

Choosing the ‘Right’ Right: Identity, Ideology, and Voting Behavior in Chile*

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Abstract

The global expansion of the far right has prompted intense scholarly attention, particularly regarding its distinctions from more moderate right-wing alternatives. However, Latin America remains relatively understudied in these debates. This article analyzes the ideological foundations of far right and mainstream right support in Chile—a country historically associated with institutional moderation but now marked by right-wing fragmentation and polarization. Drawing on original survey data from the 2023 Ultra-Lab Electoral Study, we use symbolic and operational indicators to compare ideological and attitudinal predictors of support for José Antonio Kast and Evelyn Matthei—two leading figures in Chile’s radical and mainstream right, respectively. Our findings reveal sharp contrasts: while Kast’s supporters are characterized by moral authoritarianism, anti-feminist attitudes, economic pessimism, and market radicalism, Matthei’s base is more ideologically heterogeneous, driven by pragmatic concerns such as security and economic governance. The article contributes theoretically by integrating cultural, economic, and political grievances into a unified model of right-wing support, and empirically by offering one of the first multivariate comparisons of intra-right differentiation in Latin America. These insights illuminate the dynamics of ideological polarization, the pressures facing mainstream parties, and the broader challenges to democratic resilience in the Global South.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Chile, cultural backlash, far right, mainstream right, voter behavior.

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Introduction

The global rise of far right parties has reshaped the ideological landscape of contemporary democracies. From Western Europe to the Americas, these actors have capitalized on cultural polarization, democratic dissatisfaction, and anti-elite sentiments to challenge long-standing party systems. While this trend has been extensively analyzed in Europe and North America—where far-right mobilization is typically tied to nativist appeals and anti-immigration agendas—its dynamics in other regions remain insufficiently understood. In particular, the emergence of electorally competitive far-right forces in Latin America raises important questions about how these phenomena unfold in contexts with different institutional configurations, cultural cleavages, and historical legacies.

Chile offers a particularly compelling case. Long regarded as a model of party system institutionalization and ideological moderation in Latin America, the country has witnessed a rapid reconfiguration of its right-wing bloc. The rise of José Antonio Kast and the Republican Party, alongside newer actors like the Libertarian Party and Team Patriota, has disrupted the electoral dominance of the center-right coalition Chile Vamos (composed of Renovación Nacional, Unión Demócrata Independiente, and Evolución Política), exposing deep tensions over the future of the right. These developments are not simply electoral. They reflect broader ideological shifts within Chilean society and raise concerns about the right's evolving relationship with democratic norms.¹

Despite increasing attention to far-right politics in the region, most research either examines these actors in isolation or treats the far right as analytically detached from the broader right-wing spectrum. Yet recent comparative work suggests this boundary is becoming increasingly porous. Moreover, the behavior of mainstream right-wing actors is pivotal to the fate of democracy, particularly when radical challengers gain traction. Far from being neutral arbiters, mainstream parties often face electoral incentives to absorb exclusionary narratives, adopt authoritarian discourse, or reconfigure their policy agendas.² Understanding how voters differentiate between radical and mainstream right alternatives is therefore crucial—not only for assessing electoral competition, but for evaluating democratic resilience in polarized contexts.

This article addresses these questions by analyzing the ideological, cultural, and economic determinants of support for the far right and the mainstream right in Chile. Drawing on original data from the 2023 Ultra-Lab Electoral

¹ Lisa Zanotti, Fabián Villalobos-Machuca, and Francisco Roldán, “Echoes Without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism,” *Política y Sociedad* 62, no.2 (2025), <https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rlog.99134>.

² Daniel Ziblatt, *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Survey, we construct a multidimensional framework that incorporates both symbolic and operational measures of ideology, as well as retrospective and prospective economic evaluations. This approach complements conventional left–right scales and enables a more nuanced understanding of how voters position themselves within a fragmented right-wing field.

We argue that the support for the far right in Chile is not reducible to economic insecurity or protest voting. Rather, it reflects a distinct configuration of ideological preferences—combining cultural authoritarianism, gender backlash, economic pessimism, and market liberalism—that sets it apart from the more pragmatic and policy-oriented profile of mainstream right supporters. In theorizing and empirically demonstrating this distinction, the article contributes to broader debates on the structure of right-wing politics in Latin America and the global South.

Methodologically, the study offers one of the first systematic comparisons of far-right and mainstream right electorates in the region using multivariate modeling and disaggregated attitudinal data. By focusing on the demand side of intra-right competition, we provide new analytical tools for understanding party system transformation. In doing so, we highlight why Latin America—often excluded from comparative typologies of the right—offers a critical vantage point for rethinking global theories of democratic backsliding, elite accommodation, and the mainstreaming of illiberalism.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework, integrating insights from comparative studies on the radical right with Latin American-specific dynamics—particularly the role of gender politics, neoliberal legacies, and authoritarian predispositions. We identify key mechanisms shaping support for the far and mainstream right and derive a set of testable hypotheses. The following section contextualizes the Chilean case, tracing the realignment and fragmentation of the right over the past decade. We then describe the data and methods, including original survey data and a multi-dimensional battery of symbolic and operational ideological measures. The empirical section presents a series of probit models estimating the determinants of support for José Antonio Kast and Evelyn Matthei. The concluding section discusses the implications of these findings for theories of intra-right competition, ideological polarization, and democratic resilience in young democracies.

