

Minority Language Recognition and Trust Evidence from Twenty-Five Democracies

Amy H. Liu, David S. Brown, and Meghan H. Dunn

Abstract

What are the effects of minority language recognition on trust in democracies? This essay argues that people are more likely to trust strangers and members of out-groups when governments recognize minority languages. How this effect manifests depends on the type of recognition afforded to the minority language in the education system and whether the individual speaks a majority or minority language at home. First, when the recognition afforded is of low cost, this has a positive effect on trust levels for those in the majority via the contact mechanism, but such superficial overtures are not sufficient to make a difference for those in the minority. Second, when the recognition afforded is one of high cost, the benefits of contact for the majority are now muted by tensions over funding priorities. However, for minority language speakers, such substantive policies acknowledge their cultural importance. These arguments are evaluated using data from Wave 6 of the World Values Survey (2010-2014).

Keywords: Language politics, democracy, ethnic politics, trust.

In August 2012, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a controversial language law that would have far-reaching, long-term implications. The law reinforced Ukrainian as the official language of the state. It also acknowledged seventeen other minority languages. If more than 10 percent of the population in a region spoke any of the seventeen languages, that language could be considered an official language of the region.¹ Although Russian was only one of the many

Amy H. Liu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. <amy.liu@austin.utexas.edu>

David S. Brown is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder. <dsbrown@colorado.edu>

Meghan H. Dunn is a Law Clerk for the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of California. <meghan.h.dunn@gmail.com>

¹ "Language Law Comes into Force in Ukraine," *Interfax-Ukraine*, August 10, 2012.

named languages, mass protests erupted across Ukraine.² To those in the Ukrainian-speaking West, the bill was evidence of growing Russian influence in the country.³ In contrast, subsequent efforts to repeal the bill were viewed by those in the Russian-speaking East—including Crimea—as a sign of Ukrainian-majority tyranny.⁴ The developments in Ukraine suggest the political choice to afford or withhold minority language recognition can threaten the stability of any democracy. This essay focuses on one such consequence: What are the effects of minority language recognition on trust in democracies?

Language is a tool for communication. It is a bond—allegedly the “strongest and most lasting”—that unites men.⁵ It is what differentiates humans from the animals.⁶ But concurrently, the primal need to “describe the nature of things”⁷ makes language much more than just a vehicle of communication. It is an instrument by which to build a political community⁸—one with a “distinctive history, a cultural sensibility, a literature, a mythology, a musical past.”⁹ Politics simply cannot be divorced from language.

Although United States President Wilson argued for the principle that each nation should have its own country, the reality is that linguistic diversity is the norm and not the exception. It is common for governments to face the choice of whether to recognize a minority group—linguistic or not. How governments respond has implications for how people interact with each other. We argue that, when governments recognize minority groups and their languages, this has a positive effect on trust. First, recognition facilitates cultural understanding via contact between speakers of the majority and minority languages. Second, it reduces conflict by fostering a sense of fairness. If a minority language is recognized, its speakers are more likely to feel valued.¹⁰

When there is understanding and fairness, there is trust. There is, however, a caveat: recognition effects are not uniform. They depend on type

² Miriam Elder, *Guardian*, “Ukrainians Protest against Russian Language Law,” July 4, 2012.

³ “Russian Language Debate Splits Ukraine,” *Reuters*, July 12, 2012.

⁴ “На отмену закона о региональных языках на Украине наложат вето” [On the abolition of the law on regional languages in Ukraine veto], *Lenta*, March 1, 2014.

⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835), ed. Harvey Mansfield and Delb Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 29.

⁶ Aurelius Augustine, *The City of God* (420 C. E.), ed. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh, UK: T&T Clark, 1871).

⁷ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1532), trans. Angelo M. Codevilla (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), xxiii.

⁸ David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and William Safran, “Introduction: The Political Aspects of Language,” in *Language, Ethnic Identity, and the State*, ed. William Safran and J. A. Laponce (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-14.

⁹ James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

¹⁰ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

of recognition and whether the individual is in the majority or minority. First, when the recognition afforded is low in cost, there is a positive effect on trust levels for people who are in the majority via the contact mechanism, but such superficial overtures are not sufficient to make a difference for people in the minority. Second, when the recognition afforded is of high cost, the benefits of contact for the majority are now muted by tensions over funding priorities. However, for minority language speakers, such substantive recognition acknowledges their cultural importance.

We focus on trust because, when present, it “promotes norms which abjure self-interest and reinforces the idea that individuals should act in the interest of the group in order to solve collective action problems.”¹¹ But not all trust is the same. Trust can be either “strong” or “weak,”¹² “bonding” or “bridging,”¹³ or “particularized” or “generalized.”¹⁴ Regardless of how we conceptualize this dichotomy, what matters is that the effects of trust diminish as we go from family and friends (i.e., those in the “in-group”) to those in the “out-group.”¹⁵

Normatively, it is essential to understand the causes not just for generalized trust but also for one type of particularized trust: that of the out-group. Countries with high levels of out-group trust are more stable. Specifically, out-group trust is associated with democratic support,¹⁶ economic growth and investment rates,¹⁷ positive income and education rates,¹⁸ low levels of corruption,¹⁹ and good tax compliance rates.²⁰ From a policy standpoint, all of these outcomes are desirable in any democratic polity.²¹

¹¹ Paul F. Whiteley, “Economic Growth and Social Capital,” *Political Studies* 48 (2000): 448.

¹² Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” *American Sociological Review* 78 (1973): 1360-1380.

¹³ Robert D. Putnam, *Democracies in Flux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁴ Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹⁵ See, for example, Jan Delhey, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel, “How General Is Trust in ‘Most People’? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem,” *American Sociological Review* 76 (2011): 786-807.

¹⁶ Sonja Zmerli and Kenneth Newton, “Social Trust and Attitudes toward Democracy,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72 (2008): 706-724.

¹⁷ Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4 (1997): 1251-1288, and Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack, “Trust and Growth,” *Economic Journal* 111 (2001): 295-321.

¹⁸ Alberto Alesina and Eliana LaFerrara, “Who Trusts Others?” *Journal of Public Economics* 85, no. 2 (2002): 207-234, and Joel Slemrod and Peter Katusčák, “Do Trust and Trustworthiness Pay Off?” *Journal of Human Resources* 40 (2005): 621-646.

¹⁹ Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*.

²⁰ John T. Scholz and Mark Lubell, “Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action,” *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1998): 398-417.

