

## **Comparing Taiwan and the CEE Trio The Impact of Social and Institutional Factors on Democracy**

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### **Abstract**

This essay develops a structured comparison between Taiwan and the three Central and East European countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (the CEE trio). The purpose is to explore the social and institutional factors that impact democratic performance. The rationale of the comparison is presented first, followed by a tracking of democratic development in the four cases. The CEE trio is juxtaposed to Taiwan to show their initial differences in dominant social cleavage, electoral regime, party system, and constitutional structure. The CEE trio has a material cleavage, proportional electoral regime, multiparty structure, and parliamentary (or proparliament semipresidential) system, compared to Taiwan's prematerialist identity cleavage, single non-transferable vote turned mixed member majoritarian electoral system, two-party structure, and a semipresidential regime that tilts toward the president. The CEE trio was closer to Lijphart's "consensus" model, while Taiwan clearly demonstrated features of "majoritarianism." Initially, the CEEs performed a little better than Taiwan in the Freedom House and Polity IV scores, ostensibly conforming to Lijphart's preference for consensus democracy. The social cleavage differences between the two, however, gradually have been reduced over the last decade, as the CEEs have turned more identity-centered at the expense of the traditional left-right divide, while Taiwan gradually has shifted to distributional politics in a period of economic slowdown. Institutionally, the two remain distant, as Taiwan's electoral reform made it more majoritarian, while the CEEs remained proportional (the shift of the Czech Republic from parliamentarism to semipresidentialism by instituting direct presidential election is an exception, but the president in all likelihood will be ceremonial). The CEEs' political competition became more conflictual with its shift to identity, while Taiwan shied away from blatant identity mobilization toward more urbane politics. The changes in Freedom House and Polity IV scores demonstrate the impact of changing social cleavage. Although institutionally

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more majoritarian, Taiwan's shift away from identity politics boosts its democratic performance, while the CEEs' development in the opposite direction dampens their democratic prospects, the proconsensus institutional model there notwithstanding. Through this structured comparison, we tentatively conform to Lijphart's suggestion that consensus democracy tends to be kinder and gentler, with a critical caveat that a more conflict-prone social cleavage may negate its moderating effect.

**Keywords:** Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, social cleavage, semipresidential system.

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The KMT's rule in predemocratized Taiwan was a rare case of resilient authoritarianism that lasted for more than four decades. The only comparable case was Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party. After Taiwan embarked on political reform in the late 1980s, it turned itself into a nascent democracy. There was no guarantee, however, that the young democratic regime in Taiwan would be stable. Faced with mounting pressure from the Chinese mainland, international diplomatic isolation, and the surge of an identity split that plagued national politics, Taiwan was ill-endowed in its pursuit of an open and competitive political system. There are ample cases of democratic breakdown and authoritarian reversal, or of a system in protracted transition among young democracies. Twenty years down the road, however, Taiwan has proved to be a resilient democracy, despite all the odds it faces. What are the social and institutional factors lying behind this phenomenon and what are the prospects for Taiwan's democratic future? A comparative study of Taiwan and other nascent democracies may shed some light here.

We can start with Taiwan's predemocratic regime. Unlike the autocratic rulers in the Middle East, military juntas in Latin America, and modernizing dictators in Asia, the KMT built a quasi-Leninist party-state in Taiwan that had its roots on the Chinese mainland. Its prototype was the Soviet system that the KMT incorporated and adjusted to fit its needs in modernizing China, and in ruling Taiwan after the defeat at the hands of the communists in the Civil War. A soul-search was done in the early 1950s to perfect the system, reflecting on the humiliating fiasco on the mainland. Thereafter, the KMT regime that subsequently thrived on the island was institutionally akin to the Leninist regimes in the communist countries, albeit with diametrically opposite ideology, economic institutions, and international allies. This fact leads us to a natural comparative group for democratic Taiwan (i.e., the postcommunist countries that experienced democratic transition roughly at the same time—the end of the 1980s and early 1990s—and had a Leninist legacy with which to

deal).<sup>1</sup> To compare Taiwan with the postcommunist countries means that we have controlled not only the factor of institutional legacy, but also the timing of transition. The postcommunist and Taiwanese transitions happened in the same overall international context, with the same grand forces and processes operating and impacting on both, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the West. Contemporaneousness also means that the two were aware of the other's transition, even though this does not guarantee demonstration effect or institutional borrowing. With the clear advantage of this type of comparison, however, we are still left with the daunting task of dealing with a large number of countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia that have continued to evolve politically since the downfall of the Soviet Union, adding new members to the postcommunist club.<sup>2</sup> How, then, should we go about finding the most relevant comparative subjects?

The postcommunist countries can be placed into six groups, each one with quite strong geographic, cultural, and economic cohesion. The first group is Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. The second is the Balkans (BAK), which includes Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. These first two groups were former East European allies to the Soviet Union. To the east, the fifteen successor states can be classified into four groups: the Baltic nations (BAT: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Russia and the western countries (RWS: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), Transcaucasia (TRC: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and Central Asia (CAS: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).<sup>3</sup> The six groups vary widely in terms of their levels of economic development and population size. We should then direct our attention to only those groups that have a per capita GDP level roughly comparable to Taiwan's, and with a population size also within a comparable range. The former means that democratic transition and consolidation happened against an economic and social background similar to that of Taiwan, while the

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<sup>1</sup> Cross-continental comparison of democratization and democratic performance that involves Taiwan and postcommunist countries is rare. For exceptions, see Yu-Shan Wu, "Comparing Third-Wave Democracies: East Central Europe and the ROC," *Issues and Studies* 37, no. 4 (2001): 1-37, and Junhan Lee and Doh Chull Shin, "Divergent Paths of Democratization in Asia and Former Communist Europe," *Korea Observer* 34, no. 1 (2003): 145-171.

<sup>2</sup> The postcommunist world covers a total of thirty countries, excluding East Germany (GDR), which was incorporated into the German Federation. They are Poland, Czechoslovakia which later split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia which split into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo, Albania, the fifteen post-Soviet successor countries of Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and finally Mongolia. Kosovo (2008) is the latest addition to the list of independent countries in the postcommunist world.

<sup>3</sup> Mongolia is the odd man out, albeit with some affinities with the Central Asian Five.

latter excludes from our list those countries with government widely different in size or complexity, and with qualitatively different central-local problems.<sup>4</sup>

If we compare per capita GDP across the six groups, we will find that CEE and BAT are the two postcommunist groups that have achieved levels of economic development comparable to Taiwan's. The average per capita GDP of the CEE and BAT countries stood at US\$16,433 and US\$14,200, respectively, in 2011, reasonably close to Taiwan's US\$20,122, or 81.6 percent and 70.5 percent of Taiwan's level, respectively. BAK lagged behind with an average per capita GDP of US\$8,468 (42.1 percent of Taiwan's level), followed by RWS (US\$6,123, or 30.4 percent), TRC (US\$4,475, or 22.2 percent), and CAS (US\$4,082, or 20.3 percent). This means that we should include in our list Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There are also several outliers from other groups with a nominal per capita GDP that is above 60 percent of Taiwan's level and can be added to our list. They are Slovenia (120 percent) and Croatia (70 percent) from BAK, and Russia (65 percent) from RWS. By adding those countries to the comparative list, we have ten potential subjects for comparison with Taiwan (see table 1).