Theoretical Framework: Explaining Support for the Far Right and the Mainstream Right

Understanding electoral support for right-wing parties requires distinguishing between the mainstream right and the far right, as these categories encompass distinct political traditions, ideological orientations, and relationships with democracy. The mainstream right typically includes conservatives, Christian

democrats, and economically liberal actors that accept pluralist democracy and institutional constraints.³ In contrast, the far right—encompassing both the populist radical right (PRR) and the extreme right—tends to challenge or openly reject liberal democratic principles, especially those related to minority rights, horizontal accountability, and political pluralism.⁴

Despite these differences, the boundary between the PRR and the extreme right has become increasingly blurred, with the radicalization of the PRR leading to ideological convergence with the extreme right, making the broader concept of the far right a useful analytical category for studying electoral dynamics.⁵ Events such as the January 8, 2023 attacks on democratic institutions in Brazil underscore how far-right rhetoric—centered on electoral fraud and elite betrayal—can escalate into outright rejection of democratic norms.⁶ In parallel, the rise of the far right has placed mounting pressure on mainstream right-wing parties, which in many cases have responded by adopting exclusionary narratives and hardline policy positions to remain electorally competitive. Consequently, support for the far right must be analyzed in relational terms. This paper conceptualizes right-wing electoral behavior as a simultaneous choice among competing alternatives, wherein voters weigh different options within the right, shaping patterns of intra-bloc competition and driving the ideological restructuring of party systems. This framework identifies three core mechanisms that shape electoral support for right-wing parties: (1) economic preferences and grievances, (2) cultural backlash and moral conservatism, and (3) democratic attitudes and authoritarian predispositions. These dimensions capture both structural and attitudinal drivers of right-wing support and help explain why certain voters gravitate toward far-right candidates while others remain aligned with mainstream options.

Economic Preferences and the Right-Wing Vote

Economic explanations of electoral support for the far right emphasize the role of material insecurity, downward mobility, and perceptions of relative deprivation. A growing body of literature has shown that far-right parties tend to attract individuals who perceive themselves as the “losers of globalization”—those left behind by deindustrialization, austerity, and transnational economic integration.⁷ These actors often frame economic hardship not as a structural

³ Tim Bale and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds., *Riding the Populist Wave: Europe's Mainstream Right in Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

⁴ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁵ Andrea L. P. Pirro, “Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept,” *Nations and Nationalism* 29, no. 1 (2023): 101-112.

⁶ Lucio Rennó, *La Ultraderecha en Brasil: De Bolsonaro al Bolsonarismo* [From Bolsonaro to Bolsonarism] (Santiago, Chile: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 2023).

⁷ Terri E. Givens, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1693.

problem, but as the product of elite betrayal, immigration, or unfair redistributive policies. Within this narrative, the notion of *welfare chauvinism* becomes central: far-right parties promise to protect the welfare state, but only for the “deserving” native population, excluding immigrants and minorities seen as illegitimately benefitting from collective resources.⁸ This exclusionary logic allows far-right movements to articulate a form of economic protectionism that is not egalitarian, but selective and identitarian—an economic discourse filtered through cultural boundaries.⁹

However, in Latin America—and particularly in Chile—the traditional right has been historically tied to neoliberalism. Since the Pinochet era, and under the influence of the Chicago Boys, Chile’s mainstream right has championed market liberalism, open trade, fiscal orthodoxy, and limited social spending. This legacy continues to shape the ideological profile of mainstream right-wing parties and their electoral base, which tends to support individual responsibility and oppose redistributive policies.¹⁰ This tension between pro-market orthodoxy and welfare-based grievances leads to two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, voters who favor market-oriented policies should be more likely to support the mainstream right than the far right (H1). On the other hand, voters experiencing economic insecurity or downward mobility may be more likely to favor the far right (H2). Importantly, economic grievances do not operate in a vacuum. Their political impact often depends on how they are interpreted through cultural or identity-based frames. Economic distress does not automatically translate into support for the far right. Rather, it gains political meaning when linked to narratives of threat and exclusion. This highlights the importance of analyzing how material and symbolic logics coexist in shaping voter behavior.

Cultural Backlash and Moral Conservatism

Among the leading explanations for far-right support is the cultural backlash thesis.¹¹ It interprets the rise of authoritarian populism as a reaction to accelerated sociocultural transformations—most notably in relation to gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, multiculturalism, and the decline of traditional religious authority.¹²

⁸ Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, “Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles,” *Social Policy & Administration* 52, no. 1 (2018): 293-314.

⁹ Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Lisa Zanotti, “Populism and the Welfare State,” in *Handbook on Austerity, Populism and the Welfare State*, ed. Bent Greve (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021), 41-53.

¹⁰ Tarik Abou-Chadi, Denis Cohen, and Markus Wagner, “The Centre-Right versus the Radical Right: The Role of Migration Issues and Economic Grievances,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48, no. 2 (2022): 366-384.

¹¹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

¹² Ibid.

This backlash tends to manifest most clearly among older, male, religious, and rural voters who perceive progressive change as a threat to their identity, values, and status.¹³ In Latin America, the cultural backlash is not primarily organized around immigration or ethnic diversity, as it often is in Europe. Instead, it tends to focus on gender, LGBTQ+ rights, and human rights more broadly.¹⁴ This suggests that voters with stronger commitments to traditional moral values and gender roles should be more likely to support the far right than those who support the mainstream right (H3). In the Chilean case, José Antonio Kast has explicitly anchored his political identity in the defense of heteronormative family values and opposition to what he frames as “gender ideology.” His discourse resonates with sectors that reject feminist and LGBTQ+ advancements, viewing them as elite-driven threats to national, religious, and moral order. These dynamics align with the notion of gender authoritarianism—a normative vision of society that elevates patriarchal authority, traditional family structures, and a national moral hierarchy over pluralism and liberal rights.¹⁵

Public security has emerged as a high-salience concern in Chile, as well as in most Latin American countries. This heightened concern arises amid a perceived deterioration in safety and an uptick in violent crime. As a result, crime has become a *valence issue*, a domain where there is broad consensus across the political spectrum about the urgency of state intervention, even if specific policy preferences differ. Concerns about security transcend ideological boundaries and increasingly shape political alignments across the region. A salient example is El Salvador, where President Nayib Bukele has built broad popular support—including from traditionally opposing ideological sectors—by implementing highly punitive and militarized anti-gang strategies. El Salvador’s case illustrates how public anxiety over crime can override partisan or ideological identities, generating consensus around strong security responses, often at the expense of liberal democratic norms. In the Chilean context, we expect punitive attitudes and concerns about public safety to be significant predictors of support for both the radical and the mainstream right. Rather than serving as a clear line of differentiation between these electorates, crime-related anxieties likely operate as a shared driver of right-wing alignment more broadly (H4).¹⁶

¹³ Eefje Steenvoorden and Eelco Harteveld, “The Appeal of Nostalgia: The Influence of Societal Pessimism on Support for Populist Radical Right Parties,” *West European Politics* 41, no. 1 (2018): 28–52.