²¹ See, for example, Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner, “All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Capital,” *World Politics* 58 (2005): 41-72.

Ethnicity and Trust

There are two distinct arguments about the effects of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on trust. On the one hand, heterogeneity breeds *conflict* over scarce resources.²² There are three classes of explanations.²³ The first is about preferences vis-à-vis co-ethnics: considering the welfare of other co-ethnics; valuing the same outcomes as co-ethnics; and choosing to work with co-ethnics. The second class concerns technology. Because ethnicity identifies a collective group, there is an inherent network. This network allows co-ethnics to operate with greater efficiency, to gauge each other more accurately, to interact more frequently, and to find each other. The third class reflects reciprocity, where co-ethnics can self-monitor. They can identify, police, and punish co-ethnics for not behaving in accordance with their ethnicity. Although by no means exhaustive, these classes highlight the multiple reasons why it is hard for ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and trust to coexist.

On the other hand, regular *contact* with ethno-linguistic heterogeneity can increase tolerance and breed interethnic trust.²⁴ There is evidence suggesting that individuals in heterogeneous neighborhoods are more trusting than their counterparts in homogeneous communities.²⁵ When there is heterogeneity, individuals are more likely to come into contact with people of diverse backgrounds. These repeated interactions develop into direct knowledge, thereby breeding trust. In contrast, with homogeneity, the lack of opportunity to intermingle with different people reinforces stereotypes.²⁶ Over time, these prejudices can undermine trust.

Both the heterogeneity-exacerbates-conflict and the heterogeneity-facilitates-contact arguments seem valid. Consistent across both approaches is the treatment of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity as exogenous and its effects as deterministic. But governments use policies either to escalate fears of the out-group or to increase acceptance of differences.²⁷ Whether the effects are positive or negative depends on the treatment of minority groups.²⁸ When

²² Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 155-194, and Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

²³ James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein, *Coethnicity* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009).

²⁴ J. Eric Oliver and Janelle Wong, "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings," *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2003): 567-582.

²⁵ Melissa J. Marschall and Dietlind Stolle, "Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust," *Political Behavior* 26 (2004): 125-153.

²⁶ Lawrence Bobo, "Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes," in *Eliminating Racism*, ed. Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).

²⁷ See Rothsein and Uslander, "All for All."

²⁸ Carles Boix and Daniel N. Posner, "Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam's

governments deny a minority group linguistic recognition, this can stunt the development of intergroup trust.²⁹ The Estonian government, for example, has passed laws curtailing the use of the Russian language. Not only are the Russian minorities not allowed to use their language in an official capacity, but also they are subject to Estonian proficiency tests, randomly administered by the government. Failing the exam is grounds for employment termination. Not surprisingly, trust levels are quite low between the Estonians and Russians.

In contrast, when governments afford minority groups recognition, perceptions of one group dominating another are reduced and understanding of group distinctiveness is facilitated. In Finland, for instance, the government recognizes both Finnish and Swedish as national languages. Not only are the two languages equally recognized in the parliament and judicial system, but also they are equally accepted in any municipality where the local minority constitutes more than 8 percent of the population. In keeping with this formula, there are three monolingual Swedish municipalities. Interestingly, according to the World Values Survey, the trust level in Finland (54.98 percent) is more than twice that of Estonia (21.52 percent). This pattern is consistent even when isolating only for the minority sample (46.43 percent versus 22.30 percent). By focusing on government policies toward minorities, this essay offers an alternative endogenous explanation for why some countries have higher trust levels than others—in spite of their levels of ethnic heterogeneity.

Minority Language Recognition and Trust

This essay argues that minority language recognition matters to the development of individual trust. Recognition can promote understanding via contact. While language is a pattern of words, it also involves a set of cultural cues. When these cues come into contact with another set of cues without any means for interpretation, there can be confusion. Conversely, when there is some bridge between speakers of different languages, people can better understand the nuances of a different articulation. For example, for majority language speakers, their repetitive experiences of seeing minority language signs in public, being exposed to a minority language in subtitles, and learning a minority language in school can help to develop some basic familiarity with a minority group. And where there is understanding, there is trust.

However, not all recognition types are the same. Some policies require minimal political capital to adopt and just as little in physical capital to implement. For example, printing ballots in a minority language costs money,

Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,” Harvard University Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series 96 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1996).

²⁹ See Francisco Herrerros and Henar Criado, “The State and the Development of Social Trust,” *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 1 (2008): 53-71.

but relative to the overall state budget, these costs are minimal. Likewise, paying someone to subtitle movies in a minority language requires little expenditure. Even teaching a minority language as a subject in school is relatively cheap. In contrast, some other policies can be politically contentious and quite expensive. For instance, to allow minority and majority languages to be used equally in parliamentary debates would be costly. An interpreter would be required every time an individual spoke in the minority language (and perhaps vice versa). Similarly, it is inexpensive to subtitle a movie, but it is much more costly to dub in a minority language. And finally, it is one matter to teach a minority language as a subject, but it is another to allow that language to be a medium of instruction.

The distinction among recognition types is important. While recognition can promote understanding on the part of the majority via contact, low-cost recognition is superficial. In theory, any recognition is better than no recognition for the minority. However, low-cost recognition policies still acknowledge inherent inequalities between speakers of the majority and minority languages. In fact, it is possible that the recognition is seen strictly as a symbolic concession and nothing substantive. After all, parliamentary debates, movies, and education curriculums continue to operate in the majority language. This can breed resentment. Low-cost recognition can simply hinder the development of trust among members of the minority. The following set of hypotheses reflect this discussion:

Low-Cost Majority Hypothesis: For individuals in the majority, low-cost minority language recognition has a positive effect on their trust of the out-group.

Low-Cost Minority Hypothesis: For individuals in the minority, low-cost minority language recognition has no effect on their trust of the out-group.

What happens when recognition costs are high? While members of the majority can tolerate the trivial costs spent to accommodate minorities on ballots, at movies, and in textbooks, once these costs become significant, a zero-sum sentiment can arise. Concerns may be expressed that limited public resources are being allocated for private purposes. The development of schools in which the majority of subjects are taught in the minority language can be provoking politically, if the funds come at the expense of the general taxpayer who is a majority language speaker. Additionally, since nation-building efforts have traditionally involved the standardization of one—often the majority’s—language,³⁰ any attempt to equalize majority and minority languages can be

³⁰ Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

seen as a symbolic threat. And so, although there is still intergroup contact, any understanding derived from that contact on the part of the majority is offset by feelings of intergroup conflict.