Table 1. Economic Development Level and Population Size of Postcommunist Countries Compared with Taiwan


Country	Per Capita GDP, Nominal (% of Taiwan)	Per Capita GDP, PPP (% of Taiwan)	Population (million) (% of Taiwan)
Russia	13,089 (65%)	21,246 (56%)	141.93 (610%)
Poland	13,463 (67%)	21,261 (56%)	38.216 (164%)
Czech Rep.	20,579 (102%)	26,208 (69%)	10.546 (45%)
Hungary	14,044 (70%)	21,663 (57%)	9.971 (43%)
Slovakia	17,646 (88%)	23,910 (63%)	5.440 (23%)
Croatia	14,180 (70%)	19,469 (51%)	4.407 (19%)
Lithuania	13,339 (66%)	20,321 (53%)	3.203 (14%)
Latvia	12,726 (63%)	17,569 (46%)	2.220 (10%)
Slovenia	24,142 (120%)	26,954 (71%)	2.052 (9%)
Estonia	16,533 (82%)	21,995 (58%)	1.340 (6%)

Source: The World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> For a general treatment of size and democracy, see Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973). For a pertinent postcommunist case, one can refer to the anti-Prague sentiment in the regions of the Czech Republic and compare that to anti-Taipei feelings in Southern Taiwan. Both are real but containable and are qualitatively different from the central-provincial relation in the Russian Federation. See Andrew Stroehlein, "The Second Possibility," *Central Europe Review* 100, February 8, 1999, [http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/stroehlein\\_archive/stroehlein20old.html](http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/stroehlein_archive/stroehlein20old.html) (accessed January 31, 2013).

Screening the postcommunist countries by level of economic development is a useful strategy because we understand how significantly economic factors impact a country's democratic performance. In figure 1, we show the unmistakably inverse relationship between per capita GDP and Freedom House (FH) score among the postcommunist countries and Taiwan (TAI). Country dots are distributed from upper left to lower right, suggesting the more economically developed a country is, the more democratic it tends to be. All the countries with a per capita GDP of over US\$10,000 are democratic (i.e., with a FH score of less than 2.5, the only exceptions being Russia [RUS] and Kazakhstan [KAZ]). These two outliers are explainable by their rich energy resources that created huge export revenues and raised per capita GDP.<sup>5</sup> Given the obvious impact of the level of economic development on democracy, if we want to explore the institutional and social factors that bear on democratic performance in Taiwan and postcommunist countries, we need to select economically comparable cases, so as to minimize the economic factor.

Figure 1. Per Capita GDP and FH Score, 2011



Sources: Freedom House, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20and%20Ratings%2C%201973-2013%20%28FINAL%29\\_0.xls](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20and%20Ratings%2C%201973-2013%20%28FINAL%29_0.xls), and The World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> For this “energy curse,” see Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and id., *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Now, with ten candidates on our list, we can proceed to the population test. Among the ten, Russia is way too big for a comparison with Taiwan in our study, with a population more than six times that of Taiwan (610 percent).<sup>6</sup> Six other countries also need to be removed from the list for their much smaller population sizes. They are Slovakia (23 percent), Slovenia (9 percent), Croatia (19 percent), Estonia (6 percent), Latvia (10 percent), and Lithuania (14 percent). This leaves us with Poland (164 percent), the Czech Republic (45 percent), and Hungary (43 percent). In short, Leninist institutional legacy cum contemporaneous transition, comparable level of economic development, and population size reasonably close to Taiwan's bring us to an ideal list for comparison. All three countries on the list are from the CEE group, guaranteeing a certain degree of coherence among them. The CEE trio are the postcommunist countries that are the most developed, and with a median population size. This profile makes them suitable for a comparison with Taiwan.<sup>7</sup>

## Performance over Time

We can now take a look at the democratic performance of Taiwan and the CEE trio across time. It has to be borne in mind that we are dealing with the most developed economies as well as the most stable democracies in the postcommunist world for a comparison with Taiwan (the lower-right corner of figure 1). Also, we are primarily interested in the performance categories most relevant to the core of democracy, such as civil liberties and political rights, and not in those issues close to governance effectiveness. In figure 2, we find the curve for Taiwan continuously hovering over that of the CEE trio for most of the observation period (1993-2012), starting with a 4 (partly free) in 1993, descending to 2 (free) in 1996, and stabilizing at 1.5 in 2006 and thereafter. Among the CEE trio, the same score was shared by the three countries between 1995 and 2010, with a notch of improvement in 2004 from 1.5 to 1. Only Poland in 1993-1994 (at 2, or 0.5 point worse than Hungary and the Czech Republic) and Hungary in 2011-2012 (at 1.5, also 0.5 point worse than the

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<sup>6</sup> Meaningful comparison can still be made if we concentrate on specific aspects, such as the operation and performance of semipresidentialism in the two countries. See Yu-Shan Wu, "Comparing Semi-Presidentialism in the ROC and the Russian Federation," *Chinese Political Science Review* 30 (1998): 123-186; id., *Eluosi zhuanxing 1992-1999: yige zhengzhi jingjixue de fenxi* [Russia's transition 1992-1999: A politico-economic analysis] (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2000); and id., "Banzongtongzhi xia neige zucheng yu zhengzhi wending: bijiao Eluosi, Bolan yu Zhonghua minguo" [Cabinet formation and political stability under semipresidentialism: Comparing Russia, Poland and the ROC], *Journal of Russian Studies* 2 (2002): 229-265.

<sup>7</sup> The only CEE country that is left out of our comparative list is Slovakia, because of its small size. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are commonly referred to as the Visegrad countries. Because we do not include Slovakia here, we shall refer to the three countries on our list as the CEE trio.

other two) deviated from the norm. The overall picture is clear.<sup>8</sup> First, both Taiwan and the CEE trio have performed quite well in the nascent democratic world over the past two decades. Second, Taiwan has lagged behind the CEE trio by a margin of 0.5 point for most of the time. The first phenomenon can be easily explained by the relatively high level of economic development that the four countries share. The second phenomenon, however, requires closer scrutiny.