¹⁴ Simon Bornschier, *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ Elizabeth S. Corredor, “Unpacking ‘Gender Ideology’ and the Global Right’s Antigender Countermovement,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44, no. 3 (2019): 613–638.

¹⁶ Lisa Zanotti and Kenneth M. Roberts, “(Aún) la Excepción y no la Regla: La Derecha Populista Radical en América Latina” [Still the exception and not the rule: The populist radical right in Latin America.], *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política* 30, no. 1 (2021): 23–48. <https://doi.org/10.26851/RUCP.30.1.2>.

While immigration is not generally a high-salience issue across Latin America, prior research shows that anti-immigrant sentiment can still be a significant predictor of far-right support particularly in Chile.¹⁷ In recent years, Chile has received a large influx of immigrants, especially from Venezuela, which has generated growing public concern. Although these migrants are ethnically, linguistically, and religiously similar to the host population, their arrival has nonetheless been politicized and associated with rising crime, urban insecurity, and pressure on public services. This suggests that anti-immigration attitudes in Latin America are less likely to stem from nativist or ethnonationalist logics, as is often the case in Western Europe. It is more likely to reflect civic or sociotropic concerns about integration, economic competition, and social cohesion. As such, these attitudes are better understood as part of a broader authoritarian worldview, in which immigration is framed as a challenge to order, not identity. Consequently, we expect both mainstream and far-right voters to exhibit exclusionary views, not because of ethnic threat, but because immigration is perceived to undermine civic stability and institutional performance (H5).¹⁸

Democratic Attitudes and Authoritarian Values

Another key component shaping support for the far right is the set of attitudes individuals hold toward democracy and its principles. Unlike mainstream conservative voters, who may be critical of particular governments but remain broadly committed to democratic norms, far-right supporters often express authoritarian predispositions and a willingness to subordinate democratic procedures to ideological goals.¹⁹ These attitudes are especially relevant in contexts where social conflict is perceived as a threat to order, and where liberal pluralism is framed as an elite imposition on the “silent majority.” This logic leads to the expectation that voters with weaker democratic commitments and stronger authoritarian values are more likely to support the far right than the mainstream right (H6). In Latin America, these attitudes often emerge in response to perceived moral decline, criminal insecurity, or the expansion of minority rights.²⁰ They reinforce the appeal of candidates who promise to restore authority and discipline through illiberal means. The distinction between mainstream and far right support thus reflects not only different policy preferences, but fundamentally different visions of democracy and governance.

¹⁷ Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Rocío Salas Lewin, and Lisa Zanotti, “Supporting and Rejecting the Populist Radical Right: Evidence from Contemporary Chile,” *Nations and Nationalism* 30, no. 3 (2024): 458-475.

¹⁸ André Borges and Lisa Zanotti, “Authoritarian, But Not Nativist: Classifying Far-Right Parties in Latin America,” *Political Studies* 73, no. 1 (2024): 1-19.

¹⁹ Matthijs Rooduijn, “What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties,” *European Political Science Review* 10, no. 3 (2018): 351-368.

²⁰ Leigh A. Payne, Julia Zulver, and Simón Escoffier, eds., *The Right Against Rights in Latin America* (Oxford: British Academy Scholarship Online, 2023).

Bridging Economic, Cultural, and Political Mechanisms

Rather than treating economic, cultural, and political explanations as competing accounts, this framework considers how these dimensions jointly shape support for distinct right-wing projects. Voters with pro-market views but low cultural traditionalism may lean toward the mainstream right, whereas those with authoritarian moral values and strong anti-progressive sentiments may be more inclined to support the far right. Many voters, however, hold ambivalent or cross-cutting positions, combining market liberalism with social authoritarianism, or religious values with skepticism toward pluralism. These overlapping attitudes highlight the need to analyze the differentiated appeal of multiple right-wing options within the same political space. Intra-right competition is not merely strategic but ideological, rooted in deeper societal divides over authority, identity, and governance.

Importantly, the convergence of grievances also shapes party behavior. Across Europe and Latin America, mainstream right-wing parties have increasingly adopted exclusionary rhetoric. They are also embracing restrictive moral agendas in an effort to retain or regain voters lost to the far right. This process blurs the line between moderation and radicalism, and in some cases leads to a full realignment of the right's ideological core. In Chile, this is illustrated by the trajectory of Chile's Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI). The UDI is a party that emerged from the authoritarian right, moderated its positions in the post-transition period, and is now increasingly pressured by José Antonio Kast's radical agenda.²¹ As voters shift toward more hardline positions, mainstream actors face strong incentives to recalibrate their discourse and policy stances—potentially reinforcing the legitimacy of far-right frames.

The concept of reactive activation is particularly useful for understanding how dominant social sectors mobilize in response to perceived threats to their symbolic or material status.²² While in Europe this often centers on ethnic minorities, in Latin America the backlash is more closely tied to gender politics and cultural reform. What unites these diverse cases is not the specific identity of the perceived threat, but the perception of status loss and institutional betrayal. This comparative insight allows for a flexible analytical framework that incorporates contextual variation while maintaining conceptual coherence. In this light, the far right in Latin America is not an imported anomaly but a contextual expression of broader global dynamics. The rejection of liberal pluralism, valorization of authority, and defense of traditional hierarchies may take different shapes depending on local histories and cleavages—but they follow similar logics of political reaction.

²¹ Lisa Zanotti, "La Ultraderecha en Chile: Entre Punitivismo, Defensa de los Valores Tradicionales y Neoliberalismo" [The far right in Chile: Between punitive politics, the defense of traditional values, and neoliberalism], *Laboratorio para el Estudio de la Ultraderecha*, 2023.