In contrast, when a minority language is afforded high-cost recognition, this suggests its speakers are important. For minority language speakers, conflicts with the majority are diffused. Members of the minority are put at ease; their demands have been addressed; and there is no longer a need for contentious politics. The majority and its symbol (i.e., language) do not dominate the state. The minorities are able to feel that they are part of a larger community. And when there is this sense of a larger community, there is trust. The following hypotheses summarize this argument:

High-Cost Majority Hypothesis: For individuals in the majority, high-cost minority language recognition has no effect on their trust of the out-group.

High-Cost Minority Hypothesis: For individuals in the minority, high-cost minority language recognition has a positive effect on their trust of the majority.

Research Design

The sample begins with the twenty-nine democracies in the most recent sixth wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey (WVS). Unlike the regional barometers, the WVS is global in its reach. In the sixth wave, there are sixty countries, ranging from Algeria to Uruguay, from Russia to Zimbabwe. For the purposes of this essay, a country is defined as a democracy if its Polity score was 6 or greater in the year in which the WVS was administered. For example, the surveys for Kyrgyzstan were administered in 2011. Kyrgyzstan's Polity score for that year was 7, rendering it a democracy. Had the survey been conducted one year earlier, Kyrgyzstan would have been excluded, as its Polity score in 2010 was 4. Note that four countries are dropped from the final analysis because of missing values on at least one variable.³¹ Table 1 identifies the twenty-five countries included in the sample and the survey characteristics of each.

Having identified the sample of countries, we next separate the majority-from the minority-language speakers. Here, we use the following question from the WVS: "What language do you normally speak at home?" The advantage of this question is that it provides an alternative to traditional census classifications. In the context of the United States, for example, descriptive group identifications would classify a third-generation Latina who spoke

³¹ New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan.

Table 1. The Twenty-five Democracies

Country	N
Australia	N=1477
Chile	N=1000
Colombia	N=1512
Cyprus	N=1000
Estonia	N=1533
Germany	N=2046
Ghana	N=1552
Japan	N=2443
Kyrgyzstan	N=1500
Lebanon	N=1200
Malaysia	N=1300
Mexico	N=2000
Netherlands	N=1902
Pakistan	N=1200
Peru	N=1210
Philippines	N=1200
Poland	N= 966
Romania	N=1503
Slovenia	N=1069
Sweden	N=1206
Trinidad	N= 999
Turkey	N=1605
Ukraine	N=1500
United States	N=2232
Uruguay	N=1000

English and an English-speaking fifth-generation person of German descent into different groups. But a question about language spoken at home could identify the two respondents as belonging to the same group: respondents who speak English at home.

If an individual answered that she spoke the language spoken by the plurality of the population (hereafter referred to as the “majority language”), she was placed into the “majority sample.” For instance, if a respondent in Malaysia said that she spoke “Malay” at home, she was included in the majority sample. In Malaysia, Malaysian is spoken by 62 percent of the population.³² Likewise, if a respondent in the neighboring Philippines answered “Filipino,”

³² Jacques Leclerc, “L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde” [Language management in the world] (2014), <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/> (accessed June 1-July 4, 2014).

she was classified in the majority sample, even though Filipino (i.e., Tagalog) is spoken by substantially less than half of the population (26 percent). The rule is that, so long as a language has plurality, its speakers are considered in the majority.

If a respondent was not classified as part of the majority sample, she was considered to speak a minority language. Since there may be multiple minority languages in a country, this essay classifies only those who speak the most dominant minority language in the “minority sample.” In the Malaysian and Philippine examples, the only minorities identified in the minority sample are the Chinese- (25 percent) and Cebuano- (20 percent) speakers, respectively. In accord with this classification system, there are almost three thousand respondents in the minority sample. This essay differentiates between speakers of the most populous minority language from all the other nonplurality languages for two reasons. First, there is no reason to assume that *all* speakers of *a* minority language prefer *any* minority language to be recognized. It is possible that one minority group may prefer no recognition over another rival minority group’s being afforded recognition. Second, some respondents answered that they spoke a language that is not traditionally associated with either the majority of the population or with one of the country’s minorities. In Colombia, for example, one respondent (of a total of 1,512) answered that she spoke German at home. Clearly, this respondent could not be placed in a Columbian minority group in the conventional sense. To lump her into the same minority classification as other respondents who speak an indigenous language at home would have raised validity concerns. Table 2 identifies the majority and minority languages in each of the twenty-five democracies in this sample.

Dependent Variable: Trust

In the previous WVS waves—and in many of the regional barometers—there is an abstract dichotomous question about generalized trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We cannot, however, identify intergroup trust using this one question. Fortunately, the sixth wave of the WVS asked an extensive menu of questions that made it possible to determine the mechanism between recognition and out-group trust.

To this end, we employed four trust measures. Since group cleavages can be subjective, we first used a question that asked about trusting people whom respondents have met for the first time. After removing the “no answer” and “don’t know” responses, all remaining responses range on a four-point scale from “do not trust at all” (0) to “trust completely” (3).³³ Correspondingly, a society characterized by high levels of out-group trust should score closer to 3. The distribution is skewed slightly toward the less trusting end of the scale,

³³ We recoded all measures of trust, so higher values indicate more trust.

Table 2. The Majority and Minority Linguistic Groups in Sample

Country	Majority	Minority
Australia	English (95%)	Local Aboriginal Languages (2%)
Chile	Spanish (93%)	Indigenous Languages (6%)
Colombia	Spanish (80%)	Indigenous Languages (4%)
Cyprus	Greek (78%)	Turkish (18%)
Estonia	Estonian (68%)	Russian (26%)
Germany	German (92%)	Turkish (2%)
Ghana	Akan (44%)	Ewe (9.7%)
Japan	Japanese (99%)	Korean (1%)
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz (53%)	Russian (30%)
Lebanon	Arabic (94%)	Kurdish (5%)
Malaysia	Malay (62%)	Chinese (25%)
Mexico	Spanish (88%)	Indigenous Languages (9%)
Netherlands	Dutch (74%)	Frisian (5%)
Pakistan	Punjabi (54%)	Sindhi (22%)
Peru	Spanish (76%)	Quechua (15%)
Philippines	Filipino (26%)	Cebuano (20%)
Poland	Polish (97%)	German (1%)
Romania	Romanian (84%)	Hungarian (7%)
Slovenia	Slovenian (88%)	Croatian (3%)
Sweden	Swedish (85%)	Finnish (2%)
Trinidad	English (94%)	Tobagan (3%)
Turkey	Turkish (74%)	Kurdish (20%)
Ukraine	Ukrainian (77%)	Russian (17%)
United States	English (82%)	Spanish (11%)
Uruguay	Spanish (87%)	Italian (3%)

Source: Jacques Leclerc, “L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde” [Linguistic management in the world] (2014), <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/> (accessed June 1- July 4, 2014).

with the modal response (45.75 percent) being “do not trust very much.”

