientists, and indeed journalists, have long warned about developments in the media and the negative effects they may have at the mass level.\textsuperscript{17} Concerns have been particularly resonant when it comes to potential exposure effects on voters. In one early study, Lang and Lang found that watching TV news led to voter cynicism as a result of over-emphasis on political conflict.\textsuperscript{18} Robinson, who coined the term “video malaise,” found similar feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration among voters exposed to TV coverage of politics.\textsuperscript{19} More recently, scholars found that “media attention to scandal leads to public belief that politicians are corrupt.”\textsuperscript{20} Many researchers in the 1990s appeared to share the worry that “the conflict-driven sound-bite oriented discourse of politicians and conflict-saturated strategy-oriented structure of media coverage” combined to create a “mutually reinforcing spiral of cynicism.”\textsuperscript{21}

Among other things, the changing nature of media coverage created the impression that election campaigns (and by extension, all politics) had become progressively negative. In fact, what happened, starting with the 1988 presidential campaign between George Bush Sr. and Michael Dukakis, was a significant increase in media attention to the negative aspects of political

\begin{itemize}
  \item[15] Norris, \textit{A Virtuous Circle}.
  \item[16] See, for instance, Jamieson, \textit{Dirty Politics}.
\end{itemize}
competition. In other words, negativity itself became news.\(^{22}\) The supposed degeneration of standards after 1988 was therefore an illusion, albeit a powerful and entrenched one that, to a certain extent, became the conventional wisdom. Here, as elsewhere, the media’s power in “culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people every day” distorted reality.\(^{23}\) Another prevalent example of this is how TV news’ “problem frame” that highlights distress and suffering leads to erroneous impressions among viewers about real-world levels of danger and violence.\(^{24}\) Soroka’s analysis of crime news coverage compared to actual crime rates in the United States shows this negativity bias at work—crime stories are more frequently reported than the crime rate would warrant, with a tendency to exaggerate the frequency of violent crime, and to give more space in accordance with the degree of violence.\(^{25}\) Soroka found a similar dynamic in coverage of the economy in American, British, and Canadian newspapers: overall, one mildly negative piece of economic news resulted in an average of two news stories based on it. By contrast, an average of two pieces of positive information would have to emerge to produce one story.\(^{26}\) To probe the ingrained idea that “bad news sells,” Soroka then coded the front covers of Maclean’s, Canada’s leading news weekly, and compared them to sales data, controlling for the focus of the story and a number of other variables. Issues with negative front covers sold more copies by a very substantial margin.

Seeking an explanation for media negativity, Soroka goes beyond structural and cultural accounts. He argues that the media, as an institution designed by humans for human consumption, reflect an innate, evolutionary human tendency toward negativity. Negativity is a hardwired part of the human experience and the media’s predilection for negativity reflects the inherent bias of journalists, editors, and audiences. People have evolved to focus on negative information (danger signs, for instance) because it increases their chances of survival. Much of the first part of *Negativity in Democratic Politics* marshals findings across many diverse disciplines to show how central, and “normal,” negativity is to the human experience. The consensus in the vast psychology literature on the topic is that negative information, events, and assessments have more substantial effects on peoples’ behavior than positive information. Human judgments privilege negative commentary,


\(^{25}\) Soroka, *Negativity in Democratic Politics*.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 91.
while work on information processing shows that greater cognitive energy is expended on negative experiences, which we are also more likely to remember (to the extent that fearful events triggering danger signs can leave indelible memories). Research on neurological processes shows that negative stimuli generate greater responses, which are mirrored in physiological reactions such as “fight or flight” reactions to negative events. In sum, “the inside of the body is basically a source of evaluative negative input.”