²² Lenka Bustikova, *Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

Table 1. Hypotheses and Expected Effects

Hypothesis	Expected Effect	More Likely to Support
H1: Pro-market voters	↑ Mainstream right (both?)	Mainstream Right/Both
H2: Economic insecurity	↑ Far right	Far Right
H3: Anti-feminism	↑ Far right	Far Right
H4: Anti-crime attitudes	↑ Both	Both
H5: Anti-immigration attitudes	↑ Both	Both
H6: Lower preference for democracy	↑ Far right	Far Right

Source: Own elaboration.

The Rise of the Chilean Far Right as a Driver of Fragmentation and Realignment

The Chilean right-wing has undergone significant transformations over the past decade. It is marked by the emergence and consolidation of a far right that challenges the dominance of the mainstream conservative sector. Unlike what has been observed in Europe, where the far right is often structured around nativist narratives with a ethnic component, in Chile, the phenomenon has taken on distinctive features linked to authoritarianism, anti-feminism, and anti-communism.²³ In this context, Chile’s far right, represented by José Antonio Kast’s Republican Party, the nascent Libertarian Party, and the movement Team Patriota, has emerged as an alternative to the mainstream establishment, triggering a process of fragmentation within the political right.²⁴

Since the transition to democracy in 1989, Chile’s right-wing sector has been dominated by two major parties: the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN).²⁵ While UDI maintained a conservative identity and strong ties to the legacy of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, RN positioned itself as a more economically liberal and socially moderate right-wing party.²⁶ However, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the traditional right underwent a process of programmatic moderation aimed at expanding its electoral appeal and consolidating its role within the democratic framework.²⁷

²³ Zanotti, “La Ultraderecha en Chile: Entre Punitivismo, Defensa de los Valores Tradicionales y Neoliberalismo.”

²⁴ Zanotti, Villalobos-Machuca, and Roldán, “Echoes without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism.”

²⁵ Patricio Navia, “La Transformación de Votos en Escafios: Leyes Electorales en Chile, 1833-2004” [The transformation of votes into seats: electoral laws in Chile, 1833–2004], *Política y Gobierno* 12, no. 2 (2005): 233-276.

²⁶ James Loxton, *Conservative Party-Building in Latin America: Authoritarian Inheritance and Counter-Revolutionary Struggles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

²⁷ Aldo Madariaga and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Right-Wing Moderation, Left-Wing Inertia and Political Cartelisation in Post-Transition Chile,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 52, no. 2 (2020): 343-371.

This moderation generated dissatisfaction among segments of the electorate aligned with a harder right and more authoritarian positions. In this context, José Antonio Kast emerged as a key figure in the reconfiguration of the Chilean right. A former member of UDI until 2016, Kast distanced himself from the party by accusing it of abandoning its conservative principles and making excessive concessions to progressive agendas. This rupture led to the formation of the Republican Party in 2019—a political force that explicitly reject liberal democracy and promotes a discourse centered on order, tradition, and security.²⁸ The Republican Party's impact has not only challenged the mainstream right but has also placed UDI's identity under strain. Although UDI participated in the moderation and modernization of the Chilean right, its origins are tied to a more radical and authoritarian conservatism in the 1990s.²⁹ With Kast's electoral success—surpassing the mainstream right and reaching the second round in the 2021 presidential election—UDI faces the possibility of returning to more radical positions to recapture voters who have migrated toward the Republican Party.

Mainstream vs. Far Right in the Chilean Context

Drawing on the literature on the far right, one of the core distinctions between mainstream and far-right parties lies in their relationship to liberal democracy. Whereas mainstream right-wing parties generally endorse democratic rules and prioritize institutional stability, far-right actors tend to adopt an ambivalent or at times openly antagonistic position toward liberal democratic principles, particularly political pluralism and minority rights.³⁰ In the Chilean context, this distinction is especially relevant for understanding the evolution of the right. The mainstream sector, represented by the Chile Vamos coalition (comprising RN, UDI, and Evópoli), has largely adhered to a moderate programmatic profile on both cultural and economic issues. It emphasizes on governability and institutional continuity, as evidenced during the two presidencies of Sebastián Piñera (2010–2013; 2018–2021).³¹

However, the competitive pressure from the far right has begun to affect UDI, which now faces the dilemma of maintaining its moderation or hardening its discourse on national identity, security, and traditional values to prevent further voter attrition. A distinctive feature of Chile's far right is its adaptation

²⁸ Camila Díaz, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and Lisa Zanotti, "The Arrival of the Populist Radical Right in Chile: José Antonio Kast and the 'Partido Republicano'," *Journal of Language and Politics* 22, no. 3 (2023): 342–359.

²⁹ Loxton, *Conservative Party-Building in Latin America: Authoritarian Inheritance and Counter-Revolutionary Struggles*.

³⁰ Cas Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).

³¹ Evópoli (Evolución Política) is a liberal-conservative party founded in 2012 by technocrats and former government officials from Sebastián Piñera's first administration. Positioned as center-right, it advocates economic liberalism, individual freedoms, and moderate cultural progressivism within a democratic framework.

of nationalism to a context where nativism holds less relevance. In contrast to the European radical right, which has built its identity around the exclusion of migrants based on racial or cultural differences, Chile's radical nationalism is articulated in civic-cultural terms.³² Immigration is perceived not so much as an ethnic threat, but as a burden on state resources—particularly those directed toward poor migrant populations—and as incompatible with the country's traditional values.³³ This trend may also influence the UDI, which while avoiding explicitly exclusionary rhetoric thus far, may adopt tougher stances on national identity and security under pressure from the Republican Party. Another key difference lies in how each sector relates to neoliberalism. While the mainstream right has defended the economic model inherited from the dictatorship—emphasizing growth and stability—the far right has intensified this discourse, making it a core ideological component. Both the Republican Party and the emerging Libertarian Party promote a vision of the economy in which the state is viewed as an enemy of individual liberty, aligning them with international ultraliberal tendencies exemplified by figures like Javier Milei in Argentina.³⁴ In this regard, the UDI could also undergo transformations, potentially adopting an even more aggressive stance against state intervention in order to avoid being outflanked by the emerging right's radicalized neoliberal discourse.

Fragmentation and the Rise of New Right-Wing Actors

The rise of the radical right has not only challenged the traditional right but also catalyzed increasing fragmentation across Chile's broader right-wing spectrum. While the Republican Party remains the dominant force among these new contenders, other actors with distinct ideological profiles have gained visibility.