## **Frame of Comparison**

Democracies can be compared in terms of dominant social cleavage, electoral regime, party system, and constitutional structure. They all bear on the democratic performance of the country. Among the four factors, the first one is social, and the rest are institutional. Social cleavage can be classified as prematerialist (such as ethnic and religious), materialist (typically, left and right), or postmaterialist (such as environmentalism and gender). This classification is based on historical social development in the West. The Industrial Revolution brought about a class structure that defined the materialist interests of social actors. The democratic process then acted on this structure, dividing a nation along the left-right spectrum. This socioeconomic cleavage then became the dominant divide in the West, superseding or at least mitigating the prematerialist cleavages based on ethnic and religious identity. None of the postmaterialist issues and cleavages that arose after the consolidation of the materialist cleavage has been able to replace it, as it did with the prematerialist cleavages. Although historically the West experienced these three types of

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<sup>8</sup> One may question whether the FH scores alone are sufficient to prove the pattern. For this, we look into the democratic performance of Taiwan and the CEE trio as evaluated by Polity IV. There, the pattern is the same. From 1993 to 2004, Taiwan either received a score lower than any of the CEE trio (1993-1997, 2003-2004), or stood at the CEE's lower bound of 9 together with Poland, while Hungary and the Czech Republic had reached 10, or "full democracy," in 1998-2002. Taiwan joined the CEEs in the full democracy club in 2005 and has managed to stay there. The only case when there was a CEE country receiving a lower score than Taiwan was the Czech Republic's dip from 10 to 8 in 2007, apparently reflecting the political turbulence of the time in that country. We also checked other databases, such as Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) and found that, on average, Taiwan does not fare better or worse than the CEE trio if all six aggregate indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) are taken into consideration. However, if we concentrate on voice and accountability, the one indicator that is most relevant to democratic performance, then the pattern resurfaces. Between 1996 and 2011 when data are available, we find that Taiwan's score was at the bottom for 69 percent of the time, and was the second lowest for 23 percent of the time. Through the review of the three most-cited databases, we find a sustained pattern, although it has to be cautioned that the differences between Taiwan and the CEEs are not great, and that they pale when compared with the differences between these four countries and other postcommunist countries. See Polity IV Project, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>, and The World Bank, [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc\\_country.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp), (accessed January 30, 2013).

Figure 2. Democratic Performance: Taiwan vs. CEE Trio



	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
POL	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CZE	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
HUN	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.5	1.5
TAI	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	1.5	1.5	2	2	1.5	1	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5

Source: Freedom House, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20and%20Ratings%2C%201973-2013%20%28FINAL%29\\_0.xls](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20and%20Ratings%2C%201973-2013%20%28FINAL%29_0.xls) (accessed February 1, 2013).



cleavages in clear sequence, it is not necessary for this phenomenon to repeat itself in non-Western societies.

An electoral regime can be classified in terms of its proportionality. It can tilt either toward the majoritarian end (such as first-past-the-post, FPTP), or the proportional end (such as proportional representation, PR), or somewhere toward the middle (such as single non-transferable vote, SNTV). Dominant social cleavage and electoral regime combine to define the party system: the former determines conflict intensity and the latter the number of actors in the system, which can be calculated in terms of the effective number of parties in the parliament. Finally, the constitutional structure refers to the fundamental arrangements of the government that may be parliamentary, presidential, or semipresidential. A country is said to have a semipresidential system when it combines the dominant features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism, viz., a popularly elected president and a cabinet headed by a prime minister who is responsible to the parliament. Like the electoral regime, a constitutional structure can be more or less majoritarian. Presidentialism is mostly majoritarian, followed by the various subtypes of semipresidentialism, and then parliamentarism. In short, a country's dominant social cleavage can be materialist or nonmaterialist, and its political institutions can be more or less majoritarian.

The nature of a dominant social cleavage and political institutions has great impact on the democratic performance of a nascent democracy. Prematerialist cleavages, particularly the ethnic-religious ones, are more prone to conflict than materialist cleavages. Social mobility may mitigate class divide, but has little effect on ascriptive groups. As a result, the reconcilability of socioeconomic cleavage is much higher than for ethno-cultural cleavage. In short, materialist cleavages are more easily processed through the institutional machinery of liberal democracy than prematerialist cleavages that are based on ethnic, linguistic, or religious identities.<sup>9</sup> Political institutions are also critical. For Lijphart, proportional representation and parliamentarism are the institutional building blocks of consensus democracy, which he considers a kinder and gentler form of government than a majoritarian system.<sup>10</sup> If we combine these

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<sup>9</sup> See Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> Lijphart's arguments are against the conventional wisdom that Anglo-American majoritarian institutions are better suited for a liberal democracy. As such, the Lijphart theme has been subject to various criticisms. However, Lijphart strongly countered the critiques with refinement of the concept (from consociationalism to consensus democracy), and ample empirical evidence. For advocacy of majoritarianism as a better form of democratic government, see Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political System," *Journal of Politics* 18 (1956): 391-409. For Lijphart's critique of this conventional wisdom, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), and id., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six*

two perspectives, we will find a country with a predominantly prematerialist, identity-based social cleavage, and majoritarian political institutions that are ill-equipped to process social conflict, while one with materialist, socioeconomic cleavage and proportional/consensual political institutions is better positioned to manage distribution of values among competing interests.

## Social Cleavages

The CEE countries experienced rapid industrialization during the interwar period. A class structure emerged that gave rise to political parties along the left-right divide. The historical parties that resurged after communist rule owed their existence to this early period of socioeconomic transformation, such as the Independent Smallholders in Hungary (FKgP), the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The new parties that appeared during the process of political transition in the postcommunist era can also easily find their positions on the left-right spectrum, such as the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) in Hungary, and the Democratic—and later Freedom—Union (UW) in Poland. Finally, one finds the successors to the communist parties that ruled the country for four decades, such as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), and the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP), which dominates the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).<sup>11</sup> Those successor parties also advocate particular materialist interests and find their support in specific socioeconomic groupings. In short, the dominant social cleavage and political parties in the CEE trio are closely aligned to materialist and class interests, conforming to the dominant pattern in Western democracies. Four decades of communist rule did not create a classless society. The removal of the party's dictatorial powers caused a resurgence of class politics.

Besides the dominant materialist social cleavage, the CEE trio has quite homogeneous populations. Ethnic Poles are 96.7 percent of the total population of Poland. The largest minority is the Germans at 0.4 percent. Ethnic Czechs are 90.4 percent of the population in the Czech Republic, compared with 3.7 percent Moravians in the country. Ethnic Hungarians are 92.3 percent of

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*Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). For criticism of Lijphart's theme, see Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, "Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?" *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (1995): 271-281.

<sup>11</sup> Among the three, the Polish SdRP's founding congress was the continuation of the final congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the ruling communist party in the past. The MSzMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) split into MSzMP (the conservatives) and MSzP (the reformers) after the October 1989 conference, thus MSzP's relation with the former communist party is not as strong as the SdRP's relation with the Polish communist party. The Czech KSČM is the least reformed communist party in Central and Eastern Europe. Its linkage with the past is the strongest.

Hungary's population, facing a Roma population of 1.9 percent. The biggest ethnic problem in the region was solved with the "Velvet Divorce" between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, homogenizing the populations in the two countries. Because of this reason, one does not find ethnically-based political parties in the three countries, unlike in Romania, for example, where ethnic Hungarians constitute a significant political force to be reckoned with, or in Bulgaria, where a Turkish minority carries some political weight.