The next two questions objectively delineate group cleavage: one concerns people of a different nationality and the other asks about people of a different religion. As with the previous measure, all responses have been adjusted to a four-point scale, with the maximum value of 3 to suggest “trust completely.” For both measures, over 70 percent of the respondents indicated they either “do not trust very much” (1) such people, or “trust [them]somewhat” (2).

The final question is about trusting family. This is an intentional negative check. Individuals of the same family are the least likely to be seen as members of an out-group. Whether the government recognizes a minority language should not have any bearing on a respondent’s trust of her family. Members of the same family usually interact in the same language. To ensure that the

essay is testing for the proper mechanisms (i.e., conflict exacerbation or contact facilitation), we purposely used a measure that should have no effect. Again, the variable is coded along a four-point scale. Almost 82 percent of the respondents said that they trust their family “completely.”

Explanatory Variable: Minority Language Recognition

We focus on the status of minority language in the education curriculum. As previously noted in the discussion regarding the minority sample, a language is considered “minority” if it is the largest nonplurality language. In Malaysia, for example, the two largest minority groups are the Chinese (25 percent) and the Tamil-speaking Indians (11 percent). Since the Chinese are the larger of the two groups, the focus is on only the Chinese language. In line with Albaugh,³⁴ the essay examines linguistic recognition in the classroom, since language-in-education policies are some of the most contentious policies in language planning.³⁵ But just because a language is afforded recognition in education does not mean that all instruction is the same. There are two types, and for this essay, it is important to differentiate (1) instruction *of* a minority language from (2) instruction *in* a minority language.³⁶

Instruction *of* a minority language is when a language is taught in the classroom strictly as a subject. For some period in the curriculum, students go to class where they learn to speak, read, and write in that minority language. However, use of the language does not extend beyond that demarcated time. In contrast, instruction *in* a minority language is when the language is used as a medium throughout the curriculum. Students not only study the minority language during an allotted period, but also they use that language to learn the materials in other subjects such as history and math. As an example, consider the status of the Spanish language in the United States and that of the French language in Canada. Quebec politics aside, Spanish and French are considered the most populous minority language in these countries, respectively. In the United States, Spanish is taught in schools, but (excluding charter schools) it is taught strictly as a subject. World history and geometry are taught exclusively in English. Conversely, in Canada, as protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, French-speaking students in any province have the right to learn about World War I and the Pythagorean Theorem in French.³⁷

³⁴ Ericka A. Albaugh, *State-Building and Multilingual Education in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³⁵ Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1989), and Robert B. Kaplan and Richard B. Baldauf Jr., *Language Planning* (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1997).

³⁶ Jacqueline Mowbray, *Linguistic Justice: International Law and Language Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³⁷ Ronald Schmidt, Sr., “The Politics of Language in Canada and the United States: Explaining the Differences,” in *Language and Politics in the United States and Canada*, ed. Thomas Ricento and Barbara Burnaby (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998).

To identify minority language recognition status, this essay follows Liu³⁸ and uses Leclerc’s database, *L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde*. The database covers language policies and linguistic developments in all countries. If the minority language is not given any attention in schools, the variable *Minority Language Recognition* is assigned a 0; if the language is taught but only as a class, a 1; and if the language is taught and not exclusively as a class, a value of 2.³⁹

Given the categorical nature of the variable, the variable is transformed into three dummies: *No Recognition*, *Subject Recognition*, and *Medium Recognition*. When the independent variable in a model is a set of dichotomies that collectively constitutes one singular categorical variable, it is necessary to have one dichotomy serving as the reference against which all other dichotomies are compared. Here, the reference category is *No Recognition*. The distribution of recognition types is about 30 percent no recognition, 10 percent subject recognition, and 60 percent medium recognition. Given the

Table 3. Predictions

	Majority		Minority	
	Subject	Medium	Subject	Medium
Meeting for First Time	+	∅	∅	+
Different Nationalities	+	∅	∅	+
Different Religions	+	∅	∅	+
Family	∅	∅	∅	∅

hypotheses, the predictions between minority language recognition and trust are as follows:

Control Variables: Country Level

Ethnic Fractionalization

Diversity exacerbates intergroup conflict over policies and public goods.⁴⁰

³⁸ Amy H. Liu, “The Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions,” *Journal of Politics* 73, no. 1 (2011): 125-139.

³⁹ Note that just because the language of a minority group is recognized as a medium does not necessarily suggest that the group is not assimilated. First, from an empirical standpoint, often in minority medium schools, the majority language is still a compulsory subject. Second, from a coding standpoint, a minority language is coded as having medium recognition, regardless of how many years it has been used in schools. Some languages, such as Chinese in Malaysia, are recognized as a medium only at the primary level. In contrast, others, such as Russian in Kyrgyzstan, are available at both the primary and secondary levels.

⁴⁰ Christopher Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, “How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society,” *Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (2006): 783-802, and Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” *World Politics* 53 (2001): 362-398.

This conflict, in turn, decreases trust. Fractionalization is measured using a Herfindahl index, which captures the likelihood that two randomly drawn individuals will be from different ethno-linguistic groups. A small Herfindahl index indicates a highly homogeneous society, and vice versa. The coefficient for this variable is expected to be negative.⁴¹

Civil Liberties

Social capital concerns the “connections among individuals.”⁴² When governments restrict movement, freedom of speech, and other forms of civil liberties, the “norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from [these social networks]”⁴³ are limited. Consequently, people are less trusting. This essay uses the seven-point index (1 most free; 7 least free) from Freedom House to measure civil liberties.