Among them is the Libertarian Party, rooted in ultraliberal principles and influenced by public intellectual Axel Kaiser—brother of its leader Johannes Kaiser—as well as the expanding *miletista* phenomenon in Latin America.³⁵ Another key actor is Team Patriota, situated further to the right of the Republican Party and marked by ultranationalist and fundamentalist discourse. Closely linked to former football hooligan Francisco “Pancho Malo” Muñoz, this group openly opposes comprehensive sex education, LGBTQ+ rights,

³² Ibid.; Zanotti, “La Ultraderecha en Chile: Entre Punitivismo, Defensa de los Valores Tradicionales y Neoliberalismo.”

³³ Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou, and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism,” *European Journal of Political Research* 51, no. 4 (2012): 504-539.

³⁴ Zanotti, “La Ultraderecha en Chile: Entre Punitivismo, Defensa de los Valores Tradicionales y Neoliberalismo.”

³⁵ Zanotti, Villalobos-Machuca, and Roldán, “Echoes without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism.”

and human rights frameworks, blending Christian fundamentalism with conspiracy-laden rhetoric.³⁶

These developments have introduced ideological tensions even within the far right itself. Whereas the Republican Party seeks electoral consolidation through democratic institutions, Team Patriota and some libertarian factions lean toward confrontational street politics and anti-establishment disruption. Overall, the evolution of the Chilean right reveals a deeper transformation of the partisan landscape. The emergence of these actors has eroded the mainstream right's historical dominance and expanded the space for more radical agendas. This process echoes developments in countries like Spain, where Vox—partially formed by radicalized sectors of the Partido Popular—has blurred the boundaries between traditional and far right forces.³⁷ In Chile, too, the far right remains fluid and internally diverse, raising important questions about the durability of current alignments and the potential for further realignment.

These transformations within the Chilean right are not merely ideological—they have had tangible electoral consequences. The rise of José Antonio Kast and the Republican Party has not only shifted the ideological center of gravity rightward, but also delivered notable electoral gains. This was evident in the 2021 presidential elections, where Kast advanced to the runoff while the mainstream right failed to do so. Also, it is seen in the 2023 Constitutional Council elections, where the Republican Party emerged as the dominant force on the right. The following tables summarize this evolution, highlighting both the weakening of traditional right-wing parties and the consolidation of more radical alternatives.

Data and Methods

To test our hypotheses, we used data from the Ultra-Lab 2023 electoral survey. A total of 1,488 individuals were surveyed between October and December 2023 to obtain a sample representative of Chile's voting-age population.³⁸

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable captures the propensity to vote for José Antonio Kast (far right) and Evelyn Matthei (mainstream right). To operationalize this measure, respondents were asked: “On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘I would definitely not vote for him/her’ and 5 means ‘I would definitely vote for

³⁶ Nicolás Molina Vera, “El Team Patriota como un Caso de Acción Colectiva de Extrema Derecha en Chile” [Team patriota as a case of far-right collective action in Chile], *Temas Sociológicos*, no. 34 (2024): 259-292.

³⁷ José Rama, Lisa Zanotti, Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte, and Andrés Santana, *VOX: The Rise of the Spanish Populist Radical Right* (London: Routledge, 2021).

³⁸ The survey achieved a contact/response rate of 61.7 percent, a margin of error of 2.7 percent, and a 95 percent confidence level.

Table 2. Presidential election 2017–2021

Presidential 2017			
Coallition/party	Candidate	Votes	% Votes
Chile Vamos	Sebastián Piñera	2,418,540	36.6
Frente Amplio	Beatriz Sánchez	1,338,037	20.2
La Fuerza de la Mayoría	Alejandro Guillier	1,498,040	22.7
Frente Social Cristiano	José Antonio Kast	523,375	7.9
Democracia Cristiana	Carolina Goic	387,784	5.8
Partido Progresista	Marco Enríquez-Ominami	376,871	5.7
Unión Patriótica	Eduardo Artés	33,665	0.5
Independientes sin pacto	Alejandro Navarro	23,968	0.3
Presidential 2021			
Chile Podemos+	Sebastián Sichel	898,635	12.7
Apruebo Dignidad	Gabriel Boric	1,815,024	25.8
Nuevo Pacto Social	Yasna Provoste	815,563	11.6
Frente Social Cristiano	José Antonio Kast	1,961,779	27.9
Partido de la Gente	Franco Parisi	900,064	12.8
Partido Progresista	Marco Enríquez-Ominami	534,383	7.6
Unión Patriótica	Eduardo Artés	102,897	1.4

Source: Own elaboration with data from Servel.

Table 3. Elections Constitutional Convention of Chile

Coalition	Political ideology	Constitutional Convention		Constitutional Council	
		Votes	% Seats	Votes	% Seats
Vamos por Chile (CHV)/ Chile seguro	Right	1,175,166	23.9	2,066,681	21.5
Partido Republicano (PRC)	Far-Right	–	–	3,476,333	45.1
Apruebo Dignidad (AD)	Left and independents	1,071,654	18.1	2,806,330	31.4
Lista del Apruebo (LDA)/ Unidad para Chile		825,688	16.1		
Lista del Pueblo (LDP)		411,551	16.7	–	--
Others		2,229,799	14.2	1,463,868	0.0
Indigenous people (PI)	Indigenous Representation	262,991	11.0	306,823	2.0
Total		5,976,849	100.0	10,120,035	100.0

Source: Own elaboration with data from Servel.

him/her,' how likely is it that you would vote for a candidate like José Antonio Kast/Evelyn Matthei tomorrow?" Responses were recoded into a binary variable, with "Probably yes" and "Definitely yes" collapsed into a single category (coded as 1), indicating a pro-Kast or pro-Matthei voting disposition. Based on this coding, 413 respondents (30.4 percent) were classified as pro-José Antonio Kast, and 419 respondents (30.9 percent) as pro-Evelyn Matthei.