Taiwan is an entirely different story. It has an industrial structure that tilts toward medium and small enterprises that dampens working-class consciousness. The rapid economic growth in the post-World War II decades accelerated social mobility and blurred class boundaries. Compared on the basis of the underdevelopment of class consciousness, however, Taiwan has been plagued by deep-rooted subethnic identities that clash over national identification, stance toward mainland China, and preference for the future of the nation (unification vs. independence).<sup>12</sup> In the late 1980s when Taiwan's party system was taking form, socioeconomic cleavage and subethnic identity cleavage competed for dominance. The latter handsomely won the competition and has since defined Taiwan's politics.<sup>13</sup> There are two opposing forces. The KMT/Blue camp upholds a diluted version of Chinese nationalism, and adheres to a continental, *Jus Sanguinis* historiography.<sup>14</sup> It claims that the Republic of China's sovereignty extends to the Chinese mainland, although its jurisdiction is confined to Taiwan and specific isles. It is willing to accept a gradual, phased, and conditional unification with the Chinese mainland, although there is no time table. Standing diametrically opposite to the KMT is the DPP/Green camp that upholds Taiwanese nationalism, and advocates a maritime, *Jus Soli* historiography. It asserts that Taiwan as an existing independent nation is legally separate from China. On the future of the nation, the Green camp demands *de jure* independence, or rectification of the country's name, although its moderate wing is willing to accept Republic of China as the name of the country as long as it does not pretend to cover mainland China. Understandably, different subethnic groups in Taiwan tend to support different parties and camps that reflect their inner identities, although the match is not perfect and has become less obvious among young generations. This identity-based cleavage is basically absent in Central and Eastern Europe, where the populations are more homogenized and national identity is not a defining issue in politics.

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<sup>12</sup> See Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Implications: Testing the Worst-Case Scenario," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 4 (2004): 614-625.

<sup>13</sup> Yu-Shan Wu, "Marketization of Politics: The Taiwan Experience," *Asian Survey* 24, no. 4 (1989): 382-400.

<sup>14</sup> See Yu-Shan Wu, "The Evolution of the KMT's Stance on the One-China Principle: National Identity in Flux," in *Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives*, ed. Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (London: Routledge, 2011).

In Taiwan, both the KMT and the DPP are basically probusiness. Neither has a major working class representation built into its organizational structure. Since there are no left parties to speak of, half of the right-left political spectrum is conspicuously missing in Republic of China (ROC) politics. Not only is there a lack of materialist cleavage, but also Taiwan lacks environmental politics. Even though protests against polluting factories and demand for environmental protection are common themes in politics, they have not crystallized into significant political representation, such as a vocal Green party in national politics. The DPP used to take an antinuclear position when in opposition, but when it assumed power in 2000 and faced overwhelming pressure from the business community and bleak economic prospects (particularly with the stock market in a tailspin), it could not help but make a U-turn on its decision to suspend the building of the controversial Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Because of the dominance of identity politics in Taiwan, the country is more poorly equipped than its CEE counterparts to consolidate a nascent democracy.<sup>15</sup>

## Electoral Regimes and Party System

The CEE countries have all adopted proportional electoral systems under the influence of Europe. The Polish system is highly proportional, with all 460 seats in the *Sejm* (lower house) distributed among political parties according to their shares of vote in forty-one multimember districts.<sup>16</sup> It is an open-list system, so voters can choose one candidate on the list. A threshold of 5 percent for parties and 8 percent for party coalitions is set for the allotment of seats. The *Sejm* members serve four-year terms.<sup>17</sup> A similar arrangement is found in the Czech Republic, where PR governs the distribution of seats in the lower house of the parliament (Chamber of Deputies, *Poslanecka Snemovna*). All two hundred deputies are elected to serve four-year terms by an open party-list system with proportional representation. To gain seats in the Chamber, each party needs to receive at least 5 percent of the votes nationwide. The threshold is raised to 10 percent for two-party coalitions, 15 percent for three-party coalitions, and 20 percent for four-party coalitions and above.<sup>18</sup> The Hungarian system is the

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<sup>15</sup> In this sense, Taiwan is more like Ukraine with its political divide between the eastern and western parts of the country, and their different attitudes toward Russia. The Ukrainian subethnic divide is a perennial factor that plagues its politics and prevents the consolidation of democracy there.

<sup>16</sup> The one hundred seats in the upper house of the parliament, the Senate, are allotted to political parties using the first-past-the-post system.

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the Polish electoral system and the dynamics of its changes, see Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden, "Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland's Electoral System, 1989-2001," *Journal of Politics* 66, no. 2 (2004): 396-427.

<sup>18</sup> There is also an upper house, the Senate, that elects eighty-one members from single-member constituencies using a runoff voting system. The government, however, is only accountable to the Chamber of Deputies. See Lukáš Linek and Zdenka Mansfeldová, "The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993-2004," *Journal of Legislative Studies* 13, no. 1 (2007): 26.

most complicated, in which 176 seats in the National Assembly are returned from single-member constituencies, 146 from multimember districts (with a 5 percent threshold), and the remaining 64 seats from a national list.<sup>19</sup> A runoff voting system is used for the single-member seats (the top three candidates and any candidate with more than 15 percent of the vote can compete in the runoff), while closed-list proportional representation governs the multimember districts and the national list. The votes in the national list are carried over from multimember districts (the remainder votes) and from single-member constituencies cast for nonwinning candidates. As such, the national list serves as a compensatory mechanism. Put together, the multimember districts and national list make the Hungarian mixed-voting system predominantly proportional, although its proportionality lags behind the Polish and Czech systems. In sum, all three countries have fairly proportional electoral systems, and we should expect a multiparty system to emerge.

In contrast to the proportional electoral system in the CEE trio, Taiwan was one of the few countries that used single non-transferable vote for its national elections prior to the 2005 electoral reform. The SNTV system has a level of proportionality between single-member district (SMD) and PR. The SNTV system awards seats to parties in multimember districts not based on their vote shares, but on the ranking of individual party candidates. Besides the main SNTV body, a national list was added to the system, creating a mixed structure. The SNTV and the proportional tiers are not parallel, but connected. A vote for an individual candidate in a multimember district is also counted as a vote for the party that fields the candidate. The SNTV tier thus dominates the proportional tier. This mildly proportional system was transformed into a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral regime that combines single-member district plurality rule and list proportional representation. Under the new system, there are 113 seats available in the Legislative Yuan, of which 73 (64.6 percent) are elected from SMDs and 34 (30 percent) by PR. There are also six aboriginal representatives elected from two three-member districts using the old SNTV system. The new system was first used in the Legislative Yuan election of January 2008. Obviously, Taiwan's electoral reform brought about a much more majoritarian system. As the results of the 2008 legislative elections clearly show, the new system benefits the large parties, particularly the largest one, at the expense of the small parties. Indeed, the KMT emerged as the main beneficiary of the new system.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> As such, the Hungarian system belongs to the "parallel" mixed electoral regime that combines a plural and a proportional tier without interaction between them, or Mixed Member Majoritarian system. See Matthew Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>20</sup> See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "The Origins and Consequences of Electoral Reform in Taiwan," *Issues & Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 1-22.