GDP per Capita

Wealth can attenuate conflict. With widespread poverty, it is easy for the few “haves” to denigrate the “have-nots.” Such behavior in a stratified community can hinder the cultivation of trust. When this socioeconomic stratification parallels ethnic cleavages, it can hamper individuals of one linguistic group from trusting others who speak a different language. Conversely, tolerance develops when there is wealth.⁴⁴ This tolerance (i.e., understanding) is important for trust. To the extent that wealth encourages trust, a growing GDP per capita is expected to have a positive effect and a declining GDP an adverse effect. The data come from the World Development Indicators. The variable has been rescaled to the 10,000 unit.

Control Variables: Individual Level

Respondent Ideology

In American politics, ideology is one of the two indicators (the other being partisanship) that has been shown to have a modest effect on trust. Those on the right tend to be suspicious of “outsiders” who are believed to be an obstacle to the development of a national identity.⁴⁵ In contrast, those on the left tend to be supportive of accommodating members of the out-group, whether they are ethnic minorities,⁴⁶ refugees and asylum seekers,⁴⁷ or immigrants.⁴⁸ The WVS

⁴¹ Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. “Fractionalization,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 155-194.

⁴² Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 19.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 69-105.

⁴⁵ William Safran, “Politics and Language in Contemporary France: Facing Supranational and Infranational Challenges,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 137 (1999): 39-66.

⁴⁶ Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson, “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 965-989.

asks respondents to place their own political views on a ten-point left-right scale, with 1 being the farthest left and 10 being the farthest right. *Ideology* is expected to have a negative effect on trust.

Respondent Religiosity

There are two different reasons why the respondent's religiosity matters regarding trust. First, borrowing from Jamal and Nooruddin,⁴⁹ since smaller groups are "better" at building cooperation and overcoming problems of collective action,⁵⁰ religiously observant individuals are more likely to trust.⁵¹ Alternatively, the devout have more faith in God. This faith, in turn, has externalities when it comes to trusting strangers and members of an out-group. Religiosity is measured based on the frequency of attendance at worship services. Frequency ranges along a seven-point scale from a minimum of 0 ("never, practically never") to a maximum of 6 ("more than once a week"). Data are from the WVS.

Respondent Income

For the same reason that there is a control for GDP per capita at the country level, this essay includes a measure for the respondent's income as well: As an individual's wealth increases, she is more likely to trust others. The WVS places respondents into five social classes, ranging from "lower class" (0) to "upper class" (4). The distribution across the sample is normal, with the modal social class as "lower middle class" (36.6 percent). Note that the correlation between this variable and GDP/Capita at the country level is 0.1174.

Educational Attainment

Directly, when an individual attends university classes and participates in extracurricular activities, she is afforded opportunities to meet new and different people—but all within the structure of a networked environment. The repetitive act of meeting new people and giving them some benefit of the doubt can have long-term effects, even when the individual is no longer a student. Indirectly, if minority language recognition in education affects trust because of conflict reduction and contact exposure, it is important to include a measure

⁴⁷ Ronald Kaye, "Defining the Agenda: British Refugee Policy and the Role of Parties," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7 (1994): 144-159.

⁴⁸ Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang, and Jessica Teets, "Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration," *World Politics* 66 (2014): 406-445, and Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* (London: Sage, 2003).

⁴⁹ Amaney Jamal and Irfan Nooruddin, "The Democratic Utility of Trust," *Journal of Politics* 72 (2010): 45-59.

⁵⁰ Mansur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

⁵¹ Jacob R. Neiheisel, Paul A. Djupe, and Anand Edward Sokhey, "Veni, Vidi, Disseri: Churches and the Promise of Democratic Deliberation," *American Politics Research* 37 (2009): 614-643.

of how much exposure the respondent has had to the education curriculum. An individual who has never attended school in a country where minority languages are recognized should display similar trust levels as an individual who has attended many years of school in a country where minority languages are not recognized. The WVS asks respondents about their educational attainment, ranging from no formal education to university-level education with an earned degree. *Education*, a dummy variable, is assigned a value of 1 if the respondent has completed secondary school, if not more; otherwise, a 0.

Parental Status

An alternative to educational attainment is a respondent's parental status. Directly, when a respondent attends her child's school-sponsored events and interacts regularly with other parents, she can develop a habit of trusting other people. And when a child learns to appreciate cultural differences because of what is being taught in schools, the parent also can be indirectly exposed to this mechanism. To account for this possibility, the dummy variable *Parent* takes on a value of 1 if the respondent has a child—any number of children; otherwise, a 0.

Empirical Evidence: Majority Sample

Table 4 presents the results for majority language speakers. There are four models, one for each trust measure. Minority language recognition has a positive effect on whether majority respondents are likely to trust people they are meeting for the first time. As illustrated in figure 1(a), majority respondents are more than twice as likely to indicate they “trust somewhat” when the minority language is taught as a subject in the classrooms (31.3 percent) than when it is denied recognition (15.4 percent). But this positive effect is evident only when the recognition is given to the minority language as a subject. If recognition had been given to the minority language as a medium of instruction, only 19.4 percent of the majority respondents would have answered “trust somewhat”—a figure statistically no different from that of no recognition. The trend is similar when looking at the effects of minority language recognition on “do not trust at all.” If there had been no recognition, 37.8 percent of the respondents would have indicated the absolute minimal levels of trust; if there had been subject recognition, 18.8 percent; and if there had been medium recognition, 31 percent.

The pattern holds even when shifting to other trust types. As illustrated in figures 1(b) and 1(c), when the minority language is afforded subject recognition, majority respondents are very likely to say they “trust somewhat” people of different nationalities (52.6 percent) and religions (52.1 percent). In contrast, the same respondents are much less likely to indicate the same affirmative response if recognition is completely denied (36.6 percent for different nationalities; 33.5 percent for different religions) or extended to

Table 4. Effects of Minority Language Recognition on Trust
(Majority Sample)