Independent Variables

The study employed sociodemographic characteristics, symbolic ideology, and operational ideology as independent variables.³⁹ The sociodemographic characteristics included gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female), area of residence (0 = Metropolitan region, 1 = North region, 2 = Central region, and 3 = South region), age (a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 91 years), educational level (a continuous variable from 0 = No education to 9 = Postgraduate studies), and religious affiliation (0 = No religion/Atheism/Agnostic, 1 = Catholic, 2 = Other Christian denominations, 3 = Other religion). To measure the symbolic dimension of ideology, respondents were asked, "In our country, people define political positions as closer to the left or the right. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents 'left' and 10 represents 'right,' where would you place yourself?" This question is recorded into six ideological groups: 0 = Not identified, 1 = Leftist, 2 = Center leftist, 3 = Centrist, 4 = Center rightist, and 5 = Rightist. Although this recoding reduces variability, it facilitates intergroup comparisons without excluding non-identified individuals.

For operational ideology, indicators were constructed from a series of questions. These indicators were validated using exploratory factor analyses and Cronbach's Alpha. First, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to estimate the indicators for anti-feminism, moral conservatism, and the preference for state versus market intervention. The anti-feminism latent variable was constructed from the agreement with the following statements: 1) Feminism is about hating men; 2) Modern societies prioritize women over men; 3) Women use feminism to unfairly gain advantages over men; 4) Feminists are not attractive; and 5) Feminists seek to gain control over men (KMO = 0.77 and Cronbach's Alpha = 0.85).

The moral conservatism index was developed based on the degree of agreement with statements regarding "Homosexual marriage," "Abortion under any circumstances," "Teaching children to pray and believe in God in schools," and "Adoption of children by same-sex couples." Its internal consistency was validated by a strong Cronbach's Alpha (0.72), with the item "Teaching children to pray and believe in God in schools" reversed to align with the other items (KMO = 0.67). Preferences for state versus market intervention were measured using four items that contrasted views such as "There should be more income

³⁹ Christopher Ellis and James A. Stimson, *Ideology in America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

equality” versus “There should be greater income differences as an incentive for individual effort,” and “The state should have more social responsibility to ensure that everyone has sustenance” versus “Individuals should have more responsibility to support themselves.” Additionally, participants were asked whether “The government should increase state ownership of businesses and industries” versus “Private ownership of businesses and industries should be increased,” and whether “The government should spend much more on benefits and social services” versus “The government should spend much less on benefits and social services.” These items demonstrated a coherent internal structure (KMO = 0.70).

A composite index of anti-immigration attitudes by averaging two items was also constructed: (1) “Immigration of people from other countries increases crime in Chile,” and (2) “Immigration of people from other countries increases unemployment in Chile”. This reflects widespread perceptions that frame immigration as a source of economic and social disruption. This index captures exclusionary views of immigration rooted in concerns about public safety and economic competition.

Two variables measuring sociotropic economic perceptions were incorporated. The first one is retrospective (*socioretro*) and one prospective (*sociopro*). These variables capture individuals’ assessments of the national economic situation, either retrospectively or prospectively. Retrospective sociotropic evaluations were based on the question: “*In your opinion, how has the country’s economic situation been over the past twelve months?*” Responses were recoded as follows: 0 = Worse, 1 = Same, 2 = Better. Similarly, prospective sociotropic perceptions were measured with the question: “*In your opinion, how will the country’s economic situation be over the next twelve months?*” The same coding scheme was applied. To ensure comparability and facilitate interpretation in subsequent analyses, both variables (*socioretro* and *sociopro*) were normalized using min–max standardization, yielding values ranging from 0 (most negative perception) to 1 (most positive perception).

Before presenting the main statistical models, Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis. These summary measures provide an overview of the sample composition, the distribution of key independent variables, and the proportion of respondents inclined to vote for either José Antonio Kast or Evelyn Matthei. As shown below, support for both right-wing candidates is relatively balanced within the sample, and the distributions for sociodemographic and attitudinal variables exhibit sufficient variability to allow meaningful differentiation across voter profiles.

To investigate the determinants of support for José Antonio Kast and Evelyn Matthei, a series of probit models with a binary dependent variable (0 = Anti/Neutral, 1 = Pro) were estimated. The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, models 1 and 2 include only sociodemographic controls. Second, models 3 and 4 introduce symbolic ideological identification. Third, models 5 and 6 incorporate a set of operational ideological variables, along

Table 4. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Propensity to vote: José A. Kast	1357	0.304	0.460	0	1
Propensity to vote: Evelyn Matthei	1354	0.309	0.462	0	1
Age (scale)	1482	0.410	0.226	0	1
Gender: Man	1488	0.401	0.490	0	1
Gender: Woman	1488	0.599	0.490	0	1
Education (scale)	1481	0.499	0.249	0	1
Residency: Metropolitan region	1488	0.427	0.495	0	1
Residency: North	1488	0.114	0.318	0	1
Residency: Center	1488	0.321	0.467	0	1
Residency: South	1488	0.138	0.344	0	1
Religion: Catholic	1474	0.484	0.499	0	1
Religion: Other Christian	1474	0.204	0.403	0	1
Religion: Other Religion	1474	0.092	0.290	0	1
Religion: Atheism/Agnostic/None	1474	0.218	0.413	0	1
Symbolic ID: None	1488	0.202	0.402	0	1
Symbolic ID: Left	1488	0.105	0.307	0	1
Symbolic ID: Center-left	1488	0.122	0.329	0	1
Symbolic ID: Center	1488	0.331	0.470	0	1
Symbolic ID: Center-right	1488	0.131	0.338	0	1
Symbolic ID: Right	1488	0.107	0.309	0	1
Operational ID: Anti-immigration	1486	0.686	0.238	0	1
Operational ID: Anti-crime	1485	0.566	0.358	0	1
Operational ID: Anti-feminism	1291	0.422	0.215	0	1
Operational ID: Preference for democracy	1407	0.639	0.269	0	1
Operational ID: Moral conservatism	1424	0.454	0.281	0	1
Operational ID: State/Market	1365	0.365	0.259	0	1
Retrospective perception of the economy	1452	0.200	0.314	0	1
Prospective perception of the economy	1372	0.372	0.384	0	1

Source: Own elaboration.

with retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy. All models were estimated using post-stratification weights based on age, gender, and socioeconomic status. The full results are presented in Table 5.