Research in the social sciences shows some of the practical consequences for human behavior. In microeconomics, prospect theory provides a convincing explanation for the many empirical manifestations of loss aversion, the phenomenon which leads people to care more about a loss in utility than to care about an equal gain in utility. In political science, the vast literature on negative campaigning has shown that people are more likely to remember negative advertisements. Whether negative ads “work” in the way that their sponsors intend is hard to say, but there is convincing evidence that “negative campaign ads are more likely to stimulate and inform.” The attention-grabbing power of negative ads, to take one example, is a function of the relative scarcity of negative information. In our daily lives, we are exposed to vast amounts of information, most of which does not concern politics and most of which is relatively positive. Thus, when we encounter political or other news in all its negativity, it strikes us more forcefully. Again, Soroka finds an answer in our genes: “Evolution favours animals that exhibit a combination of mildly optimistic and loss-averse behaviours. You have to be willing to try new food sources [but] if your friend gets eaten while you are there, you need to be the animal that never goes back.” As in frequency-weight theories and loss aversion in economics, expectations play a key role: we give greater weight to information that goes against our expectations. For instance, negative changes in the economy matter less when the economy is already performing badly. More formally, “the negativity bias is reduced when the information environment becomes predominantly negative [which] helps explain why we are not endlessly negative—at some point, when things are particularly bad, we start focusing on the positive.” Negativity in American media and


31 Soroka, _Negativity in Democratic Politics_, 9.

32 Ibid., 51.
politics, as Riker’s account of the debate to ratify the American Constitution demonstrates, long precedes Watergate and Cable TV.\(^{33}\) Soroka’s convincing alternative to structural and cultural explanations of negativity suggests that is exactly as it should be.

**Hybridity**

Digital communications have had a radical and disruptive effect on all aspects of media production and consumption, including, of course, political communications. In the space of a decade or so, terms such as virtual reality, multimedia, saturation, digital natives, quick time, space shrinking, going viral, and so on, have become part of the lexicon as static, desk-based computing via a fixed Internet connection has given way to mobile computing. Advanced economies, and some emerging economies such as China that moved directly to mobile computing, have witnessed the extraordinarily rapid penetration and adoption of smart phones and Wi-Fi. The speed and scale with which people have accepted using their phones to consume and create all manner of digital communications and digital media are remarkable. With the popularization of Wi-Fi and handheld devices, “print,” “broadcast,” and digital media are now available anywhere at any time. It has given rise to “a new world system of overlapping and interlinked media devices” that is characterized by “spectrum abundance, fragmented narrowcasting and less predictable ‘long tail’ audiences.”\(^ {34}\) Ubiquitous connectivity has created the conditions for what Keane calls “communicative abundance,” which he defines as the high intensity use of multimedia in people’s daily lives, enabling “messages to be sent and received through multiple user points, in chosen time, either real or delayed, within modularised and ultimately global networks.”\(^ {35}\) Accordingly, the “tyranny of distance and slow time is abolished [replaced by] non-stop acts of mediated quick time communication with others.”\(^ {36}\) Not only are people “awash in vast oceans of circulating information,”\(^ {37}\) as broadcasters become more adept at offering “customizable, personally tailored modes of consumption and interaction,”\(^ {38}\) but also they are awash in very discrete types of information that foster echo chambers and the balkanization of the Internet. Prior suggests that abundance of choice may have another unintended negative effect on the electorate.\(^ {39}\) He argues that inadvertent exposure to television news during the


\(^{35}\) Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence*, 2.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 32.

\(^{38}\) Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*, 42.

broadcast era prior to the emergence of cable TV, when viewers could watch only what was broadcast on the terrestrial networks, had a powerful effect on turnout and political moderation. In the “low choice” environment, selection of preferred content was inefficient, exposing “switchers” (i.e., viewers who favored entertainment to news, but preferred any genre to turning the TV off) to political information. A lack of alternative options forced “switchers” to watch the evening news because there was literally nothing else on. Learning from this accidental exposure often made the difference between the less engaged going to the polls or not. The contemporary, ultra-high-choice media environment allows everyone to efficiently access whatever they like without ever having accidental exposure to political information.40 Prior’s convincing claim that inadvertent exposure to political information has receded in the high-choice information age is outweighed by more widespread concerns about the effects of information overload. As Ansolabehere and Iyengar reported in the mid-1990s, information overload among less sophisticated citizens leads them to “tune politics out.”41 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse have similarly found that “the last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making,”42 which is particularly true of low sophisticates.43 In need of heuristics to help cut through the mass of information produced by communicative abundance, Soroka suggests that our natural negativity bias may actually be our most effective tool.44