	(1) <i>First Time</i>	(2) <i>Diff National</i>	(3) <i>Diff Religion</i>	(4) <i>Family</i>
Country Level				
Subject Recognition	0.978‡ (0.277)	0.842† (0.422)	0.964† (0.475)	-0.232 (0.547)
Curriculum Recognition	0.298 (0.259)	0.094 (0.324)	0.254 (0.357)	-0.307 (0.358)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.102† (0.445)	-0.551 (0.635)	-0.113 (0.690)	-0.119 (1.053)
Civil Liberties	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.337‡ (0.114)	-0.267† (0.120)	-0.085 (0.176)
GDP per Capita	0.119 (0.074)	0.052 (0.097)	0.094 (0.095)	-0.191* (0.103)
Individual Level				
Respondent Ideology	0.004 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.014)	0.030‡ (0.009)
Respondent Religiosity	0.006 (0.014)	0.005 (0.015)	0.055‡ (0.015)	-0.014 (0.029)
Respondent Income	0.176‡ (0.029)	0.191‡ (0.035)	0.168‡ (0.038)	0.161‡ (0.050)
Educational Attainment	0.024 (0.096)	0.341‡ (0.096)	0.145 (0.097)	0.190* (0.114)
Parental Status	0.104† (0.052)	0.045 (0.039)	0.067 (0.045)	0.231‡ (0.073)
N	23189 (25)	22196 (25)	22170 (25)	23711 (25)
Wald χ^2	177.28‡	257.24‡	141.22‡	78.16‡
Pseudo R ²	0.050	0.065	0.049	0.014
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-24813.203	-24900.726	-25365.486	-14363.722


Note: * $p \leq 0.1000$; † $p \leq 0.0500$; ‡ $p \leq 0.0100$.

Models estimated using ordered logit with standard errors clustered by country.

the fullest (38.2 percent and 38.6 percent, respectively). The results seem to suggest that for the majority respondent, minority language recognition can promote trust via contact, as long as the recognition type is low-cost. As soon as the recognition type is high-cost, intergroup conflict is exacerbated—and, likewise, distrust of the out-group.

The above claim is plausible considering two other pieces of evidence. First, this trend is evident not only for majority respondents answering “trust somewhat,” which is moderate and affirmative response. The pattern is similar

Figure 1. Likelihood of Out-Group Trust (Majority Sample)



even when looking at the extreme, negative response, “do not trust at all.” Respondents are about twice as likely to say they do not trust a stranger or a person of a different background if the minority language is either denied recognition (e.g., 19.9 percent for a person of a different nationality) or given full recognition (18.4 percent) than if it were afforded subject recognition (10.0 percent). Second, this pattern does not exist in the fourth model, where the dependent variable is trust in family members. (See figure 1[d]). Recall, this measure was intentionally included as a negative check. If minority language recognition is to have an effect on whom a respondent trusts, this effect should not manifest for other people in her family. The lack of significance for either coefficient of interest (*Subject Recognition* and *Medium Recognition*) is corroborating evidence.

To ensure these findings (i.e., for a majority respondent, the link between minority language recognition and trust exists only with subject recognition), this essay subjects the previous models to three alternative estimators. The results shown in table 5 are for trusting a person for the first time, and again, apply only to the majority sample. The first model is a simple ordinary least squares (OLS), with standard errors clustered by country. Even with an imposed

Table 5. Alternative Estimators Majority Sample

	(5) <i>Least Squares</i>	(6) <i>Multinomial Logit</i>	(7) <i>Multilevel Model</i>
	<i>Do not trust much</i>	<i>Trust somewhat</i>	<i>Trust completely</i>
Country Level Factors			
Subject Recognition	0.374 (0.107)‡	1.522 (0.420)‡	0.689 (0.708)
Curriculum Recognition	0.111 (0.100)	0.474 (0.410)	0.336 (0.538)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.409 (0.178)†	-1.365 (0.642)†	-2.339 (1.121)†
Civil Liberties	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.165 (0.153)	0.181 (0.237)
GDP per Capita	0.045 (0.031)	0.211 (0.111)*	0.004 (0.238)
Individual-Level Factors			
Respondent Ideology	0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.015)	0.039 (0.030)
Respondent Religiosity	0.001 (0.006)	0.007 (0.023)	-0.038 (0.047)
Respondent Income	0.070 (0.011)‡	0.279 (0.044)‡	0.319 (0.070)‡
Educational Attainment	-0.001 (0.036)	0.039 (0.139)	-0.283 (0.201)
Parental Status	0.045 (0.020)†	0.159 (0.075)†	0.359 (0.164)†
N	23189 (25)	23189 (25)	23189 (25)
F-Statistic/Wald χ^2	33.06‡	3061.12‡	211.20‡
R ²	0.098	0.059	0.070
Log Pseudo Likelihood		-24574.682	-24993.725

Note: * $p \leq 0.1000$; † $p \leq 0.0500$; ‡ $p \leq 0.0100$. Constants and cutoffs not reported.

additional assumption—that the categories for the dependent variable have relatively symmetrical cut points—the results do not change substantively. A shift from no recognition to subject recognition can increase trust by a value of 0.374—on a scale from 0 to 3. A further shift from subject recognition to medium recognition can decrease trust by another 0.263.

To address the concern that ordered logit assumes the categories in the dependent variable are ranked in some meaningful way, the second model is a multinomial logit—with standard errors clustered by country. The base category is “do not trust at all.” What this means is that all coefficients reported in the “do not trust very much” column are in reference to the base. Hence, the positive and significant coefficient for Subject Recognition ($\beta=0.624$) would suggest that, when a minority language is granted subject recognition, a majority respondent is statistically more likely to say that she does not trust very much than to say that she does not trust at all. Similarly, the positive coefficient in the next column is also significant ($\beta=1.522$). A respondent is also more likely to indicate she trusts somewhat when there is subject recognition. However, the same recognition type has no bearing at the two extremes. The coefficient for the “trust completely” model is not significant. This specific finding notwithstanding, the broader picture is telling: even when relaxing the assumption that the four categories of trust are ordered in some meaningful way, there is still no effect for medium recognition.

The third alternative is a multilevel mixed-effects model. Even when accounting for the possibility of unbalanced data and some latent country fixed effects, the findings remain largely unchanged. First, subject recognition increases trust levels ($\beta=0.411$; $SE=0.202$); but second, medium recognition does not ($\beta=0.164$; $SE=0.111$). A majority respondent is indifferent about whether the government withholds minority language recognition or affords it full status in the classroom.

There are other findings reported in tables 4 and 5 that bear mentioning. At the country level, ethnic heterogeneity has the expected negative effect. People are more likely to trust when they reside in a community with their co-ethnics. Majority respondents are 22 percent more likely to say they “trust somewhat” in a country with a Herfindahl index of 0.369 (sample mean) rather than 0.609 (one standard deviation shift from mean). The coefficients for civil liberties are also in the expected direction. Recall that Freedom House measurement is constructed so that *lower* values indicate *more* liberties. When people have the freedom to conduct their lives as they see fit, they are more likely to trust people of different backgrounds, whether the difference is of national origin ($\beta=-0.337$) or of religious belief ($\beta=-0.267$). Also at the country level, GDP per capita has a positive effect. This is consistent with expectations that wealth moderates intergroup conflict. As a country’s average income shifts from the sample mean (13,442.86) to one standard deviation above (28,693.89), majority respondents are significantly less likely to indicate they “do not trust at all,” and instead more inclined to answer “trust somewhat.” The same shift

in wealth, however, has no effect on whether a respondent “trusts completely.”