The party systems that emerged from the proportional electoral regime in the CEE trio and the majoritarian system in Taiwan are as expected. The more proportional the electoral system is, the more fragmented the party system is likely to become. Among the four countries, Poland and the Czech Republic have a pure PR system, Hungary employs a mixed system that tilts toward PR, and Taiwan has the most majoritarian electoral regime. We should then expect that Poland and the Czech Republic would develop a more fragmented party system, with the highest effective number of parties (ENP), followed by Hungary, and then Taiwan, which should have a biparty structure. A casual look at the current parliamentary parties in the four countries and their respective effective number of parties shows exactly the expected picture. In table 2, we present the average ENP from the last two elections in the four countries.<sup>21</sup> The Czech Republic and Poland have the most proportional system, and their ENPs are the highest, at 3.96 and 2.90, respectively. Hungary's PR-tilting mixed system brings about a smaller ENP at 2.20.<sup>22</sup> Finally, Taiwan's most majoritarian system begets the smallest ENP at 1.99. The prereform ENP in Taiwan was higher. In sum, the CEE's more proportional electoral regime brings about a multiparty system, and Taiwan's predominantly majoritarian regime leads to a biparty system.

If we follow Lijphart's suggestions, societies with an adversarial culture should adopt political institutions that are prone to consensus democracy, by which he means a PR electoral system and a parliamentary constitutional order.

Table 2. Electoral Regime and Effective Number of Parties

Country	Electoral System	Effective Number of Parties	Parliamentary Elections
Czech Rep.	Pure PR	3.96	2006, 2010
Poland	Pure PR	2.90	2007, 2011
Hungary	Mixed toward PR	2.20	2006, 2010
Taiwan	Mixed toward Majoritarianism	1.99	2008, 2012

Sources: The Election Resources, <http://www.electionresources.org>; <http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp?voteSel=20080101A2>; and <http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp?voteSel=20120101A2> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>21</sup> The reason for us to use the results from the last two elections is that Taiwan changed its electoral system in 2005 and has thus far held only two parliamentary elections under the new MMM system. Hence, we calculate the ENPs from the last two elections in all four countries for comparability.

<sup>22</sup> For a general discussion of the elections and the party systems in the postcommunist world, see David M. Olson and Gabriella Ilonszki, "Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist Parliamentary Development," *Journal of Legislative Studies* 17, no. 2 (2011): 234-255.

As identity-based cleavages are more conflict-prone than materialist cleavages, a society with a dominant (sub)ethnic divide should avoid majoritarian institutions, and adopt a proportional system. In our case, as Taiwan is endowed with a more adversarial identity-based cleavage, it has greater reason to adopt a proportional electoral regime than its CEE counterparts, which have developed a less conflict-prone materialist cleavage. A proportional regime and the multiparty system that it would bring about would force political actors to seek compromise and develop a culture of tolerance. Unfortunately, Taiwan not only has adopted a majoritarian electoral system, but also its constitutional order tilts toward majoritarianism.

## Constitutional Structure

The CEE trio has adopted two types of constitutional structures. Hungary and the Czech Republic are parliamentary democracies, and Poland is semipresidential.<sup>23</sup> The major difference between these two types of constitutional orders is that semipresidentialism requires direct election of the president. The juxtaposition of direct presidential election and government accountability to parliament means that there would be a tug of war between the president and the parliament if the presidential party did not control the parliament. Depending on how this problem is resolved, we can differentiate semipresidential regimes into four subtypes: *quasi-parliamentarism*, in which the president serves as titular head of state; *presidential supremacy*, where the government is responsible to the president and the parliamentary majority cannot hold the cabinet responsible; *alternation*, in which power shifts between the president and the parliamentary majority based on whether the presidential party controls the parliament; and *compromise*, in which the president relies on constitutional stipulations to control specific cabinet portfolios or policy domains, even if he is forced to cohabit with an opposition majority in the parliament.<sup>24</sup> With its “winner-takes-all” feature, presidentialism is most majoritarian, followed by the various subtypes of semipresidentialism, and finally parliamentarism. Among the semipresidential subtypes, quasi-parliamentarism is the least majoritarian, and presidential supremacy the most. Alternation and compromise are modes in the middle.

Among the postcommunist countries, a majority has adopted semipresidentialism. There are only six parliamentary regimes among the thirty postcommunist countries.<sup>25</sup> Presidential regimes are even fewer, with

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<sup>23</sup> As will be mentioned later, the Czech Republic instituted popular presidential election in 2012, and accordingly shifted to semipresidentialism. However, during the period of our observation, the Czech system remained parliamentary.

<sup>24</sup> See Yu-Shan Wu, “Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut,” in *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, ed., Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and Yu-Shan Wu (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

<sup>25</sup> They are Hungary, the Czech Republic (until 2012), Kosovo, Albania, Estonia, and Latvia.

the only case being Georgia prior to the Rose Revolution.<sup>26</sup> The dominance of semipresidential regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can be explained by the fact that the communist party-states predating the democratic regimes provided for dual executives and division of power between the general secretary of the communist party and the prime minister, and this executive dualism was sustained during the process of democratization and constitution making.<sup>27</sup> The appearance of parliamentary regimes on the western fringe of the postcommunist world and the differentiation of the semipresidential regimes into various subtypes can best be explained by political culture and geographical diffusion of institutions.<sup>28</sup>

The CEE countries are influenced by both Leninist institutional legacy and their cultural and geographical proximity to Europe, which means that it is possible to imagine the appearance of parliamentary regimes or semipresidential regimes with a tilt toward parliamentary powers in those countries. Indeed, what emerged in the trio is parliamentarism in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and semipresidentialism in Poland of the compromise/alternation subtype. The specific outcomes were not determined by the institutional, cultural, or geographical factors that impacted the trio's choices, as those factors simply set a general environment and offered a range of institutional possibilities. The institutional specifics of the three countries had much to do with the elite's rational calculation and the process of their competition and compromise. Hence, Hungarian parliamentarism was the direct result of the opposition (SzDSz and Fidesz) boycotting a referendum that could have given Hungary a directly elected president (most likely the reformist communist leader Imre Pozsgay) had it been passed.<sup>29</sup> In Czechoslovakia, President Václav Havel's attempts to expand presidential powers and institute direct election of the president as the federation was melting away in 1991-1992 met with stiff opposition and thus failed.<sup>30</sup> It is interesting to note that his major rival at the time, Prime Minister Václav Klaus, later became president of the

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<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of Georgian constitutional development, see Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch, eds., *Enough: The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), and Cory Welt, "Georgia's Constitutional Reform," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, November 11, 2010, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5443> (accessed January 20, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> See Jean Blondel, "Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World," in *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>28</sup> Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographical Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 53, no. 1 (2000): 1-37.

<sup>29</sup> See David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 1.