For media and political actors, the past decade has been a time of proliferating “disruptive” digital communications, “a chaotic transition period” in which “complex and multifaceted forces [are] reshaping the political communication environments of the western democracies.”45 In the beginning, their responses were scrambling and ad hoc, presenting openings to nontraditional actors, such as bloggers, for instance. But over time, older power dynamics have adapted and traditional power holders have regrouped and reasserted themselves under the new conditions of “communicative abundance” and “media hybridity.” In its simplest guise, media hybridity refers to the way in which “the high density

40 Preliminary research on Twitter suggests that Prior’s argument may not always hold. For instance, analysis of live tweeting around the BBC TV current affairs talk show Question Time identified “centripetal dynamics that pull disparate and often distanced individuals into a mainstream political event.” See Nick Anstead and Ben O’Loughlin, “The Emerging Viewertariat and BBC Question Time: Television Debate and Real-time Commenting Online,” International Journal of Press/Politics 16, no. 4 (2011): 457.
44 Soroka, Negativity in Democratic Politics, 121.
45 Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, 3-4.
of daily communication is reinforced by the tendency of each formerly separate medium to merge with others, to become “hybrid” media.” Chadwick goes much further, showing how the roles and effects of newer and older forms of media in politics (note the use of relative adjectives) have given way to entire media systems that, in the United States and United Kingdom at least, are best characterized as hybrid.

Chadwick is an advocate of a broad definition of media to counteract the bifurcation of the field into scholars of “traditional media” (who tend to discount the digital) and scholars of “digital media” (who are Internet-centric and tied up in utopian/realist debates) in a world where the key to understanding the media-politics ecology is the interrelationship between older and newer media. Chadwick argues that instead of a singular “media logic” we need to think in terms of hybrid media logics in the plural. The media logic concept was developed by Altheide and Snow as a way of identifying how “the assumptions, norms and visible artefacts of media, such as templates, formats, genres, narratives and tropes have come to penetrate other areas of social, economic, cultural and political life.” Over time, media logic shapes the practices of those in other (Bourdieuian) “fields,” and the borders between fields are broken down. For instance, media coverage of sports, terrorism, and war has shaped how actors in these fields behave. In politics, the merging of news and entertainment into the “infotainment” formats that dominate news programming internationally is one example. More fundamentally, “the discrete interactions between media elites, political elites and publics create shared understandings and expectations about what constitutes publically valued information and communication,” to the extent that actors who seek to influence public discourse “must adapt their communication strategies to fit the dominant formats required by the media.”

For Chadwick, the hybrid media system is constituted by complex and ever-evolving interactions among older and newer media logics (incorporating technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms) characterized by adaptation, interdependence, and simultaneous concentrations and diffusion of power. In practice, hybridity minimizes or disguises dichotomies between professional and amateur and traditional and digital media, and is characterized by complexity, interdependence, transition, heterogeneity, flux, liminality, and

46 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 14.
49 See, for instance, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media (London: Polity, 2010).
51 Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, 19.
the “blending, meshing, overlapping and coevolution of media and politics.”

It is symbolized by the culture of hacking and the mash-up. It is easy to see the fearful challenge that this presented to political actors. Soroka, for instance, notes how politicians’ “words are chopped up and reshuffled to produce a narrative determined not by the source but by the journalist.”

The trend that Hallin reported in the early 1990s—the declining average length of politician sound-bites on network news from 43 seconds in 1968 to 9 seconds in 1988—has continued, so that the words of politicians no longer dominate news stories as they once did.

One arena in which politicians have fought back against loss of control is in their election campaigns. As Chadwick demonstrates through a careful and detailed analysis of Barack Obama’s campaign for President of the United States in 2008, successful campaigns now deliberately incorporate tools associated with both the older broadcast era and the current hybrid age.