At the individual level, respondent ideology has no effect on trust. Left-leaning individuals are neither more nor less likely to trust than their right-leaning counterparts. Religiosity also largely has no bearing, although the coefficient for *Respondent Religiosity* is significant in the “trust people of different religions” model. It seems that people who are more religious than others are actually also more trusting of others. It may be surprising that a devout Christian (for example) is more likely than an atheist to trust a Muslim. However, it may be helpful to remember that religiosity—measured here as frequency of worship attendance—is not synonymous with religious extremity. Instead, when individuals are religiously active, not only are they members of a pre-established network that allows them to build cooperation,⁵² but also they are more inherently likely to trust in a divine power. In contrast, for individuals who do not attend services often, religious differences may not be a salient cleavage.

A respondent’s income has a positive effect on trust. With wealth, people are less likely to denigrate others, especially the poor.⁵³ As individuals move from the “working class” to the “lower middle class,” their likelihood of trusting a stranger “somewhat” increases by two percentage points from 18.1 to 20.7. And, as they continue to move on to the “upper middle class,” the likelihood further increases to 23.6. Respondents are also more likely to trust when they have completed at least a high school degree and/or are parents. Life experiences such as attending university classes and a child’s sporting event can afford opportunities to an individual to meet new and different people in a networked environment. Additionally, if minority language recognition is to facilitate contact and reduce conflict in classrooms, it is important that the respondent has some exposure to the education system, whether directly as a student or indirectly as the parent of a student.

Empirical Evidence: Minority Sample

What are the effects of minority language recognition on trust for those in the minority? As a reminder, the minority sample constitutes only those who claim they speak the most populous nonplurality language at home. Those speaking a less populous nonplurality language are not included. Table 6 shows that minority language recognition has a positive effect on trust for those in the minority. The measure for trust in the first column is about meeting a person for the first time. The coefficients for the two recognition types are both positive and comparable in magnitude. However, the significance for subject

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.”

Table 6. Effects of Minority Language Recognition on Trust
(Minority Sample)

	(5) <i>First Time</i>	(6) <i>Diff National</i>	(7) <i>Diff Religion</i>	(8) <i>Family</i>
Country-Level Factors				
Subject Recognition	0.907* (0.487)	-1.686 (1.160)	0.148 (0.300)	0.811 (0.931)
Curriculum Recognition	0.810‡ (0.270)	1.481‡ (0.481)	0.645† (0.291)	-0.069 (0.563)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.518† (0.615)	1.574 (1.793)	-0.826‡ (0.318)	-1.625 (1.740)
Civil Liberties	-0.181* (0.098)	-0.077 (0.232)	-0.074 (0.058)	0.196 (0.216)
GDP per Capita	-0.184 (0.149)	0.644† (0.285)	0.015 (0.076)	-0.246 (0.237)
Individual-Level Factors				
Ideology	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.039 (0.030)	0.040 (0.025)
Religiosity	0.026 (0.025)	-0.060 (0.056)	0.029 (0.027)	-0.100 (0.066)
Income	0.085 (0.059)	0.070 (0.094)	0.103 (0.075)	0.070 (0.081)
Educational Attainment	0.173 (0.127)	0.556‡ (0.180)	0.248† (0.124)	0.380† (0.166)
Parental Status	0.015 (0.098)	-0.104 (0.144)	0.111 (0.094)	0.596‡ (0.096)
N	2952 (21)	2891 (21)	2917 (21)	2978 (21)
Wald χ^2	40.97‡	312.47‡	289.56‡	91.07‡
Pseudo R ²	0.015	0.066	0.010	0.027
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3238.494	-1313.249	-3362.580	-1378.756

Note: * $p \leq 0.1000$; † $p \leq 0.0500$; ‡ $p \leq 0.0100$.

Models estimated using ordered logit with standard errors clustered by country.

recognition is only at the $p \leq 0.100$ level. A shift from no recognition to either type of recognition can double a minority respondent's likelihood of trusting somewhat.


These results suggest that by recognizing minority group languages, governments signal there is inherent equality between the majority and minority groups. This equality can help reduce intergroup tensions. However, as will be evident shortly, since not all recognition types are the same, not all equalities are the same. When a language is allowed to be used only as a subject, its

speakers perceive this recognition as some sort of window-dressing. When the majority language is the only language of the curriculum, by definition, this suggests the two languages are not equal.

The differing effects of recognition type are evident in the models where trust is measured looking at people of different nationalities (model 9) and of different religions (model 10). For a minority respondent, the effects of subject recognition are statistically no different than those of no recognition. Recognition matters for trust only when instruction exists in the minority language. As illustrated in figure 2(c), a minority is only 28.8 percent likely to trust someone of a different nationality when her language is denied recognition. This number remains unchanged (31.3 percent), even when the language is afforded subject recognition. But when the same minority language is recognized as a medium of instruction, trust levels increase to 41.5 percent. Simply put, minority respondents do not respond meaningfully if their language is only taught in the classroom.

As with the majority sample, there is a measure about trusting family members. Again, theoretically, there is no reason to believe whether the government is minority-friendly has any effect on how a minority respondent

Figure 2. Likelihood of Out-Group Trust (Minority Sample)



interacts with her family. And again, empirically, the results corroborate this assertion. Neither *Subject Recognition* nor *Medium Recognition* is significant. This noneffect is evident in figure 2(d). The effects of the control variables remain substantively similar to those from the majority sample.

These results suggest that, for the minorities, mere linguistic recognition is not sufficient to make a difference in how they trust others. If a government offers recognition simply as a political concession, teaching that language in the classroom is adequate, especially for those in the majority. However, if the concern is to strengthen social capital bonds with those in the minority, there must be more such concessions. Only when this is the case will members of the minority trust at meaningful levels.