<sup>30</sup> See Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Czech Republic: Havel and the Evolution of the Presidency since 1989," in *Postcommunist Presidents*, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and Jan Kysela and Zdeněk Kühn, "Presidential Elections in Government: The Czech Republic," *European Constitutional Law Review* 3 (2007): 91-113.



Czech Republic, and at the time of his retirement in 2013, the country held its first direct presidential election and turned semipresidential. The most likely subtype of the new Czech semipresidential system is quasi-parliamentarism. This major institutional change demonstrates how easy it is to shift between parliamentarism and semipresidentialism in the CEE region. Finally, the Polish president was originally elected by the *Sejm*, and it took the charismatic Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa to engineer a constitutional change to install direct presidential election for his own benefit. Polish semipresidentialism evolved from the compromise mode, with the presidential appointment of ministers of internal and foreign affairs and national defense (1992 Little Constitution), to alternation (after the adoption of a new constitution in 1997), and finally to quasi-parliamentarism (with the election of President Bronisław Komorowski, a protégé of the prime minister, Donald Tusk). The evolution of Polish semipresidentialism toward greater parliamentary powers is very much in tune with European preferences. In sum, whether parliamentary or semipresidential, the CEE constitutional system is nonmajoritarian.

The case in Taiwan is strikingly different. Sharing the same Leninist tradition of dual executives with the postcommunist countries, Taiwan evolved into full semipresidentialism in 1997 after a major constitutional amendment.<sup>31</sup> Because of a lack of parliamentary tradition, political culture that favors a strong president, and, particularly, the absence of an institutional core that provides incentives and demonstration for parliamentarism as did Europe for the CEE trio, Taiwan settled on the presidential supremacy mode of semipresidentialism.<sup>32</sup> As a result, the president wields absolute power in appointing and dismissing the prime minister and cabinet members, whether his political party controls the Legislative Yuan or not.<sup>33</sup> The parliament is unable to challenge the president in cabinet formation and dismissal. This constitutional system is, indeed, majoritarian.

As the CEE trio follows the principle of cabinet accountability to the parliament, and not to the president (the short period in the 1990s of dual

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<sup>31</sup> For a full account of Taiwan's evolution into full semipresidentialism, see Yu-Shan Wu, "Semi-Presidentialism—Easy to Choose, Difficult to Operate: The Case of Taiwan," in *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, ed., Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup (London: Routledge, 2007), and Yu-Shan Wu and Jung-Hsiang Tsai, "Taiwan: Democratic Consolidation under President-Parliamentarism," in *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, ed. Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and Yu-Shan Wu (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

<sup>32</sup> For Robert Elgie and others who use the "premier-presidentialism vs. president-parliamentarism" dichotomy, Taiwan is a clear case of the latter, and its political stability is somewhat a surprise because of the bad record of president-parliamentarian regimes as a whole. See Robert Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-types and Democratic Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153-157.

<sup>33</sup> See Yu-Shan Wu, "Appointing the Prime Minister under Incongruence: Taiwan in Comparison with France and Russia," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (2005): 103-132.

accountability in Poland notwithstanding), one can see that parliamentary elections are always followed by cabinet formations that reflect the distribution of seats in the parliament. As voters typically shifted to the opposition in parliamentary elections, the right and left parties took turns in forming the government (see table 3). Among the seven parliamentary elections in Poland, only two witnessed continuation of the government's overall tendency (i.e., right followed by right [2007, 2011], and only one saw the ruling coalition reelected [2011]). In Hungary, only one parliamentary election returned the same ruling coalition (2006). In the Czech Republic, a ruling coalition has been reelected (with changed configurations) twice among the five parliamentary elections since its Velvet Divorce with Slovakia. Presidential elections have little effect on cabinet formation in all three countries.

However, presidential elections affect cabinet formation in Taiwan, where government is formed by the president. The significance of presidential elections was revealed when a newly elected president was faced with a parliament controlled by an opposition majority, and when a new parliament was elected with a majority opposing the president. In both cases, the president's will prevailed. The DPP's Chen Shui-bian took office in May 2000 when the KMT held an absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan. Chen nevertheless appointed a new cabinet headed by Tang Fei, a holdover from the previous KMT government but now joining the cabinet on an individual basis. The transitional Tang administration was then followed by no less than five DPP cabinets, whose prime ministers all were factional leaders in the party favored by President Chen at the time. Toward the end of Chen's tenure, a parliamentary election was held in January 2008, seventy days prior to the presidential election. The parliamentary race produced a super KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan (partly the effect of the majoritarian electoral reform), the first time since that party lost the majority in the December 2001 election. However, between January and May, the DPP's Chang cabinet persisted with Chen's blessing. In short, one finds Taiwan's governments closely follow the president's preferences, and have little to do with the results of parliamentary elections (see table 4).

The constitutional system thus adds to the electoral regime in making Taiwan's political institutions much more majoritarian than those of the CEE trio. This can be seen by taking a look at the nature of the cabinets: the trio almost always has coalition governments, while Taiwan invariably has single-party cabinets. For the trio, a proportional electoral system brings about a multiparty system, and a parliamentary regime requires the formation of coalition governments for the support of the parliament. In Taiwan, a much more majoritarian electoral regime produces a biparty system, and the dominance of the president means that there is much less need for compromise, even when the presidential party is in the minority in the parliament.

Table 3. Party Turnovers in the CEE Trio

Country	Parliamentary Elections	Government	Prime Minister	Orientation
Poland	Oct. 1991	PC, ZChN, PChD, PL (Dec. 1991-June 1992)	Jan Olszewski (PC) (Dec. 1991-June 1992)	Right
		PSL, PL, PChD, KLD (June 1992-July 1992)	Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) (June 1992-July 1992)	
		UD, ZChN, KLD (July 1992-Oct. 1993)	Hanna Suchocka (UD) (July 1992-Oct. 1993)	
	Sept. 1993	PSL, SLD (Oct. 1993-March 1995)	Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) (Oct. 1993-March 1995)	Left
		SLD, PSL (March 1995-Feb. 1996)	Józef Oleksy (SLD) (March 1995-Feb. 1996)	
		SLD, PSL (Feb. 1996-Oct. 1997)	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) (Feb. 1996-Oct. 1997)	
	Sept. 1997	AWS, UW	Jerzy Buzek (AWS)	Right
	Sept. 2001	SLD, PSL, UP	Leszek Cezary Miller (SLD) (Oct. 2001-May 2004);	Left
			Marek Marian Belka (SLD) (May 2004-June 2004) (June 2004-Oct. 2005)	
	Sept. 2005	PiS (Oct. 2005-May 2006)	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS) (Oct. 2005-July 2006)	Right
Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) (July 2006-Nov. 2007)				
Oct. 2007	PO, PSL	Donald Tusk (PO)	Right	
Oct. 2011	PO, PSL	Donald Tusk (PO)	Right	
Hungary	May 1990	MDF, FKgP, KDNP	József Antall (MDF) (May 1990-Dec. 1993)	Right
			Péter Boross (MDF) (Dec. 1993-July 1994)	
	May 1994	MSzP, SzDSz	Gyula Horn (MSzP)	Left
	May 1998	Fidesz, FKgP, MDF	Viktor Orbán (Fidesz)	Right
	April 2002	MSzP, SzDSz	Péter Medgyessy (MSzP) (May 2002-Sept. 2004)	Left
			Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSzP) (Sept. 2004-June 2006)	
	April 2006	MSzP, SzDSz (June 2006-April 2009)	Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSzP) (June 2006-April 2009);	Left
Gordon Bajnai (MSzP) (April 2009-May 2010)				
April 2010	Fidesz, KDNP	Viktor Orbán (Fidesz)	Right	