It is worth citing at length Chadwick’s summation of the landmark Obama campaign, which

...the campaign clearly saw the internet as a tool for mobilization and the coordination of face to face activity such as canvassing and voter registration and mobilization. But the internet was not understood as a means of replacing TV and newspapers. ... [and] the internet campaign would be tightly managed to ensure that it was fully integrated with the other divisions. Online interactivity, while encouraged, would, as much as possible, be on the campaign’s own terms and harnessed in a way that fitted with this hybrid campaigning model. Obama’s campaign was a calibrated and controlled response to long-term trends in the fragmentation of mediated politics. And yet 2008 also revealed the continuing importance of physical gatherings and big TV events. The theatrical, the grandiose, and the televisual endure in importance. Televised debates, ads, newspaper interviews, web videos and high profile TV appearances increasingly meshed together to create new campaign dynamics.

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52 Ibid., 4.
53 Soroka, Negativity in Democratic Politics, 75.
56 Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, 136.
The effects of the hybrid media system have been felt in many spheres, not just in election campaigns, and not just in the United States. Consider, for instance, WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, Occupy Wall Street activists, and the democracy supporters in Egypt watching themselves on big screens, hoping that the media coverage being beamed around the world would save them from the repercussions of their demonstrations. Consider how the “Occupy [Wall Street] activists hybridized real-space physical presence, with their own instantaneous social media resources and publishing channels—flows of information that they knew would be monitored and reassembled by professional journalists eager to create authentic representations of their protest camps.”\(^57\) Activists have learned and adopted practices from broadcast media to exploit the porous boundaries in the hybrid media system, but the same kind of adaptation works the other way, too. Consider FOX News host Glenn Beck’s rally in Washington, D. C. to “restore honor,” later emulated by Daily Show host Jon Stewart and (at the time) The Colbert Report host Stephen Colbert’s “rally to restore sanity and/or fear.” Both events attracted tens of thousands of participants by issuing appeals on their TV shows and online. As Chadwick notes, “the nature of mediated politics is evolving rapidly and is being pushed and pulled in multiple directions by multiple actors: Some of these forces are contradictory, some are integrative, all are generative of systemic hybridity.”\(^58\)

Communicative abundance and media hybridity have broken down the traditional barriers between the media and other spheres of life. As Keane describes it, “from the most intimate everyday milieux through to large scale global organizations [all] operate within heavily mediated settings in which the meaning of messages is constantly changing and often at odds with the intentions of their creators.”\(^59\) The same goes for the media, now that the horizontal interactions of social media mean that “some big political news stories now break first online and are picked up by TV and print journalists who obsessively follow their email, Twitter, Facebook and blog feeds in the hunt for new leads.”\(^60\) And while the effects of cost-cutting measures prompted by the decimation of traditional media business models has undermined their authority, a new class of independent creators emerged—political commentators like the blogger Paul Staines (penname Guido Fawkes) who “regularly produce articles that are indistinguishable from those published in the op-ed sections of newspapers.”\(^61\) Again, boundaries are blurred and evolving, and, after an uncomfortable period of adjustment, older power dynamics have reasserted themselves. In the United States, successful political bloggers have been hired

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\(^{57}\) Ibid., 55. Similar tactics were used by students in Taiwan’s Sunflower movement and Hong Kong’s Occupy Central.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 59.

\(^{59}\) Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 23.

\(^{60}\) Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, 44.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 47.
by campaigns, interest groups, government agencies, and traditional media. In short, “they have been appropriated by all elite sectors of public communication in the US, from politicians and agency officials to professional journalists to TV and radio presenters.”62 In the United Kingdom, too, bloggers such as Staines have been incorporated into the “reserved domains of power” of the older news media, which “remain deeply embedded in the routines and insider networks of Westminster, Whitehall and the major metropolitan centres.”63 Despite the supposed democratization of information, where everyone has the potential to create and disseminate content, it is “newspaper journalists working in well-equipped and well-connected newsrooms [who] remain the content engines of talkback radio, TV news shows and blogs and tweets.”64 Established media organizations have the experience as well as the human and capital resources to out-perform newer media in terms of editorial authority, sophisticated delivery platforms, and participatory Web environments. It was “traditional” print media that broke the Snowden leak.65 Julian Assange’s decision to bypass traditional media and dump WikiLeaks material en masse online meant that “the cables have never had the dedicated attention they deserve. They made a splash and then were left languishing.”66