Linguistic recognition, regardless of type, does not happen in a political vacuum.⁵⁴ It is possible that a majority lacking intergroup trust for whatever nonlinguistic reason is able to constrain its politicians from adopting minority-friendly policies. And conversely, a society characterized by high levels of out-group trust may find minority language recognition in the classroom a less politicized process. Ideally, we would like to test changes in out-group trust levels before and after recognition. However, given how early recognition happened in some of the countries in the sample (e.g., the Netherlands recognized Frisian as a language of instruction as early as 1955) or closely on the heels of a major regime change (e.g., Romania recognized Hungarian after the 1989 Revolution), such surveys do not exist.


Alternatively, what we do is identify whether respondents were born before or after minority language recognition occurred in their country.⁵⁵ Splitting the respondent pool into two subsamples allows us to examine their effects. This comparison is also why we focus on only the sample of countries where the minority language is recognized—regardless of type. Put differently, if there is no recognition, there can be, by definition, no “post-recognition” respondent.

If recognition is to have a positive effect—whether it is low-cost for the majority or high-cost for the minority—we should see this effect more pronounced in the post-recognition subsamples. We re-ran the models from table 4 (majority) and table 6 (minority). The results were telling. Figure 3 shows the marginal effects of (1) subject recognition of the majority sample when we go from before recognition to after, and (2) curriculum recognition of the minority sample when we make the same shift. For those in the majority, subject recognition has a significant and positive effect—but only for those born after recognition occurred. And for those in the minority, curriculum recognition has a positive effect when the respondent was born post-recognition.

⁵⁴ Amy H. Liu, *Standardizing Diversity: The Political Economy of Language Regimes* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

⁵⁵ Given possible lag effects, we also ran models with the sample cut at five, ten, and fifteen years before recognition.

Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Being Born after Recognition



Discussion

This essay asks whether minority language recognition can affect trust and finds that, indeed, it can. For majority language speakers, recognition can facilitate cultural understanding via contact. But such benefits manifest themselves only when recognition is low-cost (e.g., allowing the minority language to be taught as a subject in schools). Once the recognition becomes high-cost (e.g., permitting the minority language to be a medium of instruction), this can be construed negatively by the majority. There is now some semblance of a zero-sum game. However, the opposite is the case for minority language speakers. Low-cost recognition has no effect on trust since it is seen as being just symbolic. Only when the recognition is substantive does it promote trust among minorities.

The policy implications of these findings are extensive. With the right policies, the development of out-group trust is possible even when ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is high. This should come as good news for those interested in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies. In pre-Taliban Afghanistan, for example, the education system was multilingual. Five languages (Baluchi, Dari, Pashtu, Turkmen, and Uzbek) were adopted and used in the curriculum.⁵⁶ All this changed during the Taliban era. The government closed most of the schools and banned the use and teaching of minority

⁵⁶ Robert Cowen and Martin McLean, *International Handbook of Education Systems: Asia, Australasia, and Latin America* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1983).

languages. However, with the passage of the 2004 Constitution and subsequent laws, minority languages are again recognized in the education system.⁵⁷ The story is similar in Iraq. Although the 1970 Constitution recognized the use of Arabic and Kurdish in schools, the reality was a far cry during Hussein's tenure. The language-in-education policy then was about forced Arabization. Kurdish was banned.⁵⁸ But with the ratification of the 2005 Constitution, Arabic and Kurdish are now both mediums of instruction.⁵⁹ Given these findings, these general developments in Afghanistan and Iraq are welcomed. The recognition of minority languages will be especially critical in developing intergroup trust in these countries.

The implications of this research are not confined to merely post-conflict societies abroad. Given the increasing numbers of immigrants, the relevance for Western democracies is no trivial matter. Immigration-relevant policies are just as important for trust. When immigrants perceive a policy as being discriminatory, they are less likely to demonstrate interpersonal trust.⁶⁰ This is evident, for instance, in a survey conducted by Michelson.⁶¹ Michelson found that after California passed Proposition 187 declaring the state as English-official, Mexican-Americans ranked discrimination as an important issue. But once the court overturned Proposition 187, discrimination was identified as being less important. Put simply, whether the heterogeneity is between "sons of the soil" (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq) or due to immigration (e.g., into the United States), policies that recognize minority languages can have positive effects for building trust.

While recognition can have a positive effect, it is evident that there are two opposite dynamics at play. It may seem that governments have to balance between being accountable to the majority and protecting the minority from majority tyranny. Here, this essay offers two possible solutions. The first is to afford minority languages low-cost recognition nationally, but if a certain set of conditions is met subnationally, extend high-cost recognition. In Slovenia, for example, Slovene, the majority language, is technically the only language of government services; yet, Hungarian and Italian, two of the larger minority languages, are afforded some recognition. In parliamentary sessions, Hungarian and Italian representatives are entitled to submit motions and raise questions in their own languages—which are then interpreted into Slovene. But at the subnational level, in municipalities with large Hungarian

⁵⁷ Leclerc, "L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde" [Linguistic management in the world].

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 5 (2007): 670-698.

⁶⁰ Melissa Michelson, "The Corrosive Effect of Acculturation: How Mexican-Americans Lose Political Trust," *Social Science Quarterly* 84 (2003): 981-933.

⁶¹ Melissa Michelson, "The Effect of National Mood on Mexican American Political Opinion," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 23 (2001): 57-70.

or Italian populations, the two languages may be used in judicial proceedings and as mediums of instructions in public schools—both evidence of high-cost recognition.

Alternatively, the other solution is to extend high-cost recognition to minority languages at the national level, but allow for more restrictive use at the subnational level—again, under certain conditions. In Finland, for instance, Swedish (minority) is afforded equal status with the majority language. In any municipality with more than 8 percent minority, public services from the courtroom to the classroom must be bilingual. However, there is a clause. At the subnational level, when the minority is less than 6 percent, singular recognition is legal. Incidentally, while this additional stipulation protects the majority Finnish speakers in the more homogenous Finnish municipalities, the same clause applies to the Swedish speakers in the Swedish-dominant areas as well.

The study's results suggest that out-group trust can be manufactured through specific government action. The results caution, however, that reform can be taken too far. Legislation, when skillfully crafted, can actually have the effect of bringing different groups of society together. There is no evidence to believe these findings are limited only to language and ethnicity. These findings could apply to any situation involving competing groups for limited political resources. A preponderance of political science research focuses on the impact that context has on the functioning of democratic institutions. Trust, social capital, and civil society are the things that make democracy work, after all. This essay opens up the possibility that democracies can manufacture trust, generate social capital, and raise the level of civil society through specific government action.