Table 3. Party Turnovers in the CEE Trio (2)

Country	Parliamentary Elections	Government	Prime Minister	Orientation
The Czech Republic*	June 1996	ODS, ODA, KDU-ČSL	Václav Klaus (ODS) (July 1996-Dec. 1997)	Right
			Josef Tošovský (Independent) (Dec. 1997-July 1998)	
	June 1998	ČSSD	Miloš Zeman (ČSSD)	Left
	June 2002	ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU, SN, ODA (July 2002-July 2004)	Vladimír Špidla (ČSSD) (July 2002-July 2004)	Left
		ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU (July 2004-Aug 2006)	Stanislav Gross (ČSSD) (July 2004-April 2005)	
			Jiří Paroubek (ČSSD) (April 2005-Aug 2006)	
	June 2006	ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ (Aug. 2006-May 2009)	Mirek Topolánek (ODS) (Aug. 2006-May 2009)	Right
		ODS, ČSSD (May 2009-June 2010)	Jan Fischer (Independent) (May 2009-June 2010)	
	May 2010	ODS, TOP 09, VV	Petr Nečas (ODS)	Right

Source: Compiled by author.

\*We do not include the elections held prior to the breakdown of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993.

PC = Center Alliance (Poland)

ZChN = Christian National Union (Poland)

PChD = Party of Christian Democrats (Poland)

PL = Agrarian Alliance (Poland)

PSL = Polish Peasant Party (Poland)

KLD = The Liberal Democratic Congress (Poland)

UD = The Democratic Union (Poland)

SLD = Alliance of Democratic Left (Poland)

AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action (Poland)

UW = Freedom Union (Poland)

UP = The Labour Union (Poland)

PiS = Law and Justice (Poland)

SRP = Self-Defense (Poland)

LPR = League of Polish Families (Poland)

PO = Civic Platform (Poland)

MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary)

FKgP = Independent Smallholders (Hungary)

KDNP = Christian Democratic People's Party (Hungary)

MSzP = Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungary)

SzDSz = Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary)

Fidesz = Alliance of Young Democrats (Hungary)

ODS = Civic Democratic Party (the Czech Republic)

ODA = Civic Democratic Alliance (the Czech Republic)

KDU-ČSL = Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovakia People's Party (the Czech Republic)

ČSSD = Czech Social Democratic Party (the Czech Republic)

SN = Association of Independents (the Czech Republic)

US-DEU = Freedom Union-Democratic Union (the Czech Republic)

SZ = Green Party (the Czech Republic)

TOP 09 = Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (the Czech Republic)

VV = Public Affairs (the Czech Republic)

Table 4. Party Turnovers in Taiwan

Country	Parliamentary Elections	Government	Prime Minister	Orientation
Taiwan	Dec. 1992	KMT	Lien Chan (KMT) (Feb. 1993-Sep. 1997)	Pro-unification
	Dec. 1995	KMT	Lien Chan (KMT) (Feb. 1993-Sep. 1997)	Pro-unification
			Vincent Siew (KMT) (Sep. 1997-May 2000)	
	Dec. 1998	KMT (Sep. 1997-May 2000)	Vincent Siew (KMT) (Sep. 1997-May 2000)	Pro-unification
		DPP (May 2000- Feb. 2002)	Tang Fei (Independent)* (May 2000-Oct. 2000)	Pro-independence
			Chang Chun-hsiung (DPP) (Oct. 2000-Feb. 2002)	
	Dec. 2001	DPP	Chang Chun-hsiung (DPP) (Oct. 2000-Feb. 2002)	Pro-independence
			Yu Shyi-kun (DPP) (Feb. 2002-Feb. 2005)	
	Dec. 2004	DPP	Yu Shyi-kun (DPP) (Feb. 2002-Feb. 2005)	Pro-independence
			Frank C.T. Hsieh (DPP) (Feb. 2005-Jan. 2006)	
Su Tseng-chang (DPP) (Jan. 2006-May 2007)				
Chang Chun-hsiung (DPP) (May 2007-May 2008)				
Jan. 2008	KMT	Chang Chun-hsiung (DPP) (May 2007-May 2008)	Pro-unification	
		Liu Chao-shiuan (KMT) (May 2008-Sep. 2009)		
		Wu Den-yih (KMT) (Sep. 2009-Feb.2012)		
Jan. 2012	KMT	Sean Chen (KMT) (Feb.2012-Feb. 2013)	Pro-unification	
		Jiang Yi-Huah (KMT) (Feb. 2013-)		

Source: Compiled by author.

KMT = Kuomintang (Taiwan, Republic of China).

DPP = Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan, Republic of China).

\*Though a KMT member, he joined the DPP cabinet on an individual basis.

## Conclusion: Trends into the Future

The combination of the electoral and constitutional institutions in the CEE trio brings about a representative and diverse political landscape, and the need for compromise and coalition. On the contrary, the majoritarian institutions in Taiwan concentrate power in the hand of the president, who has less need to compromise or share power. Combined with the fact that Taiwan has a more conflict-prone identity cleavage than the CEE countries, one finds an unfavorable social and institutional setting for a nascent democracy. This, in part, explains the trailing of Taiwan's democracy score behind those of the CEE trio, though only by a small margin (figure 2).

Although the institutional setting has remained basically unchanged for the CEE trio and Taiwan for the past two decades, there appears to be a gradual shift of social cleavage in both. In the case of the CEE trio, one witnesses more conflictual politics that center on identity. In Poland, this trend began with the rise of the Kaczyński brothers (Lech and Jarosław), who represented popular social conservatism and expressed unequivocal disdain for those who lacked "Polishness." With the decline of the left in Polish politics, the main political battle increasingly is being waged between two right parties. The left-right divide thus has lost its significance and identity differences have become more prominent. In Hungary, a high authoritarian tendency is evident among the supporters of Fidesz, led by incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose uncompromising ultranationalist rhetoric has stirred up great controversy both domestically and internationally.<sup>34</sup> The enactment and amendment of the constitution in January 2012 and one year later are particularly controversial, with the curtailment of the powers of independent institutions, such as the judiciary and the central bank. Even in the most liberal of the three CEE countries, the Czech Republic, the January 2013 presidential election witnessed Miloš Zeman's playing on the fear of the return of the Sudeten Germans, and attacking his opponent, Karel Schwarzenberg, for lack of "Czechness."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of the rising authoritarian tendency among supporters of Fidesz, see Bojan Todorović and Zsolt Enyedi, "Authoritarian without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 5 (2008): 767-787.