Negativity, Abundance, and Democracy

Information is a necessary commodity for representative democracy to function effectively.67 If elections are understood as the means by which the “will of the people” is expressed through the selection of candidates or parties that best represents the majority, or plurality, of voters’ interests,68 then the role of voters is to choose the party or candidate that best represents their interests. For this to be possible, voters must have some awareness of their own preferences and sufficient relevant knowledge of the contending candidates.69 If citizens in a democracy should be enabled and encouraged to communicate their preferences in favor of particular policies or to reward or sanction incumbents for their performance, it follows that sufficient relevant information should

62 Ibid., 54.
63 Ibid., 48.
64 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 7.
be made available to them. In short, “in an ideal representative democracy plentiful and reliable political information should be readily available to allow citizens to make informed political decisions.” The acknowledgement that “information matters” has prompted several political scientists to argue that even unseemly elements of current political competition, such as negative campaigning, may have a constructive role. Indeed, Soroka suggests that “focusing on negative information may be a perfectly reasonable means for citizens to monitor their environment, and particularly their governments.”

Not only is negative information useful heuristically in an increasingly crowded information environment, but also it is consistent with the human predilection for negativity and the way in which a wide range of cultural and social institutions have been designed to privilege negative information. Consider, for instance, the checks and balances built into most democratic systems. As Soroka observes, “representative democracy has been to a large extent about giving power to govern to one group and then surrounding that group with as many checks and balances as are necessary to minimize error.” The consequence of this emblematically human institutional design is that political information is predominantly negative: only the government of the day actually produces positive information, while all other actors are obliged (and incentivized) to produce negative information. The end result of “the need for constant error monitoring [is] that everyday politics is rather negative.”

The media are negative because they were designed to fill this role. Negativity “reflects one of their principal institutional functions in a democracy: holding current governments accountable.”

For Keane, communicative abundance generated by the democratization of information, the cheap methods of digital reproduction, and the increase in the number of people with the gadgets they need to access open information banks promised to have a fundamental effect on the extent to which citizens can monitor governments. Indeed, in the early phase of the era of communicative abundance, “politicians [were] sitting ducks.” But of course, companies and government have fought back, often in cahoots with older, established media. As Chadwick observes, “The practices of [older] media and political actors become so interpenetrated and the alliances between them so strong that the disruptions caused by the emergence of newer media affect the status and power of both media and political elites.” Both have the incentive to

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70 Gunther and Mugham, Democracy and the Media, 421.
71 For a review, see Franz et al., Campaign Advertising and American Democracy.
72 Soroka, Negativity in Democratic Politics, 1.
73 Ibid., 30-31.
74 Ibid., 31.
75 Ibid., 21.
76 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 43.
adapt together to the new conditions, by slowly colonizing cyberspace and by continuing to manipulate and control public opinion through the media. Yet, Keane argues that something much more fundamental is happening to our democracies: “an historic sea change, one that it taking us away from the assembly-based and representative models of democracy of past times towards a form of democracy with entirely different contours and dynamics.” In previous work, he has conceptualized this new phenomenon as “monitory democracy.”

Key to the emergence of monitory democracy are several trends emanating from the architecture of communicative abundance: the democratization of information; the politicization of the private-public distinction; high intensity efforts by citizens and organizations to attack power holders with publicity and public exposure; the multiplication of unelected representatives; and so on. The upshot of these developments is that “within all democracies many hundreds and thousands of monitory institutions now skilfully trade in the business of stirring up questions of power, often with political effect.” By putting politicians, parties, and governments “permanently on their toes, monitory institutions complicate their lives and question their power and authority, often forcing them to chop and change their agendas—sometimes by smothering them in political disgrace.” The routinization of “-gate” scandals demonstrates that these “public monitors” work (to what extent we don’t really know), and also reminds us that “the political dirty business of dragging power from behind the curtains of secrecy remains fundamentally important.” Revelations of malfeasance entrenches the idea in people’s minds that all institutions must be viewed suspiciously—a kind of cynicism that Keane argues is healthier than the conceit of the “informed citizen” who knows everything he needs to about politics—an anti-democratic idea from the nineteenth century used to promote a restricted educated franchise. Keane euphemistically conceives of these cynics as “wise citizens” and imbues them with street smarts: they know they have to think for themselves and keep an eye on power holders. Yet, they also understand that sometimes monitoring power does not work or it backfires, and that they should be skeptical, especially in the age of paparazzi and Photoshop, as the camera often lies. Keane sees the tools of communicative abundance (and media hybridity) as harnessing the “wisdom of crowds,” where “wisdom” resembles cynicism and the street smarts to continuously question and scrutinize power holders. Reversing Orwell’s dystopian vision to turn the