Results

The results reveal clear differences in the demographic and ideological profiles of each candidate's supporters. For Kast, age has a consistently negative effect (Model 1: -0.413; Model 5: -0.993; $p < 0.01$), suggesting that younger individuals are more inclined to support the far right. Living in the southern region is significantly associated with higher support across all specifications (e.g., Model 5: 0.379; $p < 0.01$), and religious affiliation—particularly Catholicism and Evangelicalism—emerges as a strong and significant predictor.

In contrast, Matthei's support is positively associated with age (Model 1: 0.589; Model 5: 0.576; $p < 0.01$) and religious affiliation, though the magnitude of her coefficients is generally smaller than Kast's, suggesting a more socially heterogeneous support base. Education becomes significant in the final model, indicating a positive association between higher educational attainment and support for Matthei (Model 5: 0.601; $p < 0.05$).

Symbolic ideological identification clearly differentiates both electorates. Individuals identifying as right or center-right are significantly more likely to support both candidates, whereas center-left identification has a strong and negative association with support for Kast (-0.725; $p < 0.001$), and a more moderate effect for Matthei (-0.470; $p < 0.001$). These patterns confirm that while both candidates attract voters from the ideological right, Kast elicits stronger rejection from moderate leftist sectors.

Operational ideology further reinforces this divergence. Support for Kast is strongly associated with anti-crime attitudes (0.644; $p < 0.001$), anti-feminist beliefs (0.871; $p < 0.001$), moral conservatism (0.484; $p < 0.05$), and pro-market preferences (0.937; $p < 0.001$). Critically, perceptions of economic deterioration—captured by the retrospective economic variable—are also strongly and negatively associated with support for Kast (-1.055; $p < 0.001$), indicating that voters who perceive the national economy as worsening are more likely to align with the far right. This provides empirical support for H2, linking economic grievance to radical right support.

In contrast, Matthei's support is significantly associated with concerns about crime (0.538; $p < 0.001$) and market-oriented economic views (0.507; $p < 0.01$). The relationship with anti-feminist attitudes is positive but weaker than for Kast and only marginally significant (0.460; $p < 0.1$), while the effect of moral conservatism does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Notably, economic pessimism also decreases support for Matthei (-0.460; $p < 0.05$), though the effect is smaller than for Kast. Sociotropic perceptions of future economic conditions, however, do not reach conventional significance levels for either candidate.

Table 5. Probit models for the propensity to vote

VARIABLES	M1	M2	M3 3	M4	M5	M6
	Kast	Matthei	Kast	Matthei	Kast	Matthei
Age (scale)	-0.413* (0.218)	0.589*** (0.216)	-0.674*** (0.229)	0.543** (0.222)	-0.993*** (0.302)	0.576** (0.272)
Gender ¹ : Woman	-0.046 (0.089)	0.163* (0.089)	-0.037 (0.095)	0.211** (0.091)	0.0539 (0.113)	0.219** (0.109)
Education (scale)	-0.209 (0.203)	0.226 (0.202)	-0.258 (0.220)	0.242 (0.208)	0.126 (0.278)	0.601** (0.254)
Residency ² : North	0.273* (0.147)	0.088 (0.154)	0.226 (0.160)	0.011 (0.158)	0.171 (0.176)	-0.179 (0.187)
Center	0.116 (0.105)	-0.163 (0.104)	0.203* (0.111)	-0.139 (0.107)	0.182 (0.133)	-0.111 (0.124)
South	0.487*** (0.133)	0.151 (0.133)	0.459*** (0.140)	0.062 (0.132)	0.379** (0.162)	0.172 (0.158)
Religion ³ : Catholic	0.616*** (0.126)	0.478*** (0.123)	0.537*** (0.125)	0.381*** (0.121)	0.537*** (0.151)	0.478*** (0.138)
Other Christians	0.876*** (0.142)	0.449*** (0.144)	0.783*** (0.145)	0.316** (0.144)	0.881*** (0.176)	0.542*** (0.168)
Other Religion	0.410** (0.189)	0.238 (0.176)	0.267 (0.205)	0.104 (0.179)	0.307 (0.227)	0.364* (0.203)
Anti-immigration					0.148 (0.246)	0.182 (0.235)
Anti-crime					0.644*** (0.175)	0.538*** (0.157)
Anti-feminism					0.871*** (0.274)	0.460* (0.253)
Preference: Democracy					-0.077 (0.215)	-0.041 (0.201)
Moral conservatism					0.484** (0.237)	-0.032 (0.220)
State/Market					0.937*** (0.222)	0.507** (0.221)
Economy Restrop.					-1.055*** (0.226)	-0.460** (0.209)
Economy Socio.					-0.012 (0.162)	-0.198 (0.156)
Leftist			-0.170 (0.182)	-0.355* (0.199)		
Center Leftist			-0.725*** (0.182)	-0.470*** (0.169)		
Centrist			-0.165 (0.139)	-0.022 (0.129)		
Center rightist			0.762*** (0.164)	0.744*** (0.159)		
Rightist			1.317*** (0.175)	1.016*** (0.165)		
Constant	-0.908*** (0.194)	-1.308*** (0.199)	-0.874*** (0.217)	-1.372*** (0.214)	-2.162*** (0.336)	-2.164*** (0.318)
Observations	1,341.000	1,336.000	1,341.000	1,336.000	1,027.000	1,017.000

Source: Own elaboration.

Together, these results confirm a sharp attitudinal divide between mainstream and far right electorates. While both are concerned with public security and economic liberalism, Kast’s supporters are further distinguished by cultural backlash and stronger economic dissatisfaction, consistent with hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. Contrary to the expectations outlined in H4, anti-immigration attitudes do not appear to significantly differentiate either radical or mainstream right voters. Finally, the effect of lower support for democracy (H6) is negative as expected but does not reach statistical significance.