<sup>35</sup> Zeman built the Czech Democratic Party (ČSSD) into political dominance in the 1990s, replacing the communist party (KSČM) as the most significant force of the left and successfully challenging the right led by Klaus. He served as prime minister from 1998 to 2002. His nationalistic campaign came as a surprise, as such language had been more commonly heard from the far right and in any way untypical of the more urbane Czech politics. For Zeman's political career as the builder of the ČSSD, see Lubomir Kopeček and Pavel Pšeya, "Czech Social Democracy and Its 'Cohabitation' with the Communist Party: The Story of a Neglected Affair," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41 (2008): 317-338. For Zeman's campaign rhetoric, see Martin Ehl, "Wake Up Call," *Transitions Online Weekly* (February 1, 2013): 2, and Jiri Pehe, "The Czech Election Paradox," *Transitions Online Weekly* (February 1, 2013):

In all three countries, politics have become more polarized, and focus more concentrated on nationalism and identity. This trend predated the current economic crisis in Europe, but obviously grew as a result of the worsening economic situation.<sup>36</sup> In particular, the xenophobic rhetoric and authoritarian policies of Orbán were to such an extent that Hungary's democratic credentials were undermined. Whether this trend will continue to gather pace remains to be seen. The development of an identity-based social cleavage is undoubtedly harmful to the nascent democracies in the CEE.

While the three CEE countries are moving toward identity politics, an opposite trend is obvious in Taiwan. Throughout the bulk of the 1990s and 2000s, the focus of political contention in the country was on national identity and the future of the nation. The KMT gradually had been losing ground on that front, to the extent of losing the 2000 presidential election. Knowing that popular identification with "Taiwan" rather than with "China" was continuing to escalate, the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou sought to shift popular attention to the economic performance of the DPP government. Ma's new course emphasized the material needs of the population and toed a middle line between the Blues and the Greens on the ideological spectrum. In this way, Ma attempted to redefine Taiwan's politics by shifting the main dividing issue from identity to the economy. Because of a worsening economic situation, the grand shift struck a positive chord among voters. The parliamentary and presidential elections in tandem in early 2008 were the first elections in which there was significant economic voting, although traces of identity voting were still evident.

The KMT's shift to an economic focus was followed by the DPP. After the electoral debacles in 2008, the DPP made a surprising comeback under Dr. Tsai Ing-wen. She led the DPP to challenge the KMT in the presidential cum parliamentary elections of January 2012. Under Tsai's leadership, the party adopted a moderate, middle-of-the-road strategy. It downplayed the DPP's traditional identity platform and accepted the ROC as legitimate, equating it to Taiwan, while severing its legal ties to the mainland. After Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) signed a landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with its mainland counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), premised on the

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8-10. For an analysis of the Czech far-right parties, see Miroslav Mareš, "Czech Extreme Right Parties an Unsuccessful Story," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44 (2011): 283-298. For a comparison between the right in the Czech Republic and Poland, see Stanislav Holubec and Gavin Rae, "A Conservative Convergence? The Differences and Similarities of the Conservative Right in the Czech Republic and Poland," *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 2 (2010): 189-207.

<sup>36</sup> For the rise of nationalistic and intolerant sentiment in CEE countries and their relation with economic and social conditions, see Hilde Weiss, "A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland," *Political Psychology* 24, no. 3 (2003): 377-401.

1992 consensus that upheld one China, the DPP did not campaign for abolition of the ECFA, but merely pointed out the costs of economic integration with the Chinese mainland, presenting itself as attending to the concrete, material needs of the people. The 2012 elections thus were centered on a duel between two economic policies, not on competing identities. Although Tsai did not win the presidential race, the emphasis of the DPP has shifted decisively from identity to materialist cleavage. This became increasingly obvious as Taiwan moved into a painful period of economic reform, with the government emphasizing the need to impose more taxes, cut pensions, raise the retirement age, and reduce subsidies for electricity and petro prices. An uproar of popular discontent ensued, giving the DPP perfect opportunities to score political points, and furthering the shift from identity to distribution politics in political competition.

Taiwan still has a set of electoral and constitutional institutions that are much more majoritarian than those in the CEE trio, but there has been gradual but fundamental change in the dominant social cleavage, making it less identity-based and more materialist/distributional. As a materialist cleavage is less conflict-prone than one driven by identity, one can consider this a welcome change, although the mechanisms that touched off this change (i.e., economic slowdown and worsening distribution) are hardly pleasant.

Both social and institutional factors bear on democratic performance. Before the shift in social cleavage, the two types of factors worked in unison. Taiwan suffered from conflict-prone, identity-based cleavage as well as from majoritarian institutions. As would be expected by Lijphart, this caused a problem. A comparison with the CEE trio endowed with materialist social cleavage and consensus institutions shows that Taiwan trailed behind, although the margin was not significant. At this point of our structured comparison, it is in order to point out a caveat. Both Taiwan and the CEE group are best performers among nascent democracies. Their relatively high level of economic development (which is not based on energy extraction) obviously contributes to their success. It is only when we move into more nuanced comparison that we find different social and institutional factors lying behind the slight differences among them. It is in this light that we talk about the relative advantages enjoyed by the CEE trio in terms of their less conflict-prone social cleavage and nonmajoritarian institutional arrangement, which according to Lijphart and echoed by FH scores produce kinder and gentler politics.

The recent development in both the CEE trio and Taiwan suggest the two sides are moving closer, by adding new and competing cleavages to the original ones, although from opposite directions. This makes Taiwan's cleavage profile less conflict-prone, while the CEEs' more so. Compared with the pattern in the past, we find social cleavage no longer works in unison with the institutional factors. Although institutionally more majoritarian, Taiwan's shift away from identity politics boosts its democratic performance, while the CEEs' development in the opposite direction dampens their democratic



prospects, the proconsensus institutional model there notwithstanding. Through this structured comparison, we tentatively conform to Lijphart's suggestion that consensus democracy tends to be kinder and gentler, as witnessed by the track records of Taiwan and the CEEs in the past. However, a more conflict-prone social cleavage may negate the moderating effect of consensus-prone institutions, as shown in recent developments in the trio, and a less conflict-prone cleavage provides a friendlier environment for majoritarian institutions to function, as shown in Taiwan.

Lijphart advocates consensus institutions as a better arrangement for liberal democracies, social cleavages being equal. This essay turns social cleavages into a variable, and tests their effect on democratic performance. It is important to recognize, in view of the political developments in Taiwan and the CEE trio, that social cleavages are not static: they evolve. Their impact on democratic politics is as significant as that of institutions. Hence, institutions need to be studied along with social cleavages. Without being sensitive to cleavage shift, we would be unable to look into the future of nascent democracies with fixed institutional profiles, such as Taiwan and the CEE trio. Social cleavage, as an exogenous factor in Lijphart's model, needs to be brought into the analytical picture.