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78 Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence*, 79.
80 Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence*, 47.
81 Ibid., 81.
82 Ibid., 49.
83 Ibid., 107.
panopticon against the state, Keane suggests “the constant public scrutiny of power by many differently sized monitory bodies with footprints large and small makes it the most energetic, most dynamic form of democracy ever,”84 where “potentially all fields of social and political life come to be publically scrutinized...by a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies operating within, underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial states.”85 No wonder he writes that “politics in the age of monitory democracy has a definite ‘viral’ quality about it.”86

The potential Keane foresees in current developments is much more fundamental than the meanings normally attached to “going viral” (think BuzzFeed memes and YouTube videos), to the extent that the central tenet of representative democracy (one person, one vote, one representative) becomes one person, many interests, many voices, multiple votes, and multiple representatives under the evolving system of monitory democracy. Keane writes that “in the era of monitory democracy it is as if the principles of representative democracy—public openness, citizens’ equality, selecting representatives—are superimposed on representative democracy itself.”87 This is exhilarating stuff. But lest we get ahead of ourselves, he cautions that, like any other political system, monitory democracy is not inevitable. The potential for monitory democracy fostered by communicative abundance already is being undermined by the co-optation of the same technologies, via the manipulations of information by commercial oligopolies’ secret algorithms,88 the normalization of surveillance and the dissolution of privacy,89 hacking, disinformation, deception, and dissimulation. Instead of promoting tolerance and diversity, the infrastructure and tools of communicative abundance “hands out mirrors to citizens, who use them to preen themselves in the looking glass of their blinkered choice.”90 It leads to virtual mob rule, witch hunts, dogmatism, irresponsibility, and “rabbit holes of special interests.”91 It also results in disorientating “information cascades” that overwhelm people with rumours, trivia and spin,92 so that the “the cult of the amateur” Triumphs93

84 Ibid., 105.
85 Ibid., 86.
86 Ibid., 107.
87 Ibid., 86.
90 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 122, and Alice E. Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).
91 Mat Honan, “Fear and Liking on Facebook,” Wired, November 2014, 49.
and anonymous online interactions take the form of “random shouting.”

Equally pernicious is the silence that surrounds the multiplying number of “slow motion catastrophes,” such as global poverty, the arms trade, and environmental destruction that move too slowly, are too complicated, or are not deemed newsworthy enough. Catastrophes are symptomatic of the failure of democracy, warnings that “silent exercises of arbitrary power by manipulative human beings—the absence of monitory democracy—have harmful effects on citizens.” Freedom of communication, abundance, and muckraking (i.e., the components of monitory democracy) are crucial bulwarks against these abuses of power. Keane thus exhorts (“wise”) people to make a noise, to shatter the silence that surrounds power holders, and “to sound the alarm whenever they suspect that others are causing them harm.”

Anyone who has been online recently will bear witness to the cacophony therein, but noise alone will not guarantee that power holders toe the line or are held to account. Governments sometimes (how often, we can only guess) escape censure, either by avoiding detection or through collusion with the media. Collusion is an ugly word; perhaps we should say that there is frequent contact and cooperation between journalists and politicians who work closely and need each other. Politicians need the media because they can give positive or negative coverage, and have the power to selectively cover and frame things as they like. But politicians make the laws that govern media operations and can grant or deny access to journalists who need scoops and content. Communicative abundance has not changed the reality that “journalists and politicians drink and dine together...bump into each other at gatherings, in shopping malls, airports and school grounds and at formal functions...they frisk and frolic and keep in touch; sometimes they share beds...their working habits coincide...they think about similar things and talk to the same people often in tight circles of friends, sources, advisers, colleagues and former colleagues.”