To better illustrate these effects, Figure 1 displays the average marginal effects of symbolic and operational ideology on the propensity to vote for each candidate (see also Table A in the Appendix).

Discussion

The findings offer a comprehensive view of how symbolic and issue-based ideological variables shape support for two distinct types of right-wing leadership in Chile. While both Evelyn Matthei and José Antonio Kast draw support from voters who identify as right or center-right, their constituencies diverge sharply in ideological intensity, cultural attitudes, and economic worldviews.

Kast’s electorate exhibits a distinctly radical profile, marked by strong cultural traditionalism, gender backlash, and pronounced economic libertarianism. His support base is driven by high levels of anti-feminist sentiment, moral conservatism, and pro-market preferences. Additionally, negative retrospective evaluations of the national economy are strongly associated with support for Kast, suggesting that perceptions of national economic decline serve as a key mobilizing factor for far-right voters. This

Figure 1. Marginal effects of Symbolic and Operational Ideology on the Propensity to Vote for José A. Kast and Evelyn Matthei



Source: Own elaboration.

combination of cultural and economic discontent points to a reactionary worldview that seeks to restore perceived traditional hierarchies and challenge the legitimacy of progressive reforms. Kast's base also displays greater ideological polarization: moderate leftist identifiers strongly reject him, while those on the ideological right express the highest levels of support. These patterns confirm that Kast's appeal is grounded in a coherent and exclusionary ideological project, rather than diffuse dissatisfaction with the political status quo.

Matthei, in contrast, draws support from a more programmatically moderate and ideologically heterogeneous segment of the right. While her voters express concern over crime and tend to favor market-oriented policies, their support is not strongly rooted in moral traditionalism. The association with anti-feminist attitudes—though positive—is considerably weaker and only marginally significant. Her electoral base shows limited signs of cultural resentment, and moral conservatism does not appear to be a primary mobilizing factor. Notably, although negative perceptions of the national economy are also associated with support for Matthei, the effect is substantially smaller than in Kast's case. This suggests that her voters may interpret economic discontent through a more pragmatic lens, grounded in concerns linked to governance rather than systemic critique or cultural threat.

Public security emerges as a cross-cutting concern among both electorates, underscoring its centrality in the Chilean right-wing agenda. However, only among Kast supporters is this concern part of a broader constellation of exclusionary, authoritarian, and culturally conservative attitudes. This divergence reveals a critical difference within the Chilean right constituencies: between a traditional, stability-oriented mainstream and an insurgent, ideologically rigid radical far that seeks to reconfigure the political agenda around moral order and economic libertarianism.

These dynamics carry important implications for intra-right competition in Chile. As the far right consolidates its support around a more coherent and ideologically motivated electorate, mainstream actors like Matthei—and the parties that support her—face increasing pressure to reposition themselves in a shifting ideological landscape. Whether this leads to a strategic moderation of the far right or a radicalization of the mainstream remains an open question. What is clear, however, is that the Chilean right is no longer a unified bloc but a fragmented field shaped by competing visions of authority, tradition, and the role of the state.

Understanding these differences is essential not only for mapping the current electoral realignment, but also for anticipating the future of democratic resilience in Chile. The behavior of mainstream conservative actors plays a crucial role in determining whether democracies resist or fall prey to authoritarian drift.⁴⁰ In this context, the Chilean case illustrates how divergent

⁴⁰ Ziblatt, *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy*.

attitudinal and ideological foundations within the right can either reinforce democratic norms or erode them from within.

Conclusion

This article has analyzed the attitudinal and ideological foundations of support for two competing segments of the Chilean right: the far-right candidacy of José Antonio Kast and the mainstream alternative represented by Evelyn Matthei. Drawing on original national survey data and a multi-step probit modeling strategy incorporating both symbolic and operational measures of ideology, the current paper tried to capture dimensions such as moral traditionalism, anti-feminism, anti-immigration, democratic attitudes, and economic perceptions. Results reveal a sharply segmented right-wing electorate, with distinct ideological configurations underpinning each camp.⁴¹

Support for Kast is driven by a coherent set of exclusionary beliefs, combining gender backlash, cultural authoritarianism, and strong market radicalism, alongside heightened perceptions of national economic decline. In contrast, Matthei's supporters are more moderate and pragmatic, with a profile oriented toward security concerns and economic liberalism, but detached from the cultural reactionism that characterizes the far right. This divide illustrates that support for the radical right in Chile is not merely a protest reaction but reflects a substantive ideological project.

Theoretically, the study offers a disaggregated framework that moves beyond binary left–right analyses, integrating economic, cultural, and political mechanisms into a unified explanation of voter alignment. By comparing symbolic identification with issue-based attitudes, we show how ideological configurations vary between far-right and mainstream support, and why voters choose between them. The findings reinforce existing comparative insights on the interplay between economic grievances and authoritarian cultural attitudes, while adapting them to the Latin American context—where gender, rather than immigration, constitutes the core axis of cultural backlash. Moreover, this study contributes to an understudied area by systematically comparing far-right and mainstream right support within Latin America, addressing a gap in the literature that often isolates radical-right actors from broader intra-bloc dynamics.

Beyond the Chilean case, the findings point to broader processes of ideological reconfiguration across the political right. The far right does not emerge in isolation; rather, it reshapes the discursive and strategic choices of mainstream actors. In Chile, this dynamic is evident in the pressures faced by the UDI, whose trajectory—from authoritarian origins to democratic normalization—is now being tested by renewed competition from the far

⁴¹ Bustikova, *Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe*.

right.⁴² These developments highlight how mainstream actors can become vehicles for the reintegration of exclusionary ideas, with important implications for democratic resilience.

Future research should investigate how other emerging actors—such as the Libertarian Party and Team Patriota—fit into this evolving landscape, and whether they exert further centrifugal pressures on the right. Longitudinal studies could assess the stability of these ideological configurations over time, while cross-national research might help determine whether Chile’s case is part of a broader regional realignment. Understanding these patterns is essential for anticipating the trajectories of right-wing politics and the evolving character of democratic contestation in the Global South.

⁴² Zanotti, Villalobos-Machuca, and Roldán, “Echoes without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism.”