However, these unavoidably tight connections have long been cause for concern—the fear of mediacreacy predates the current digital age.

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94 Keane, *Democracy and Media Decadence*, 126.

95 Ibid., 239.

96 Ibid., 241.

97 Ibid., 182.

Conclusion

Politicians, corporations, and powerful actors in other sectors have long understood the importance of “controlling the message,” using the media to their benefit, and minimizing the damage of scandals and negative events. The technology may have changed, but the underlying motivations of powerful interests are the same in the digital age as before it. As Keane explains, “the techniques and tools of media-saturated societies are being used by powerful forces in ways that are having harmful effects on democracy.”99 This may sound dramatic, until one considers the United States under President Obama, the Nobel Peace Laureate, who entered office so memorably as a beacon of hope (in large part, by systematically and ruthlessly exploiting “democratizing” digital tools and media). For the first time in its history, the Committee to Protect Journalists felt compelled to issue a report on the United States in 2013, heavily criticizing President Obama’s “control freak administration.” The report of the nonprofit organization, headed by a former editor of the Washington Post, stated that the “war on leaks and other efforts to control information are the most aggressive...since the Nixon administration,” while noting the sophisticated use of digital media to control the message.100 Obama’s attempts to control the agenda are symptomatic of the broader culture of spin that has given rise to a dissimulation industry. In a piece for the Financial Times entitled “The Invasion of Corporate News,” Edgecliffe-Johnson cites the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to the effect that “for every working journalist in America, there are now 4.6 PR (public relations) people.”101 The incursion of PR into journalism is one thing; the broader culture of fear bred by the endless “War on Terror” is another. As Glenn Greenwald, the American journalist who helped bring Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA surveillance program to the world, maintains in his memoir, “a population, a country that venerates physical safety above all other values will ultimately give up its liberty and sanction any power seized by authority in exchange for the promise, no matter how illusory, of total security.”102 Pervasive suspicion and the compulsive need to “know everything” in order to prevent another terrorist attack led by turns to the systematic surveillance of millions of citizens and the astonishing scale of violations perpetrated by the NSA program. After blowing the whistle

99 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 241.
on the program, Edward Snowden, who it appears was driven by noble intentions, was forced into uncomfortable exile. Eerily echoing Keane, in an email he wrote to the filmmaker Laura Poitras, Snowden averred that “in the end we must enforce a principle whereby the only way the powerful may enjoy privacy is when it is the same kind shared by the ordinary.” For Keane, this is exactly what the promise of communicative abundance holds: “monitory democracy” carried out by savvy and cynical citizens in the all-seeing, always-on digital age. But as the Snowden affair demonstrated, there is considerable resistance from entrenched, powerful, and threatened interests. For one thing, the potential for monitory democracy is being undermined by what Keane calls media decadence, the “troubling counter trends [that] encourage concentrations of cunning power without limit, so weakening the spirit and substance of public scrutiny and control of arbitrary power that is so vital for democracy.” Here, another “disquieting gap” has opened up, between the ideals of monitory democracy and the reality in which media are implicated in promoting “intolerance of opinions, stifling the public scrutiny of power and fostering the blind acceptance of the way things are heading.” As O’Hagan reminds us, “it was often journalists who opposed Snowden’s actions and hated what Greenwald was writing.” On Meet the Press, host David Gregory asked Greenwald, “To the extent that you have aided and abetted Snowden... why shouldn’t you Mr. Greenwald be charged with a crime?” Here was a journalist implying that a professional colleague should face prosecution for pursuing the truth at the discomfiture of the government. I began this essay by remarking on scholars’ preoccupation with negativity in the 1980s and 1990s. Fears about negativity have receded, and, indeed, now appear rather quaint, but the intersection of politics and the media is still cause for concern. Since this intersection involves powerful interests competing to maintain their power, it will always remain so. The emergence of communicative abundance and media hybridity has changed the nature of citizens’ engagement with political communications, but not the underlying dynamics.


104 Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence, 112.

105 Ibid., 119.


107 Ibid.